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AE: Arab Executive. It evolved from MCA in 1920 to lead the Palestinian resistance against the Jewish 
immigration to Palestine in 1920s. 
 
AHC: Arab Higher Committee. It was set up in 1936 to steer the Great Revolt (1936-1939). 
 
ANU: Arab National Union. It formed the formal grassroots institution in support for Nasser regime 
during 1950s, and early 1960s. 
 
ARC: Agriculture Relief Committees. 
 
B’Tselem: Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories. 
 
CEC: Central Elections Commission. 
 
CPRS: Centre of Palestine for Research & Studies. 
 
DCO: District Coordination & Cooperation Office. 
 
DFLP: Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine; a PLO faction, and opposes Oslo process. 
 
DOP: Declaration of Principles.  
 
EU: European Union. 
 
Fatah: The reversed Arab acronym of the Palestinian National Liberation Movement. 
 
FIDA: The Palestinian Democratic Party, a DFLP’s splinter group led by Yassir Abed Rabu and supports 
Oslo process. 
 
GMC: General Monitoring Commission. 
 
Hamas: the Arab acronym of the Islamic Resistance Movement, a radical non-PLO organization, and 
opposes Oslo process. 
 
HCPF: Higher Council for Policy Formulation, ministry of Social Affairs. 
 
HRDD: Human Resources Development Directorate, ministry of Health. 
 
HSC: Health Services Council. 
 
IDF: Israeli Defense Forces. 
 
JDEC: Jerusalem District Electricity Company. It was founded in 1959 to supply the main cities of the 
West Bank with electricity.  
 
JEC: Palestinian-Israeli Joint Economic Committee. 
 
JMCC: Jerusalem Media Centre & Communication. 
LAW: Palestinian Society for the Protection of Human Rights and Environment. 
 
MCA: Muslim-Christian Association. It was founded by Palestinians in 1918, to express opposition for 
Belfour Declaration, and was headed by Musa Kazim El Husayni. 
 
MoH: Ministry of Health. 
 
MOPIC: Ministry of Planning and International Cooperation. 
 
OPT: Occupied Palestinian Territories. It denotes the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and Gaza 
Strip. 
 
PA: Palestinian Authority. 
 
PCHR: Palestinian Centre for Human Rights. 
 
PECDAR: Palestinian Economic Council for Development and Reconstruction. 
 
PFLP: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, a PLO faction, and opposes Oslo process. 
 
PHC: Palestinian Health Council. 
 
PHIC: Palestinian Health Information Centre, MoH. 
 
PIF: Palestinian Investment Fund, ministry of Finance. 
 
PLC: Palestinian Legislative Council. 
 
PLO: Palestinian Liberation Organization. 
 
PMA: Palestinian Monetary Authority. 
 
PNC: Palestinian National Council, the PLO’s legislative body. 
 
PNF: Palestinian National Front. It emerged in OPT in 1970s as a PLO affiliated political institution. 
 
PNSC: Palestinian National Security Council. 
 
PRCS: Palestinian Red Crescent Society. 
 
SMC: Supreme-Muslim-Council. It was founded by British manadte in December 1921. The goal was to 
enable Palestinians to manage their religious affairs. Amin El Husayni, the Mufti, was appointed as head 
of it. 
 
UHCC: Union of Health Care Committees. 
 
UHWC: Union of Health Work Committees. 
 
UN: United Nations. 
 
UNHRC: United Nations Human Rights Commission 
 
UNLU: Unified National Leadership for the Uprising (it steered the first Intifada 1987-1993) 
 
UNRWA: United Nations for Refugees and Working Agency. It was founded in December 1948 in 
response to Palestinian refugees crisis.  
 
UPMRC: Union of the Palestinian Medical Relife Committees. 
 
VAT: Value Added Tax. 
 
VIP: Very Important Person. 
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Identifying the elements of state building in Palestine is one of the most difficult 
challenges that might be confronted by any scholar or researcher. Historically 
speaking, Palestine was subjected to various rules and regulations that made a huge 
impact on the socioeconomic and political structure of the country. Ottomans, British, 
Jordanians, Egyptians, and finally Israelis -all of them alike- attempted to leave 
complex legal and structural systems designed to promote their interests over those of 
the Palestinian population, often whilst simultaneously trying to maintain the façade 
of helping the Palestinians.  
 
When the Palestinian Authority (hereinafter PA) was established on the Gaza Strip 
and West Bank (hereinafter WBGS) one of its main challenges was how to deal with 
this debilitating heritage whilst promoting institutions and institutional capacity 
building, both of which began gaining momentum from 1994 onwards. In this 
connection, the PA was asked to build central state institutions capable of promoting 
good governance and democracy. 
 
The subject of this dissertation is the process of state building in the WBGS.  Its scope 
is limited to a specific time and place. It focuses on the period from the establishment 
of the PA in 1994 up to 2004, the first decade of the PA’s existence.  The dissertation 
is an analysis of how the institutional developments that took place within WBGS in 
this period have contributed to the process of state building in the WBGS.  In the 
context of this study, the period divides into two distinct epochs: 
 
• from May 1994 (when the PA was established) until September 2000 (the 
outbreak of Al-Aqsa Intifada); and 
• From Al-Aqsa Intifada until 2004. 
 
This is not to say that the developments (whether political, economic, social, etc), that 
occurred in each period are isolated from the developments that occurred in the other 
period.  Indeed the contrary is the case.  The two periods are intertwined and there is 
significant continuity. Neither epoch can be explained in isolation from the other.  
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One of the most notable features of the period of 1994-2000 was the Para-state 
institutions (or the national level institutions of state functions) which appeared in 
1994. As a result of the Oslo accords Palestinians, could have their legislative, 
ministerial, and bureaucratic bodies. In the aftermath of the elections that took place 
in January 1996, the elected president Yasser Arafat, was mandated to propose the 
members of the first Cabinet in Palestinian history. The President and the Cabinet 
members form, according to the Oslo agreements/accords, the executive authority. For 
the purposes of this dissertation, the Palestinian Authority (PA) will be understood as 
the executive authority together with the Bureaucracy and the Palestinian security 
forces. 
   
In the same year, members of the first Palestinian legislative assembly were elected.  
The assembly, which was inaugurated in March of the same year, become to be 
known as the Palestinian Legislative Council (hereinafter PLC). The PLC is 
composed of 88 members and only represented Palestinians of WBGS (including 
Palestinians of East Jerusalem), and thus excluded Palestinian refugees in exile. 
 
Alongside the PLC was the Palestinian bureaucracy which was introduced for the first 
time in Palestinian history. The Oslo process enabled Palestinians to take control over 
their civil affairs. In this regard, Palestinians from 1994 onward were able to run their 
affairs in various civil fields such as health, social affairs, education, transportation, 
infrastructure, and so on.  
 
Thus the Para-state institutions (the cabinet, the legislative assembly, bureaucracy, 
and so on) were already on the ground. It is, therefore, important to study the 
conditions through which these institutions came into being and then analyse their 
functions and relationships with each other and with Palestinian society. In this 
regard, the following questions come to mind: 
 
• Under what conditions did these institutions come into being? 
• To what extent, and in what way, did these conditions influence the form and 
functions of these institutions, their relationship with each other, and their 
relationship with Palestinian society? 
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• To what extent did these institutions manage to develop themselves into the 
hub of a modern state, including the ability of issuing territorially binding 
rules and monopolizing coercion? 
 
To answer these questions, I introduce a brief discussion over the theories of state in 
chapter I (the State: Theoretical Framework and Arab State) before moving on to 
discuss the main features of the Arab state. Obviously Palestine has a shared political, 
economic, and cultural history with the rest of the Arab world. I therefore use the 
discussion of the process of state building within the Arab world in order to situate the 
narrower context of Palestine.  
 
In chapter II (Palestinian Autonomy: Historical Overview), I discuss the historical 
development of state building in Palestine. In so doing, I am focusing my attention at 
the historical development of Palestinian access to national & local level institutions 
of state functions. By national level institutions of state functions I mean the Cabinet 
and Parliament. By local level institutions of state functions I mean the municipal and 
rural councils.   
 
I argue in chapter II that the Para-state institutions which had emerged since 1994 
were not born in vacuum. Rather, they are an institutional culmination of a historical 
process of state building. In fact, Palestinians- throughout their history- have always 
had some level of access to state institutions (local level institutions) but only 
intermittently had access to national level institutions of state functions. However, at 
all times and regardless of the level of access, Palestinians have always been 
constrained in their access by their ruler. It was the Oslo process which made it 
possible (in theory) for everyone to have full access at all levels.  
 
In chapter III, therefore, I move to discuss the Oslo process, and the power conflict 
associated the rise of the PA (the first Para-state institution provided by Oslo process) 
at both the Palestinian-Palestinian level as well as Palestinian-Israeli level. The 
chapter touches also the PA relation with Palestinian society, including the political 
and civil society in addition to the general public. Furthermore, the chapter discusses 
the PA mode of government, and how this mode denied the majority of Palestinians 
access the national level institutions of state functions (mainly the Cabinet). 
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In chapter IV, I discuss the structure of the second Palestinian national institution of 
state functions, which is the PLC. In this connection, the chapter discusses the 
Palestinian elections of 1996 which introduced the PLC, and the relation of the PLC 
with the executive authority (PA), and to what extent such a relation is governed 
according to the democratic principles of the rule of law, transparency, and the 
separation of powers.  
 
Then I move in chapter V to discuss how the PA mode of government influenced the 
structure of the bureaucratic system. In other words, the chapter discusses the main 
features of the Palestinian bureaucracy which emerged for the first time in Palestinian 
history in 1994, and to what extent this system managed to fulfil its responsibilities of 
supplying people with the main services. Moreover, the same chapter discuses how 
the PA mode of government influenced the structure and shape of local government 
institutions in a manner that hindered the emergence of professional local authorities.  
 
The chapter goes further to show how, in response to PA mode of government, the 
opponents of Oslo process (Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and PFLP) laid down the 
foundation of their Para-state institutions, and practised Para-state functions  parallel 
to  PA formal institutions.  In so doing, these opponents were motivated not only by 
their opposition to PA mode of government, but mainly by their opposition to the 
Oslo process and what might be derived from such a process, including the Para-state 
institutions of the PA. 
 
This fact contributed to the picture of “state within a state” in the WBGS. That is why 
the reform emerged at the top Palestinian agenda during Al-Aqsa Intifada (2000-
2004). The final chapter, therefore, discusses the extent to which Palestinians 
managed to revise this picture and to build their state in terms of a centralized 
monopoly on the use of force by a legitimate/representative governing body that has 
the ability to issue territorially binding rules.  
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Note on the Methodology 
 
The dissertation’s main hypothesis is that; “the process of building a state in terms of 
central, autonomous, and differentiated  organization that monopolizes coercion and 
has the capacity to issue territorially binding rules is not separate from the process of 
building a state  in terms of external sovereignty. The completion of the later process 
is a pre-condition for the success of the former process.” The dissertation hypothesis, 
therefore, is an explanatory one. The best research methodology to test such kind of 
hypothesis is “observation by using case study analysis”.1  
 
Though a case study might be criticized for the fact that its results cannot be 
generalized to other cases and remain applied to the case under study, it remains the 
best method to have decisive evidence for or against a political theory. More 
importantly, it tells us not only whether the hypothesis holds, but also why. This is 
considered to be the essence of the case study’s format of “process tracing” with its 
focus on the “cause-effect link”. The process tracing format of case study analysis 
implies the following up of the sequence of events which evidences that a given cause 
produce a given effect in a given case, and to rely on the testimonies/statements of the 
actors who experienced these events to find out why these actors acted as they did. 2   
 
In this connection the interviews emerge as the most important research instrument 
and source of data. Alongside them are the documents, reports, newspapers, 
periodicals, articles, internet sites, and books. During my writing of this dissertation, I 
carried out two field trips: the first one was in the period of September-mid October 
2003. The aim of that trip was to collect a number of books and documents about 
issues related to Palestinian state building. In this regard, the Gaza-based Palestinian 
Centre for Human Rights was of crucial help. The Centre put its library at my disposal 
24 hours a day, and offered me all the facilities and support I needed.  
 
In the period of August-November 2004, another field trip was carried out in the Gaza 
Strip. The aim that time was to interview the relevant actors in Palestinian state 
                                                 
1  Stephen Van Evera. Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca & London: Cornell 
University Press, 1997, Pp.50-55. 
2 Ibid., Pp.55-67. 
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building (Palestinian Authority officials, members of Palestinian Legislative Council, 
& NGOs representative). Once again the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights was of 
crucial help as it put its newspapers archive at my disposal, and offered me an office 
and computer as well as free access to the Internet. Without the Center’s help, my 
fieldwork would not have been successful.  
 
In the fieldwork I have done I have encountered huge difficulties, mainly due to the 
Israeli policy of collective punishment against Palestinians. This policy, which widely 
pursued by Israeli since the outbreak of Al- Aqsa Initifada in September 2000 onward, 
had denied all Palestinians of the occupied territories the right to free movement 
between the cities, towns, and villages of West Bank and Gaza Strip. Alongside it is 
the comprehensive closure which has been imposed preventing movement between 
the Gaza Strip and the West Bank since 1991. In addition to the problems resulting 
from closure is the shelling of and the incursions into the camps, towns, and cities. 
These acts, which have become routine during the intifada, have created an 
environment in which it has become increasingly difficult for research, for data 
collection and even for daily travel from my parents home in Rafah to the office I 
work from in Gaza city.  
 
During my second fieldwork trip (August-November 2004), I was unable to travel 
from my home to the various offices on 25 days. Moreover, even on the days which I 
was able to travel there were often enormous delays at the Israeli checkpoints. I would 
estimate that each journey each way (between Rafah and Gaza City) took me an 
average of 2.5 hours, quite apart from the humiliation and danger each day of travel 
brings. The two most dangerous aspects of the daily commute occur at the Israeli 
checkpoints of Abu Houli and al-Matahin. Palestinians waiting to cross them (often 
for hours) are frequently shot at by the Israeli soldiers who control the checkpoints. 
Along with many Palestinians I was put through the process of a full strip search, at 
al-Matahin checkpoint, on the pretext of searching for explosives, something they 
could have seen I was not carrying once I had lifted up my shirt. 
 
Despite the long delays to my travel I was usually able to ensure (on the days travel 
was possible) that I was on time for meetings I had arranged to interview members of 
the PA, even if this meant getting up at 4.30 in the morning. However, despite the 
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effort I put into making the meetings, my efforts were by no means always 
acknowledged let alone reciprocated by those I sought to interview. For example 
having been given a time to see him it took me one month of going every day before I 
got to interview the Deputy Minister of Finance.   
 
Despite these problems, I have carried out several interviews with the different 
concerned actors (PA officials, members of Palestinians Legislative Council, NGOs 
representatives). Each interview lasted on average for one and half hours. It took me 5 
hours on average to transcribe each interview. During these interviews, I directed the 
following guiding questions: 
 
Questions to high ranking civil servants 
 
1. What is the number of your ministry’s civil servants? 
2. What is the average compensation of these servants? 
3. What is the Ministry’s annual allotment? 
4. What is the number of Director-Generals, Deputy Ministers, of the Ministry? 
5. What is the main problem your ministry encountered during the intifada? 
6. Do you think that the recruitment system of the Palestinian bureaucracy is efficient/ 
inefficient? 
7. In either case, why? 
8. To what extent do you think the reform is necessary for Palestinians? 
 
Questions to PLC members 
 
1. How do you assess the relation between PA and PLC? 
2.  To what extent was this relation influenced by the ongoing intifada? 
3. Did the PLC encounter difficulties in carrying out its work during the intifada? 
4. If yes, what were these difficulties? 
5. How did such difficulties influence PLC’s relation with PA? 
6. Do you think that the PA apparatus should be reformed? 
7. Why do you think so? 
8. How might these apparatus be reformed? 
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Questions to the representatives of the Opponents Para-State Institutions 
 
1.  Why do you think that the presence of your organization is important? 
2.  What kind of services does your organization offer to the public? 
3.  Do you receive any financial support from the PA? 
4.  How do you assess the relation of your organization with the PA? 
5. How many times were you (interviewee) or any member of your organization 
subject to PA harassment (detention for example)? 
 
Alongside these interviews, there were several interviews which I had done during my 
work at the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights. At that time I was working in the 
Democratic Development Unit. As a researcher, my area of interest was the 
Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) as well as the Right to Freedom of Expression 
under the PA. Throughout the years of my work, I carried out several interviews with 
PLC members. The transcripts of some of these interviews were used in this study and 
were of crucial help in drafting some chapters of this dissertation, in particular chapter 
IV. 
 
The press was used in parallel to the interviews as a source of data and information. In 
this regard, the Palestinian newspapers of Al Hayat Al-Jadeeda, Al Quds, Al-Ayyam, 
Al-Bilad, Al -Risalah, Al-Istiqlal, and Al-Quds Al-Arabi were of vital help. Alongside 
them were the Israeli newspapers like Yidot Ahrnot, and the Jerusalem Post. Arab 
newspapers were also used. Among these newspapers were the London-based of Al 
Hayat, and Al Sharq Al Awsat. The data obtained from these newspapers were 
supplemented by the data obtained from the international newspapers like the New 
York Times, the International Herald Tribune, the Economist, and others.  
 
In addition to the press, periodicals have been used in this dissertation. The most 
important of these periodicals were the local ones like Al Waqaea’, the formal gazette 
of PA, the Palestine-Israel Journal, Journal of Palestine Studies, and Palestine 
Report. Alongside the local periodicals were the Arab ones like Arab-Studies Journal, 
and international ones like the Middle East Policy, the Middle East International, and 
Journal of Middle East Review (MERIA). 
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Internet articles having a relation to the topic were also used, and some information 
was obtained from the websites of human rights organizations, as well as other 
organizations working on the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, and international news 
agencies (e.g., CNN, BBC). The books had been used to draft chapter I, and were of 





















Chapter I: The State 
Theoretical Framework and Arab State 
 
“There can be no ‘general state theory’.  There can only be state structures formed by 
the contingencies of social developments.”3
 
One of the main problems of studying the state is the absence of any standard 
definition or theory that can serve as base for building a general hypothesis. Anyone 
who is interested in studying the state finds himself before a mass of theories and 
definitions that reflect in some part the author’s own perspective, and in part the 
empirical reality of the case under investigation.   
 
Another problem in studying the state is related to the history of state formation, or to 
when the state emerged. This problem is basically connected to the first one.  The lack 
of consensus among scholars as regards what the state is has led to the emergence of 
different histories of state formation. Some authors claim that the state had emerged 
before several thousands years ago, while others claim that the state in its current 
modern form emerged in the 19th century with the full blooming of capitalism at the 
expense of the land-based feudal system.   
 
These authors assert that the full bloom of capitalism, marked by the rapid 
development of trade and communications and emergence of a market economy, gave 
rise to new social forces such as the bourgeoisie, merchants, bankers, and civil 
servants. These socio-economic developments manifested themselves politically and 
led to increasing demands for extending political, civil, and social rights, phenomena 
which made it necessary to re-conceptualize the relationship between society and 
political authority.4
 
Accordingly, a new form of politics emerged. The nation-state as a relatively 
                                                 
3 Bo Strath & Rolf Torstendahl. “ State Theory and State Development: States as Network Structures in 
Changes in European Modern History”, in Rolf Torstendahl (ed.,). State Theory and State History. 
London, Newbury Park, & New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1992, p.12. 
4 Ibid. See also Charles Tilly. “ Reflections on the History of European State Making. In Charles Tilly 
(ed.,). The Formation of National States in Western Europe. Princeton & London: Princeton University 
Press, 1975.  See also Charles Bright & Susan Harding (eds.,). Statemaking and Social Movements: 
Essays in History and Theory. U.S.: The University of Michigan Press, 1985.  
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autonomous, differentiated, centralized, and separate association came into existence 
for the first time. Such a state gradually expanded the ranks of citizenship to include 
all the excluded social groups, and made it possible for an individual to stand in direct 
relationship with the sovereign political authority, a fact which contrasted with the 
feudal system, where such direct relationship was limited only to specific social 
groups (groups of nobles and clergy, for example).5  
 
The impact of the 19th century’s socio-economic developments was not limited to 
these realms, but also extended to include other realms of thought, particularly 
political thought. That century’s socio-economic developments had shifted the 
political focus from the individual (for example, the political thought of Hobbes, 
Locke, and Rousseau) to the structure of society. This shift in political thought 
expressed itself in the political ideas of Karl Marx (1818-1883), Friedrich Engels 
(1820-1895), Emile Durkheim (1858-1917), Max Weber (1864-1920), and others.  
 
These thinkers had basically devoted themselves to study of the new socio-economic 
transformations in Europe, and their political manifestations, in particular the newly 
emerging political identity (the capitalist state) and its relationship to society. It is not 
the aim here to review the ideas of these thinkers on the state, as that goes beyond the 
scope of this dissertation, but it is worth mentioning Karl Marx's and Max Weber’s 
contributions to theories of the state, as their ideas formed the departure point for most 
of the 20th century’s theories of the state.   
The Marxist Perspective versus the Weberian One 
 
A brief survey of Marxist and Weberian political thought will show clearly how such 
thought is developmental, and conceives history in a dynamic way. This dynamic 
vision of history had, in fact, shaped both Marx's and Weber’s notion of the state. The 
state for them is the apparatus of government, administration, and an instrument of 
coercion, and is in a continuous developmental process. 
 
                                                 
5 Reinhard Bendix. Nation-Building & Citizenship: Studies of Our Changing Social Order. New 
Brunswick/US & London: Transaction Publishers, 2ed edition, 2002, Pp.39-96. 
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Marx considered the society’s mode of production, more specifically the production 
relations, as the basic foundation on which the political and other institutions arise.6 
Accordingly, the state as a political institution is, for him, a manifestation of the 
dominant mode of production within the society, and varies according to variation in 
this mode of production. The state in this sense serves the interest of the economically 
dominant class, which manages to control the civil bureaucracy as well as the military 
and police apparatus. Therefore, the state in pursuing its policy becomes fully guided 
(not autonomous) by the interests of this class.  State policy is the political expression 
of such interest.    
 
On the other hand, Weber believes that the state has its own interest totally separate 
from the interest of any social group within the society. The state, according to him, 
emerges as part of a general trend toward rationalizing the society according to 
impersonal, universal, and general rules. In this sense the state is understood as a 
rationalized bureaucratic organization working according to general, universal, and 
impersonal rules that are devoted to specific ends established by the state itself. These 
rules make the state immune from the influence of society. In implementing these 
rules the state tends to monopolize the means of coercion within well-defined 
territories.7 The state according to this concept is fully autonomous in pursuing its 
own policy and is not subject to the influence of any social force/class within the 
society, as in the case of the Marxist concept. 
 
Clearly, the two notions converge on what the state is, but they separate when it 
comes to the relationship between state and society. While the Marxist notion reduces 
the state to a specific social force/class within the society, and identifies coercive 
force as the essence of the state for protecting the interest of the said social 
force/class, the Weberian one regards the state as neutral. It emerges within the 
context of a general sociological process rationalizing society according to legal rules 
and principles.  Such rules and principles constitute the essence of the state, and 
coercive force comes as a necessity to preserve these means of protecting society’s 
welfare.   
                                                 
6 Theda Skocpol. States & Social Revolutions: A comparative Analysis of France, Russia & China. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979, Pp.24-28. 
7 Max Weber. The Theory of Social and Economic Organization.  Talcott Parsons (eds.,), New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1947, Pp.8-86. 
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The 20th Century’s State Theories 
 
Most of the 20th century’s theories of the state are built on either Marx's or Weber’s 
notion of the state. Antoni Gramsci (1891-1937), drawing on Marx, conceived the 
state as an instrument in the hands of the dominant class and for the serving of it, but 
he expanded the means of social control to include ideological means alongside the 
coercive ones. Accordingly, Gramsci introduced us to his concept of ‘Hegemony’, by 
which he meant "A mode of social control through which one group exerts its 
dominance over others by means of ideology. “8    
 
For Gramsci coercion secures state domination over society, but it does not secure 
state hegemony. To achieve hegemony over society, coercion should be 
complemented by ideological means of domination. Only this would enable state to 
gain the cultural and political support of the subordinated groups. Consequently, 
Gramsci provided the state as,  
 
"the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class 
not only maintains its dominance but manages to win the consent of those over whom 
it rules.” Thus, state is “political society plus civil society” or in other words, 
“hegemony protected by the armour of coercion”.9   
 
Gramsci did not discuss how such a capitalist state comes into being.  He was more 
interested in analyzing the relationship between state and society, than in explaining 
the process by which this state comes into being. 
 
Paul M. Sweezy, too, in his Modern Capital and other essays argued the state as an 
instrument in the hands of the economically dominant class. In this regard he wrote, 
 
"...The continued existence of monopoly capitalism depends on the existence or 
creation of sufficiently strong counteracting forces to permit the system to operate at a 
politically tolerable level of production and employment...; this therefore becomes 
increasingly the responsibility of the state, which, as noted above, has its primary task 
in assuring the smooth functioning of the accumulation process."10
 
                                                 
8 James Martin. Gramsci’s Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction. Basingstoke: Macmillian Press, 
1998. P.66. 
9 quoted in Roger Simon. Gramsci’s Political Thought. London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1982, P.71. 
10 Paul M. Sweezy. Modern Capital and Other Essays. New York & London: Monthly Review Press, 
1972, Pp.8-9, 34. 
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Like Gramsci, Sweezy was not interested in studying the process through which the 
capitalist state emerges.  His interest was in the international capitalist system, and in 
how such a system had developed during the 20th century.  
 
Charles Tilly, in his distinguished essay entitled Reflections on the History of 
European State Making,11 focused on the process through which the state comes into 
being.  According to him, the main engine of building the state is tax extraction for 
military purposes. Military purposes necessitated the process of tax extraction, which 
in turn necessitated the process of establishing bureaucratic staff to extract tax, and to 
manage and coordinate the flow of revenue to the state. Army establishments are 
crucial in this context. They produce the means to support government control over 
the population, to promote territorial consolidation, centralization, differentiation of 
the governmental apparatus from other organizations, and monopolization of the 
means of coercive force. Accordingly, Tilly, based on Weber, introduced the state as 
 
"an organization which controls the population occupying defined territory is a state 
in so far as (1) it is differentiated from other organizations operating in the same 
territory; (2) it is autonomous; (3) it is centralized; and (4) its divisions are formally 
coordinated with one another."12
 
Theda Skocpol in her Theory of Revolution agreed with Tilly on tax extraction as the 
main motor of state building, and strongly emphasized, in this regard, the 
administrative and coercive organization as the most important aspects of any state. 
The state, she declared, is 
 
"A set of administrative, policing, and military organizations headed, and more or less 
well coordinated by, an executive authority. Any state first and fundamentally extracts 
resources from society and deploys these to create and support coercive and 
administrative organizations.13
 
Michael Mann accepted the coercive force as an aspect of the state, but he refused to 
consider it, as was the case with Skocpol, as basis of the state. Instead, he highly 
emphasized the monopoly of making binding rules, and the centralized functional 
institutions, as the most important foundations of any state. The state, he wrote, is 
 
                                                 
11 Tilly op.cit. 
12 Ibid., P.70. 
13 Skocpol op.cit., P.29. 
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1. A differentiated set of institutions and personnel embodying 
2. Centrality in the sense that political forces radiate outwards from a center to cover 
3.  A   territorially demarcated area, over which it exercises 
4.  A monopoly of authoritative, binding rule-making, backed up by a monopoly of 
the means of physical violence.14 
 
Joel S. Migdal emphasized also these binding rules as the base of any state. In this 
regard, he cited the state as an organization that had as its major function 
 
"…To make and implement the binding rules for all the people as well as the 
parameters of rule making for other social organizations in a given territory, using 
force if necessary to have its way."15  
 
Clearly, the underlying assumption of the Weberian perspective is that the state is 
differentiated, distinctive, separate from society, and strong enough to lead it.  There 
is no space within this perspective for society to influence state. Society is always 
seen as a dependent variable while state is an independent one. In other words, the 
state is the entity that is responsible for solving the crucial questions concerning 
society, and in creating historical changes.  
 
 
Towards an Advanced Definition of the State 
 
The above brief survey of state theories shows the basic conditions of any modern 
state. Evidently, any organization which controls a given population in a well-defined 
territory, and has the ability to issue binding rules for its population and to 
monopolize the levers of coercion, is called a state. Given those basic features of a 
state, scholars might vary in their perception of the relationship between state and 
society.  The Marxist perspective is extremely reductive in the sense that it conceives 
the nature of the state-society relationship to be rooted in the economic structure. At 
the same time, the Weberian perspective is extremely static in the sense that it 
conceives the state to be an undifferentiated entity with a homogenous interest. 
 
                                                 
14 Michael Mann. States, War and Capitalism: Studies in Political Sociology. Oxford UK & Cambridge 
USA: Blackwell Publishers, 1988, P.4. 
15 Joel S. Migdal. Strong Societies and Weak States: State-Society Relations and State Capabilities in 
the Third World. Princeton & New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1988, P.19. 
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Bo Strath and Rolf Torstendahl in their State Theory and State Development16 rejected 
the Marxist and Weberian perspectives on the state-society relationship, and 
developed a new perspective on that relationship. In doing so, they traced how the 
state had developed since 1800, from the early capitalist state until it reached its 
current form of modern welfare state. After explaining how the state had developed to 
its current form, they arrived at a more holistic, reciprocal, and dynamic vision of the 
state-society relationship. 
 
According to them, the form of any state is not the outcome of the interest of a 
specific social force/class, or the state agents’ interest.  The state can not be reduced to 
a specific social force/class, nor yet can it be reduced to the interest of state agents. 
Rather, the state's form is the outcome of the reciprocal influences of social 
forces/classes and state agents.  In other words, the state is influenced by the interests 
of different social forces/classes within the society, but it is not a mirror of such 
interests, since it reflects also the interest of state agents.  In this sense the state is 
autonomous but, at the same time, influenced by the society.  
 
Charles Bright & Susan Harding highlighted also the influence of social forces on the 
state, as they consider state building to be a question of state agents’ initiatives, as 
well as of social forces reacting to such initiatives. But, they added the competition 
between the politicians and bureaucratic agents, who can develop and defend their 
own interest in the face of the politicians, as another factor that influences the form of 
a state.  The state, according to them, is 
 
"A distinct realm of structural political relations that is defined by contentions along 
its boundaries and among politicians and bureaucrats who, in competing for office and 
influence, rework social and economic conflict into political terms. These contentions 
both define the state vis-à-vis other social and economic institutions and continually 
re-make the state.17
 
Although Charles Bright & Susan Harding highlighted the state as a differentiated 
organization that formed two competitive parts, the bureaucracy and the politicians, 
they remained unable to explain how these two parts might be influenced in different 
degrees by different social groups or forces, an issue which is heavily emphasized by 
                                                 
16 Strath & Torstendahl op.cit., Pp.12-37. 
17 Bright & Harding op.cit., P.4. 
 18
Joel S. Migdal in his State in Society: an approach to struggle for domination.18  
 
Migdal went a step further and regarded the state as an organization formed of not just 
two parts, but of many different parts with different interests. These parts, according 
to him, are in a continuous competitive engagement with other social forces. Such 
engagement includes the top policy makers, legislators, law enforcement personnel 
(executive bodies), the state’s policy implementation structure (bureaucracy system), 
and so on. The new contribution of Migdal is his assertion that through such 
engagement the different parts of the state, according to different interests they 
encompass, react and responds differently to the pressures they are exposed to.   
 
The overall reactions of different parts of the state and different social forces resulting 
from such competitive engagement decide the pattern of domination in the society. It 
decides the extent to which the state can assume a full coherent domination and 
complete control over society, and thus act in a coherent fashion (integrated 
domination or centralization), or to which neither the state nor any other social forces 
have full domination in the country (non-integrated or dispersed domination or 
decentralization). 
 
Generally speaking, the state is seen as an organization that monopolizes coercion as a 
means to support its major function of issuing binding rules for a given population 
occupying a given territory.  For Charles Bright & Susan Harding (1984) and Bo 
Strath & Rolf Torstendahl (1992) the state must not be seen in a static way.  Rather, 
the state is placed in a social context that influences and is influenced by it, and 
therefore affects the state's form. Also the state must be placed within its international 
environment, which also influences its form. For Migdal (1994), moreover, the state 
must be seen not in a coherent, but in a heterogeneous fashion, in which its different 
agencies exhibit different interests and continuously interact with other social forces 
in the society.   
 
                                                 
18 Joel Migdal. “The State in Society: an approach to Struggle for Domination”. In Joel Migdal & 
others (eds.,). State Power and Social Forces: Domination and Transformation in the Third World. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994, Pp.8-34. See also Migdal op.cit, Pp.10-41. 
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Accordingly, and drawing on the above-mentioned scholars’ discussion, it’s possible 
to conclude the state as an organization that 
1. Monopolizes coercive force and has extractive capacity (tax collection). 
2. Constitutes the ultimate source of the legally binding rules for the population. 
3. Works in a well-defined territory. 
4. Controls the population which occupies this territory. 
5. Forms agencies with different interests. 
6. Locates within a social context which it influences and by which it is influenced. 
7. Engages in international activities. 
 
Conceiving of the state according to the above-mentioned paradigm sheds light on 
issues that lie at the heart of any state. Issues such as state differentiation, state agency 
coordination, autonomy, and centralization seem to be, as Tilly emphasized, a major 
criterion by which one can judge the degree of statehood in any country.19  
 
The process of statehood necessitates the establishment of well-coordinated agencies 
(legislative, executive, judicial agencies) that are differentiated from other economic 
or social organizations within the society, a task that is heavily connected with state 
autonomy. State autonomy seems to be an extremely vague concept.   
 
For example, Charles Bright & Susan Harding stressed that state autonomy lay in its 
ability to self-regulate, in the sense that it was governed by its own law, and not 
influenced by other internal or external forces.20  
 
Joel Migdal sheds light on the actions of state officials, considering the state to be 
autonomous when state officials have the capacity to act upon their own preferences.21 
 
Bo Strath and Rolf Torstendahl refused to consider state autonomy as an empirically-
oriented concept, rather asserting that state autonomy is an “amorphous” concept.22  
 
Theda Skocpol rejected such an idea, asserting that the state can be, to some extent, 
                                                 
19 Tilly op.cit., Pp.34-35. 
20 Bright & Harding op.cit., P.4. 
21 Migdal . Strong Societies, op.cit., Pp.18-19. 
22 Strath & Torstendahl op.cit., p.15 
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autonomous, and this can be measured by looking at the administrative and military 
institutions of the state. These institutions, she had emphasized, are the basis of state 
power (as the resources in the society are extracted for them), and have the potential 
of being autonomous (in their relationship to the social forces, and in their 
relationship to other states).  To what extent they are autonomous can be explained 
"...in terms specific to particular types of socio-political systems and to particular sets 
of historical international circumstances."23
 
The concept of state centralization seems to be strongly related to the concept of state 
autonomy. State centralization, in the sense of its ability to get its people to obey its 
rules and to absorb and monopolize them toward its legal and moral framework, 
seems to be the normative foundation of state power, or what Michael Mann called 
the “infrastructural power”.24 According to Mann the source of the state’s real power 
is to be found not in its ability to monopolize the sources of coercive force, but in its 
ability to penetrate the society and to implement its authoritative legal rules 
throughout the whole society, in a way that secures the dominance of such rules over 
any other rules within the society.  The state’s authoritative legal rules must triumph 
over any ethnic, clan, familial, or any other social-force-based rules (primacy). 
State in the Arab World 
 
The previous debate over the nature of the state and its relation with society is, in fact, 
Eurocentric. It reflects a specific historical European context, in particular the context 
of feudalism, in which power was fused between long-established nobles, who 
enjoyed specific privileges in their relationship with the central authority (the king), 
and their relationship with their subjects (serfs). A group of a reciprocal rights and 
duties resting on customary law had organized the above-mentioned two relationships. 
25
 
The decentralized nature of feudalism created equal and competitive power centers 
(the estate). Each power centre was controlled by a noble class, and constituted an 
autonomous political unit. The basic social organization of such system was the 
                                                 
23 Skocpol op.cit.,  P.30 
24 Mann op.cit., Pp.5-30. 
25 Bendix op.cit, Pp.39-48, &  Bertrand B. & Pierre B. The Sociology of the State. Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1983, Pp. 6-10, 79-85. 
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peasantry society engaged in subsistence production as the dominant mode of 
production. The political decentralization of the feudal system was associated with 
non-concentration of the land-surplus in the hand of specific social forces. The three 
basic social forces of this system (peasants, the noble class, and King together with 
the church) shared, with varying degrees, land surplus.  
 
The dominance of such modes of production, and the absence of any parallel modes 
of production (such as the tribal mode of production), were, according to Tilly, the 
necessary historical conditions that made it possible for the nation-state to emerge in 
Europe,26 since it introduced a unified ideological superstructure (the peasant culture), 
among Europeans. Hence, when the state emerged it emerged as a manifestation of 
the European ruling class’s attempts to accentuate the diversity of European societies 
(or to accentuate the notion of “We”). That is why it is possible now to talk about the 
French nation-state, the German nation-state, and so on.  
 
While the historical economic infrastructure of Europe promoted horizontal power 
relations, and consequently, produced nation-states with a major emphasis on the  
individual as a self-standing entity, the historical economic infrastructure of the Arab 
world promoted vertical power relations, and consequently, produced empires with 
major emphasis on the individual.  However, this individual was not regarded as a 
self-standing entity, but rather as “part of the whole”.   
 
With the exception of Egypt, which has a long history of a peasant society, most of 
the Arab World experienced the tribal social formation. The economic infrastructure 
of this social formation (pastoral activities) produced a cultural superstructure in 
which the group constituted the “basis for identity, political allegiance, and behavior” 
and the “…personal, moral, and ascriptive factors…”27  constituted the basis for 
individual status. 
 
                                                 
26 Tilly op.cit.,  Pp.28-29. 
27 Richard Tapper. “Anthropologists, Historians, and Tribespeople on Tribe and State Formation in the 
Middle East”.  In Philiph S. Khoury & Joseph Kostiner (ed.). Tribes and State formation in the Middle 
East. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990, P. 68. 
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Without exception, Arab tribes were linked by blood lineage, or what Ibn Khaldun 
called asabiyya.28 It was this biological linkage (asabiyya) which enabled the Arab 
tribes in the Gulf countries to extract the Khawa (tribute) under the threat of sword 
from merchants carrying out long-distance trade activities.29 And it was the one which 
enabled tribes in North Africa (Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia) to raid urban centers, 
and confiscate their treasures. The important factor here is that this tribal social 
formation does not imply, as Nazih Ayubi observed, the traditional Marxist 
correspondence between the mode of production (infrastructure), and the political and 
ideological superstructures.30 Indeed, the absence of the mode of production that 
distinguishes this tribal formation (pastoral economy) does not imply, for example, 
the absence of the cultural manifestation of this mode, or the political pattern 
associated with it, in spite of the fact that this cultural manifestation and political 
pattern, might take different forms.  
 
With the introduction of Islam in the seventh century the tribal cohesion or blood 
cohesion was subjected to a process of Islamization. In other words, most of the Arab 
tribes were reorganized within the framework of the newly emerged Islamic umma 
governed by the new religious rules and principles. These rules and principles were 
derived from the Shari’a which is derived from the Muslim holy book (the Qur’an), 
the Islamic Sunni (denotes Prophet Muhammad’s sayings, actions, and orders-
“Hadith”), and the Muslim jurists ijma‘(consensus).31 The Shari’a formed a new 
“legal” recourse to unite all Arab tribes within the framework of the Islamic Umma 
(Islamic community).  
 
Though Prophet Mohammad succeeded in recruiting the traditional asabiyya for his 
cause (the Islam), his success in this respect was short-lived. Islamic history shows 
clearly how this asabiyya was re-born again after Mohammad’s death and played a 
significant role in the creation of the Islamic-dynasty-based empires such as the 
                                                 
28 Steven C. Caton. “Anthropological Theories of Tribe and State Formation in the Middle East: 
Ideology and the Semiotics of Power”, In ibid. Pp85-103. 
29 Khaldoun Al-Naqeeb. Society and States in the Gulf and Arab Peninsula: A different Perspective. 
London: Routledge, 1990, Pp.6-21. 
30 Nazih N. Ayubi. Over-Stating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the Middle East. London & 
New York: I.B. Tauris Publishers, 1995, Pp.24-30. 
31 Albert Hourani. Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age: 1798-1939. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
1970, Pp.1-7. 
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Umayyad (AD 660-750), and Abbasid (AD 750-1258) empires, and finally the 
Ottoman empire, which could take control over most of the Arab world in 16th and 
17th centuries, and then ruled it for about 400 years.32  
 
With the rise of Ottomans to power, and their success in diffusing their rule over most 
of the Arab world, Arabs, for the first time since the introduction of Islam, lost control 
over their future, and their fate became very much connected to the fate of another 
race (Ottomans). During the first half of the 19th century, Ottomans underwent 
significant developments, the most important of which was the rebellion of the Wali 
of Egypt, Mohammad Ali, against the central authority in Istanbul.   
 
The event strongly alarmed Ottomans who, since then, have exhibited deep concern 
over the emergence of a centre of political activities or opposition to their rule. Driven 
by this concern, and seeking military support, Ottomans forged alliances with Western 
powers (mainly Britain). In exchange for this support, Ottomans bowed to Western 
powers’ demands and signed the “Treaty of Free Trade and Friendship” in 1838.33 
The treaty, which diminished Ottoman’s control over their economy, left the 
territories of the empire open to foreign products and investment,34 and consequently, 
initiated the crystallization of the empire’s economy as a peripheral one in the 
international economic system.  
 
The incorporation of the Ottoman Empire into the international economic system 
broke the basic foundations of the empire’s political economy, and left the Ottomans 
unable to control the production and distribution of the economic surplus, as was the 
case before 1838 (within the context of the Asiatic mode of production which was 
followed by Ottomans).35 The response of the Ottomans to this development was a 
group of reform measures (Tanzimat) which sought to change the mode of 
                                                 
32 For excellent assessment on these empires see Ayubi op.cit., Pp55-80. 
33 Resat Kasaba. The Ottoman Empire and The World Economy in Nineteenth Century.  Albany, NY: 
State University of New York Press, 1988. Pp54-55. 
34 For example, these treaties set 5% as tariff on import, and 12% as tarrif on export. See Sevket 
Pamuk.  The Ottoman Empire and European Capitalism, 1820-1913: Trade, Investment and 
production. Cambridge: Cambridge Universiry Press, 1987, P.20.  
35 Huri Islamoglu-Inan (ed.,). The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1987, Pp.47-62. 
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organization of the state apparatus. But these measures were inspired by the Western 
model, and thus, were alien from the socioeconomic infrastructure of the empire.  
 
This fact brought state into conflict with local population who perceived the tanzimat 
as a radical break in the basic foundation of the empire.36 As a result, the state started 
to loose its legitimacy in the eyes of its inhabitants, in a way that enabled Western 
powers to subject most of the Gulf countries to their tutelage, and later, in the last two 
decades of the 19th century, to occupy most of the Arab Countries in North Africa.  
The growing weakness of the empire was further manifested in the emergence of 
separatist national movements during the first decade of 20th century. The most 
notable of these movements was the “Young Turks” which advocated the turkization 
of the empire, and opposed the autocratic regime of Sultan Abdellhamid.  In 1908, 
this movement revolted against the Abdellhamid regime, and succeeded in seizing 
power.37  
 
The success of the Young Turks in seizing power became a standard-bearing example 
for other nations of the empire, among which was the Arab nation. Accordingly, Pan-
Arabic organizations and movements started to appear on the scene from then onward. 
The most notable of these organizations and movements was El Qahtaniya (founded 
in 1909 by group of Arab officers of high rank in the Ottoman army), Al Fatah 
(founded by a group of young students in Paris in 1911) and the “Ottoman 
decentralization Party” (founded in 1912 by group of Arab activists).38 All of these 
movements and organizations emphasized the particular nature of Arabs as an ethnic 
group with a similar history, language, culture, religion, and so forth.  
 
This emphasis was the instrument through which these organizations and movements 
sought to legitimize their demands either in an independent Arab state or some self-
rule arrangements. Towards this end, Sharif Hussein, the member of Hashemite clan 
to which the Prophet Muhammad belonged, and the guardian of the holy places in the 
                                                 
36 For discussion over the Ottoman reform and its ramifications see Moshe Ma’oz. Ottoman Reform in 
Syria and Palestine 1840-1861: the impact of the Tanzimat on Politics and Society. Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1968. 
37 For excellent assessment over the “Young Turks” revolt see the first three chapters (Pp.20-70) of 
A.L. Macfie. The End of the Ottoman Empire: 1908-1923. London & New York: Longman, 1998. 
38 George Antonius. The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement.  Lebanon: 
Hamish Hamilton, 1976, Pp.109-112. 
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Arabian Peninsula, engaged in secrete negotiations with the British commissioner to 
Egypt, Sir. Henry McMahon.  
 
Through these negotiations, which took the form of an exchange of letters between 
the two men, Hussein sought to enlist Britain on the side of his demands for an 
independent Arab monarchy under his throne, in exchange for uprising against the 
Ottoman regime, which became one of Britain’s foes due to its alliance with 
Germany, the chief foe for Britain during the First World War. In the period of July 
1915- to January 1916, eight letters were exchanged between Hussein and McMahon.  
 
The most notable of these letters was the one dated on 24 October, 1915. In this letter, 
McMahon declared British support for the establishment of an independent Arab state 
in the territories covering Greater Syria (excluding the portions located to the West of 
Damascus, Homs, Hama, and Aleppo), most of Iraq, as well as the Arabian Peninsula 
(except Aden).39 But all of these letters were to no avail, as in May 1916 Britain 
secretively signed the so called Sykes-Picot agreement with France.  The agreement 
divided the Arab East into areas of direct and indirect control under France and 
Britain, and consequently, completed colonial control over the whole of the Arab 
world.   
 
The post-War San Rimo peace conference in 1920 formally recognized mandatory 
rights of Britain to Palestine, Iraq, and Transjordan, and of France to Syria, and 
Lebanon. The legitimacy of these mandates was secured by the ratification of the 
League of Nations in July 1922. Once they assumed their rule over the region the 
colonial powers sought to create a new geographical, economic, and political reality 
adequate to their own knowledge and needs.  The aim was to weaken the Pan-
Arabism scheme in favour of the Western-based national state scheme.  
The Post-Colonial Arab State: A state against Society  
 
The above-mentioned historical overview shows clearly that the Arab state, in the 
Western sense, was the outcome of two interrelated variables: the dissolution of the 
last Islamic empire (Ottoman Empire) and the subsequent rise of Western colonial 
                                                 
39 Appendix “A” (Pp.413-427) in Ibid . 
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hegemony in the region. Among the most notable impacts of the colonial era was the 
imposition of artificial borders, and the significant reform in the socioeconomic 
infrastructure of the region. As Ayubi observed, the colonial powers were “…the most 
instrumental in drawing up boundaries in roughly their present form, in redirecting 
economic relations away from the Middle East and towards Europe...in defining - 
often very artificially - the units that were to be singled out as distinct states”40
 
The new borders were, therefore, the geographical manifestations of more profound 
changes in the basic premises of the political economy. The most notable of these 
changes, Samir Amin argues, resulted from the colonial policy of redirecting the 
economy, in particular the agriculture sector, to the needs of international economic 
system. Most of the colonial powers, Amin asserted, sought to privatize the system of 
land ownership, and consequently, redistributed land among those who exhibited 
readiness to cooperate, mostly among tribal Sheikhs and urban notables. 41  
 
All related sectors necessary for promoting agricultural commercialization were 
developed: railways were built, roads, irrigation networks were established or 
improved, and credit institutions emerged. In addition, some forms of parliamentary 
democracy were advanced, but the access to political life remained confined to special 
stratum within the society; tribal sheikhs, urban notables (in the Arab East mainly), 
and the aristocratic class (mainly in Egypt). 
 
When Arab states gained independence after the Second World War, a large number 
of them tended to eliminate the economic and political legacy of the colonial era (e.g., 
the life of the semi-parties). This trend was obvious in countries like Egypt, Algeria, 
Tunisia, Iraq, and Syria, in the period of 1950s-1970.42 In these countries, where the 
nationalists (e.g., the Free Officers in Egypt, National Liberation Front in Algeria, the 
Ba’ath in Syria and Iraq, the regime of Habib Bourguiba in Tunisia) replaced 
traditional tribal Sheikhs and semi-aristocratic classes in power.  The nationalists were 
                                                 
40 Ayubi op.cit., P. 86. 
41 Samir Amin. The Arab Nation: Nationalism and Class Struggles. London: Zed Press, 1978, Pp.25-
30. 
42 Roger Owen. State, Power & Politics in the Making of Modern Middle East. London & New York: 
Routledge, 1992, Pp.32-52. 
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driven by a desire to promote economic development for the welfare of the people and 
so adopted a state-led import-substitution scheme. 
 
Large scale industrialization programs, therefore, were advanced, and hence, 
bureaucracy was expanded so that the state would be able to assume control over 
economy.43 To meet the increasing demand of the expanded bureaucracy for civil 
servants, education was encouraged, and made available to lower classes. While the 
state assumed control over the industrial sector, it tended to assume control also over 
the agricultural sector.  
 
Without exception, all countries in this case brought a considerable amount of 
agricultural land under state control as a means to break away from the unfair colonial 
distribution of land, which enabled about 1% of the population in Egypt to control 
70% of the cultivatable land, and 3% of Iraqi landowners to control about 66% of the 
agriculture land, and one Syrian family to control 36 villages!44  
 
The nationalists did not only seek to break away from the economic arrangements of 
the colonial era, but also from the political arrangements as well. Once they assumed 
power, they set up a single-party regime, and made their party the only legitimate 
institution (e.g., the National Union and later the Arab Socialist Union in Egypt, the 
Neo-Destour in Tunisia which was renamed Parti Socialist Destourien “PSD” in 
1964, National Liberation Front in Algeria, and the Ba’ath in Syria and Iraq) for 
political participation.  All other political parties were dissolved, or declared illegal. 
Other forms of horizontal associations like the functional associations (agricultural 
associations, women’s associations, industrial association, and so forth) were either 
co-opted within the regime, or, in case they challenged the regime (through opposing 
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the hegemony of the single party over the political life) declared against the national 
interest.45  
 
The appeal to national interest was one tool among so many other tools used by these 
nationalists to preserve their regime. The most important of these tools is the military. 
Having arrived at power mostly through military coups, most of these nationalists 
sought to prevent the development of the military outside of their control, in order to 
prevent a possible counter-coup.46  The method to achieve this goal was the carrot 
policy. Through this policy, they permitted generals and other members of the 
military to enter civilian economic and political life, and consequently, promoted 
common interest between technocrats and generals who forged alliances with each 
other in support of the status-quo (the single-party regime). In so doing, they kept the 
military at their disposal, and furthermore, mobilized it to serve their oppressive 
policy toward society.  
 
In Gulf Countries, and unlike the above-mentioned countries which experienced 
single-party rule in the period of 1950s-1970, family rule dominated. The root of this 
rule is dated back to the last decade of the second half of 19th century, when Britain 
succeeded in occupying Aden in 1839, and thereafter started to assume gradual 
control over the main traffic through world trade routes. With this control, Britain was 
able to impose the capitalist mode of trade over long-distance trade, the latter of 
which had dominated the region for hundreds of years. Though the introduction of the 
capitalist mode of trade was received with opposition by some dynasties, other 
dynasties tolerated this development, and consequently were promoted to power under 
the protection and tutelage of Britain.47   
 
The state emerged, therefore, as the outcome of the interaction between two variables: 
the withdrawal of long distance trade in favor of the capitalist mode of trade, and 
second, the alliance of Britain with some cooperative dynasties. These dynasties are 
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the ones which assumed rule over Gulf countries, since then until the present day. 
Concerning Saudia Arabia, it can be claimed that the emergence of the state there was 
the outcome of the alliance between religion and chiefdom. Unlike other Gulf 
countries in which tribal chieftains depended on trade as major source of revenue, 
Saudia Arabia’s tribal chieftains depended on pilgrims as the main sources of revenue.  
 
When the founder of Saudia Arabia Abdel Aziz Ibn Saud was born in 1882, the area 
was under control by the Rashid clan, the main rival of the Saud clan; which 
experienced weakness in the early 19th century due to the fragmentation of its main 
ally, the Wahabi Islamic reform movement founded by Muhammad Abdel El Wahab 
in 18th century. In 1906, Ibn Saud managed to defeat the Rashid clan, and 
consequently, removed the main obstacle in his way to build his kingdom. Ibn Saud’s 
remarkable war skills were backed by his success in introducing himself as a religious 
leader when he founded the Ikhwan (Brotherhood) movement as a renewed version of 
the Wahabi movement. In so doing, Ibn Saud succeeded in gaining other tribes’ 
loyalty, and hence, was able to extend his control over the whole of Saudia Arabia by 
1934.48   
 
Together with the Gulf sheikhdoms, alongside Moroccan and Jordanian Monarchs, 
Ibn Saud adopted a family rule characterized by “a great concentration of highly 
personalized power, a marked reluctance to permit the existence of political parties, 
trade unions or similar organizations (except in Morocco), limited social mobilization 
and a basic commitment to private economic enterprise”.49  
 
In essence, thus, the family regime which emerged in the Gulf countries, Saudia 
Arabia, Jordan, and Morocco, did not differ from the single-party regime which 
emerged in the Arab East, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt in 1950s-1970. Both regimes 
extended state control over the economy, abrogated the development of any horizontal 
associations far from their control, monopolized access to political power, and 
expanded the size of the central government apparatus (e.g., the bureaucracy). Despite 
this, both of them used different tools to preserve their regime. 
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While the single-party regimes in the Arab East, Tunisia, Algeria, and Egypt relied 
upon the myth of “national security”, coupled with military and intelligence services 
to preserve their regime, the Gulf Sheikhdoms and Arab monarchs relied upon the 
myth of noble family lineage, noble deeds, and descent from Prophet Mohammad 
(Morocco and Jordan are good examples) to preserve their regime.   
 
Alongside the claimed noble lineage and other subjective factors, the Gulf 
Sheikhdoms and Arab monarchs managed to develop a clear mechanism of 
succession, and consequently, kept intra-family rivalry at minimum. In addition to 
this, all of them kept control over the main and sensitive positions in the state. 
Members of these families occupied positions like Minister of Defense, Foreign 
Minister, Minister of Interior, and so forth. Furthermore, most of them forged 
alliances with the main traditional elements in society (big tribes for example) that 
have traditionally been reluctant to any form of modern horizontal associations 
(political parties, functional associations, and so forth) and hence, had interests in the 
ongoing political arrangements (the family rule).50  
 
With the oil boom in the 1970s, these families (excluding the Hashemite and Alawi 
families in Jordan and Morocco respectively) were endowed with additional resources 
in support of their rule. Through oil revenues they were able to limit, even end 
altogether, their dependence on citizens as a source of revenue (through taxes), and 
consequently, they could assume full autonomy from society. At the same time, oil 
revenues enabled these families to buy off the allegiance of their citizens through 
providing them with the necessary public goods and services (education, health, 
security, social security, infrastructure, and so forth) without asking for any taxes (or 
asking for minimum taxes). This promoted a situation where citizens, as Hazem 
Beblawi argues, are: 
 
“…far less demanding in terms of public participation. The history of democracy owes 
its beginnings, it is well known, to some fiscal association (no taxation without 
representation). The government’s budget in the oil states remains a one-sided 
document, an expenditure programme, a promise to spend money and distribute 
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benefits to the population with virtually no levy on them in terms of taxes or similar 
impositions.”51
  
States in Gulf Countries and Saudia Arabia emerged, thus, as a typical model of a 
Rentier state. Here we are talking about a state in which the government’s main 
function is to allocate revenue accruing to it - not because it shared in producing this 
revenue, but because it leased or rented its territories to foreign productive forces to 
produce this revenue.  Though all states perform or seek to perform an allocative 
function, allocation for Gulf States and Arabia, Giacomo Luciani asserts, “…is the 
only relationship that they need to have with domestic economy…”52  
 
In this sense, the high per-capita income and the welfare features of these countries do 
not indicate real growth in the productive capacity of society, rather, it indicates a 
state tendency (the ruling family in our case) to corrupt society through distributing 
favors and benefits as a means to gain allegiance, and accordingly, to remain in 
power. While this policy promotes citizens’ economic prosperity, it leaves questions 
related to democracy and the public’s access to political power unresolved.  In these 
countries, Ferrel Heady asserts,  
 
“…political activity is severely curtailed. Competitive politics is usually not 
permitted. Political parties and associational interest groups with diverse programs are 
not tolerated or are weak. On the other hand, the political elite does not attempt to 
mobilize the mass of the population in any official political movement, and little 
interest is shown in articulating a political ideology. A political attitude of 
acquiescence and conformity in the community suits the dominant elite, and it is not 
inclined to invite trouble by pushing hard for programs to…stimulate political 
awareness.”53
 
The effect of oil revenues was not limited to the politics of Gulf States and Arabia 
only, but extended to the politics of oil poor countries like Egypt for example. The 
rise of the petrodollar, coupled with the internal pressure the Egyptian government 
encountered after 1973’s war to promote economic reform, were two factors, among 
other factors, which promoted the Egyptian departure away from state-led 
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development (as it was the case in 1950s-1970), and towards the policy of infitah 
(open-door economic policy) since 1974 onward.54  
 
Within the context of this policy, President Sadat of Egypt promulgated hundreds of 
laws and regulations that sought to encourage foreign and local investment, minimize 
state intervention in economic enterprise, create private financial institutions, release 
bureaucratic restrictions, and create free zones. Due to these laws and regulations, 
huge sums were invested in Egypt by oil-rich Arab countries, and other loans were 
granted to Egypt by the International Financial Institutions (e.g., World Bank, IMF), 
European countries, and the US. These funds, which were used in investment projects, 
sought to promote the productive capacity of the country, and hence, produce 
economic growth.  
 
It is not the aim here to discuss the reasons for why this goal remained unattainable, 
but it is worth mentioning that the absence of legal certainty caused by frequent 
changes in laws, coupled with the lack of coordination between various bureaucratic 
levels, alongside the denial of investors’ access to information, led to a situation 
where only 32% of all projects approved by Egyptian government (or the national 
investment authority which was created by the government for authorizing investment 
projects) had started operation by the end of 1978. These projects, mainly service 
projects (tourism, banking, housing, and so forth), employed only 11% of the labour 
forces that were supposed to be employed by the approved projects.55  
 
The fact that most of these projects were of a services nature led to a serious shortage 
in the basic products (wheat, sugar, and so forth), and promoted the creation of semi-
monopolistic merchants, who, taking advantage of the infitah, and supported by 
corrupted bureaucratic system, created black markets, and pushed basic products’ 
prices to unprecedented levels. This development promoted the creation of a 
commercial bourgeoisie. Interestingly enough, this bourgeoisie, which benefited most 
from the infitah, managed to develop a common interest with the old technocratic-
generals alliance which was, as we have seen, the group which benefited most under 
Nasser rule (during 1950s-1970). The three groups (technocratic, Generals, and 
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commercial bourgeoisie) succeeded, therefore, to enrich themselves at the expense of 
the disadvantaged majority of population 56  
 
The integration of upper elements of Nasser regime into the new system was 
accompanied with the disintegration of the lower elements (grassroots) of the same 
regime. The Arab Socialist Union, which mobilized the grassroots elements under the 
Nasser regime, was disintegrated into three separate parties.57  Furthermore, the real 
opposition parties (the new Wafd, and the Progressive Party for instance) were placed 
under strict watch, and denied many rights (e.g., right of association and publication). 
Meanwhile, moderate opposition parties were created (e.g., Al Amal party) to offer 
mild criticism for the regime. To ensure support for these arrangements, President 
Sadat opened channels for private-sector interest groups (which had an interest in the 
status quo of infitah) to affect the major policy decisions, notably through the 
specialized committees of the people’s assembly and the public role assigned to the 
three representatives of major businessmen’s associations who were placed on the 
board of the national investment authority.58  
 
This misleading political openness did not hide the real state of affairs of the mode of 
government in Egypt. In short, the President of Egypt remained the most important 
political actor (as it was the case of the one-party regime in 1950s-1970). He, for 
instance, stood above all the political institutions of state. He monopolized the 
country’s key decisions, and most importantly, his term in office was for life, unless 
he was forced to leave his office by a coup or death.  Alongside this was the fact that 
the opposition was not permitted to develop in an effective manner. Furthermore, 
human rights issues remained a serious problem as Sadat promulgated Law Number 2 
of 1977, which declared a state of emergency that provided a punishment of life 
imprisonment for “illegal assembly” or strike.59 The case of infitah might serve as 
evidence showing the lack of correspondence between economic liberalization and 
democracy in the third world countries, and in the Arab world in particular.  
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In Tunisia the attempts to promote the private sector since 1971 onward was not 
accompanied with some form of political relaxation to incorporate the resultant 
interest groups without discrimination. In other words, Borugouiba, whose term in 
office became a life term since 1971 onward, remained the main political actor, and 
stood above all the political institutions. In a similar fashion to the socialist period, the 
commercial agricultural bourgeoisie, which was considered the historical ally of 
Borugouiba, remained the most politically franchised group. This fact brought the 
state into conflict with society, in particular with Tunisian workers employed in 
private sector projects since 1971 onward.  
 
These workers, as a conscious interest group consolidated during the second half of 
the 1970s, were directly affected by state policies, in particular the policy of lowering 
wages to attract foreign investment. Consequently, this interest group pressured for 
political representation so that it could influence major decisions of state policy. 
When the state became aware of this group’s demand, it blocked all of their channels 
to political power. Wide scale demonstrations, therefore, broke out throughout 1977 
and early 1978. The State responded with further oppressive measures against these 
workers and their institutions (labour unions), and their allies (the students and the 
disadvantaged peasants). Many of the labour union leaders, workers, and students, 
were either detained or shot to death.60  
 
The demonstrations in Tunisia were one sample of a series of demonstrations which 
erupted in the Arab world in protest of the policy of economic liberalization, in 
particular the IMF-negotiated structural adjustments programs. In Egypt, for instance, 
the dramatic increase in the prices of the basis products led to wide-scale 
demonstrations in 1977. Morocco experienced similar unrest in response to the cut of 
government expenditure in 1980, 1981, and 1984. The pattern was repeated in Tunisia 
in 1984, Sudan in 1985, Algeria in 1988, and Jordan in 1989.61  
 
These demonstrations protested not only the policy of economic liberalization, but 
also the social injustice and lack of democratization associated with this policy. 
Without exception, Arab rulers were unwilling to answer these fundamental questions 
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notwithstanding their willingness to revise some features of the policy of economic 
liberalization, like Borugouiba’s revocation of prior price increases in 1984, and 
Hosni Mubarak’s slowing down of the pace of economic liberalization in Egypt in 
1980s.  
 
In essence, therefore, the Arab state emerged irresponsive to people demands & 
pressure exerted by society. This left its legitimacy as appropriate ruler of society very 
much questionable. To defend itself, Arab state tended to enforce its security laws 
with a heavy hand. The security forces, in particular the intelligence (Mukhbarat), 
carried out a strict watch over intellectuals, professional associations, trade unions, the 
press and so forth. This trend was patently clear in countries like Egypt, Iraq, Syria, 
Algeria, Tunisia (all of which experienced single-party rule in 1950s-1970) in the 
1980s.62 Interestingly enough, while the state in these countries relied mainly upon 
force to keep its immunity from public pressure, the state in the Gulf Countries and 
Saudia Arabia relied (as we have seen above) mainly upon the petrodollar, and to a 
lesser extent, force, to assert its immunity. In both cases, the state emerged 
unresponsive to the input or interests of various social groups when articulating public 
policy, and consequently left the majority of the population unable, or too weak, to 
influence its policies or to have access to political power.  
 
The reluctance of Arab states to permit wide scale political participation, coupled with 
the lack of social justice, were the main factors which enabled Islamic fundamentalist 
movements to assume wide constituencies in the Arab world from 1980s onward. 
These movements started to appear on the scene since 1967 in response to the defeat 
of the Arab world in 1967’s war, and the resultant collapse of the Pan-Arabism 
scheme. Nonetheless, these movements remained unable to assume wide support, and 
hence, to play influential role in the Arab politics.63  
 
The failure of the Arab state to promote social justice and democracy in 1970s, 
coupled with the success of Ayatollah Ali Khomeini in seizing power and establishing 
Islamic state in Iran in 1979, were the factors which enabled these movements, with 
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their call for social equity, to claim wide constituencies in the Arab world, and thus, to 
emerge as an influential variable in Arab politics.  In the late 1970s, and during the 
1980s, most of the Arab countries would witness the rise of Islamic associations. 
These associations, which peacefully protested the Westernization of the Arab world, 
enjoyed footholds in universities, professional associations, charitable organizations, 
and so forth. Alongside them were the Islamic underground organizations set up 
around the same period.  
 
These underground organizations pursued a radical policy as they called for the 
violent overthrow of the Arab rulers as means to establish an Islamic state. Inspired by 
Sayed Quttub, the member of Muslim Brotherhood who was executed by Nasser 
regime of Egypt in 1966, most of these organizations believe, as Quttub did, that the 
proper function of the government is to enforce the Islamic legal codes.64 These 
movements, therefore, touched very fundamental issues relating to the role of the 
Arab state as an appropriate ruler of society.  In this sense, they constituted a serious 
challenge to the Arab rulers. To deal with these movements, Arab rulers pursued 
policies that ranged between co-optation and to oppression. In the 1970s, President 
Sadat of Egypt enabled these movements to enjoy some sort of freedoms and released 
hundreds of them. But quickly he abandoned his liberal policy when he became aware 
of their growing power since the late 1970s onward.  He arrested hundreds of them in 
1981. Hafez Al Asad adopted the same oppressive policy when he oppressed the 
disturbances of Hama in 1982 at a cost of around 10,000 causalities among the 
Muslim Brotherhood’s members. The same line was followed in Kuwait when the 
government launched large-scale wave of arrest against them in 1985.65  
 
In response to these measures, the military wing of these of Islamic movements 
assassinated Sadat in 1981, and made an unsuccessful coup attempt against Numeiri 
regime in Sudan in 1985. Thereafter, the Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak refused 
to allow their party to be represented in various state organs (e.g., parliament), and 
pursued an iron-fisted policy toward their military wing. The same trend can be 
noticed in Sudan and Jordan in 1980s and 1990s.  
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In Tunisia and Syria, the iron-fisted policy was pursued in respect of both wings. Both 
regimes refused to permit the political wing of these movements to run in elections. 
Leaders of the Tunisian major Islamic organization (the Mouvement de la Tendance 
Islamique) thus, had to suffer the detention or deportation before their movement was 
formally dissolved in 1990s. The same thing can be said about the Syrian Islamic 
Movement, of which most leaders were either detained or exiled by the regime.66  
 
The Arab state policy toward Islamic movements might reveal the overall policy of 
this state toward society in 1980s and 1990s. Continuously, the Arab state seeks to 
assert its rule and to enhance its legitimacy. Toward this end, it tends to undermine the 
emergence of any real opposition. Political parties in this context either are denied 
access to real political power (Tunisia and Syria’s policy toward Islamic movements) 
or are used as an instrument in the hands of state to enhance its legitimacy (Sudan and 
Egypt’s policy toward the same movements). In the meanwhile, the Arab state tends 
to assume hegemony over civil society (e.g., professional associations) and 
undermines basic human rights (e.g., right to freedom of expression). In so doing, the 
Arab state is backed by the security forces, in particular the intelligence. The Arab 
state, Ayubi notes, “is a fierce state that has frequently to resort to raw coercion in 
order to preserve itself…” 67  
 
While Arab state does so, it failed to achieve economic development, and hence, left 
the majority of its citizens economically deprived. Access to wealth in the Arab world 
is associated with access to the levers of state power. Given the fact that access to 
levers of state power is confined only to special social stratum (e.g., Hashemite family 
and their supporters in Jordan, Saud clan and their supporters in Saudia Arabia, the 
Ba’ath supporters in Syria), the Arab state emerged as instrument in the hands of 
specific social groups to achieve economic gains.  
 Rethinking the Arab State 
 
By means of this discussion it becomes clear that the current Arab state is the most 
enduring legacy of the colonial era. But this is not to say that all Arab states were a 
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direct result of colonial imposition. Some of these states were a direct imposition 
(Lebanon, Syria, Jordan, and Iraq), while others were an indirect result of capitalist 
penetration (Egypt, North African countries, Gulf States and Saudi Arabia). But no 
doubt all of them came into being within the context of integrating the Arab world 
into the international capitalist system, and thus were born as tributaries.  
 
The fact that the Arab state is connected with the colonial era left a negative 
impression of the relationship of this state with its people. The concept of 
centralization of political power is a new phenomenon, which was experienced only, 
as has been shown, during the colonial era. Thus, the state in terms of a central 
authority that monopolizes the right of issuing binding rules over a territorially 
defined population is not accepted without question, as it brings back memories of 
colonial administration. Accordingly, the legitimacy of the Arab state as the 
appropriate framework for solving the crucial issues of society is questionable.68  
 
In addition, Arabs still conceive of themselves as one nation with the same history, 
language, culture, and ethnic background. This perception found its political 
expression very early on with the attempt of Sharif Hussein during the First World 
War to separate from the Ottoman Empire and to establish an independent Arab state. 
But with the ratification of the mandate system by the League of Nations in July 1922, 
the Pan-Arab project had receded and each Arabic country, from that year onward, 
would face its fate alone.  
 
However, the idea of Arab unity had not disappeared, and once again it found its 
institutional expression with the establishment of the League of Arab states in 1945, 
and found its unprecedented political expression with the rise of Jamal Abd El Nasser 
to power in Egypt in 1953 and the following Egyptian-Syrian unity in the period of 
1958-1961. But the Israeli-Arab war in 1967 and the defeat of Nasser's regime in that 
war weakened the Arab unity project and raised, instead, regionalism. With the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait in August 1990, the Arab unity project totally collapsed and 
regionalism strongly prevailed. Despite this check, the appeal to Arab unity has not 
been stilled; on the contrary, until the present time it has many supporters. 
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Arab unity ideology, or Pan-Arabism, is not the only super-state ideology that marks 
the Arab world. Alongside this ideology is Islam. The majority of Arabs are Muslims. 
The call for an Islamic state that governs according to Islamic codes is another basic 
feature of Arab politics. This appeal emerged after the 1967 defeat, a defeat that was 
to be understood in terms of Pan-Arabism ideological failure to face the historical 
challenges encountered by Arabs. In the 1970s, the appeal gained strong momentum 
due to the failure of the Arab state to realize social justice, and the success of the 
Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979. The historical origin of this appeal is to be found 
in the Muslim Brotherhood movement that emerged in 1928. Starting in Egypt, this 
movement moved across different Arab countries, and formed a serious threat to the 
secular state in the Arab world.  
 
For example, the origin of the Palestinian Islamic movement Hamas, which forms the 
most serious challenge to the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) rule, is to be found in this 
earlier movement.  By adopting Islam as the ideological framework for governing the 
relationship between people and the political authority, this movement offers a 
challenging alternative to the secular framework of the nation-state. Simon Bromley 
asserted that the ideologies of Islam and nationality are by definition exclusive: it is 
not possible for them to coexist.69 While the concept of nationality implies loyalty to a 
territorially defined population, Islam overlaps territories and asserts ideological and 
religious linkage at the expense of the political and legal linkage of nationality.  
 
The tribal social formation which dominated the Arab world offers another challenge 
to the nation state. As mentioned elsewhere, this formation does not imply the 
traditional Marxist correspondence between the economic mode of production and the 
ideological superstructure. Thus, and despite the retreat of the tribe as a form of social 
production, tribal culture remained another basic aspect of Arab politics. In contrast to 
the nation-state, which stresses loyalty to a territorially defined population and asserts 
formal and impersonal criteria as bases for status, the tribe gives primacy to kinship  
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criteria, stresses loyalty to a narrow community that shares the same blood lineage, 
and asserts informal /personal criteria as bases for status.70
 
Thus, the homogeneous population, with the exception of Egypt, as a pre-condition 
for the nation state is absent from the Arab world. Not only this, but also the 
economic foundation necessary for the nation state is absent. Reinhard Bendix 
asserted the development of capitalist relationships as a pre-condition for the nation 
state. According to Bendix, the emergence of capitalist society with its focus on 
formal contractual relationships is the factor which allowed the individual to conceive 
of his liberty in terms of being part of a wider political community, and thus 
appearing as a self-standing entity in legal and political relationship with the political 
authority.71  
 
As regards the Arab world, we have noted how the colonial powers circumscribed the 
bourgeoisie in the agricultural sector. This bourgeoisie was denied any access to 
industrialization (except for some isolated social groups that invested in sectors 
derived from agricultural commercialization: finance, communication, commerce, and 
so on). After independence a specific model of industrialization emerged: “import-
substitution model”. Within the context of this model, the Arab state assumed the role 
of the bourgeoisie, and pursued industrialization through a dependence on foreign aid 
and capital (Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and Tunisia, in 1950s-1970 are good 
examples).  
 
In so doing, the Arab state led the bourgeoisie and emerged as a capitalist state. 
Nevertheless, the Arab state emerged as a capitalist state not in the Marxist sense 
which is based on social stratification; rather, in the sense of “state-led industrial 
projects.” To put it in different terms, the Arab state tended to assume hegemony over 
the economy. Though the period of the 1970s and 1980s witnessed a general trend in 
the whole Arab world toward economic liberalization, the bourgeois class which 
emerged was self-interested but was very much connected to state. This was so much 
so that it hindered the development of an independent and strong bourgeois class, and 
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hence, impeded the development of inter-state capitalist relationships in the Arab 
world.  
 
The above-mentioned conditions (Pan-Arabism, Islam, tribal culture, weak capitalist 
relationships) created a situation in which the individual has a multitude of loyalties. 
On the one hand, he belongs to a specific tribe, and on the other he belongs to the 
Arab nation and Muslim community, and maybe to a given class. Thus, the individual 
came to be defined always in reference to a wider community. As a result, the concept 
of “individualism”, in the sense of the individual as separate entity in his own right, 
had not emerged.  This led to a situation where the state as an outcome of “Locke’s 
social contract” is unknown, and thus liberty as a legal and contractual right of an 
individual is also unknown.72   
 
At another level this multitude of loyalties of the individual made it difficult for an 
Arab state to morally penetrate the identity of its people and to restructure it according 
to new premises.  The Arab state finds huge difficulties in getting its people to obey 
its rules and in absorbing and mobilizing them within a state-based moral framework. 
This normative foundation of state power or what Michael Mann calls the 
“infrastructural power” is lacking in the Arab world.73 The state is lacking the 
capability of securing the loyalty of individual citizens over their pre-existing forms 
of tribal or super-state-ideological loyalties.  
 
This situation created the potential of what Theda Skocpol, relying on Charles Tilly’s 
conception of revolution in his Mobilization to Revolution, calls the “Multiple 
Sovereignty”, 74  where the state encounters forces that claim the moral right to rule 
the society (the Islamic fundamentalist movements for instance). Thus, political 
conflict in the Arab world came to revolve not around the content of specific policies, 
whether social or economic, as in the case of Europe, but around fundamental issues 
related to the very essence of the state as appropriate ruler of society. 
 
As a result of this situation, the Arab state appears in continuous attempts to assert its 
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rule and to enhance its legitimacy. Thereby, it tends to undermine the emergence of 
any real opposition. Political parties in this context either are denied access to real 
political power or are used as an instrument in the hands of the state to enhance its 
legitimacy. This implies that political parties in terms of vehicles for public 
participation are either weak or absent from the Arab world. This is understandable, 
given the weak and dependent Arab bourgeoisie. This character of the Arab 
bourgeoisie denies it the ability to organize itself on the grounds of well-defined 
economic and social demands that can be channeled to state institutions, and thus 
politically expressed by a given state policy.  
 
The state's attempts to enhance its legitimacy touch the administrative system. It is the 
administrative system which is used as a mechanism for mobilizing people and 
enhancing the state's legitimacy. By such action the state politicized the 
administration and thus undermined the traditional democratic separation between 
politics and administration which implies an implementation role for the state's 
bureaucracy. This separation is not well developed in the Arab world. The 
politicization of administration was achieved through the state’s diffusion of networks 
of patronage-client relationships.  
 
Even the building of military administration takes place within the context of a state's 
attempts to enhance its legitimacy. The state tends to be highly selective in recruiting 
military personnel. Usually, they are drawn from specific tribes, sects, and loyalists to 
the President (Egypt, Syria, and Iraq). In some other cases, such as the Gulf countries 
and Saudi Arabia, the military is placed under direct supervision of the ruling family’s 
members. In some extreme cases, such as Jordan, the military is placed under direct 
supervision of the King, who assumes the role of commander-in-chief.75
 
To conclude as to the Arab state, it seems that this type of statehood tends to assume 
complete hegemony over society by assuming the role of patron with regard to the 
economy and by politicizing the bureaucracy as well as the military.  Furthermore, it 
seems that this state tends also to assume ideological hegemony by co-opting civil 
society and absorbing it within state ideology.  Though this helps it to assume 
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autonomy from popular will, it simultaneously brings its legitimacy into doubt in 
terms of its capacity to gain the voluntary compliance of its people. Accordingly, 
terror and violence emerge as a prominent aspect of the Arab state's relation to its 
society.   
 
These are the main features of the Arab state that was born within the context of the 
colonial hegemony in the region. Now the question which might arise, as far as 
Palestine is concerned: did Palestinians undergo a different historical experience from 
that of Arabs, and if they did, what are the main characteristics of this experience and 
how will this contribute to the current process of state building?  
 
Unlike most of the Arab countries, Palestinians were confronted from the very 
beginning by the ambition of another people (the Jews) who sought to uproot them 
from their land and to establish their own state. By the Palestinians' unfortunate lot, 
the mandate writ backed such ambition when it included the Balfour declaration 
(which stipulated a British support for a Jewish national home in Palestine- as we will 
see later) in its preamble and thus granted such ambition international sanction. This 
grant blocked all Palestinian attempts to enjoy any access to state institutions, in 
particular the national level institutions (e.g., parliament). Despite this, Palestinians 
were permitted to take part in the local level institutions (municipal and rural 
councils) under the Mandate.  
 
In tracing the historical development of Palestinian state building, therefore, I will 
highlight the development of the Palestinian access to the national and local level 
institutions of state functions under various foreign powers that ruled Palestinians 
since the nineteenth century up to 1993, when the Oslo treaty was signed and enabled 
Palestinians, for the first time in their history, to enjoy their own Para-state institutions 
(Cabinet, parliament, Bureaucratic system-“national level institutions of state 
functions”). Mainly, I will focus on the Ottoman, British, Jordanian, Egyptian, and 
Israeli era.  My aim is to find out how these initial conditions were translated into the 
Para-state institutions provided by the Oslo process.  
 
 44
Chapter II: The Palestinian Autonomy 
Historical Overview 
 
Among other things, the system of local autonomy seeks to encourage public 
participation in the “provision and administration of governmental services”, and 
hence to motivate and advance political leadership.76 Rural and municipal councils, 
which form the main building blocks of this system, are devised to achieve two goals: 
public participation in the provision of governmental services, and the recruitment of 
political leadership. Accordingly, these councils constitute important and politically 
powerful government institutions; as such, they are also accompanied by key national 
government bodies like parliament and cabinet.  
 
In this sense it was not before the second half of the 19th century that the first signs of 
Palestinian access to national & local state institutions (via parliament and rural & 
municipal councils, respectively) occurred. At this time Palestine was controlled by 
the Ottomans, a population that experienced significant challenges to its rule during 
the first half of 19th century. The most important of these challenges was the rebellion 
of the Wali of Egypt and Mohammad Ali against the Porte, and Mohammad Ali's 
occupation of Palestine and Syria for about one decade (1831-1840).77 This 
occupation greatly alarmed the Ottomans, who were, from then onwards, deeply 
concerned about the potential emergence of a centre of political activities or 
opposition to their rule.  
 
Consequently, once Ali's regime was overthrown with British help and Ottoman rule 
restored in Palestine and Syria, the Ottomans adopted a set of reform measures 
(tanzimat) in a bid to tighten their control over the imperial territories.78 The reform 
measures included comprehensive institutional arrangements aimed at structural 
adjustments in the financial, military, judicial, administrative, educational and 
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economic sectors. It also included measures and regulations aimed at redefining the 
concept of “citizenship” in accordance with a Western perspective.  
 
Of primary concern to our interests is the measure enacted in the 1850s, which set up 
Administrative Councils (Majlis adara) at the provincial level. These councils, which 
enjoyed financial, administrative, and judicial authorities, were set up to counter the 
Wali power and to serve as the institutional foundation for social mobilization and 
political participation. Three Muslims alongside a proportionate number of the non-
Muslims were elected to the council. Another three Muslims (among the religious 
functionaries) were appointed. The nomination for these councils was open to any one 
who was older than 30 and paid more than 15 piaster in annual taxation.79   
 
Due to these provisions, most of those who gained access to these councils were from 
rich Palestinian families — the ayan (urban notables), according to Albert Hourani’s 
terminology.80 The middle and lower classes of society were therefore 
underrepresented and non-Muslim deputies were marginalized. In the 1850s, the 
British Consul James Finn confirmed the situation when he noted: “it should be 
mentioned that a close corporation of Arab families, not recognized by law, but 
influential by position, usurped all municipal offices among them”.81  
 
The most prominent of these families were El Husayni, El Nashashibi, Al Alami, and 
El Dajani. In the pre-reform period these families occupied important religious posts 
such as Mufti (official expounder of Muslim law), Shari’a court jurist, Naqib Al 
asharf (steward of the descendants of the Prophet), and Sheikh El Harm (guardian of 
Al Aqsa Mosque and the Dome of the Rock), and consequently had enhanced status.82  
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With the introduction of the provincial councils, members of these same families were 
elected or appointed to them as well. Gradually, these prominent families succeeded 
to dominate the councils at the expense of both the non-Muslim deputies and the 
village Sheikhs, who themselves enjoyed the right of Iltizam (Tax-farming) in the pre-
reform period. According to the Musha system, this right enabled the village Sheikhs 
to collect taxes from the peasants who cultivated their land.83 When the provincial 
councils were formed, however, they were empowered to decide on the distribution of 
Iltizam and the ayan, used their status and membership in the councils to transfer the 
right from the village Sheikhs to themselves.84  
 
This shift was very much connected to other developments sparked by the land reform 
law of 1858. The law sought to strengthen state control over miri land (state land) and 
thus called peasants to register their land and pay tax on it in cash.85 Instead of 
strengthening the state’s control over miri land, however, the law enabled the ayan to 
consolidate and control large estates of land. The ayan were in part able to do this by 
taking advantage of the peasants’ illiteracy and their fears that they would be 
conscripted into the Ottoman army if their real names appeared in Ottoman 
authorities’ files.  Due to this fear of conscription, most of peasants refrained from 
registering their land in their real names; instead they registered it in the names of the 
ayan who had access to the authorities in an attempt to exempt themselves from 
appearing in these files.  In addition, the demand to pay the land tax in cash forced 
many peasants to register their land in the names of money-lenders (connected to the 
ayan) to whom they failed to repay debts (the natural result of extortionate interest 
rates).  
 
These rates, estimated by one scholar at 10-50%,86 forced some peasants to eventually 
yield their land to money-lenders in exchange for having their debts written off. The 
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overall outcome of the situation was that large stretches of land were consolidated 
under the control of a few ayan, and status of peasants shifted from that of a land 
owner to that or either a tenant or agricultural laborer on an ayan’s estate.  
 
In 1864 the Ottomans became aware of the negative ramifications of their tanizmat in 
respect to local government. Accordingly, the Vilayet law was introduced to promote 
local government at village and town levels. The law, enacted in 1867, introduced a 
system of Nahiyas (rural districts) at the village and town levels. Each Nahiya was 
said to be under the control of a Mudir, who functioned as the chair of his local 
council. However, few councils were actually established, and the position of 
Mukhtar (Chief of the Village) introduced by the same law generally assumed the 
functions intended for the rural councils.87  
 
The Vilayet law also elected a municipal council for Jerusalem, and in 1876 the 
Ottomans enacted a second law that granted 22 towns and large villages municipal 
status.88 Yet while the municipal councils of these towns were said to be elected, the 
voting qualifications were unfairly demanding, and only those aged 25 and older, who 
paid more than 25 piaster in annual tax on property or income, were eligible to vote.89   
 
In light of this narrow electoral base, the ayan control of most Palestinian land, and 
the fact that the Ottoman authorities retained the right to appoint mayors, it comes as 
no surprise that the ayan again dominated these councils. The first mayor of 
Jerusalem belonged to the El Husayni family (Salim El Husayni), and was succeeded 
by Faidy Al-Alami and Musa Kazim El Husayni.90  Moreover, the ayan were the only 
social stratum which had access to the Parliament provided by the 1876 constitution. 
In 1911 both Sa’id El-Husayni and Ruhi Al Khalidi were elected to Ottoman 
Parliament as representatives of the Jerusalem constituency.91   
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This state of affairs, in which only the ayan and Mukhtars had access to national & 
local level political institutions (parliament, and municipal and rural councils, 
respectively) continued until the First World War, a conflict which instigated two 
developments that vitally impacted the ability of Palestinians to access their political 
institutions.  The first development was the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, and the 
consequent termination of its rule over Palestine. The second unfolded as the capture 
of Palestine by British forces in December 1917 coupled with the new Zionist venture 
in Palestine. Through these two developments, Palestinians were still denied access to 
national state institutions, but were permitted to participate in local government 
bodies.   
Palestinian Autonomy under British Mandate 
 
In December 1917, British forces captured Palestine, and set up a military 
administration for approximately four years, before introducing a civil administration 
in 1922 to implement the resolutions of the 1920 San-Rimo peace conference. This 
conference placed Palestine under the British mandate; yet, unlike mandate systems 
instituted in the rest of the Arab world, the mandate in Palestine — which was 
formally recognized by the League of Nations on 24 July 1922 — incorporated the 
Belfour declaration and singled out Palestine to become the site of a new Jewish 
national home.92  
 
Due to this specific decision, the mandatory government was legally obliged to place 
“...the country under such political, administrative, and economic conditions as well 
secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home” and to “facilitate Jewish 
immigration” to Palestine (article 2 & 6 of the League of Nations mandate over 
Palestine provided). The writ of the mandate went further and enabled Jews to have 
their own representative body  (the Jewish Agency) “...for the purpose of advising and 
co-operating with the administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other 
matters as may effect the establishment of the Jewish National Home and the Interests 
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of the Jewish population in Palestine...” (Art. 4).  These particulars are extremely 
important to consider when addressing the political motivations and concerns which 
guided the mandatory government in drafting legislation related to Palestinian 
autonomy.  
 
From the very beginning it was clear that the mandatory government’s policy toward 
Palestinian autonomy and Palestinian access to any level of state power would be 
restrained by the provisions of the Mandate (including the Belfour declaration). In 
light of these restrictions, the mandatory government was going to implement the 
provisions of article (3) providing for a Palestinian autonomy.93  The first move made 
to promote some form of Palestinian autonomy occurred in December 1921, when the 
mandatory government issued an order providing for the establishment of a Supreme-
Muslim Council (SMC) for the control and management of Shari’a affairs and 
Muslim Awqaf (land which is considered to be collectively owned by all Muslims — 
for example, the Dome on the Rock or the Al Aqsa Mosque complex). The SMC was 
empowered with the right to nominate, for the approval of the mandatory government, 
various religious functionaries, and was intended to administer the Waqf fund. 
Through the creation of the SMC, the mandatory government franchised Palestinians 
right to exercise religious authority. Amin El Husayni, a young member of El Husayni 
family and new Mufti of Jerusalem, was appointed head of the council.94
 
Alongside the SMC, the mandatory government left Palestinians enjoying their own 
political institutions. In this regard, it tolerated, and possibly supported, the Muslim-
Christian Association (MCA) founded in 1918 as an institutional expression of the 
Palestinian opposition for the Belfour declaration and Jewish immigration to 
Palestine.95 Later, it tolerated the Arab Executive (AE), which evolved from the MCA 
in 1920 and was chaired by Musa Kazim El Husayni. Though it did not recognize it as 
de-jure representative of Palestinians, the mandatory government dealt with the AE as 
a de- facto representative of all Palestinians during 1920s.  
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From the mandatory government’s point of view, these institutions were necessary 
because they provided Palestinians a voice and created a channel of communication 
between itself and the Palestinian population. In this sense, the mandatory government 
sought to appease Palestinians and to keep a balance of power between the two 
populations (Palestinians and Jews, the latter of which already had a representative 
body: ‘the Jewish Agency’). From the mandatory government's point of view this 
gesture was expected to pave the way for including Palestinians in formal state 
institutions, and thus to implement the mandate policy.  But was this analysis correct?  
 
The mandatory government failed in its estimate of the Palestinians' principle 
opposition to the mandate terms stipulating a Jewish national home be created in the 
country. This opposition supported the criticisms launched by the SMC and the AE 
against the seven Palestinians (four Muslims and three Christian) who joined three 
Jewish and ten British officials in the advisory council set up by the Higher 
Commissioner to pass legislations regarding issues of concern for Muslims, Christians 
and Jews in October 1920.96  This wave of criticism promoted the resignation of the 
above-mentioned Palestinians from the council, and consequently forced the 
mandatory government to declare on 10 August 1922 its ordinance “Palestine Order-
in-Council”.97 The new ordinance, which provided for a legislative assembly 
comprised of twenty-two members in addition to a non-elected higher commissioner, 
constituted a further attempt to contain the traditional elite represented by the AE, and 
to enable Palestinians to take part in national level government institutions. But the 
proposed power and structure of this legislative body failed to secure the necessary 
moral approval from the AE, which remained dissatisfied with the process.  
 
Firstly, the constitution enabled the higher commissioner to veto any legislation that 
“concerns matters dealt specifically by the provision of the Mandate” (Art. 26 of the 
1922’s constitution). Furthermore, the structure of the legislative assembly in fact 
problematised Palestinian decision-making processes regarding important issues like 
Jewish immigration. Out of the twenty-two elected members of this body, ten 
members were said to be British officials, and twelve were elected (Art. 19).  
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According to Sir Herbert Samuel, the British Higher Commissioner to Palestine in the 
period of 1920-1925, out of the twelve elected seats of the legislative body, eight were 
assigned to Muslims, two to Christians and two others to Jews. This distribution, 
according to Sir Samuel, went against the wishes of the AE, which demanded an 
overwhelming majority of Palestinians in the council. When the mandatory 
government rejected the AE’s demand, Palestinians announced a boycott of the 
elections proposed for the following year. The High Commissioner then suspended 
the proposed legislative body, and continued to exercise legislative powers himself, in 
consultation with the advisory council.98  
 
The developments concerning 1922’s constitution might reveal the main issue of 
conflict between Palestinians and the mandatory government, as far as Palestinian 
participation in the administration of public affairs was concerned. While the 
mandatory government was, in principle, prepared and desired to give Palestinians the 
opportunity to share state authority, it was not willing to permit them any state 
authority in ways potentially inconsistent with the provisions of the mandate.  
 
On the other hand, Palestinians were also aspiring to attain complete national 
government responsibility through a national legislative assembly that would claim all 
rights to decide on issues related to the country, including that of it becoming a Jewish 
National homeland.99 This position made Palestinian participation in the 
administration of the country, according to the terms of the mandate, impossible. 
Though a similar attempt was made to enable Palestinians to participate in the 
administration of public affairs, it too failed for the same reasons.100 The inability of 
the mandatory government to convince Palestinians to take part in national level state 
institutions was further problematised by the government's inability to promote 
effective Palestinian local autonomy.  
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We have seen that under the Ottoman regime the rural population were denied power 
to control their own affairs, and the Mukhtars managed to assume the rural councils’ 
functions. In 1921, the mandatory government sought to revise this situation when it 
promulgated the “Local Council Ordinance,” providing for the creation of local 
councils at both village and town levels. These councils were given the rights to 
impose and collect fees, taxes and other charges. Also they were empowered with the 
right to issue by-laws for securing good order in the village. However, the autonomy 
of these councils was very limited. It was the British district commissioner who 
enjoyed the rights to approve rates of tax, levy rates, the councils’ annual expenditure 
and revenue, as well as the councils’ by-laws. According to this restricted legal base 
for rural autonomy, by 1924 the mandatory government enabled twenty-seven rural 
areas, four of which were Jewish, to have rural councils.101  
 
 As far as the Palestinian local councils were concerned, and in the Peel 
Commission's102 point of view, two factors kept these councils from functioning as 
effective tools of wide political participation. The first factor was the sweeping power 
conferred to the British commissioner, and the second was the social and cultural 
setting of the rural areas.103 In various occasions, the former factor left the future of 
these councils hostage to the political winds of the country. In 1930, for instance, 
following the Western Wall events,104 the higher commissioner abolished the rural 
councils in six Palestinian Villages.105 The latter factor (the matter of social and 
cultural setting) was the most serious since it dealt with issues that needed much time 
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to be remedied. One main feature of this cultural setting was its emphasis on 
community affiliation at the expense of any other form of modern affiliation (for 
example, national affiliation). Provided for by this cultural setting, the decision-
making process was thus guided by factors other than rational choices.106   
 
This means that there was an absence of any normative foundation to support efficient 
systems of local government at the village level. The problem was aggravated by the 
failure of the mandate to significantly promote education as an instrument of building 
such a normative foundation. In 1932, the school age population in Palestine was 
estimated at 215,000. Of this, only 25,000 had access to schools.107 In such 
circumstance, it would not be difficult for the traditional power-oriented or patriarchal 
culture to penetrate these councils and to stamp them with its traditional concept of 
authority, a concept which assigned a mediating role to the leader that placed him 
between the public and superior powers. The role of these councils, consequently, 
became to mediate between villagers and the mandatory government.      
 
Due to its failure to promote an efficient system of local government in rural areas, 
the mandatory government abolished the 1921 ordinance, and enacted a new one 
(ordinance no. 36) in 1941. This new ordinance reasserted the powers of rural 
councils originally provided by the 1921 ordinance, and added additional powers 
including the right to issue by-laws in domains like health and internal administration 
(for example, regarding roads development) as well as in some municipal domains (to 
do with the supply of electricity and water, for instance). Rural councils also gained 
the right to impose a fine on villagers who breached the council’s by-laws. This fine 
was set at five pounds, and was said to increase by one pound per each day during 
which the breach continued.108  
 
In 1945, the mandatory government went further and promulgated its Ordinance No. 
29 concerning local councils (Local Authorities “Business Tax” Ordinance). The 
Ordinance, which also covered the municipal councils, empowered rural councils with 
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the right to levy tax on all persons carrying out business and trade activities within the 
council’s territory of jurisdiction. In this sense, the Ordinance franchised the rural 
council with further authorities, in addition to its extant ones.109 However, the causes 
which impeded the success of the 1921 ordinance remained unresolved in the 1940s, 
and the new Ordinances, notwithstanding the additional powers and authorities they 
conferred to the rural councils, kept the power and authorities of the district 
commissioner (granted by the 1921 ordinance) in place.  
 
The district commissioner, for instance, had the right to dissolve these councils any 
time he considered it proper to do so. Furthermore, the duration of any council 
meeting was decided by the district commissioner, and any activities carried out by 
these councils had to be approved by the district commissioner (Article 10 of Local 
Council Ordinance No. 36 of 1941). The 1945 Local Authorities “Business Order” 
even reserved the power to approve or disapprove any verification in the Business tax 
which these councils empowered to levy (Article 4 Local Authorities “Business Tax” 
Ordinance No. 29 of 1945”) for the district commissioner.   
 
Exacerbating the potential problems of the above political arrangements, the village’s 
cultural setting remained hostile to any trend of institutionalization. The failure of the 
mandate to bring about any significant cultural changes in this respect (through 
education for example) allowed for a large a percent of Palestinian villagers to be 
hostile to rural councils and prompted villagers to perceive such councils as threats to 
their traditional way of life. This belief was strengthened among Palestinian villagers 
by the fact that the mandatory government, which founded these councils, was a 
foreign power. 
 
In fact, this situation reveals the other side of the problem. When the mandatory 
government enacted its ordinances, it was inspired by a European culture which 
emphasised horizontal relations and the individual as a self-contained entity. This 
contradicted the traditional cultural setting of the Palestinian village, which 
emphasised vertical relations and community affiliation. The facts that the number of 
Palestinian rural councils decreased from 23 in 1924 to 11 in 1948, the year when the 
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mandate was terminated, and that the local Jewish councils (which mainly served 
European–oriented communities) increased from 4 in 1924 to 26 councils in 1948,110 
seem to confirm how various cultural settings demote or promote the success of local 
authority schemes.   
 
At the municipal level, various legal and political factors impeded the advancement of 
an efficient municipal system, creating to a situation in which municipalities “...serve 
as the collective mouthpiece of the people towards the District governors...they are 
permitted to carry out their functions as independently as possible, but it is at the same 
time essential that their activities should be carefully correlated with those of district 
administration; and with this end in view each District Governor is responsible for the 
work of the local authorities within his district”.111  
 
This was the situation in which the municipalities found themselves up to 1927, when 
the first municipal elections were conducted. Before that, the mandatory government 
appointed mayors and deputy-mayors to the various municipal councils. When the 
mandatory government promulgated the first Municipal Franchise Ordinance in 1926, 
providing for elected municipal councils, the voting qualifications were so demanding 
that only male Palestinian citizens of 25 years and upwards, with tax-rate paying 
qualifications, were eligible to vote.112 Thanks to this system, only the ayan, who 
enjoyed high standards of living in comparison to other Palestinians, had been eligible 
to vote and run in elections. When the elections were held in 1927, the ayan filled 
most of the Arab municipal councils. For instance, out of a total of 12 seats in a 
municipal council in Jerusalem, ten of these were occupied by the ayan and their 
Christian supporters.113  
 
Most of these ayan belonged to the El Nashashibi opposition camp, and were 
involved in politics. Mainly, they ran the elections according to their competition with 
the El Husayni Camp (this is to say, the AE and the SMC), whose supporters won 
only two seats in the municipal council of Jerusalem. The Al-Nashashibi opposition 
camp emerged in the early 1920s, when Raghib Al Nashashibi, then the Mayor of 
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Jerusalem, founded the “Arab National Party” as a counter-political front for the AE 
and SMC. The party, which embraced members of the ayan such as Suleiman al-Taji 
al-Faroukhi, Arif El Dajani, Khalil al-Khalidi and Asa’ad Al-Shuqayri, adopted a 
more cooperative policy towards the mandatory government, notwithstanding its 
rejection of the Belfour declaration.114 In this sense, the camp stood in opposition to 
the non-cooperative policy of the AE and the SMC, despite the fact that its members 
were derived from the same social class of the AE and SMC’s members.  This fact 
reveals the other problem that stalled the advancement of an efficient municipal 
system: a mixing of the civil domain with the political domain in a manner that 
diverted councils from their intended purposes.  
 
This above situation forced the mandatory government to set 1930 as a year of new 
municipal elections; however, the outbreak of the Western Wall events abrogated 
these elections.115 In 1934, further attempts were made by the mandatory government 
to activate the municipal system when it promulgated the Municipal Corporations 
Ordinance, but once again the ordinance conferred sweeping powers and authorities 
on the Higher Commissioner. The Higher Commissioner enjoyed the right to appoint 
and dismiss mayors and deputy mayors, the right to fix their salaries, the right to 
dissolve the councils and call elections, the right to approve members of any 
committee formed by the councils to regulate and supervise the administration of the 
civil issues (water supplies, town planning, and so on), the right to approve council 
transactions, to supervise the council accounts and to approve the council loans, and 
to approve by-laws.116
 
Importantly, however, the Municipal Corporations Ordinance enabled every 
townsman to vote in elections (Article 14). However, the Second Schedule annexed to 
the ordinance defined 'townsman' as every male Palestinian of 21 years or more, with 
tax-paying qualifications. (Article 2 of the “Second Schedule” of the ordinance). Thus 
the provisions maintained the municipal electoral base as very narrow. The “Forth 
Schedule” of the ordinance also asked that any Palestinian who wished to run for the 
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election to said councils be literate (Article 2 of the Fourth Schedule of the 
ordinance). Given the fact that the ayan were the most educated among Palestinians, 
they alone became eligible to run for election.  
 
Based on this narrow electoral base, new municipal elections took place in twenty-two 
municipal areas in 1934.117 Of course the elected councillors came from the ayan, 
who could pay the annual tax on property/income, and who had access to education. 
In addition to their unrepresentative nature, most of these twenty-two new elected 
municipalities suffered a lack of public support (mainly due to the cultural setting), as 
well as an inability to assume any initiative thanks to strict governmental control 
provided for in the 1934 ordinance.118 This state of affairs lasted until 1936, when the 
Great Revolt (1936-1939) erupted.  
 
At the outbreak of the Great Revolt, not a few of the Palestinian mayors were 
involved in the revolution’s activities and some of them, like the mayor of Jerusalem 
Dr. Hussein Fakhri Effendin al-Khalidi, joined the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) 
that had been set up to direct revolutionary activities under the leadership of the 
SMC’s president Amin El Husayni.119 Owing to the escalation of these activities, a 
Royal British commission of inquiry (called the Peel-Commission) arrived in 
Palestine in November 1936 to investigate the reasons for the unrest. Its report 
concluded in July 1937 with the commission recommending the abrogation of the 
mandate, and a partitioning of Palestine into two states: one for Jews and the other for 
Palestinians. The AHC’s leaders, with the exception of Raghib Al Nashashibi, 
rejected the partition proposal and declared their fundamental opposition to a cession 
of any part of Palestine.  
 
The AHC rejection of the partition plan, along with the murder of the British district 
commissioner of Galilee L.Y. Andrews, marked a new phase in the future of 
Palestinian mayors.120 The mandatory government, shocked by Andrews’ murder, 
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declared AHC illegal and arrested most of its leaders. The remaining members of the 
AHC had to follow in the footsteps of Amin El Husayni, who fled the country after 
being fired from the presidency of the SMC. With the collapse of the AHC and the 
detention of its members, those mayors who joined the AHC, and those who were 
involved in revolutionary activities, were removed from office.  
 
On the eve of the Second World War then, a total of eight Palestinian mayors found 
themselves removed from office for political reasons.121  The mandatory government 
measure against these mayors restrained the remaining fourteen elected mayors still in 
place from involving them in any political activities. This describes the Palestinian 
mayoral scene up to the end of the Second World War, after which point the 8 
removed mayors resumed their political activities (before the State of Israel was 
declared in May 1948).  
 
The inception of the state of Israel terminated the Mandate rule over Palestine, and 
scattered the Palestinian society throughout the Arab world. While some 160,000 
Palestinians remained in the territories under Israeli control, and were then dubbed the 
“Arabs of Israel”, still around 750,000 Palestinian were displaced from their land and 
scattered throughout neighboring Arab countries, the West Bank and the Gaza Strip 
(the only Palestinian lands which remained under Arab control after the war). Of this 
number, tens of thousands joined the 70,000-100,000 Palestinians who already 
inhabited the Gaza Strip, while other tens of thousands joined the 350,000 
Palestinians in West Bank. The remaining Palestinians dispersed between 
Transjordan, Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, and other countries.122  
 
The dispersion of Palestinian society throughout the Arab world left the issue of 
Palestinian access to national and local level state institutions subject to the good will 
of those Arab states, in particular to Jordan and Egypt, under whose control the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip (the only Arab territories remaining after the war) came to 
rest. While Egypt did not extend citizenship to the inhabitants of the Gaza Strip, 
leaving them to maintain their Palestinian nationality, Transjordan did. Egypt, 
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accordingly, supported the establishment of the “all Palestine Government” in Gaza in 
September 1948, but the powers and the authorities of this government were shadowy, 
and limited by Egypt's permission (the country enacting military administration within 
the Gaza Strip).  
 
The "all Palestine Government", first headed by Ahmad Hilmi Pasha before Amin El 
Husayni took it over, was thus used by Egypt as an instrument to abrogate the 
ambitions of the Amir of Transjordan Abdallah in the West Bank. Abdallah, who 
sought to extend his rule over the West Bank, sponsored two conferences of West 
Bank ayan, mainly involving those from the El Nashshaibi camp.  The most important 
of these conferences was the Jericho conference, which took place on 1 December. 
This conference, convened under the leadership of Sheikh Muhammad Ali al Jabari, 
the mayor of Hebron and loyal to Amir Abdallah, called for the immediate annexation 
of Arab Palestine to Transjordan under the crown of Abdallah. This resolution urged 
the Transjordan Parliament to endorse the annexation of the West Bank to 
Transjordan on 13 December, 1948.123  The eventual approval of the West Bank 
annexation by the Transjordan parliament marked the collapse of “the all Palestine 
Government Scheme” and placed the West Bank under Trans-Jordanian civil rule. 
Due to this split between Egyptian Military administration in the Gaza Strip, and 
Jordanian civil rule in the West Bank, the Gaza Strip and West Bank have had very 
separate experiences in terms of local autonomy. 
The Gaza Strip’s Autonomy under the Egyptian Rule  
 
The extension of Transjordanian civil rule over the West Bank and Egyptian military 
rule over the Gaza Strip initiated a new phase of Palestinian access to national & local 
level state institutions. During the mandate, as we have seen, the Palestinians were 
granted access to the national level institutions; however, due to political reasons, they 
refused to take part in these institutions. This situated Palestinians apart from state 
power, badly positioning them to take part in shaping the future of their country.  
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At the level of local government, rural and municipal councils were made available to 
Palestinians. Yet while Palestinians were involved with these institutions, cultural and 
political factors kept the institutions from developing an effective system of local 
government.  Generally, until the end of the mandate rule both the Gaza Strip and the 
West Bank shared the same historical experience in terms of Palestinian autonomy. 
However, once Egyptian military administration asserted itself in the Gaza Strip, and 
Jordanian civil rule in West Bank, these two regions were set on different paths. 
 
Unlike the West Bankers who gained access to national level state institutions shortly 
after its annexation, and who managed to influence state policies through these 
institutions (as will later be further explained), the Gazans had to wait until 1962 for 
such access. In the Gaza Strip, the Egyptian military governor, appointed by virtue of 
Order No. 1 of June 1st 1948, vested all the powers and authorities of the former 
British Higher Commissioner in himself124 and was consequently able to block Gazan 
access to all levels of state power. This was the situation until March 1962, when the 
Egyptian regime enacted a constitution that provided for a legislative council.125 
While this council, comprised of 22 elected and 10 appointed members (Art. 30), 
sought to encourage Gazan participation in the administration of the affairs of the 
Gaza Strip, the electoral base and the powers of this council were to narrow to attain 
this goal.  
 
To start with, the ten appointed members were decided on by the military governor, 
and only those who enjoyed the membership of the local committees of the Arab 
National Union “ANU” (which had formed as grassroots institution to support the 
Nasser regime of Egypt) had the right to participate in the election of twenty-two 
members to the council (Art. 30). In addition to the right to choose the ten non-elected 
members, the military governor, who himself presided over the council (Art. 30) and 
controlled the executive authorities (Art. 15), also retained the right to call or suspend 
the council’s sessions, to approve or disapprove the council’s Standing Order, and to 
veto and promulgate laws issued by the council (Art. 36, 40, 42). In exchange, the 
council, with the exception of its nominal right to question executive members, was 
                                                 
124 Order # 1 in  Al Waqea’  El Filistaniya (Arabic). The formal Gazette of Gaza Strip, Number 1, 31 
December 1949.  
125 Ibid. Extraordinary Volume, 29 March, 1962. 
 61
deprived of any right to hold the executive body accountable by means of motions of 
no-confidence, ad-hoc committees of inquiry, and other methods of monitoring (Art. 
44, 45). 
 
When the elections were held, only 345 Gazans voted. All the voters enjoyed the 
membership of the local committees of the Arab National Union mentioned above. 
The Gaza Strip was divided into four constituencies; Gaza (along with its surrounding 
villages and camps), Dier El Balah (along with its surrounding villages and camps), 
Khan Younis (along with its surrounding villages and camps), and Rafah (along with 
its surrounding villages and camps). The number of seats per constituency was 
stipulated in proportion to the number of members in the local Arab National Union 




# of members of local 
committees of ANU 
# of Seats 
Gaza 167 10 
Khan Younis 72 5 
Dier El Balah 57 4 
Rafah 49 3 
Total 345 22 
 
Source: Articles 2, and 3 of Order (12) for the year 1962 in Al Waqea’  El Filistaniya (Arabic), op.cit., 
Extraordinary Volume, 20 May 1962. 
 
 
The results of the elections again revealed an ayan domination over the council (the 
ayan being the original residents of the Gaza Strip). Out of the ten seats of the Gaza 
constituency, seven were occupied by the ayan, and out of the five seats of the Khan 
Younis constituency, four seats were occupied by the ayan. In a similar fashion, at 
least three seats of the seven designated to the Dier El Balah and Rafah constituencies 
were occupied by the ayan.126 Moreover, the Military governor appointed no less than 
five ayan (original residents) to the council. The ayan therefore occupied 19 seats 
(59%) of the 32 seats of the council.127 They constituted an overwhelming majority, 
by means of which they restored their earlier status and reproduced its influence over 
society, reversing its withdrawal forced by the inception of the state of Israel.   
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The tendency of the Egyptian regime to promote the idea of this council and to 
advance the status of the ayan in the Gaza Strip must be understood within the context 
of the challenges such regime encountered. In fact, the idea of the council was 
advanced after the collapse of Egypt’s union with Syria in 1961, and around the time 
of the rise to power of the Syrian Ba’ath (Arab Renaissance) party in 1963. The 
Ba’ath party, with its socialist-pan-Arabic ideology, proposed a serious threat to the 
Nasser-led pan-Arab scheme, and thus to Nasser’s hegemonic control of the Arab 
world.  
 
Nasser, accordingly, seemed eager to act to counter the growing 'threat' of the Ba’ath 
party. Owing to its importance for Arabs, the Palestinian cause emerged as a 
significantly potential instrument with which to legitimize Nasser’s hegemony. In 
acting as a primary patron of the cause, in support of Palestinian political rights 
including the population's right to an independent political identity, Nasser pursued a 
policy which was mainly intended to restore his status and keep his hegemony 
intact.128 Thus it makes sense that, while Nasser appeared to support Palestinian 
autonomy, he was also constantly concerned that the Palestinians would remain 
outside his sphere of control. Consequently, he aimed to promote Palestinian 
autonomy only in keeping with his own terms and political calculations. This might 
explain Nasser’s support for the creation of a Palestinian council that would exhibit 
the limited powers and narrow representation described above; the Egyptian regime's 
policy regarding local government in the Gaza Strip only supports this analysis. 
 
The central authority in Cairo, for instance, left the 1934’s municipal law in force in 
the Gaza Strip, thereby conferring sweeping powers and authorities onto its Egyptian 
military governor. The military governor enjoyed the right to appoint and dismiss 
mayors and deputy mayors, the right to fix their salaries, the right to dissolve the 
councils and call elections, the right to approve members of any committee formed by 
the councils to regulate and supervise the administration of the civil issues (water 
supplies, town planning, and so on), the right to approve council transactions, the right 
to supervise council accounts, the right to approve council loans and the right to 
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approve council by-laws (for details on the 1934 law see the discussion of Palestinian 
autonomy under the British mandate). 
 
But unlike the British Higher Commissioner, who permitted municipal elections, 
albeit with a narrow electoral base (only franchising male Palestinians of 21 years or 
more, with tax-paying qualifications), the Egyptian military governor tended to 
appoint councillors and mayors in large part from the ayan population.129 Due to these 
regulations, Gazans experienced no municipal elections from this point onwards 
(under the Israeli occupation, as we will see later, the municipal mayors and 
councillors were also appointed rather than elected). Gazans were denied any part in 
deciding their own political affairs and, again, most of those people appointed to 
municipal offices were derived from the ayan population, or from loyalists who 
supported the Egyptian regime.  
The Political Implications of West Bankers under Jordanian Rule 
 
With the introduction of the Jordanian civil rule over the West Bank, new 
developments unfolded. Unlike Gazans, West Bankers, in particular some ayan and 
other loyalists, had access not only to the legislative body, but also to high-ranking 
government posts. The El Husayni camp, which stood in opposition to the annexation 
of the West Bank by Transjordan, forged an alliance with the Egyptians and sought an 
independent Palestinian state. Alternatively, the El Nashashibi camp forged alliances 
with Amir Abdallah and supported unity between the West Bank and East Bank.130  
 
In response, Amir Abdallah dissolved the Supreme-Muslim Council, the main source 
of El-Husayni power, and put his newly established Ministry of religious affairs in 
charge of all Arab religious matters in Transjordan and the West Bank.  On 3 May 
1949, after having dissolved the Cabinet, Amir Abdallah also issued a Royal decree 
that appointed Ragib El Nashashibi, Ruhi Abdel Hadi, Musa Nasir and Khulusi Khairi 
to the Ministries of Refugees and Rehabilitation, Foreign Affairs, and Agriculture and 
Commerce, respectively. This set of appointments was not a unique gesture; during 
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the period of 1952-1956 no less than 15 Palestinians were appointed to ministerial 
positions, most of them coming from the El Nashashibi camp.131  
 
Further steps were also taken to incorporate Palestinians into the Transjordanian state 
institutions and apparatus, and the most important of these steps was the ordinance of 
June 1949, which altered the name of the state from 'Transjordan' to the 'Hashemite 
Kingdom of Jordan' in acknowledgement of changes made to the country's 
boundaries. The June 1949 ordinance was followed by another in December, which 
granted Palestinians Jordanian citizenship and so enabled them to participate in 
legislative elections.  The last of this particular set of incorporative gestures, two 
ordinances were issued in the same month to expand the number of parliamentary 
seats from 20 to 40, and to allow Palestinians to nominate themselves.132 However, 
the results of opening the legislative body to Palestinians were exactly those feared by 
the Hashemite regime: instead of containing and absorbing Palestinians, the 
legislative body ended up hosting Palestinians attempts to alter state policy against the 
king's wishes. 
 
When the first legislative elections were held after the merger in April 1950, at least 
175,000 West Bank inhabitants went to the polls to choose between 125 candidates 
(65 of whom were from West Bank).133 Out of the 40 deputies eventually elected, 16 
were from the West Bank.134 Some of these deputies were affiliated with the main 
parties that existed in the West Bank at the time, such as the Communist Party, the 
Ba’ath Party, Muslim Brothers, the Liberation party and the Arab Nationalists 
Movement (Harikat A-Qawmiyun Al-Arab). All of these parties opposed the 
Hashemite regime, and more importantly, they recruited intellectuals like teachers, 
students, doctors, lawyers and so forth in support of their cause.135  
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Most of these intellectuals, having benefited from educational opportunities offered 
by the Jordanian regime post-annexation, derived from the rich (ayan) families. 
However, thanks to their education, as Palestinians they broke with the conservative 
nature of the ayan, and challenged Jordanian activities in West Bank, seeking to 
realize Palestinian allegiance by way of Palestinian, pan-Arab or pan-Islam options. 
Moreover, Palestinians intellectuals sought fundamental changes to their extant 
political arrangements, in particular wanting alterations made to the Hashemite 
constitution that made the cabinet responsible to Abdallah, rather than to the 
parliament.  
 
In the beginning, Palestinian demands to change such political arrangements 
encountered strong opposition from Abdallah, who refused to yield any portion of his 
authority.  However, in the aftermath of Abdallah’s assassination in 1951, the newly 
proclaimed King Talal bowed to their wishes and in January 1952 enacted a new 
constitution that made the cabinet responsible to parliament before the king, reversing 
the previous case. When King Husayn assumed power in 1953, other steps toward 
political liberalization were also taken, although these steps ultimately failed to 
moderate Palestinian opposition to the Jordanian regime (particularly in light of 
Jordan’s foreign policy).  
 
The split between Palestinians and the Jordanian regime over the Baghdad Pact 
provides a case in point. The pact, which adopted a pro-Western policy, was founded 
in February 1955 and at that time included Iraq and Turkey; in March, Great Britain 
joined in as well. The pact formalised a counter coalition that stood in opposition to 
the pro-Arab coalition that mainly consisted of Egypt, Saudia Arabia, and Syria.  
Husayn expressed a desire to join the former on several occasions, however 
Palestinians — along with Egyptian and Syrian populations, as well as Jordanian 
nationalists — opposed Husayn's rapprochement and, from December 1955 to 
January 1956, wide-scale demonstrations protesting the agreement broke out in 
various cities and towns located in the West Bank. Palestinian opposition to the pact, 
bolstered by the Arab states' position and coupled with the position of Jordanian 
nationalists, forced king Husayn to refrain from joining.136  
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Husayn's failure to join the Baghdad Pact was a significant victory for Jordanian 
nationalists, as well as for Palestinians. This victory was consolidated when these 
nationalists and Palestinians occupied 30 of the 40 seats that made up the Jordanian 
legislative body following the elections of October 1956.137 The largest single party in 
the legislative body at that time was the Nationalist Socialist party, under the 
leadership of Suleiman El Nablusi. According to the Jordanian constitution, the party 
that won the highest number of seats in the legislative body forms the government, 
therefore at this time Suleiman El Nablusi was entrusted with this task.  
 
Reflecting his fidelity to pan-Arabic ideology, El Nablusi placed both Jordanian 
Nationalists and Palestinians in key cabinet posts in the Defence, Interior and Foreign 
Ministries, and adopted an anti-Western political programme. This programme 
clashed with the King's plans to join the American coalition, and should be 
contextualised by the newly emerged Eisenhower Doctrine. As a result of this clash, 
the king refrained from his liberal internal policy, dismissed the cabinet, outlawed 
political parties, arrested and deported most of the nationalists, declared martial law, 
banned freedom of expression, and formed a new cabinet under one of his most loyal 
followers: Ibrahim Hashim.138 In doing this, the king restored royal absolutism, and 
tightened his control over the country's society. 
 
This brief survey of the political situation in the early years of the annexation 
demonstrates how Palestinians, through their participation in national state 
institutions, were able to affect the Hashemite regime's national policies in spite of the 
oppressive measures later adopted by king Husayn. This must be recognised for the 
reason that it reveals the political considerations that generally guided the Jordanian 
legislature's treatment of the issue of Palestinian local autonomy.  
Local Government in the West Bank, Under Jordanian Rule 
 
Once it extended its civil rule over the West Bank, the Hashemite regime sought to 
establish strict control of systems of local government by tying them to the central 
authority in Amman. Accordingly, two decrees were issued in March 1949 dividing 
the West Bank into three districts: Hebron, Ramallah, and Jerusalem. These decrees 
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subordinated the three newly appointed Palestinian civil governors of these districts to 
the Minister of Interior, who was entrusted with all the powers and authority once 
vested in the former British Higher Commissioner.139 In this sense, the Minister of 
Interior enjoyed the right to call municipal elections, the right to dismiss municipal 
councils, the right to appoint new ones, the right to appoint and dismiss mayors and to 
fix their salaries, and the right to control municipal councils’ budgets   
 
These conditions persisted until 1954, at which time — following his 1953  
inauguration — King Husayn adopted a number of liberal measures, among which 
was the municipal law no. 25, of 1954. This law laid dawn two mechanisms for the 
advancement of local government at village and town levels. According to the law, 
local councils comprised of 3-11 appointed members were supposed to be established 
in any village with a population of less than 2,500 inhabitants.  
 
It was instructed that the members and heads of these councils were to be appointed 
by each district's civil governor, who was empowered to approve all administrative, 
technical and financial decisions made by the councils. As they had previously 
enjoyed such powers, civil governors tended to appoint the council members from 
among the traditional chiefs or Mukhtars.140 At least 96 rural councils were appointed 
and regulated by the 1954 law during the Jordanian period.141 Because this law 
provided the base for rural autonomy until the termination of Jordanian rule in 1967, 
until 1967 village councils were therefore under strict governmental control and in 
particular fell under the power of the Minister of Interior (even the district civil 
governor being subject to the management of this office).  
 
As far as local autonomy at the town level was concerned, with the exception of a 
short period of time, most of the West Bank municipal councils suffered the same 
restrictions as the rural councils. When the law of 1954 was enacted, it included 
provisions that secured strong legal foundations for the advancement of effective 
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mechanisms of local autonomy at the town level.  The law, for example, called for 
municipal elections every four years and revised the voting qualifications of the 1934 
British Municipal Ordinance to enable all Palestinian men aged 18 or older to vote in 
the municipal elections, even if they did not pay taxes. In addition, the law limited the 
power of the Minister of Interior over the municipal councils, and enabled said 
municipal councils to elect their own mayors and to fix their salaries independently.142 
The law thus weakened the municipalities’ ties to the central authority in Amman, and 
established the legal foundation for widespread political participation.  
 
A side note, however: the Hashemite regime refrained from the law and itself 
promulgated a new one in 1955. The new law revived the restrictions imposed by 
1934’s law addressing voting rights, and confined these rights to males who were 
aged 21 years or older and who paid at least one Jordanian dinar per year in business 
or property tax.  This clause again gave the rich families and landowners a greater 
chance of being elected to the councils than others for, as an example, if someone paid 
1000 dinars in tax he would secure for himself, his friends or his family 1000 votes.  
 
Furthermore, the government once again controlled the post of mayor (that is, the 
rights to appoint mayors and to fix their salaries) and entrusted itself with the right to 
appoint two ex-officeo councillors. This clause, in tandem with the narrow electoral 
base, enabled the government to prevent the entry of opponent political forces into 
these councils. Moreover, the government controlled all the financial affairs of the 
municipalities and thus left these municipalities dependent on the central authority in 
Amman.143
 
The power of the government in this regard was used to discriminate between 
municipalities in the East Bank and those in the West Bank. Unlike the municipalities 
in the East Bank, most municipalities in the West Bank suffered a lack of revenues 
sufficient to cover their expenditures. In 1967, for instance, the mayor of Jenin 
complained that it had been "more than three years that the municipality of Jenin have 
                                                 
142 Ma’oz. Palestinian Leadership, op.cit.,  Pp.27-28. 
143 For a discussion of the law see Ibid, Pp.28-30 & Sasson Levi. “Local Government in the 
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requested 400 Dinars annually from the tax committee for education and culture…in 
order to rent a building for the male primary school in Jenin.”144  
 
Beyond their inability to carry out educational projects, Palestinian municipalities 
were also unable to carry out water and electricity projects. In the pre-1948 period, the 
main source of water in both the West Bank and Gaza strip was groundwater (pools). 
After the 1948 war, the United Nations for Refugees and Working Agency (UNRWA) 
145 took the responsibility of supplying water to refugee camps; the municipalities 
supplied the cities and, in part, the camps located within their territories. This split 
situation continued until 1964 when the Jordanian government, after having received 
a grant from the Agency of International Development (AID), established the 
Jerusalem District Water Authority to develop water supply projects in cooperation 
with the municipalities. Had there been no grant, West Bank cities would have 
entirely lacked water such projects.146  
 
With respect to electricity, the situation was worse. It was not until 1959 that West 
Bank cities had an effective and uniform supply of electricity. This development took 
place after the municipalities of Jerusalem, Ramallah, Al Bireh, Beit Jala and Beit 
Sahour took the initiative and established the Jerusalem District Electricity Company 
(JDEC) in 1956. However, due to lack of financial support, this company failed to 
ensure a supply of electricity for all urban and rural areas. By 1967, the year when 
Jordanian rule in the West Bank terminated, around 20% of the urban areas did not 
have a regular supply of electricity, with only around 23% of rural areas enjoying 
electricity for but a few hours a day.147  
 
The failure of the Palestinian municipal system to provide regular basic utilities and 
services was not merely due to wide-scale governmental intervention and lack of 
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financial support; rather, it must also partially be blamed on the absence of necessary 
social prerequisites for the attainment of an effective municipal system. Jamil Hilal 
noted that the Jordanian regime’s role in fortifying some Palestinian families at the 
expense of others (through inclusive and exclusive policy-making), was not 
accompanied by essential, fundamental changes to the basic principles of such elite 
formation.148  In other words, functioning as it had historically, clan and familial 
background remained the factor that determined a person's access to social power.  
 
When the family or clan constitutes the basic social unit in a given society, individual 
decision–making processes are guided by factors other than rational choice. 
Consequently, even if there were a strong legal foundation for the advancement of an 
effective Palestinian municipal system, and even if elections for municipalities had 
been held, it still seems unlikely that such elections would be capable of promoting 
the professional talents needed for an efficient municipal system is these talents were 
not paired with the obligatory clan status.  
 
Thus the main problem lay in the voting mentality. As shown, Palestinian voters 
would treat these councils as means to perpetuate a given family’s power, rather than 
as a device to encourage an effective municipal system. This meant that the social 
foundation needed for an efficient municipal system was absent from the Palestinian 
scene. Given this lack, given the comprehensive power (over these councils) that was 
enjoyed by the Hashemite regime, and given the absence of wide participation in the 
elections, the Jordanian regime of course encountered little resistance to its use of 
these councils as instruments with which to support its rule over West Bank. 
 
The Hashemite regime's tendency to support its rule through certain municipalities is 
evident in the appointments made to those municipalities. Sheikh Muhammad Ali al 
Jabari, for instance, was a member of one of the principal families in Hebron, and was 
considered one of the most famous of the Hashemite regime's loyalists; he served as 
Hebron's mayor for about three decades. In other cities like Nablus, members of 
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wealthy families like El Masri, Shaka’ and Kan’an, enjoyed status similar to that of 
Al-Jabari.149  
 
Until 1967 therefore, only members of the upper-level income families and big clans 
(ayan) enjoyed access to local level government institutions; in 1967 the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip were occupied by Israel. Around this time, Arab states then founded 
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) to enable Palestinians to play a part in 
liberating their country. Meanwhile, Yasser Arafat and his movement “the Palestinian 
National Liberation Movement” or Fatah (its reversed Arabic acronym), were 
advancing their own status in the Arab world.150  
 
Following the 1968 Al Karamah battle,151 Fatah — via a plan of an armed struggle 
organised with other guerrilla groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of 
Palestine (PFLP) and the Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (DFLP) — 
succeeded to dominate the PLO. The rise of the guerrilla groups within the PLO, 
combined with the 1974 Arab states' endorsement of the PLO’s claim that it was the 
sole representative of Palestinians and the following parallel endorsement made by the 
UN General Assembly,152 promoted the PLO as one of the most influential variables 
affecting the future of Palestinian local autonomy under Israeli occupation.  
Palestinian Autonomy under Israeli Occupation 
 
In 1967, following its war with Egypt, Syria, and Jordan, Israel captured the West 
Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. Israel’s assumption of these 
Palestinian territories formally ended Jordanian rule and Egyptian military 
administration within both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. On 7 June 1967, the 
military order no. 2 was proclaimed and concentrated all powers and authorities 
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divested from the former regimes in the hands of an Israeli military governor. Article 
3 (a) of this order reads; “Any power of government, legislation, appointment, or 
administration with respect to the Region or its inhabitants shall henceforth be vested 
in me alone and shall be exercised only by me or by a person appointed by me to that 
end or acting on my behalf”.153   
 
Though the order enabled the military governor to assume the same powers and 
authorities of the former Jordanian regime and the Egyptian military administration, 
the manner in which Israelis exercised these powers and authorities differed. The 
difference lay mainly in the Israel’s systematic policy of land appropriation for the 
purposes of settlement. The first signs of this policy appeared in a plan made in June 
1968 by Yigal Allon, then Minister of Labour in the Israeli Labour government. 
Allon's strategy, commonly referred to as the Allon Plan, proposed among other 
things a Jewish settlement strip in a 10-15 kilometer-wide plot of land that runs along 
the Jordan Rift Valley.154 Accordingly, 18 rural settlements and 12 industrial and 
agricultural settlements were built in the relatively unpopulated Jordan Valley 
between 1968 and 1977; in 1977 the Likud Party assumed power.155  
 
With the Likud party in power in 1977, the Allon plan was expanded to include 
settlement in the more populated areas of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
Following an ideological commitment to a “Greater Israel” that claims the West Bank 
– "Judea and Samaria”, in Likud terminology – as an integral part of Israel, the Likud 
government stepped up settlement in the West Bank and the Gaza strip’s heartland 
and aimed to block horizontal expansion within these territories.156 This settlement 
policy paralleled a policy of creating full employment for Palestinians in both the 
West Bank and the Gaza Strip, a policy which was pursued with one eye kept on the 
PLO and which was designed to discourage Palestinian support for the PLO by raising 
the living standards in the occupied territories; the latter was intended to create 
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Palestinian social groups interested in maintaining the status quo (in other words, the 
occupation). As a result of this policy, no less than 18,000 Palestinians were 
employed by Israel157 and by 1987 this number had jumped to 109,000.158  
  
Related to this policy was another policy of non-intervention in non-political 
Palestinian affairs (for example, religious and educational matters). From the very 
beginning, Israel left Palestinians to run their own religious affairs. This is illustrated 
by the occasion when it tolerated the re-establishment of the Supreme Muslim 
Council (SMC), and by how it accepted a Jordanian compensation for religious 
functionaries (the case before 1967). Nevertheless, despite subjecting the council to 
strict control and attentive supervision, Israel did not formally recognize the SMC. 
When some SMC members began to engage in organised resistance against the 
occupation, the military government deported them. 159
 
The measures carried out by Israel toward the SMC’s members reveal the main 
principles of the Israel’s policies toward the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). 
Israel sought neither to Judaize Palestinians nor to extend citizenship to them. On the 
contrary, Israel was prepared to respond to Palestinian wishes, and sought to leave 
them enjoying their non-political institutions, insofar as these institutions remained 
consistent with Israeli rule. This was the main philosophy informing Israel’s policy of 
“co-existence", and remained that policy's trademark throughout the first ten years of 
the occupation (1967-1977). Moshe Dayan, then Minister of Defence in the Labour 
government and the main architect of the above policy, clarified its essence in writing 
the following words:  
 
“The…formula was that while they (Palestinians) were opposed to our rule and 
wished us to evacuate the territories we had captured, as long as the existing situation 
continued, normal life was to be maintained”.160  
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What Israel sought, therefore, was some form of Palestinian reconciliation with that 
population's new daily reality: the occupation. To elicit this reconciliation, Israel had 
to find a Palestinian partner that was ready to cooperate according to such terms. 
Israel’s need for this partner grew more and more urgent following the Gaza-based 
armed resistance that emerged in 1970 to interrupt that “normal life” Israel sought to 
establish.161 This armed movement was a clear indicator of the Gaza Strip’s principled 
refusal to cooperate with the occupation and Israeli terms. Accordingly, the military 
administration assumed strict control of the Gaza Strip's local government institutions 
by invoking a municipal law in 1934 as the legal frame for the work carried out by 
these institutions.  
 
The military administration used the sweeping powers this law conferred on territory 
rulers to appoint four mayors and municipal councils in the four cities of Gaza Strip 
(Gaza, Khan Younis, Rafah, and Deir El Balah), and eight rural councils in Jabalia, 
Beit Lahia, Beit Hanoun, Bani Suhlia, Abasan El Kabira, Abasan El-Saghira, 
Kheza’a, and Zawaida. Three local committees were also formed in three refugee 
camps (Maghazi, Bureij, and Nuseirat).162 Each of these institutions was subject to 
strict control and its future was clearly hostage to the country's changing political 
situation (see footnote 161).  
 
While the military administration assumed strict control over local institutions in the 
Gaza Strip, it let the same institutions enjoy a margin of freedom in the West Bank in 
hopes of supporting the pro-Hashemite conservative Palestinian leadership's rise to 
power. This leadership, as we have seen, derived from the strongest families in the 
OPT and controlled important positions in the Hashemite cabinet, the Palestinian 
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municipal councils and other institutions. Yet while this leadership preserved its status 
in the early years of the occupation, thanks to its active participation in the 
resistance,163 it failed to do so following the 1970 Palestinian-Jordanian civil war.164 
The war weakened the prestige of this leadership among Palestinians and at the same 
time raised the status of the PLO within the OPT, position this leadership in a 
defensive position with regards to the PLO. Israel perceived this development as an 
ideal opportunity to proceed with its policy of “co-existence”, for it sensed the weak 
position of the pro-Hashemite elements and observed those elements might easily be 
pressured into cooperation. Israel, therefore, announced its intention to hold municipal 
elections and scheduled these elections for 1972.  
The 1972 Municipal Elections 
 
With the 1972 elections Israel sought to achieve two goals: to institutionalize the 
PLO's defeat in Jordan’s civil war by reviving the status of the pro-Hashemite 
elements within the OPT, and furthermore to proceed with its policy of co-existence 
(playing off the fact that pro-Hashemite Palestinians would be more moderate 
negotiators than the pro-PLO faction). Toward these ends, Israel not only pressured 
the pro-Hashemite elements to present their candidates in the 1972 elections, it also 
threatened some (for example, Hajj Ma’zuz al-Masri, the mayor of Nablus, and Hafiz 
Tuqan, head of the Nablus chamber of commerce) with punitive measures in the case 
that they did not present candidates.165  
 
It was under such pressure and bullying that the pro-Hashemite elements took part in 
the 1972 municipal elections, which were held according to the Jordanian municipal 
law of 1955 — therefore being held in two rounds and excluding women and young 
men from participating. The first round took place in March, covering the northern 
cities of the West Bank, while the second round took place in May and covered the 
southern cities of the West Bank. With exception to Hebron, where the ex-mayor 
Muhammad Ali al Jabari was nominated for the mayoralty by consensus, the elections 
took place in all West Bank cities. Around 32,000 Palestinians were registered as 
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eligible voters. Of this number, approximately 26,000 voted for 337 candidates (from 
22 municipal councils) who sought 182 municipal seats, excluding the aforesaid 
municipal seats in Hebron.166  
 
Most important were the results of the elections and, in particular, the socio-economic 
background of those who won seats in the municipal councils. Though more than 50% 
of the councillors were new faces, these councillors enjoyed the same socio-economic 
background of the incumbent mayors and councillors re-elected in cities like Nablus, 
Qalqilya and Tulkarm.167 The elections therefore brought about no significant changes 
to the factors that determined Palestinian access to local state institutions. In other 
words, most of those who were elected or re-elected yet again belonged to extensive 
clans or wealthy families (ayan). Politically, this social set possessed a conservative-
moderate view and sought a peaceful solution for the West Bank — either through 
unity with Jordan, or through another formula to be agreed upon with Israel.  
 
For Israel this conservative elite was more acceptable than the pro-PLO elements and 
the wishes of their exiled leadership (the PLO); the latter refused to take part in the 
elections for the reason that they were held under Israel’s “flag”.168  In spite of this 
defiance, however, the results of the elections constituted a great victory for Israel and 
for Moshe Dayan in particular.  Dayan perceived the results as a significant step 
towards “co-existence” with Palestinians in line with Israeli terms. Only through this 
conservative leadership, Dayan believed, would Israel enjoy its desired normalization. 
In his words: 
 
“The acting leaders of the Arab population in the occupied territories were the city 
mayors. They were the link between the Arab community and the Israeli authorities. It 
was through them that the administrative procedures were conducted governing 
commerce – the grant of export and import licenses; entry permits for relatives in the 
Arab states to visit their families; education and health services; grants and loans for 
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Accordingly Israel, by means of its contact with this elite, could now open a channel 
of communication between itself and local Palestinian populations, and hence could 
proceed with its policy of co-existence. Curiously, the other success facilitated by 
these elections was achieved by King Husayn, who understood the victory of his 
supporters as a step towards the realization of his own plans for the West Bank. The 
only loser then was the PLO, whose future in the OPT had suddenly come under 
serious threat. To remedy its loss in the municipal elections, the PLO turned instead to 
establishing footholds in various Palestinian academic institutions that had been built 
under the occupation. Ironically, these institutions were being promoted by the same 
strategy that had restored the status of the pro-Hashemites: Dayan’s policy of “non-
intervention”. 
Israel’s Policy of Non-Intervention: The Path Toward Political 
Mobilization 
 
While the occupation's policy of co-existence helped the traditional leadership to 
restore its status, the policy of non-intervention actually promoted a new elite that 
challenged this leadership. The new elite was better educated, younger and more 
radical than its predecessor. Most of its members derived from village and refugee 
families, making its font of power the educational programmes that flourished under 
the occupation.  
 
Prior to the occupation, education services had mainly been provided by the 
UNRWA. In the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, UNRWA ran the elementary and 
preparatory schools. The UNRWA did not operate any secondary educational 
programmes (excluding some vocational programs).170 Up until 1948, most secondary 
schools were private and run largely by Christian and religious institutions, and 
concentrated mainly in Ramallah and Jerusalem.  At the time, the only social stratum 
with access to these schools was that of the ayan.171
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After the occupation, secondary schools were developed and made available to all 
refugees (a detailed discussion of education under the occupation unfolds in chapter 
V). While Israel assumed the running of these schools, the UNRWA continued to 
manage the elementary and preparatory schools. During the early years of the 
occupation Palestinians were inspired by the feeling of insecurity evoked by their 
stateless condition to develop a strong commitment to education. In the academic year 
1973-1974, for instance, more than 31% of the territories’ total population (excluding 
East Jerusalem) attended schools (elementary, preparatory, and secondary).  
1973/1974 
Region Total Population Number of Students 
West Bank 646,200 207,729 
Gaza Strip 406,300 123,556 
 
Source: Reproduced from Munir Fasheh: “Impact on Education”. In Nasser Aruri (ed.). Occupation: 
Israel over Palestine. London: Zed Books, 1984, P.296. 
 
Two curriculum and examination systems were applied within the territories. While 
the Jordanian curriculum and examination system were deployed within the West 
Bank (Excluding East Jerusalem), education in the Gaza Strip was characterised by 
the Egyptian curriculum and examination system. By 1977, no less than 8,300 
Palestinians completed their secondary education (according to the 
Jordanian/Egyptian examination system), as opposed to about 5,000 in 1969. The 
following figures illustrate the number and percentage of students who took the 
Tawjihi (secondary school general examination) in 1969 and 1977.  
 
                                                                      1969                                                       1977                                               
 No.  % No. % 
Literary 3,021 60.4 5,398 65.0 
Scientific 1,780 35.6 2,655 32.0 
Vocational 137 2.7 171 2.1 
Commercial 37 0.7 57 0.7 
Agriculture 24 0.5 19 0.2 
Total 4,999 100.0 8,300 100.0 
     
Source: Munir Fasheh: “Impact on Education”. In Nasser Aruri (ed.). Occupation: Israel over 
Palestine. London: Zed Books, 1984, P.303. 
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These students, in particular Literary and Scientific students, originally attended 
neighbouring Arab countries’ universities (mainly in Egypt and Jordan); however, 
during 1970s, the OPT underwent important developments in terms of postsecondary 
education.  Many higher education institutions were established, making it possible 
for Palestinian students to engage in higher education without leaving the territories. 
The most important and prestigious of these institutions was Bir Zeit University in the 
West Bank city of Ramallah; its history dates back to 1924 in Bir Zeit Village, when 
the Nasser family established it as a preparatory school. Gradually the university 
developed to offer a two-year diploma, and in 1973 was granted a licence by the 
occupation to operate a four-year study programme.  
 
Along with Bir Zeit, there is El Najah University in Nablus and the University of 
Bethlehem in Bethlehem. While the former started as college in 1968 and was granted 
the licence to operate four-year programme in 1975, the later was established by the 
group Brothers of Christian Schools and was permitted to operate a four-year 
programme in 1973. Other Universities and higher academic institutions were 
established around the same period, such as the Islamic University in the Gaza Strip 
and the University of Hebron in Hebron. These universities and institutions attracted a 
considerable number of Palestinians who had passed the Tawjihi.172 In 1979-80, for 
instance, no less than 4,586 Palestinians were enrolled in the universities and other 
higher academic institutions.173  
 
Most of the students who attended university came from the peasant and refugee 
populations which had born the brunt of the occupation; many of their fathers and 
mothers had been uprooted from their original villages by the 1948 or 1967 wars. 
Over the course of their lives, these students had been subjected to what Rosemary 
Sayigh calls “a process of re-creating Palestine through memory”.174 This process, in 
which fathers and mothers play a crucial role, sought passed on to these students the 
home that was their heritage. When they arrived at university therefore, these students 
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were not only looking for education, they also sought the “Palestine” they knew 
through their fathers and mothers.  
 
In this sense, student bodies were seen as “good soil” for political recruitment to 
various PLO factions like Fatah, PFLP, DFLP and the Communist Party. As Glenn E. 
Robinson observed, the various PLO factions succeeded, through these students, in 
establishing political footholds in each university and higher academic institution. 
According to Robinson, the pro-PLO Palestinian prisoners who were released from 
Israel’s jails in 1970s took leading roles in recruiting these students.175   
 
In each university, thus, one could find a student bloc associated with one or another 
PLO faction. The Al Shabiba student movement emerged as the biggest and most 
influential student movement, and was associated with Fatah. Several Palestinian 
leaders who would eventually play influential roles in the post-Oslo scene (Marwan 
El Bargouthi for example) were also affiliated with Al Shabiba movement. Alongside 
Al Shashiba, the Progressive Student Labour Front was associated with the PFLP, the 
Student Unity group was associated with the DFLP, and the Progressive Student 
Union was associated with the Communist party.  
 
All of these blocs engaged in stiff competition, with each trying to recruit more 
students to that PLO faction with which it was associated. Over time, the influence of 
these blocs extended outside the University campuses and into the Palestinian villages 
and streets. Each bloc succeeded at developing its own Voluntary Work Programme, 
through which students involved with the bloc devoted some days to helping villagers 
reclaim their uncultivated land by planting trees and repairing roads, sewage lines, 
water pipes and so on. This programme, inaugurated by Bir Zeit’s students in the 
1970s, was developed to include voluntary work committees in each camp, village, 
town and city. All committees were associated with main PLO factions. Through 
these committees, therefore, the PLO succeeded at strengthening its ties to the wider 
Palestinian community, and thus at enlisting these people in its cause.176
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Related to this development were the social changes Palestinians had undergone since 
1967. Though these changes were the outcome of numerous variables (e.g., Israel’s 
settlement policy, the remittances of Palestinians employed in Gulf countries in the 
1970s); the influence and interaction of these variables are difficult to isolate, but 
there is some indication that economic policy during the occupation, in particular the 
policy of full employment, had a huge impact on Palestinian social structure (largely 
in the rural areas in which 70% of the population lived).177  
 
Traditionally, in the rural areas the family functioned as the main productive unit. 
Most family members (including females) were involved in agricultural activities on 
their own or ayan’s farms. These farms constituted the main source of a rural family’s 
livelihood. The social equivalent of this economic infrastructure was a social structure 
in which the extended family (hamula) functioned as the basic social unit, and 
authority rested in the head of the hamula (which was the patriarch). These were the 
general social circumstances up to 1967, when the occupation introduced the 
aforementioned policy of full employment.  
 
With the introduction of a full-employment policy, many peasants (or members of the 
rural family) preferred to benefit from the high-scale wages of Israel’s labour market 
and so left their farms to pursue work opportunities in Israel. If Tamari’s figures are 
accurate, the percentage of the West Bank labour force employed in agriculture in 
1976 did not exceed 26.1%, in comparison to 50% in 1969.178 This factor (the 
migration of rural family members into Israel to pursue other work opportunities) “has 
hastened the process of the break up and nuclearization, in part because younger 
bread-winners in the family established a source of earning independent from their 
fathers”.179 This implied the withdrawal of collective identification (though not its 
absence) in favour of an individualistic perspective and, accordingly, the decline of 
the role of hamula and that mode of patriarchal authority associated with it.180  
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At the same time, employment within Israel promoted economic prosperity among 
villagers by enabling them to send their sons to universities and the other Palestinian 
institutions of higher education that had been established in the 1970s. Villagers’ 
access to education further weakened their hamula identification, instead paving the 
way for a new social identification that was associated with various PLO factions. 
Moreover, the migration of so many peasants into Israel created a new situation in 
which land ceased to be the sole livelihood of rural families; consequently the 
correspondence between land and economic power was reduced. This reduction of 
land as a major source of the economic power implied the collapse of the ayan 
economic base, and thus implied the collapse of their political power as well.181  
 
The socio-economic developments experienced by Palestinian villages after 1967 
might be best represented by the situations in the Palestinian refugee camps and 
towns; all of these camps and towns supplied labour forces to Israeli labour markets. 
In 1973, for instance, the West Bank supplied 66.6% of its labour force to the Israeli 
labour market, while the Gaza Strip supplied 65.7% of its labour forces to the same 
market.182 Providing these statistics, it becomes possible to sum up those socio-
economic developments experienced by Palestinians after 1967 as the following: 
 
• Access to Education     +       Social Mobility    +        Political Mobilization 
• Access to Israeli Labour Market            the Role of Hamula               
Collective Identification      +       National Identification. 
• Access to Israeli Labour Market             the Role of Land as a Source of 
livehood               The Economic Base of the Ayan                 Ayan Political 
Power 
All of these developments favored the PLO in its competition with pro-Hashemite 
elements in the occupied territories. Furthermore, in addition to localised changes, 
regional political developments also favored the PLO. The most important of these 
developments was the war of 1973. That war, which erupted on the 6th of October, 
was the first by which the Arabs achieved some limited victory over Israel183 and it 
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paved the way for two related shifts: first it weakened the myth of the “invincible 
army” of Israel and so prompted a strong Palestinian nationalism, and secondly it 
weakened the status and prestige of the Hashemite regime (specifically, in the eyes of 
Palestinians) when the that regime failed to contribute to the war.  
 
These developments promoted anti-Hashemite sentiment in the territories, and 
strongly recommended the nationalists associated with the PLO as an alternative to 
the pro-Hashemites. New points of reference and feelings of political allegiance were 
developed, and were institutionally expressed in the Palestinian National Front (PNF) 
that emerged in the early 1970s to embrace all anti-Hashemite nationalists.184 The 
PNF, which adopted a political programme that intended to establish a Palestinian 
State in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, was formally recognized by the PLO 
and assigned seats in the Palestinian National Council (the Palestinian assembly in 
exile) in 1973. Its political programme paralleled the PLO’s “ten-point programme”, 
which was adopted during the twelfth Palestinian National Council meeting that took 
place in June of 1974; the programme sought to establish Palestinian Authority on any 
part of Palestine. 185  
The 1976 Municipal Elections: PLO Factions Rise to Office 
 
The previous discussion demonstrated how the Israeli policy of non-intervention, 
coupled with the socio-economic transformation experienced by Palestinians since 
1967, promoted political mobilization and hence a new, more radical and younger 
leadership. This leadership, institutionally expressed in the PNF, adopted a political 
programme that sought to establish statehood for the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. 
The program paralleled the PLO’s “ten-point programme”, as mentioned above.  
 
This political shared by the exiled PLO and their internal supporters (the PNF), along 
with the intensely national mood that characterized the territories at this time, gave the 
traditional ayan elite and their pro-Hashemite programme little chance to make a 
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mark in the municipal elections of April 1976. These elections were conducted just 
two years after the UN General Assembly and the Arab states’ endorsement of the 
PLO’s claim to be the sole representative of Palestinians. This complicated timing and 
the growing national support for the PLO make Israel’s decision to hold these 
elections a perplexing one.  
 
However, it seems probable that Israel would have sought to counter the PLO’s 
regional and international political victories with an attempt to reinvigorate the power 
of the pro-Hashemite factions within the territories (thus undermining the PLO’s local 
power). This analysis, if true, reveals Israel’s failed estimation of the socio-economic 
developments in the OPT since 1967. More importantly, it also implies Israel’s failure 
to gauge the political ramifications of these developments, including the growing 
number of nationalists associated with the PLO. Whatever the considerations and 
motivations behind Israel’s decision to call these elections, post-elections events 
proved that decision to be a big mistake.  
 
When the elections were conducted, they were held according to new regulations. 
Unlike the 1972 elections, which restricted the vote to older males (of 21 or more 
years), Israel extended the vote to females and young males without property. Israel’s 
extension of the voter prompted opposition from the Hashemite regime, which 
considered the change a grave violation of international law, in particular the Forth 
Geneva Convention obliging occupying powers to preserve the status quo of their 
occupied territories. Unlike the Hashemite regime, the PLO supported this extension 
of the vote and urged its supporters (members of the PNF and other nationalists) to 
take part in the elections when it became clear that those elections would put PLO 
supporters in office.186  
 
It seems unlikely that the Hashemite regime's opposition to Israel's extension of the 
vote actually issued from concerns regarding Israel’s failure to carry out the 
obligations assigned in the Forth Geneva Convention. The main reason for the 
Hashemite opposition, rather, was likely an awareness of its own weakened support 
and the growing popularity of the PLO (among young people in particular). In light of 
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the contemporary situation, Israel's extension of the vote undeniably favoured the 
PLO. Supporting this analysis, there was also the fact that — once it became aware of 
Israel’s determination to hold the 1972 elections, and noted the determination of the 
PLO’s supporters to run in these elections — the Hashemite regime strongly urged its 
supporters to participate in the elections despite the new regulations.  
 
Both sides, PLO supporters and pro-Hashemites, were thus motivated by political 
considerations in running for election. This fact can be inferred from the following 
figures comparing the 1976 elections with the 1972 elections in terms of the number 









88,467 (appro. 33,000 W .) 
62,998 (appro., 21,000 W) 









                
Source: Ma’oz. Palestinian Leadership, op.cit., P.136 & Sahliyeh, op.cit., P.66. 
 
The results of the 1972 elections further demonstrate the politicization of the 
municipalities. Among the 205 elected councillors, there were 153 (75%) new faces, 
which included 14 of the 24 mayors. 40% of the new councillors and 33% of the new 
mayors were pro-PLO or leftist nationalists. Moreover, the new elected councillors 
and mayors were younger (67% were under the age of 50, and 10% were under the 
age of 30), and better educated (53% had higher education). In addition, 40% were 
white collar, 40% were traders and businessmen, and 20% were farmers and 
landowners.187 The nationalist orientation of these councillors and mayors did not 
correspond with the new sociological orientation. In other words, as noted by 
Sahliyeh, these mayors and councilors “came from the same well-to-do and socially 
prominent families in their towns that they had always provided leadership”, 
notwithstanding their pro-PLO and leftist political orientation.188  
                                                 
∗ W: denotes Women. 
187 Ma’oz. Palestinian Leadership, op.cit., P.136-137 & Sahliyeh, op.cit., Pp.66-67. 
188 Sahliyeh, op.cit., P.67. 
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This was particularly clear in regards to the new mayors. In Nablus, for instance, Hajj 
Ma’zuz al-Masri, was replaced by the nationalist Bassam al-Shak’a (derived from a 
big family in Nablus). In Hebron, Sheikh Muhammad al Jabari, who had dominated 
the mayoralty since 1948, was replaced by the nationalist Fahd al-Qawasma. 
Similarly, the following nationalists replaced pro-Hashemite mayors in a number of 
towns and cities: Hlimi Hanun, Ibrahim al-Tawil, Muhammad Halhul, Abd-Aziz al-
Suwwayti, Ziyadah Ya’kup, Amin Nasser and Bishara Dawud. All of these mayors 
were affiliated with the PLO and other leftist parties, but at the same time they either 
derived from big families or had undergone higher education; this statement excludes 
the re-elected mayor of Bethlehem Elias Freij, who was among the old guard and had 
a pro-Hashemite orientation.189   
 
In this sense, the 1976 elections brought about no significant change in terms of the 
sociological orientation of the Palestinian mayors and councillors. Due to this, Israel 
received the results of the elections with little concern, and ruled them out as any 
indicator of “a deep transformation” or “radical change in the social structure and 
political orientation of the West Bank leadership”.190 Jordan in fact had a similar view 
of the results, and accordingly welcomed them and even offered financial and 
logistical support to the new mayors.191 The PLO, mainly Fatah, considered the 
election results encouraging since they brought young nationalist ayan into the office 
and therefore supported the results of the elections, even forging an alliance with the 
newly emerged nationalist ayan.192  
 
Therefore, all the major players (Israel, the PLO and Jordan) perceived the election 
results as satisfactory, and no exhibited an interest in changing the status quo. For 
instance, in accordance with its policy of co-existence, Israel still sought to cultivate 
the newly elected mayors as an alternative to PLO leadership. Jordan, on the other 
hand, believed the socio-economic background of these mayors would prevent them 
from adopting an anti-Hashemite policy. Meanwhile, the PLO considered these 
mayors part of its political army in the territories thanks to their pro-PLO policy and 
nationalist ideology. This was the situation until May 1977, when the Likud party 
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assumed power. Under the Likud government, Israel’s policy toward the nationalist 
mayors turned radical, sparking new developments for Palestinian autonomy.  
Palestinian Local Autonomy under the Likud Government: Toward a 
Bottom-Up Model 
 
While the Labour government (1968-1977) pursued a policy of co-existence with 
Palestinians, and thereby enabled the nationalist mayors to run for office in hopes of 
cultivating them as an alternative to PLO leadership, the radical national orientation of 
the Likud government prompted it to consider all Palestinians, including the mayors, 
as potential enemies.   
 
The Likud government denied the nationalist mayors any powers and authorities to 
manage civil affairs. It took over water sources in the territories and denied the 
municipalities any practical power in fields like that of water management. Instead, 
these powers were put in the control of the Israeli Water Company Mekorot in a way 
that limited the municipalities' role to collecting water bills from residents and 
administering the daily distribution of water.193
 
In a similar fashion, the Likud government denied the municipalities any powers to 
manage electricity. All municipalities were asked to obtain permission from the 
military administration before initiating any electricity-related project. This 
permission was rarely granted, most requests being rejected. Due to this increased 
Israeli control, many municipalities were unable to meet local demands for electricity 
and were forced to link to Israel’s national power grid.  
 
In 1980 the military administration refused to grant the municipality of Jenin a 
permission to import new units for the generation of electricity to allow it to meet an 
increasing demand. Owing to this refusal, the municipality agreed to link to the Israeli 
national grid.194 By connecting the Palestinian towns and cities to Israel’s national 
grid, the Likud government left only the tasks of collecting electricity bills and 
administering daily supplies of electricity to the municipalities.  
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These measures were inspired by Likud’s belief the nationalist mayors posed a threat 
to Israel’s national security and sought to weaken the ability of these mayors to handle 
civil affairs (and so undermine their influence on the local community). At the same 
time as enacting these measures, the Likud government also initiated secret talks with 
pro-Hashemite elements that aimed to enlist those elements to support a proposed 
plan for Palestinian autonomy that would allow for only some self-rule arrangements 
in the territories.195 The plan, the general framework for which was provided for by 
the Camp David treaty,196 constituted a further attempt by Israel to unilaterally decide 
who should lead Palestinians, as well as the forms of their autonomous institutions.  
 
This attempt provoked wide-scale Palestinian opposition,197 and transferred the 
disagreement into an almost a “zero-sum” conflict. In the face of Palestinian 
opposition to the Camp David scheme, the Likud government adopted harsh measures 
against nationalist mayors who actively participated in opposition activities. On 2 
May 1979, the military administration deported the mayors of Hebron and Halhul. 
The following month Israel launched an assassination attempt against three leading 
mayors in the West Bank, leaving the mayors of Nablus and Ramallah (Bassam El 
Shaka and Karim Khalif, respectively) maimed. Further measures were taken against 
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these mayors, including restrictions placed on their movement outside the country, 
reduction of their rights to engage in political activities, and so forth.198  
 
In response to these measures, Palestinians broke with the formal state institutions 
(the municipalities), and instead performed para-state functions via their own informal 
institutions. In doing this, Palestinians were supported by Arab states which had 
decided, in a summit convened in Baghdad in November 1978, to allocate hundreds of 
millions of USD in support of the Sumud (steadfastness) of Palestinians in the 
territories. A joint Jordanian-Palestinian committee was also set up to facilitate 
communication between Arab states and the territories.199 In the period of 1979-1985, 
this committee distributed about 400 million USD to the territories.200 This fund was 
of crucial importance to Palestinians at this critical juncture in their conflict with 
Israel; through it, Palestinians were able to disengage from occupation control and 
proceeded to build grassroots organizations.  
 
These organizations, which offered health, social, economic and legal services, 
constituted institutional manifestations of the Palestinian disengagement, and they 
were all accordingly affiliated with main factions of the PLO and employed 
voluntarism as the main principle of their daily operation. In 1979 the Union of the 
Palestinian Medical Relief Committees (UPMRC) was established in the West Bank 
to offer health services to uncovered villages and camps in the West Bank and in the 
Gaza Strip. A few years later the Union of Heath Work Committees (UHWC), the 
Union of Health Care Committees (UHCC) and the Health Services Council (HSC) 
were also founded for the same purposes.201  In 1992, one year prior to the signing of 
the Oslo accords, these organizations operated some 132 clinics in 118 communities, 
and served nearly half of the territories’ population.202  
 
Other grassroots organizations were founded during the same period that offered 
economic service; an example of this is the Agricultural Relief Committees (ARC), 
                                                 
198 Emile Sahliyeh. “The West Bank Pragmatic Elite: The Uncertain Future”. In Journal of Palestine 
Studies. Vol.xv.No.4 (summer 1986), P.35. 
199 Yezid Sayigh. Armed Struggle and the Search for State. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997, 
P.437. 
200 Robinson, op.cit., P.53. 
201 Ibid, Pp.39-49. 
202 Ibid., P.49. 
 90
which offered various materials, technical and logistic services to farmers.203 
Furthermore, some 23 charitable organizations were founded in the territories to offer 
similar services.204 The most prominent of these charitable organizations was Jam’iyat 
In’ash el-Usra (the Society for Family Rehabilitation), which operated vocational 
centres, offered partial and full university scholarships, provided health services and 
ran cultural projects (e.g., kindergartens, Palestinian folklore centres, et cetera).205  
 
Most of these grassroots and charitable organizations, depended on the funding 
distributed by the joint committee and a number of international and Palestinian 
benefactors who offered their services without charges (or with minimum charges). 
They mainly recruited their members from the middle class and intellectual circles, 
and included women.  The changes indicate early steps toward expanding the social 
base of those people who carried out state and Para-state functions. Even though the 
1976 elections brought a new political orientation and ideology into office, they failed 
to achieve a new social orientation. In other words, those who rose to office — despite 
their nationalist orientation and pro-PLO ideology — still issued from the upper class.  
 
When Palestinians decided to break with formal state institutions and began to 
establish their own, the input they provided these institutions with was sociologically 
different and yet still politically similar to that given the 1976 municipal councils.  
Those people who dominated and operated the new grassroots and charitable 
organizations embraced the same national ideologies of the people who achieved 
office in the 1976 elections, but they came from an altogether different social class. 
So with the grass roots organisations we see an extension of the social base of those 
who were practising state/Para-state functions. It is therefore safe to claim that from 
1979 onwards a new social class, a middle class, joined the ayan in carrying out state 
and para-state functions.  
 
A question remains to be asked: did the Likud government tolerate this development, 
or did it take some measures to abrogate it?  The Palestinian response to Likud 
measures against the municipalities manifested in institutions, as we have seen; the 
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Likud government's response to this development was institutional as well. In 
November 1981, the government issued its military order no. 947 and declared a civil 
administration was to be established in the territories. Section 2 of the order states that 
the civil administration was established to “administer the civilian affairs in the region 
in accordance with the directives of this order, for the well-being…of the population, 
and in order to supply and implement the public services and taking into consideration 
the need to maintain an orderly administration and public order in the region”.206  
 
The head of the civil administration was to be appointed by the area commander, 
considered the ultimate authority. However, the head of the civil administration was 
empowered with the rights to issue second-hand legislations (or secondary 
legislations) in civil domains, and to appoint officials in the civil administration 
whose purpose was to execute these laws. Nevertheless, all issues related to security 
remained under the control of the area commander, who enjoyed absolute (over the 
civil administration as well).  
 
In other words, all the powers and authorities exercised by the head of the civil 
administration were delegated to him by the area commander, and were exercised in 
that area on the area commander’s behalf. Ultimate authority was thus vested in the 
area commander, and the civil administration functioned as an executive body only, in 
spite of its right to issue secondary legislation in civil domains. In January 1982, 
military order no. 947 was issued to emphasize this fact. The order reads: “in order to 
remove any doubt, there is nothing in the provisions of the Order (Order No. 947) 
which restricts or abrogates any of the privileges or rights vested in the Commander 
of the Israeli army in the area or in any of those appointed by him”.207 The area 
commander thus retained all the powers he assumed through order no. 2 of June 1967 
(for more regarding this order see P. 74), including the power to issue first-
legislations.  
 
If the new order kept all powers in the hands of the area commander, then what 
exactly changed in terms of the administrative setup of the territories? To understand 
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whether essential changes took place or not, the below figure showing how the 
military administration operated prior to 1981, might be helpful. 
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Source: developed from Shehadeh, op.cit., Pp. 68-69 & Meron Benvenisti. The West Bank Data 
Project. A Survey of Israel’s Policies. Washington & London: American Enterprise for Public Policy 
Research, 1984, P.45. 
 
The area (local) governor was asked to perform two tasks. The first was civil; in this 
regard, as the figure illustrates, he presided over a number of army officers who ran 
for a number of civil offices in each area or district. In doing this he was subordinate 
to the West Bank/Gaza Strip governor, whose own main task was a civil one and who 
was himself subordinate to the Coordinator of the Territories' Activities (who worked 
under the direct supervision of the Minister of Defense). The other task a local 
governor had to perform was: to keep order in his district or area. In this capacity he 
was subordinate to the army Commander assigned to the area, and through the 
Commander also subordinate to the Chief of Staff (who was also under the direct 
control of the Minister of Defense).  
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With the introduction of the civil administration, two developments occurred: the 
Chief of Staff assumed the functions of the Coordinators of the Territories’ Activities, 
and thus integrated the civilian tasks with the military ones. This implied that army 
Commander assigned to an area assumed the functions of that area's governor. 
However army officers were denied the right to run civil offices, and only civilians 
assumed posts in the civil administration. The below figure illustrates this shift: 
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Source: Benvenisti, op.cit., Pp. 45-46. 
 
What happened was therefore a revolution to change Dayan’s policy of non-
intervention. In other words, while the Labour government sought a minimal armed 
intervention in civil domains, and thus left Palestinians to run their own civil affair, 
the Likud government sought direct armed control over these civil domains and 
entrusted itself with the right to run Palestinian civil affairs. However, this shift was 
not accompanied by any fundamental changes in the source of legislation. Both 
governments retained the area commander as the final source of legislation.  
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The Likud government's policy of directly controlling Palestinian civil affairs 
stemmed from its concern regarding the (in its opinion) harmful ramifications of 
Dayan’s policy of non-intervention, these having enabled PLO factions to take office. 
Prof/Colonel Menachem Milson, the first civil administer of the territories, 
summarized the Likud’s position towards the PLO's status in the territories when he 
pointed out: “combating the PLO in the territories had been perceived by the Israeli 
policy-makers as a military and security matter…while the PLO attach a special 
political importance to its quest for influence in the territories….{its success} 
facilitated the mobilization of people for terrorist acts.” Therefore, “a political 
infrastructure opposed to the PLO and ready to cooperate with Israel”208 should be 
created.  
 
It is against this background that the creation of the civil administration must be 
examined. The civil administration was in fact that very political apparatus through 
which the Likud government sought to minimize the PLO’s influence in the territories 
by franchising some of the civil administration’s powers to those who were ready to 
cooperate; consequently, it sparked the creation of counter-institutions for the pro-
PLO municipal offices, as well as the development of Palestinian grassroots and 
charitable organizations. At that time, the village league was the only institution that 
had been qualified to assume this role (of counter-institution and host for pro-PLO 
municipal offices and grassroots organizations).  
 
The league, created by Mustafa Dudin in the Hebron district in 1978, was designed as 
an institutional protest against the hegemony of the urban-based, pro-PLO groups in 
regards to state institutions (eg, formal institutions like municipalities, and informal 
institutions like grassroots organisations). Among its main objectives was “the 
encouragement of rural cooperatives and social and charitable societies which will 
work for the benefit of all villagers”.209
 
The Likud government found in this league a proper institution through which its goal 
of eradicating the PLO’s social base in Palestinian towns might be realized. So the 
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new established civil administration started supporting the creation of village leagues 
in various rural areas, and franchising them with some of its own powers. These 
powers ranged from the provision of family reunion permits to issuing building 
permits, permits for the acquisition of driving licenses, and travel permits.210 The civil 
administration even went further and allocated sums of money to these leagues which 
enabled them to carry out water and electricity schemes in their local areas.  
 
These measures did not, however, ensure wide constituencies of support for the 
village leagues. Two factors were to blame for this: firstly the attachment of these 
leagues to a given family or clan alienated them from most of Palestinians (who 
emphasized national identification at the expense of family or clan affinities), and 
secondly Likud designed radical measures against Palestinians that, among other 
things, confiscated land in the villages.211 The failure of these leagues to halt the latter 
measures weakened their credibility among Palestinians and forced some of them to 
distance themselves from Israel’s policy and to adopt a more nationalist position. This 
distancing brought the leagues into conflict with Likud policy, and thus prompted 
their dissolution by the Likud government in summer of 1983.  
 
Regardless of the failure of the village leagues and the political considerations 
surrounding their creation, these leagues still enabled other stratum in the society to 
practice state functions.  Despite the fact that the head of each league was still 
constituted by a family/clan chief, the leagues embraced villagers with peasant 
backgrounds212 and thus — whatever their political goals and ideologies — they 
enabled peasants to join the ayan and middle class elements in carrying out state/para-
state functions. Though this development was short-lived, it signified a new expansion 
of the social base to include those people who practiced state and para-state functions; 
previously the only social stratum that had been denied the right to do so were 
refugees, who remained far outside any government institution (formal and informal 
alike), notwithstanding their active contribution to Palestinian resistance to the 
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occupation as manifested in the Gaza-based armed movement of 1970 (for further 
information see Pp. 78-79 and footnote 161).  
 
The situation of exiled refugees, or rather refugees settled in surrounding Arab 
countries, in particular in Lebanon, was slightly different. In Lebanon, the PLO 
succeeded at establishing down some para-state institutions, and consequently enabled 
the exiled refugees there to practice para-state functions. In 1969, for example, the 
Sons of the Palestinian Martyrs Institute (Samad), was founded, begun as an orphan-
aid project and gradually expanding to include large factories for textiles, carpentry 
and so forth.   
 
This institute, which established permanent venues in various Arab countries and 
developed networks of relations with some Western countries like Italy, France and 
Norway, employed thousands of Palestinian refugees.213 Alongside it there was also 
the Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS), which was headed by Arafat’s Brother 
Fathi Arafat.  The PRCS ran various medical facilities in Palestinian refugee camps 
and by 1979 had been operating 30 hospitals and 100 clinics.214  
 
Coupled with these foreign developments was another which related to the PLO para-
state security forces that emerged in 1979.  Said forces, through which the PLO’s 
various guerrillas were organized, were promoted by the resolution of the 1978 Arab 
Summit which, as mentioned above, donated hundreds of millions of USD to the 
PLO. A considerable part of this fund was invested in transforming the guerrillas into 
proper para-state armed forces. Consequently, various regular forces like Ain Jalut, 
Qastal, Yarmuk , Karamah, Unit of 17 (Arafat’s bodyguards), the Political Security 
Forces, and the Chairman Security Agency (to name the most important), were 
formed.215  
 
Most of these armed forces enjoyed permanent bases and were led by officers with 
conventional military training. Their members were recruited mainly from Palestinian 
refugees in Lebanon, and elsewhere. One of the forces’ top priorities was to defend 
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Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon. Though the PLO as an organization lacked the 
formal authority to issue and implement binding rules for refugees, and thus in Joel S. 
Migdal's point of view lacked a defining feature of statehood,216 most of the refugees 
were inspired by a national commitment to obey the PLO’s instructions and so could 
ultimately be coerced by its armed forces. 
 
In this sense, it is possible to assume that those refugees who had access to PLO 
armed forces assumed para-state functions as well. Was this assumption accepted, the 
exiled refugees can then be understood as having practiced para-state functions in 
parallel to their ayan and middle class counterparts inside the territories.  Similarly to 
the fate of the village leagues, however, this development was to be short-lived.  The 
Lebanese war of June 1982217 and following dispersion of the PLO para-state forces 
throughout the Arab world ended that particular opportunity for the refugees to 
engage in para-state activities; the war, coupled with the necessary shift of the PLO 
headquarters from Lebanon to Tunisia, ended a phase in which the refugees had 
access to the forces that afforded them this opportunity. Moreover, the war signified 
an escalation in Likud’s radical treatment of autonomous Palestinian institutions 
inside the territories.  
 
This escalation can be traced through the civil administration's June 1982 decision to 
replace five elected municipal councils with loyal appointed committees,218 and the 
following measures adopted against Palestinian universities (including closures, the 
detention of students, shootings and consequent killings of students, and the 
deportation of college staff members). In the period between 4 November 1981 and 2 
April 1984 Bir Zeit University was closed five times for a total of eleven months. In 
1983 Al-Najah University was closed three times for a total of five months, and 
Bethlehem University was closed twice for a total of one and a half month.219 In the 
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217 For more information regarding this war see Jonathan Randal. The Tragedy of Lebanon: Christian 
Warlords, Israeli Adventurers and American Bunglers. London: The Hogarth Press, 1983 &  Ze’ev 
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period lasting from December 1986 to April 1987, three students from Bir Zeit 
University were shot and killed.220  
 
Similarly brutal measures against college staff were taken. In the fall of 1982 the civil 
administration required non-resident Palestinian college members (those who did not 
hold military-issued identity cards) to sign an anti-PLO pledge in order to obtain 
residence and work permits. When these members refused to sign the pledge, the civil 
administration deported them. Approximately 100 of the 500 college staff who 
worked in Palestinian universities were affected by this measure.221  
 
In addition to the above, the civil administration granted itself the right to annually 
license Palestinian universities, as well as the right to control the creation of 
additional departments, programs and colleges. No university was allowed to operate 
new departments, programs or colleges without permission granted by civil 
administration; in most cases, such permission was denied.  Two requests to operate a 
college of agriculture and a hotel management program were made by the Al-Najah 
University and Bethlehem University, and both were rejected by the administration. 
Further exerting its power, the civil administration also assumed strict watch over the 
universities’ educational materials. and many books on subjects like philosophy, 
Palestinian history and politics, folklore, and more, were banned without 
explanation.222  
 
Considering these measures, along with Israel’s invasion of Lebanon in June 1982 and 
the following semi-destruction of the PLO military and civil infrastructure, we can 
conclude that they were not only related to issues of the academic freedom.  Rather, 
they also related to wider issues concerning Israel’s intention to foreclose on the 
option of statehood for Palestinians. In fact, Israelis hesitated very little in expressing 
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this intention when they re-elected the Likud party under its slogan “…no to 
Palestinian state…”223  
The First Intifada (1987-1993): Palestinians Attach Further Themselves to 
Grassroots Institutions 
 
As discussed above, Israeli policy toward autonomous Palestinian institutions had 
changed drastically since the Likud party’s assumption to power in 1977. Likud 
policy sought to abrogate any Palestinian attempts to lay down institutional 
infrastructure for Palestinian state. In response, Palestinians continued to break with 
formal state institutions and deepened their attachments to grassroots organisations. 
This was clearly the case during the Intifada (literally translating as "a shaking 
off").224 The Intifada (1987-1993) was the most spontaneous of Palestinian uprisings 
against the occupation, and encompassed all segments of the population: young and 
old, male and female, rich and poor, intellectual and illiterate, religious and secular, 
rural and urban. It expressed the Palestinians’ protest against the humiliating 
conditions imposed on them by the occupation, as well as their desire for complete 
disengagement from that occupation's control.  
 
The most notable expression of this disengagement appeared in the Popular 
Committees set up in each village, town and city. These committees were arbitrated 
by the Unified National Leadership for the Uprising (UNLU), which was established 
in early 1988 to steer Intifada activities. Comprised of four members representing the 
main factions of the PLO (Fatah, PFLP, DFLP and the Palestinian Communist Party), 
the UNLU issued weekly leaflets providing detailed instructions for how Palestinians 
should act.  
 
Usually, these instructions related to political, social and economic issues. The 
Popular Committees functioned as the executive body to enforce UNLU decisions and 
                                                 
223 Efraim Torgovnik. “An Incumbent’s Electoral Politics under Adverse Conditions”. In Danjiel J. 
Elazar & Shmuel Sandler (eds.). Israel’s Odd Couple: the 1984 Knesset Elections and the National 
Unity Government. Detroit/Michigan: Wayne State University Press, 1990, P.39. 
224 Numerous works deal with the Intifada. For an excellent and first hand account of the movement see 
Ze’ev Schiff & Ehud Ya’ari. Intifada: The Palestinian Uprising-Israel’s third front. New 
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were backed by Strike Forces. These forces were established to punish Palestinian 
collaborators and those who breached UNLU decisions — for example, hours for 
commercial strikes fixed by the UNLU, or boycotts of Israeli products and labour 
markets.  The Popular Committees also assumed the considerable challenges of 
guarding camps at night, distributing food to refugees to support their steadfastness, 
and collecting funds to support families of martyrs, detainees, and injuries. Finally, 
these committees also assumed the considerable task of organizing rites of 
conciliation between disputing families, and acted as arbitrators between said 
families.  
 
Later, the Popular Committees created a system of informal classes to provide 
educations for Palestinian students who had been denied access to their schools when 
Israel instituted a formal, mass closure of Palestinian schools in the West Bank, and in 
light of the spot closure that had been in place in the Gaza Strip since February 1988. 
These classes, which relied on volunteer teachers, were organized in all Palestinian 
neighborhoods. Usually, they took place in camp houses provided for elementary, 
preparatory and secondary level students.225
 
 Many factors hindered this system from achieving more success and replacing the 
students’ lost formal education. Among these was the involvement of the students in 
the daily activities of the Intifada, which left them subject to Israeli measures 
including detention, shootings (potential death), and so forth. The students' Intifada 
involvement and the important absence of a system to confer certificates or degrees 
created little incentive among students to attend the informal classes, and so 
destabilized the good intentions of the system. Despite this, the act of organising such 
classes again signified an expansion of the social base of the Palestinians who 
practiced para-state functions. The Popular Committees, which operated this system, 
recruited their members from the refugees of camps and in most cases these refugees 
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led and supervised the committees’ activities. Thus the Intifada, enabled the refugees 
of the territories to join with ayan, and middle class Palestinians in participating in 
para-state activities. 
 
The notable development here not only relates to the inclusion of a new social stratum 
in the practice of para-state functions, but also to the emergence of a new political 
ideology alongside the extant pro-PLO political ideology (secular ideology), as 
expressed in the Islamist Popular Committees. These committees were associated with 
the main Islamic movements that emerged in the late 1980s: Hamas (the Arab 
acronym for the Islamic Resistance Movement, which translates as “zeal” or 
“bravery”) and Islamic Jihad. Both movements, which gained momentum during the 
Intifada, followed ideological lines that differed from that of the PLO.  
 
While the PLO advocated the establishment of a secular state comprised of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, Hamas and Islamic Jihad advocated the establishment of an 
Islamic state on the whole of Mandate Palestine, and claimed Palestine as Waqf land 
owned by Muslims throughout the world; consequently, no one had the right to cede 
control of any part of it to a non-Muslim. In this sense, they did not distinguish 
between land occupied during the 1948 and 1967 wars. 226
 
The ideological coincidence of Hamas and Islamic Jihad regarding these general 
principles did not at first imply an agreement on the instruments necessary to realize 
the goal of establishing an Islamic state all over Mandate Palestine. While Islamic 
Jihad placed equal emphases on the important of resistance and the revival of the 
Islamic society in attaining this goal, Hamas perceived greater import in the revival of 
Islamic society. However, as the Intifada unfolded, out of a fear of losing its 
constituencies of support Hamas revised its approach and adopted one more in line 
with that which was articulated by Islamic Jihad.  
 
Hamas’ revision of its approach toward the struggle with Israel enabled it to claim 
wider constituencies of support in the territories, and thus to emerge from then 
onward as an influential player in Palestinian politics. Hamas could therefore stand in 
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opposition to the PNC’s resolutions of November 1988 (announced in the West Bank 
and in the Gaza Strip), which provided for PLO endorsement of the right of Israel to 
exist in peaceful relations with the state of Palestine, and at the time gained the 
recognition of around 100 states.227   
 
Hamas also stood in opposition to those peace initiatives made during the Intifada, 
including the peace initiative of President of Egypt Hosni Mubarak — the so called 
Ten Points Plan — and the following Five Point Plan. The latter, which was 
advocated by USA secretary of state James Becker in the summer of 1989, was 
formed along the same lines as the Mubarak plan and called for Israeli-Palestinian 
negotiations to be sponsored by Egypt and the United States.228 Hamas was not the 
only party to oppose these initiatives. The Likud government also refused to deal with 
any of them, despite the PLO having given them its blessing (in particular, the 
Mubark initiative). The following right-wing government, formed in 1990, pursued 
the same anti-peace policy and refused to negotiate any peace initiative.  
 
After Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and the subsequent Gulf War (1990-
1991), and in light of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the US began to intensify its 
diplomatic efforts in the post-war Middle East with the aim of re-drawing its political 
map. At the time, the American administration envisaged a peace conference co-
chaired by the United States and Russia, designed to negotiate a “land for peace”.  
The Likud government, under huge pressure from the American administration to 
participate, conditioned the Palestinian participation in the conference by attaching 
insider Palestinians (Palestinians of the territories) to a Joint Palestinian-Jordanian 
delegation.  
 
The PLO, which had suffered the loss of the logistical support of the Arab states (due 
to its support of Sadam Husein’s invasion of Kuwait) and the financial support of 
Gulf countries (cut off for the same reasons as that of the Arab states), had no option 
but to accept Israel’s conditions with few modifications. The PLO demanded 
Jerusalem be represented by the Palestinian team, and the right to decide the team’s 
                                                 
227 See Jerusalem Post on 14, 15, 16, November 1988. 
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members. The Likud government, under U.S. pressure, responded to PLO demands 
and so the Madrid Peace Conference began on 30 October 1991. This did not imply a 
successful conclusion for the conference. In fact, Israel adopted a tactic that, 
according to Israel’s Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir, sought to prolong the 
negotiations for 10 years (during which it might accelerate settlement building and 
accomplish further changes on the ground).229 This tactic made the round of talks in 
Madrid and those that followed in Washington (1991-1992) unproductive.  
 
The deadlock of the peace talks intensified already extant opposition to the Madrid 
process, and prompted Hamas, which had taken the leading role in opposing the 
Madrid process, to escalate its Military operations against Israeli targets. The most 
notable of these operations was carried out by a group of Izz al-Din Qassam brigades, 
the Military wing of Hamas, which shot and killed three Israeli soldiers in the Gaza 
Strip town of Beit Lahya on 7 December 1992.230 Less than a week later, Hamas 
succeeded in kidnapping the Israeli soldier Nissim Toledano, and demanded the 
release of its spiritual leader Ahmad Yassin in exchange for its own release of 
Toledano. 
 
This act, considered intolerable by the newly elected Labour government led by Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin, enabled Hamas to claim further constituencies in the 
territories. In retaliation for the deaths of the three soldiers and the kidnapped 
Toledano (whose body was found by Bedouin women in a village near East Jerusalem 
on 15 December), Rabin’s government detained more than 1,200 Hamas and Islamic 
Jihad supporters, and expelled over 400 to Marj El Zuhur in South Lebanon231 Hamas' 
actions bolstered its credibility among Palestinians, and introduced the organisation as 
a serious alternative to the PLO. When it became clear that the Madrid process was 
useless, Arafat perceived this development as a particularly serious threat to his status 
and organization within the territories. To counter the growing status of Hamas then, 
Arafat urgently needed a political achievement of any sort.  
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In January 1993 Arafat endorsed the Norwegian-sponsored backchannel initiated by 
Ahmed Qrieh (better known as Abu Alla) and Yair Hirschfeld, an Israeli Senior 
Lecturer on Middle East Affairs at Haifa University. The first round of negotiations 
between these two men was held during the period of 20-22 January 1993, before 
being upgraded to include top officials from both sides; on 20 August 1993 the 
negotiations culminated in the Declaration of Principles (DOP) or, as it is more 
commonly known, the Oslo accord.232  The DOP stipulated autonomous Palestinian 
institutions (national level state institutions) in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip. 
Art. I of DOP stipulated that “the aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations...is, 
among other things, to establish Palestinian Interim self-Government, the elected 
council (the “council”), for the Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza 
Strip, for a transitional period no exceeding five years...”233
 
The DOP enabled Palestinians, for the first time in their history, to enjoy their own 
state institutions, in particular at a national-level. Though Palestinians had access to 
national-level institutions under Ottoman and Jordanian rule, as well as under 
Egyptian rule, these institutions had remained not their own. More importantly, they 
took part in these institutions not in their capacity as Palestinian citizens, but rather as 
either Ottoman or Jordanian citizens (excluding the Gazans, who had been under the 
Egyptian rule discussed earlier); therefore their access to these institutions was 
conditioned by their loyalty to a ruler, and confined to a particular social stratum. The 
situation was worse under British Mandate and Israeli occupation. Under both rules, 
Palestinians had been denied all access to national level government institutions, 
although they were permitted to take part in local level institutions. In both cases, 
however, their access remained hostage to the political atmosphere of the country, and 
was limited to a specific social stratum.  
                                                    
With the signing of the DOP, Palestinians were for the first time permitted a cabinet, a 
legislative assembly, a bureaucratic system, and other para-state institutions, and the 
decision of who should enjoy access to these institutions was to made by Palestinians 
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alone, rather than by foreigners as was the case before. The next chapter discusses the 
system of the Palestinian autonomy promoted by DOP (eg. the Oslo process), and 
shows how this system operated. It will focus therefore on the structure of the newly 
emerged Palestinian Authority, the relation of this authority to political society, civil 
society, and general publics — finally addressing the mode of government that 







Chapter III: Gaining Autonomy through Oslo  
On the Peace, the People, and the Authority 
 
“I think that what is being discussed in Israel now is not whether the Palestinians 
should have a state or should not have a state, an entity or not entity. What they are 
discussing is the size, the capital, what should be included, whether it should be armed 
or not armed…”234   
 
With these words, former Palestinian Minister of Local Government and Chief 
Palestinian Negotiator Sa’eb Erekat described the shift in the Israeli position toward 
the Palestinian entity promoted by the Declaration of Principles (DOP) made on the 
20th of August 1993. Erekat’s main point was that the DOP highlighted Israel’s 
formal recognition of Palestinian national existence, and thus transferred the issue of 
Palestinian entity from the realm of theoretical possibility into that of empirical 
reality.  
 
Nonetheless, the above recognition did not imply Israeli recognition of a Palestinian 
right to self-determination and statehood. From the Israeli point of view, the DOP 
stated that a change in the status quo had prevailed for the first time since the Israeli 
occupation of WBGS in 1967; yet as far as Israel was concerned the scope of this 
change must remain subject to open-ended negotiations which should be regulated 
mainly by the principle of a power-balance apart from any international legality, and 
which should leave the door open for every possibility (including that of a Palestinian 
state). This was the Israeli logic of peace upon which the DOP rested, and according 
to which Israel conditionally recognized the right of Palestinians to take control over 
some crucial features of any negotiated state.  
 
 
The Background Behind and Rise of the PA 
 
With conditional recognition of Palestinian national existence and the Cairo 
Agreement (signed on 4 May 1994, regarding the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area),235 
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Israeli forces pulled out of parts of the Gaza Strip and withdrew completely from the 
West Bank city of Jericho (which constitutes approximately 1% of the West Bank). 
The Palestinian Authority (PA) was established to replace the outgoing Israeli forces. 
Following was an Israeli-Palestinian interim agreement regarding the West Bank and 
the Gaza Strip (known as the Taba Agreement, or Oslo II), which was signed on 
September 28, 1995. In December 1995 arrangements issuing from these events 
extended to the PA partial/full rule over a further 27% of the West Bank, and 
promised further extension of PA rule over the whole of the West Bank (excluding the 
settlements) by the end of 1997.  
 
The rule of the PA, according to these agreements, had been specified to cover only 
civil spheres, and was to be applied only to Palestinians in the self-ruled areas, 
excluding Palestinians in East Jerusalem and those who lived in the Jewish 
settlements built in self-ruled areas which; along with those regarding refugees, 
borders, foreign relations, water, and other matters (e.g., the issue of final status), 
were agreed to be negotiated during the final status talks set for the beginning of the 
third year of the five-year interim period.   
 
The clock regulating this period would begin to tick on the arrival of the PA in Gaza 
and Jericho (May 1994). Under the agreements, UN Security Council Resolutions 242 
and 338 were to be implemented. Until agreement over final status issues was 
reached, Israel would keep control of external security, borders, and foreign relations. 
Moreover, she would maintain the right to extend her jurisdictions over Jewish 
settlements in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and to control the military posts and 
the bypass roads surrounding these settlements. Altogether these areas constitute 
approximately 40% of the Gaza Strip and 72% of West Bank. Israel also retained the 
right to review PA legislation regarding civil powers.  
 
By virtue of these agreements the PA, whose composition was limited to 24 members 
(Article IV of the Cairo Agreement) was empowered with legislative, executive, and 
judicial authority to handle civil issues. The legislative authority of the PA included 
the promulgation of primary and secondary legislation, including the basic law or 




constitution for the interim period, and other matters. However, Article VII. 3 of the 
Cairo Agreement enabled Israel to veto any legislation inconsistent with her interests.  
 
With the conclusion of Oslo II, in order to enable the PA to assume rule over further 
territories (as provided by Oslo II) the composition of the PA, previously constructed 
to correlate with the Palestinian Council, was expanded to 82 elected members for the 
duration of the interim period. The chairman of the executive branch (authority) of 
this council was to be elected by Palestinians at the same time as they elected the 
members of the Palestinian Council, and would form with them the interim 
Palestinian self-government. (Articles I, II, III, IV, and V of Oslo II). 
 
Thus, for the purpose of our discussion the term PA will be understood as meaning 
the executive authority (including the President) of the Palestinian self-government 
alongside those Palestinian security forces provided for by article VIII of the Cairo 
Agreement; these forces were allowed for to serve the aim of keeping “public order 
and internal security for Palestinians of the Gaza Strip and the Jericho area”. Article 
III of Annex I of the same agreement established the population of these forces at 
9,000, out of which up to 7,000 were recruited from abroad. It was agreed that the 
forces would be distributed among the Civil Police (Al Shurta), Public Security (or as 
it is commonly known: the National Security Force Qwaat Al Amn Al Watani), 
General Intelligence (El Mukhabbarat al-Amma), Emergency Services and Rescue (Al 
Difa’a Al Madani), and the Palestinian Coastal Police.  
 
These five security branches were the only branches the PA was permitted by the 
Cairo Agreement to establish. Yet with the conclusion of Oslo II and the subsequent 
extension of PA rule over further cities and towns in the West Bank, the PA was later 
permitted to increase the number of its security forces to 30,000, out of which up to 
12,000 were to be deployed in the West Bank, and 18,000 to be deployed in the Gaza 
Strip. Moreover, the PA was also permitted to establish additional security branches 
including Preventive Security, and Amn Al Ri’asah (Presidential Security) (Article. IV 
of Annex I of the Oslo II/ Taba agreement).  
 
Accordingly, in a strict legal sense, the Palestinian security forces was to be composed 
of seven security branches; however this number was likely to prove fluid during the 
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interim period as local residents joined these forces and new branches emerged. At 
least four security branches did emerge: the Military Intelligence, Military Police 
(said to be attached to Military intelligence), Air Guard, and Special Security (Al Amn 
El Khas).236  The proliferation of the Palestinian security forces and local residents’ 
participation in them, according to some, increased their total number to 
approximately 50,000 security personnel.237  
 
With 50,000 security personnel, the autonomous areas were said in 1998 to be the 
most heavily policed territories in the world, having one security person per every 59 
residents (the estimated population of the autonomous areas was 2,958,579 in 
1998).238 Most of these forces were either recruited from groups of ex-PLO militants, 
or had been Fatah activists during the Intifada, in particular connected to armed 
popular committees (such as qwaat Dariba, or Strike Forces) and popular committees 
(like Lijan Sha’biya) which had been dissolved after Oslo. Consequently, the PA’s 
various security branches served to contain these activists and created a protective 
vanguard for Arafat’s policy and rule.  
 
Administratively, the forces are noteworthy for how their responsibilities overlapped, 
and the unclear & ambiguous delineation of their functions and mandates. With the 
exception of the Special and Presidential Security Forces that operated under Arafat’s 
command, all the forces were directed by Palestinian officials, who reported to Arafat 
alone (he exercised ultimate authority over them). They lacked any sort of 
coordination with each other, and acted without reference to law or due legal 
procedures. Alongside the PA’s various security forces, Islamist militants including 
the Izz al-Din Qassam brigades, the military wing of Hamas, and Islamic Jihad 
militants could establish themselves as clandestine organizations enjoying 
autonomous status outside of PA control.  
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The positioning of the Izz al-Din Qassam brigades along with the Islamic Jihad 
militants outside of the PA’s control implied the PA’s lack of a crucial feature of any 
sovereignty: a monopoly on the use of coercive force. Faisal El-Husayni, a former 
PLO member and director of Orient House in East Jerusalem, expressed an awareness 
of the importance of monopolizing coercion in any modern state when he called upon 
people “to stop using weapons and to hand them over to the Palestinian 
Authority...with the presence of the Palestinian security, there is no need for people to 
maintain using weapons”.239 Thus, from the very beginning the PA was asked to 
assert itself as a sole source of coercion. 
 
This challenge reveals a major feature of post-Oslo Palestinian politics: that it had to 
unfold as a politics of state-in-making within Palestinian territories subject to the 
context of peace process parameters. This political scramble weakened the role of the 
PLO and its independent militant groups (like the PFLP, the DFLP, and so on), as 
well as its political institutions like the PNC and the executive committee; moreover, 
it limited the role of these institutions to that of “broker” for the newly emerging PA 
and its peace policy.240   
 
The rise of the PA as a central authority within the Palestinian territories, which had 
the rights to monopolize coercion and to rule society within the context of the peace 
process parameters, revised the premises of Palestinian politics. Unlike the PLO era, 
in which various Palestinian militant groups enjoyed independent status and 
representation in various PLO institutions based on a quota system, the PA was 
dominated by Fatah-affiliated officials who sought — within the context of the peace 
process — to evolve this authority into a state with derivative attributes including a 
monopoly on coercion. 
 
The PA was also asked to deal with the negative economic repercussions of the 27 
years of Israeli occupation of the WBGS. In seeking to subordinate the economy of 
the WBGS to her priorities and needs, Israel discouraged the development of large-
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scale industrialization and had treated the WBGS as a market for her products and as a 
source of cheap labour. Due to such policies the economy of WBGS had become very 
much connected to the Israeli economy, and the livelihood of a large segment of 
Palestinians in the West Bank and in the Gaza Strip was dependent on employment 
within Israel. On the eve of the first Intifada in 1987, for instance, the WBGS 
constituted one of the largest markets for Israeli products, with approximately 961.2 
million USD states as the value of WBGS imports from Israel vs. the 303.7 million 
USD said to be the value of the WBGS’s exports to Israel. In the meantime, no less 
than 40% of the WBGS’s labour forces were working inside Israel. This reduced the 
contribution of the WBGS’s GDP to the GNP by about 18% during the period of 
1970-1987.241  
 
The economy of WBGS witnessed further deterioration during the years of the first 
Intifada (1987-1993), manifested as the significant contribution of the agricultural 
sector to GDP (33% of GDP issued from agricultural fields) and a weak investment in 
infrastructure (3% of GDP).242 The overall result of this situation was low Palestinian 
GDP. Indeed, Palestinian GDP was estimated at 4.1% of Israeli GDP (whose 
estimation was 62,000 million USD), and in 1992 low Palestinian GNP per capita was 
estimated at 16% of Israeli GNP per capita (estimated at 11,760 USD).243 With the 
implementation of the Israeli policy of "closure” the deterioration of WBGS’s 
economy only sped up.  
 
The policy of closure, which is regarded as an Israeli innovation, was first 
implemented in 1991 during the first Gulf War; the West Bank and Gaza Strip were 
sealed for approximately six consecutive weeks. Though Israel claims that this closure 
was implemented for security reasons, a careful scrutiny of the Zionist ideology upon 
which the state of Israel was founded indicates that the closure was actually carried 
out with racist and political considerations. The chief objective of closure is to 
separate Palestinians from Jews in a way that secures the “Jewishness” of the state of 
Israel.  
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The foundation for this idea was laid down on the arrival of the second Aliyah (wave 
of Jewish immigrants) in Palestine in the period 1904-1914. Most of this wave’s 
members, a population estimated at 25,000, were inspired by the ideology of the 
Russian-based movement of “Lovers of Zion”, which strongly advocated the re-
building of a pure Jewish political, economic, and ethical identity. Toward this end, 
members of this wave, including David Ben-Gurion (the first Israeli Prime Minister), 
Yitzhak Ben-Zni (the second President of Israel), Moshe Sharett, and Levi Eshkol 
(both became Israeli Prime Ministers),244 advocated the principle of “Kibbush 
Ha’avoda” (Hebrew for “conquest of Labour”). This principle called for reliance on 
Jewish labour and the exclusion of Arab/Palestinian labour from Jewish settlements as 
a means of strengthening Jewish ties to the country's soil.245  The concept appears to 
have been invoked in the last decade, but in the more comprehensive form of closure.  
 
Closure regulations deny Palestinians from the West Bank and Gaza Strip access to 
Jerusalem (including East Jerusalem) and Israeli territory, and forbid movement 
between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip by people without permits. To obtain such 
a permit, an individual is subjected to strict security scrutiny, and in most cases, the 
permit is denied. All Palestinians, including professionals, merchants, workers inside 
Israeli territory, Gazan students in the West Bank’s universities, those seeking 
medical treatment in Israel or Jerusalem, and so forth, are asked to have permits. 
Should the permit be granted, it is subject to various restrictions regarding time 
(specific hours for entry and exit) and duration (for example, a permit might be issued 
for a day, week, et cetera).246  
 
Due to these restrictions, a large portion of the estimated 40% of the WBGS’s labour 
forces (the total of which was estimated at 312,000 in 1991247) employed inside Israel 
before the closure either lost their work or became engaged in more casual labour on a 
daily/weekly basis; the latter depended on whether they were granted a permit, and on 
the duration of the permit. This meant that the future of these workers became hostage 
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to political shifts within the territories.  When there was stability they could get work 
some days inside Israel, and when there wasn't stability they could not. 
  
The PA, therefore, inherited from Israel a regressive economic system and generally 
destroyed infrastructure. To preserve the new political order stimulated by the Oslo 
agreements, and to preserve the peace process, the PA, Israel, and the United States 
agreed that a new economic order was necessary to re-define the asymmetrical 
economic relationship between Israel and Palestinians.248 Against this background, the 
PLO, on behalf of the PA, signed the Protocol on Economic Relations249 with the 
Israeli government in Paris on 29 April 1994, and this was annexed to the Cairo 
Agreement (Annex IV). 
 
By virtue of the Protocol on Economic Relations, the PA was able to set up a 
Monetary Authority (the PMA) to supervise and regulate the banking sector and to 
assume the fiscal powers the Israeli government had held within the territories. These 
powers included bank licensing and regulating foreign exchange transactions, in 
addition to others (Art. IV, 1-7). Even so, the PMA was denied any right to issue an 
independent Palestinian currency, and Israeli currency (Israeli New Shekel, NIS) 
remained the official tender in the territories; the US dollar and Jordanian dinar, in 
addition to the Egyptian pound (in the Gaza Strip) are also commonly used.  The 
refusal to allow an independent Palestinian currency denied the PA the capacity to 
design its own monetary policy, particularly with respect to establishing interest rates 
and currency values. Accordingly, the Palestinian economy was continually at the 
mercy of Israeli currency fluctuations.  
 
Still, the PA was granted some economic freedom insofar as its imports from Arab 
countries (mainly Jordan and Egypt) were concerned. Article III enabled the PA to set 
up an independent import policy, which included the rate of customs, purchasing 
taxes, and establishing levies on all goods and products imported from these 
countries. In so doing, the PA was restrained by the criteria of the GATT 1994 
agreement (Art. III. 2, b). The PA import policy was to be confined to specific goods 
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and products specified in Appendix I and II of the protocol; specified products 
included food and agricultural products, construction materials, household electric 
appliances, as well as capital goods (e.g., farm machinery, equipment used within the 
textile industry, and so forth).250  
 
All goods and products not included in the mentioned categories were subjected to 
Israeli import policies, including Israeli customs, purchase taxes, and levies (Art. III. 
10). As the result of Israeli custom taxes being imposed on these goods, the PA was 
forced to increase the customs taxes on these goods and products when Israel did, a 
situation which had negative economic ramifications given the low Palestinian GNP 
per capita (as compared with Israeli GNP per capita). 
 
Furthermore, the PA was not absolutely free to decide the specific quantities to be 
imported of the goods and products over which it exercised independent import 
policy. Art. III. 2 restrained the PA in this respect by connecting such quantities to the 
Palestinian market needs that were agreed would be decided by a sub-committee of 
experts from both sides (Art. III. 3). The sub-committee was derived from the 
Palestinian-Israeli Joint Economic Committee (JEC) which was set up by virtue of 
Art. II. 1 to oversee the implementation of the protocol. Thus the PA became hostage 
to the committee’s interpretation of market needs. These needs were connected 
mainly to the Palestinian marginal propensity to consume (MPC), a variable that was 
extremely uncertain in light of the unstable political situation in the WBGS. The 
overall outcome, therefore, is that the PA’s ability to accrue financial gain from such 
new import regulations was uncertain and subject to unexpected changes in local 
demand. 
 
Despite this, the PA enjoyed other financial channels due to its right of direct taxation; 
these included income and property taxes (Art. V.1-3), in addition to indirect taxation 
including VAT set at a rate of 15-16% (Art. VI). The PA also succeeded in gaining 
Israeli endorsement of a monthly transferring [to itself] the income taxes deducted by 
Israel from the pay-checks of those Palestinian labourers employed inside Israeli 
territories (Art. VII). No less than 75% of this tax was agreed to be transferred to the 
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PA (Art. V.4). According to some estimates the PA, by virtue of these regulations, 
gained approximately 360-420 million USD in direct tax and VAT, and an annual 180 
million USD in tax deductions.251 Still, while the first two channels (direct tax and 
VAT) were under the PA’s full control, the transfer to the PA of income tax deducted 
by Israel from Palestinian labourers remained subject to Israeli good will, the political 
atmosphere, and in particular any advances in the peace process.  
 
PA financial gains from direct and indirect taxation came at the expense of its ability 
to control the flow of fresh Israeli agricultural and industrial products into its 
territories. Art. VIII. 10 stimulated unrestricted flow of fresh agricultural products 
between the PA’s territories and Israel; this, of course, placed Palestinian farmers at a 
disadvantage, as Israeli farmers enjoyed the subsidies and support of their government 
while Palestinian farmers were denied these by the PA’s financial weakness.  
Moreover, the unrestricted flow of agricultural products between the PA’s territories 
and Israel was not applied to those products that allowed Palestinian farmers a 
comparative advantage in terms of their production (e.g., potatoes, cucumbers, and 
tomatoes). The PA was not permitted to export more than the annual quantities of said 
products specified by the protocol (at least the case during the period of 1994-1998).  
 
Art.VIII.10 was accompanied by article IX, which provided for the unrestricted flow 
of Israeli industrial products into the PA’s territories. This article further 
institutionalized the economic relations between the Israel and the territories to favour 
Israel’s priorities and needs; it denied the low-capital and small-scale Palestinian 
industrial sector any competitive power within its relationship with the highly 
developed, sophisticated, and subsidized Israeli industrial sector. 
 
The protocol regarding economic relations, therefore, further institutionalized the 
asymmetrical economic relationship between Israel and the Palestinian territories that 
had prevailed since the Israeli occupation of the WBGS in 1967.  The economic 
parameters of this protocol, plus the PA’s lack of control over key resources in the 
occupied territories (including water), forced the PA to turn to the international 
community for assistance for its development efforts. The PA had significant hopes 
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that the international community would develop Palestinian autonomous areas. In July 
1994 Arafat told a news conference in Cairo that “the Israeli colonization destroyed 
the Palestinian infrastructure. We have to start from scratch in everything and this is 
the responsibility of the international community.”252
 
Arafat’s words sought to remind the international community of its pledges and 
promises to assist the process of state-building in the WBGS, made at the first donors’ 
conference in support of Middle East peace that took place in Washington DC in 
October 1993. Approximately 50 delegations represented 50 states and international 
organizations, attended the conference and committed some 2.3 billion USD to assist 
Palestinians in the development and reconstruction of their territories during the 
period of 1993-1998. By December 1998, the PA had received some 2.1 billion 
USD253; of this, approximately 525 million was received in 1994. Nearly 10.5% of the 
funds received in 1994 was allocated to building PA security forces, and another 6% 
to building PA institutions (including bureaucratic ones, of course), compared to the 
10.2% allocated to education, 5% to the health sector, 0.75% to agriculture, 0.13% to 
transportation, 0.68% to human rights, 2% to democratic development, and 1.71% to 
private sector development. The remaining funds were allocated to support concerns 
like women's issues, housing, environment, and so forth. No funds whatsoever were 
allocated to the legal and industrial sectors.254  
 
The donors’ main concern was over the success of the Oslo process and, accordingly, 
they emphasised the import of a stability achieved only through a strong central 
authority.  Hence they also placed greater emphasis on developing the PA’s capacity 
at the expense of other sectors like civil society and the economic sectors (agricultural 
and industrial). By strengthening PA capacity and ignoring these other important 
sectors, donors accelerated the emergence of a centralized rule in the WBGS. This 
situated the PA in direct confrontation with the wishes and hopes of the WBGS 
population and its priorities of democracy and improved economic conditions. In a 
poll conducted by the Centre of Palestine for Research and Studies (CPRS) in Nablus 
in November 1993, 74% of WBGS Palestinians supported the establishment of a 
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democratic system based on free elections, separation of powers, accountability and 
transparency. The poll also revealed 72% of Palestinians supported the right of the 
opposition to exist and freely express its opinions.255  
 
The opposition was yet another dilemma facing the PA. On 5 January 1994, ten 
Palestinian Islamic and secular factions — including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, the PFLP, 
and the DFLP — set up the so-called “Palestinian Forces Alliance” as an opposition 
front to counterbalance the DOP and the peace process; these factions then made a 
“declaration of the alliance’s political task”.256 Justifiably, they pointed out that Oslo 
process did not provide for a total Israeli withdrawal from the WBGS, and that it 
maintained the right of Israel to control the majority of WBGS territories. Ultimately, 
this arrangement denied the Palestinian right to a state and independence.  
 
More importantly, they asserted that by deferring essential, conflicted issues (e.g., 
Jerusalem, refugees, settlements, and borders) to third-status negotiations, Israel 
would have the time needed to establish its facts on the ground — thereby making it 
very difficult for any Palestinian state to be formed. Against this background, the 
factions declared their commitment to the PLO charter and to national struggle, as 
well as their commitment to Jihad (the war in the path of God) as a means of 
liberating Palestine.  
 
Despite such declarations, the opposition front quickly collapsed after its members 
could not agree on how exactly to pursue an opposition policy. While secular factions 
preferred a peaceful method, Islamic opposition — mainly Hamas — preferred all out 
war with Israel and its peace process.257  Toward the latter's ends, on April 6, 1994 (a 
few weeks prior to the PA’s arrival in Gaza), in Afulla a Hamas car bomb was 
detonated by Ra’id Abdullah Zakarna (a 25 year old from Kabatyia, near Jenin) next 
to Israeli bus no. 340, killing seven Israelis and wounding 52 others.258 Hamas 
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claimed that the attack avenged the killings of 29 Palestinians by an Israeli extremist, 
who had acted against Muslim worshippers at the Cave of the Patriarchs (in Hebron) 
on 25 February 1994.  Hamas also warned there would be further actions taken 
against Israeli targets. 
 
When the PA arrived in May, Israel perceived its main duties as being to maintain 
Israeli security and to stop further attacks by Hamas. According to Ron Pundik who 
— in association with Yair Hirschfield — worked the Oslo backchannel, “...the 
declaration of principles was not signed out of a sudden love for Palestinians, or out 
of a sudden understanding of the Palestinian political demands, but rather out of a 
belief that the process will provide more security and better quality of life...”259 This 
was and still is the Israeli interpretation of article XV of Oslo II. The article cites that 
both sides are to “take all measures necessary in order to prevent acts of terrorism”.  
 
This article was further elaborated to place responsibilities on Palestinian security 
forces to “act systematically against all expressions of violence and terror” and to 
“arrest and prosecute individuals who are suspected of perpetrating acts of violence 
and terror” as well as to cooperate with the Israeli security forces “in the exchange of 
information and coordination of policies and activities”. Furthermore, Palestinian 
security forces were asked to protect all citizens (including Israeli citizens) in the 
areas of the PA’s jurisdiction, and “…to prevent and deal with any attempt to cause 
damage or harm to infrastructure serving the other side…”(Article II of Annex I of 
Oslo II). 
 
The main problem with the aforementioned articles is their absence of any clarity 
regarding the terms of how to combat violence and terror were concerned. While 
Israel insists that the terms imply unconditional security for Israelis, including Israeli 
soldiers who remain installed around Jewish settlements in the WBGS (in addition to 
Israeli civilians inside Israeli territories), the PA insists that the terms imply 
conditional security connected to advancement within the peace process.  
Furthermore, Israel had to fulfil her commitments to the Oslo accords; in particular 
she had to halt her settlement activities in the WBGS. As long as Israel failed to meet 
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her own commitments, the PA continued, Palestinians would retain the right to fight 
the occupation of their land.  Nothing could prejudice this right, as it had already been 
secured by international law.  
 
The crisis of the PA in this respect derived from the logic of the entire Oslo process. 
Since the initiation of the peace conference in Madrid in 1991, Israel’s main concern 
was not to hang any peace settlement with the Palestinians on terms of international 
legality. But the Palestinian insistence on international legality during those 
negotiations meant the Madrid conference and the following Washington talks would 
be unproductive. A shift in the Palestinian position occurred when the PLO engaged 
with the Oslo backchannel, and signed the Oslo accords. By so doing, the PLO 
accepted the Israeli logic of peace, which rested on the existing balance of power; 
after this, the PA was left at the mercy of the Israeli interpretation not only of peace, 
but of security as well.  
 
The Israeli interpretation of security was broader than the PA expected. It was not 
confined to asking that future attacks on Israeli targets be stopped, nor to the need to 
“arrest and prosecute individuals who are suspected of perpetrating acts of violence 
and terror”, but rather extended to include a crack down on Hamas and other 
opposition factions. This view was clearly expressed by Yitzhak Rabin when he 
declared that through the Oslo process the “PA would be able to repress the 
Palestinians without appeals to the Supreme Court and without human rights 
organizations”.260 Rabin’s view implied inter-Palestinian violence, a condition 
considered to be taboo by both the PA and the opposition factions (including Hamas). 
Dr. Mahmoud El Zahar, Hamas’ Gaza spokesman, revealed Hamas’ expressed an 
awareness of the above Israeli plans when he described those in the PA as 
“brothers...neighbours, ...cousins...we understand what it means, to implement this 
accord with Israel...we are wise enough not to play the Israeli game”.261
 
Yet, while in Hamas' point of view not playing Israel's game meant not being 
involved in armed confrontation with the PA under any circumstances, it did not 
imply a stop to attacks on Israeli targets, nor did it imply Hamas' submission to the 
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PA as an ultimate source of coercion. Abu Mohammad Mustafa, Damascus 
representative of Hamas, pointed out that Hamas “totally reject the disarming of 
Palestinian people because occupation is still continuing in our land...”262  
 
The words of Mustafa point to the main crisis suffered by the PA. When the PLO 
signed the Oslo Accords, the PLO/PA committed itself to denouncing armed struggle 
as means of liberation, and also promised to fight all forms of “terror” which might 
spoil the peace prospects in the region. This commitment, which placed huge 
responsibilities on the PA, was not met with equal Israeli commitment to ending the 
occupation of WBGS — e.g., to stopping settlement activities and collective punitive 
measures like the Israeli policy of closure. Accordingly, the essential features of the 
old political order (the Israeli occupation of WBGS, so to speak) remained visible and 
subject to further Israeli-Palestinian negotiations. The PA exerted a great deal of effort 
to accelerate the disappearance of these features; their presence placed the PA under 
great pressure from opposition factions — particularly Hamas, which used the 
structural deficits of the peace accords to justify its military operation against Israeli 
targets inside WBGS and Israeli territories.  
Between a Rock and a Hard Place: the PA’s Search for Legitimacy 
 
Hamas' military operations were to place the PA under continuous Israeli pressure, 
and seriously threatened it’s political future; this was particularly the case given the 
PA's inability to create structural changes with respect to the economic situation of the 
majority of Palestinians as a result of it dependence on another partner (Israel) hostile 
to any vision of effective social, economic, and political liberation for Palestinians 
living in the occupied territories. This situation in turn subjected the PA to further 
pressure from its local community.  
 
Fully aware of this, on his arrival in July 1994 Arafat made his first speech on 
Palestinian soil and sought to recruit wider support for the Oslo Accords by appealing 
to his people “to be united as one man...to build...homeland as free men, a homeland 
of democracy, freedom and equality.” Statehood, in Arafat's opinion, would be 
difficult to attain without containing his opponents (mainly constituted by Hamas), 
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who considered his visit to Gaza “...shameful and humiliating, as it occurs in the 
shadow of occupation and in the shadow of Arafat’s humiliating submission before 
the enemy government...” Accordingly, in an address to Ahmad Yassin — the Hamas 
leader who had been jailed by Israel since 1989 — Arafat vowed “not to rest or be 
silent until you are (Yassin) with us by our side, here, here, here...”263  
 
Arafat’s accommodation of his opponents expressed one part of his future policy 
toward them; Barry Rubin concluded that Arafat pursued a mix of both 
accommodative and oppressive policies in this respect.264 Though he enabled his 
opponents to maintain their social institutions/military infrastructure, and opened 
channels of dialogue with them,265 he also exhibited a readiness to combat any 
possible rebellion against himself (ostensibly, by said opponents). Toward this end, 
from Tunisia he issued decision no. 14 on 27 August 1994. The decision empowered 
Arafat with the right to ratify the security forces’ payroll, and the right to decide on 
the appointments of top-position militants (e.g., colonels, brigadiers, etc).266  
 
Having enjoyed this power, he appointed his most loyal militants to head various PA 
security branches and set himself as chief commander of these forces. Colonel Nasser 
Yousef — one of said exiled PLO militants — was appointed Commander of the 
National Security Forces before being replaced by Sae’b AL-A’jz. Amin El Hindi, a 
Fatah-affiliated militant originally from the Gaza Strip, was said to have disappeared 
between the early 1970s and the 1990s — a period during which he appears to have 
served as Commander of General intelligence. Musa Arafat, said to have family 
connections with Arafat, was appointed as the head of military intelligence. Faisal 
Abu Sharekh was appointed as the head of the presidential security forces. Ghazi El 
Jabali, very well known thanks to his loyalty to Arafat, was appointed as the head of 
the civil police.267   
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Playing the above Generals off each other, and consequently discouraging the 
emergence of any homogenous command that might challenge his own power, Arafat 
also introduced a number of insiders to head certain security branches.268 Colonel 
Muhammad Dahaln, originally from Khan Younis (the southern Gaza Strip) and in the 
1980s the leader of the pro-Fatah youth movement Al Shabiba, headed the Gaza 
branch of preventive security forces. Dahaln headed preventive security in Gaza, Jibril 
Al Rajub — a Fatah activist in 1970s arrested by Israeli forces — was released and 
eventually took command of the West Bank preventive security forces.  
 
Notwithstanding their different geographical and cultural orientations, this clique of 
generals retained loyalty to Arafat in order to protect the peace process and to 
abrogate any attempt to destroy their regime. For these generals, with Arafat behind 
them, acting against the peace process seemed a most intolerable act; it was this 
process upon which the legitimacy of their regime rested, and consequently any 
attempt to spoil the process was considered an attempt to abrogate their own political 
legitimacy.  
 
When Hamas’s military wing the Izz al-Din Qassam brigades kidnapped the Israeli 
solider Nahshon Wachsman on 11 October 1994, the Palestinian generals considered 
this act to be in defiance against their own regime and did not hesitate to assist Israeli 
forces in locating Wachsman. Although the crisis ended on 14 October with 
Wachsman's death, after an aborted Israeli rescue attempt,269 it escalated tensions 
between Hamas and the PA. On 19 October Hamas, angry at the PA's participation in 
the crisis, staged another attack on Dizengoff Street in Tel Aviv, killing 21 Israelis and 
injuring dozens of others. The PA, determined to keep peace process alive, launched 
an arrest campaign against Hamas supporters and detained approximately 200 of 
them.270  
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Islamic Jihad supporters were also targeted by the PA arrest campaigns; no less than 
150 of them were arrested on 11 November 1994 after an Islamic Jihad member blew 
himself up and killed three Israeli soldiers who had been installed on the main road 
between Rafah (south of the Gaza Strip) and Gaza city.271 The tension between the PA 
and the Islamic opposition (primarily Hamas and Islamic Jihad) reached its peak when 
Hamas organized a demonstration outside Gaza’s Palestinian mosque on 18 
November 1994 to demand the release of Palestinian prisoners from the PA’s jails. 
According to Human Right Watch, the demonstration turned into a violent clash 
between PA security forces and Islamic militia, leaving 14 Palestinians killed and 
hundreds of others wounded.272  
 
In his analysis of the unprecedented inter-Palestinian bloodshed, PLC member Ziad 
Abu Amr points out that the events “...suggested that Arafat had decided...to act 
against Hamas because.... Israelis were pressuring him to act or risk a suspension of 
expanding the autonomous rule to other areas of the West Bank.”273 Although Abu 
Amr's analysis implies a decrease in Arafat's popularity among Palestinians, given the 
latter’s support for a democratic system and rule of law, the events’ aftermath 
indicated the opposite.  A June 1995 poll stated that 60.9% of Palestinians believed 
Arafat to be the symbol of Palestinian nationhood, and 46.6% of Palestinians 
supported Arafat’s party (Fatah) vs. the 18.2% that supported Hamas and 0.1-4.4% 
that supported other factions (like the PFLP, the DFLP, and Islamic Jihad).274 This 
wide popular support for Arafat and his party enabled him to proceed with his current 
policy, and to conclude Oslo II with Israeli government.  
 
The Oslo II, formally known as the Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement on the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip and signed in Washington on 28 September 1995, divided 
the West Bank into three classifications: Category A covers the areas over which the 
PA would have full control (e.g., administrative and security responsibilities); 
Category B, covers the areas over which the PA would have partial control (e.g., 
complete administrative responsibilities and partial security responsibilities, with 
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Israeli forces being allowed to enter freely into these areas); and finally Category C 
covers the areas over which the PA would assume neither administrative nor security 
responsibilities. Category C covered Jewish settlements and the bypass roads 
surrounding them. (Article XI).275
 
Moreover, a two phase of Israeli redeployment was agreed upon. The first phase 
included Israeli redeployment from the major cities of the West Bank (excepting 
Hebron, which enjoyed special privileges within the agreement and was scheduled to 
be redeployed by March 1996 by virtue of Art. VII of Annex I). These cities included: 
Ramallah, Bethlehem, Nablus, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, and Jenin. The PA was to have full 
administrative and security responsibilities in these cities (e.g., they fell into Category 
A). Also within the context of the first phase of Israeli redeployment, Israel agreed to 
transfer about 450 villages and towns from Category C to Category B.  
 
The implementation of the first phase of the redeployment implied an extension of full 
PA control over 2% of West Bank territories, in addition to an extension of PA partial 
control over 26% of West Bank territories.276 The second phase of Israeli 
redeployment included redeployment from the remaining territories of West Bank 
(with exceptions made regarding final status issues) according to an 18-month 
timetable (Art. I of Annex I). Appendix 1 of Annex I of the agreement provided for 
the completion of the first phase of Israeli redeployment in December 1995.  
 
The conclusion of Oslo II marked a new phase in the peace process. Dissatisfied with 
the agreement, Jewish extremist Yigal Amir assassinated Israeli Prime Minster 
Ytizhak Rabin on 4 November 1995 as Rabin was leaving a peace rally in Tel Aviv. 
Asked why he committed this act, Amir responded, “Rabin wanted to give our 
country to Arabs”.277 This event, combined with Hamas' suicide bombings, revealed 
that the peace process had failed to change the deeply rooted hostilities that infested 
the Palestinians-Israeli relationship.  
 
                                                 
275 The full text of the agreement is online at 
 http://www.usembassy-israel.org.il/publish/peace/interim.htm 
276 Edward Said.”Palestinians Under Siege”. in Roane Carey (ed.) & Noam Chomsky (introd.) The New 
Initifada: Resisting Israel’s Apartheid. Verso Press, 2001, p. 35. 
277 CNN on 7 November, 1995, online <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9511/rabin/amir/11-
06/index.html>  
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This was not the case, however, with the relationship between Israeli and Palestinian 
politicians. In his comments on Rabin assassination, Arafat considered the event as 
“awful...where I lost one of the most important, courageous men in Israel.”278 Shimon 
Peres, by then acting Israeli Prime Minister, vowed during Rabin's funeral “not to 
hesitate for peace”279 and to implement those measures that had been agreed upon. In 
December Peres brought the first phase of the Israeli two-phase redeployment 
provided by Oslo II into force, and enabled the PA to extend its full/partial control 
over 28% of the West Bank territories. 
 
The extension of PA rule over further territories in the West Bank recruited further 
Palestinian support for the peace process and Arafat’s policy. At least 70,000 
Palestinians welcomed Arafat’s arrival to Nablus,280 and a further 50,000 Palestinians 
welcomed his arrival to Qalqilya following the Israeli redeployment from the city. In 
response, some 25,000 Hamas supporters met at a Gaza Rally on 16 December 1995 
and condemned Oslo II, vowing to “make the land of Palestine a graveyard for the 
children of Zion”.281  Toward this end, Hamas suicide bombers committed two attacks 
on 25 February 1996, which left 25 Israelis killed, and 80 others injured. Hamas 
claimed that the attacks avenged the January 1996 assassination of Yahiya Ayyash (a 
Bir Zeit University student considered to be an innovator of suicide bombings).282  
 
The two Hamas operations occurred just a few months prior to the Israeli May 
elections. The candidates nominated for Israeli premiership were acting Prime 
Minister Shimon Peres of the Labour party, considered the architect of peace with the 
Palestinians, and the Likud hard-liner Benjamin Netanyahu who was known mostly 
through his tough policy toward peace with Palestinians. Netanyahu's hard line was 
expressed by Likud Party member Uzi Landu on the eve of the election: “we’ll have 
to put much more emphasise on our security”... “If we really want peace: no 
Palestinian state here”.283 In Israeli public opinion, Hamas’ operations only 
strengthened the case for taking such a tough line toward the Palestinian state.  Hence 
Netanyahu rose to power in May 1996.  
                                                 
278 CNN on 6 November, 1995 in Ibid. 
279 Ibid. 
280 Al Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 16 December 1995.  
281 Jerusalem Post on 17 December 1995. 
282 Palestine Report. Vol. 1, no.40, March 1, 1996.  
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The rise of Netanyahu to power was accompanied by a growing influence of radical 
religious parties, which held 24 parliamentary seats after the election, increased from 
the 16 seats they had occupied in the pre-election era. In addition, the secular radical 
party Israel for Immigration won 7 seats, and the Third Way party won 4 seats. All of 
this further supported the government's hard-line, but created a situation in which 
Netanyahu (whose party had taken 34 of the 120 seats in Israeli parliament) 284 had to 
accept the conditions of these parties in order to successfully form his government. 
Fully aware of this fact, Netanyahu exhibited an unwillingness to honour the pledges 
of the former Israeli government and vowed in his victory speech not to negotiate 
over East Jerusalem, nor to redeploy from further territories unless the security of all 
Israelis was guaranteed.285
 
Netanyahu’s statement exhibited two aspects: on the one hand it showed concern for 
his political future as Israel’s prime minister, and on the other demonstrated the Likud 
party’s position with regards to the peace process. For the Likud party the Oslo 
process implied, in its final stage, Palestinian self-rule over some Palestinian 
territories that are geographically unconnected and moreover surrounded by Jewish 
settlements under Israeli sovereignty. According to the Likud agenda East Jerusalem 
not up for negotiations under any circumstance, the subject constituting taboo. For 
Palestinians, the Oslo process or self-rule arrangements were to be the first stage 
toward a fully independent Palestinian state (WBGS), with the capital as East 
Jerusalem. Arafat stated this view very clearly in his comments on the Israeli elections 
and Netanyahu's security agenda:  
 
“It is more than naive self-delusion to claim that Israel is capable of achieving peace 
without a full withdrawal from Palestinian and Arab territory, and without 
recognizing the right of the Palestinians to return to self-determination and establish 
an independent state with its capital in Jerusalem”.286
 
Arafat's words seemed to have little impact on Netanyahu who, after forming his 
government in June, decided to resume building at the controversial Har Homa, called 
Jabal (mountain) Abu Ghuneim by Palestinians. The issue of Jabal Abu Ghuneim 
stems from Israel’s Minister of Finance Isaac Moda’ee's 1991 order that at least 6,500 
                                                 
284 Ibid. 
285 CNN on 2 June, 1996. Online <http://www.cnn.com/WORLD/9606/02/israel.netanyahu/index.html> 
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housing units be constructed on this mountain to settle forty thousands Jewish 
settlers.287 Palestinian opposition to the project, backed by a veto from Israel’s 
judiciary, deferred its implementation. With Netanyahu’s assumption of power, the 
Israeli Supreme Court removed the legal restrictions regarding building on this 
mountain, and the government was given the green light to go ahead.  
 
Consequently, Netanyahu ordered the construction of a bypass road to connect the 
proposed Har Homa settlement in Jabal Abu Ghneim with the settlement of Gilo, 
south of East Jerusalem. The settlement building in Jabal Abu Ghneim, located no less 
than 2 km north of Bethlehem and sized at 2 squared km, was to complete the 
suffocation of the city, which was already surrounded by the Etzion settlement bloc in 
the South, Bitar Ilite in the West, and Taqoa in the East. Furthermore, the by-pass 
road between Hara Homa settlement and Gilo settlement would create physical 
barriers between Bethlehem and Jerusalem, and thus deny Bethlehmites access to East 
Jerusalem.288  
 
From a Palestinian point of view, settlement in Har Homa was a grave violation of the 
Oslo accords, which committed both sides not “...to take any step that will change the 
status of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip pending the outcome of the permanent 
status negotiations” (Art.XXXI.7 of Oslo II). Consequently, the Palestinians blamed 
Netanyahu for failing to honour the accords and called on him to stop building in Har 
Homa. Netanyahu, on the other hand, considered Jewish settlement in Har Homa a 
natural right for Jews not prejudiced by any agreement, and called Palestinians to 
account for failing to do their utmost to thwart the Hamas and Islamic Jihad networks. 
Indeed, Netanyahu went even further and called on the PA to denounce the PLO’s 
charter naming Israel’s destruction as a pre-condition for any further Israeli 
redeployment from the West Bank. The PA considered Netanyahu's demands 
unreasonable, since the PA’s involvement in the peace process with Israel already 
implied the PA’s denouncement of the PLO charter. Consequently, the PA interpreted 
the demand as another attempt by Netanyahu government to destroy the peace 
process. 
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As each side insisted on blaming the other for the failure to honor the agreements, 
mistrust intensified and clashes broke out on 24 September 1996, leaving no less than 
68 people killed, 54 Palestinians and 14 Israelis and hundreds of others injured 
according to a CNN report made on 28 September. These clashes broke out 
specifically in the aftermath of the Israeli decision to open a tourist tunnel near Al 
Aqsa Mosque. Palestinians perceived the decision as an Israeli attempt to tighten 
control over Jerusalem, which was, according to Arafat, “an escalation by the Israeli 
government against our people”.289 Netanyahu denied Arafat’s claim, asserting the 
“tunnel...does not harm to the holly places and ...expresses our sovereignty in 
Jerusalem”.290 Both sides therefore expressed unwillingness to end the crisis 
peacefully. However, as the clashes escalated to endanger the whole process of Oslo, 
both leaders responded to international and US demands to halt hostilities and resume 
peace talks. Accordingly, a USA-sponsored summit was convened in early October, 
and proclaimed the end of the crisis and the resumption of the peace talks.  
 
This summit paved the way for both sides to conclude the Hebron Protocol on 15 
January 1997. The protocol, elaborated in article VII of Annex I of Oslo II, enabled 
the PA to assume control over 80% of the Hebron city whilst simultaneously leaving 
Israel to control an enclave of 400 settlers and 20,000 Palestinians.291 With the 
conclusion of the Hebron Protocol, both sides showed interest in denouncing the 
violence and keeping the peace process alive, notwithstanding their conflicting 
perceptions of this process.  
 
However, the process quickly entered another stalemate as result of Netanyahu’s 
policy, which turned its back on the former Israeli government pledges observed by 
Art.I of Annex I of Oslo II. These provided for Israeli redeployment from the 
remaining territories of the West Bank by no later than March 1997. Netanyahu's 
failure to fulfill the pledge of the former Israeli government was accompanied by an 
escalation of settlement building expressed by a 25% increase of the West Bank’s 
settlers and a 6% increase of Jerusalem’s settlers during the period of 1996-1999 
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(1999 being the year when Netanyahu left office),292 and the bulldozing of some 1,000 
dunoms in the Gaza Strip for settlement purposes in the same period.293 Most notable 
was the resumption of settlement construction in Har Homa, following the March 
Hamas suicide bombings that left three Israelis dead and another forty-eight 
wounded.294  
 
Hamas' new suicide bombings put the PA on the defensive, and enabled Netanyahu to 
justify his settlement activities and to launch an offensive campaign against the PA 
aimed at displaying the it’s failures to denounce violence and fulfill its commitment to 
the peace agreements; “the Palestinian authority has not rescinded the Palestinian 
Charter calling for our destruction. It has not fought terrorism. It has not stopped the 
incitement against Israel...”295 Netanyahu’s argument followed that, because of this, 
the PA was no longer qualified to assume rule in further territories in West Bank. 
Under this justification, Netanyahu considered his government to be no longer bound 
by the former Israeli government’s pledges as stated in Oslo II.  
 
Netanyahu’s campaign was not restricted to claiming the PA’s failure to fulfill it’s 
commitments in the political agreements, and also extended to assert the PA's failure 
to respect human rights and rule of law; “I think it is ghastly, monstrous to issue a law 
which says who sells land to Jews executed...this is...a racist law, a Nazi law”. 
Netanyahu was pointing to the announcement made by the PA’s Minister of Justice 
Freih Abu Medein on 6 May 1997, in which the death penalty was assigned to any 
one convicted by a Palestinian court of selling land to Israelis. The announcement was 
made after it had been discovered that about 70% of the land in the Har Homa project 
was purchased by Jews before 1948 or after 1967.296  
 
The PA, consequently, sought to defend Palestinian land. In the words of Arafat “our 
law is a Jordanian law that we inherited which applies to both the West Bank and 
Gaza, and sets the death penalty for those who sell land to Israelis. It is our right to 
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defend our land”.297 On 30 May Mahmoud Ali Jambour, from Jerusalem but with an 
Israeli ID card, was found shot twice in the head in the south of Ramallah. Jambour 
was accused of selling a house in Jerusalem’s mixed Jewish-Palestinian Abu Tor 
neighborhood to a Jewish organization, and was the third Palestinian to be murdered 
in the same month for reportedly selling land to Israelis.298  
 
The murders of these Palestinians, which were attributed to PA security forces, made 
Arafat vulnerable to the criticisms of the Clinton administration, whose State 
Department spokesman Nicholas Burns considered these acts “...contrary to what 
must prevail in the Middle East, which is peace” and called upon Arafat “to stand up 
for the rule of law...and defend it in what he says and in what he does.”299 Ironically, 
no mention was made of the tens of Palestinians from the Islamic opposition and 
national factions who had been held in the PA’s various detention centers since 1994, 
mostly without charge or trial.300  
 
These prisoners, detained in massive waves of arrests carried out in the aftermath of 
each suicide bombing, were subjected to various forms of torture during interrogation 
that included shackling, sleep deprivation, and Shabah (standing or be shackled to a 
chair).301  Mostly they were detained under Israeli and American pressure. The 
developments that followed the conclusion of the Wye-River Memorandum302 should 
confirm this fact. 
 
The memorandum, signed in Washington on 23 October 1998, provided for PA 
full/partial control over a further 13% of West Bank territories — 1% as area “A”, 9% 
as area “B”, and 3% as Natural reserves — and the transference of 14.2% from area 
“B” to area “A” (Art. I). However, the memorandum conditioned the PA’s assumption 
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of control over these territories by making it necessary for the organisation to bring 
the level of violence to zero. Toward this end, the PA was obliged to develop an anti-
terror work plan, to collect illegal weapons, to promulgate an anti-incitement decree, 
to exchange intelligence with Israel, and to amend the PLO charter that called for 
Israel’s destruction. To ensure the PA’s fulfilment of these obligations, two US-
Palestinian committees were set up. One agreed to meet every two weeks “to review 
steps...taken to eliminate terrorist cells”, and the other was to review PA’s steps to 
punish terrorists (Art. II, A.1).  
 
In addition, three trilateral US-Palestinian-Israeli committees were agreed upon. The 
first was to review steps taken by the PA to prevent the proliferation of illegal 
weapons in the Palestinian autonomous areas, while the second was to monitor 
incitement. The third committee, which agreed to meet every two weeks, was to 
exchange intelligence and identify terrorist threats (Art. II, A.2, 3, B.3). Moreover, the 
PA was obliged to call for a wide PNC meeting with the aim of amending the clauses 
of the PLO charter that called for Israel’s destruction (Art. II, C.2). It was agreed that 
President Clinton would address the PNC meeting. In addition, the memorandum 
called on both parties to resume the final status talks as soon as possible, so that an 
agreement over the final status issues could be concluded no later than 4 May 1999 
(Art. IV).  
 
Furthermore, the memorandum set a timetable of 12 weeks for its implementation 
according to three phases. The first phase was due to begin two weeks after the 
signing of the memorandum. In this phase, Israel would transfer 2% of land from area 
“C” to “B”, and 7.1% from “B” to “A”. In exchange, the PA would survey illegal 
weapons, develop an anti-violence work plan, and join the anti-incitement trilateral 
US-Palestinian-Israeli committees. The second phase was due to begin in weeks 2-6. 
In this phase, Israel would transfer 5% from areas “C” to “B”. In exchange, PA would 
collect the identified illegal weapons, amend the PLO charter that called for Israel's 
destruction, and provide Israel with a list of its policemen. The third stage was set to 
occur in weeks 6-12. In this phase, Israel would transfer 5% from area “C” to “B”, 
and 1% from “C” to “A”, and 7.1% from “B” to “A” (see attached memorandum). 
 
 132
The memorandum heavily emphasized security cooperation and, under full American 
sponsorship, left wide scope for human rights and public freedom violations to occur 
under the auspices of fighting terror. The fact that terms like “terror combat” and 
“violence” were left ill defined by the memorandum meant conflicting interpretations 
of these terms would be possible, if not inevitable. Consequently, it became unclear 
whether acts of national struggle, which are legitimate under International law, would 
be included in the term “terror” as it was used in the memorandum or whether the 
term “terror” was confined only to “suicide bombings”. Furthermore, would the term 
“terror” include suicide bombings against Israeli military targets, or would it only 
cover those carried out against Israeli civil targets? What would be the case, for 
instance, if a Palestinian committed a suicide bombing against an Israeli military 
outpost in WBGS?  
 
Sa’eb Erekat denied that the memorandum implied any restrictions over the 
opposition activities, and also denied that it implied any obligation on the part of the 
PA to outlaw Hamas and Islamic Jihad.  Muhammad Dahaln, who headed the 
Preventive Security Forces in Gaza, went even further and denied that the term “terror 
combat” obliged the PA to alter their intelligence as far as Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
were concerned, stating rather that it obliged the PA to alter its intelligence with 
respect to the number and positions of PA security forces: “we have no problem 
providing one list of policemen and another list of policemen who do administrative 
work and are unarmed.”303  
 
The Israeli perception of the memorandum, as expressed by Netanyahu, was certainly 
differed from that of the Palestinians; Israelis considered it a means to “block ...many 
of the holes in the `Swiss cheese` of Oslo”.304 For Israelis, therefore, the 
memorandum was to serve as an instrument to achieve 100% security, and would treat 
the deficits in Oslo II (from Israeli point of view) that enabled Palestinian opposition 
factions to keep their military infrastructure and thereby enabled them to launch some 
463 attacks on Israeli targets in 1997 alone (according to Ami Ayalon, the head of 
Israel’s Security Services).305   
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Consequently the PA, from an Israeli point of view, was obliged to stop any further 
attacks on Israeli targets (militant and civil) and to establish 100% security for 
Israelis. Of course neither the PA nor any state in world could achieve 100% security. 
It seems most unlikely that Israel was not fully aware of this fact, and therefore also 
seems that Israel sought to drive Palestinians to civil war (particularly in light of the 
Israelis full awareness of the absence of a Palestinian national-wide consensus 
regarding the Oslo process in general, and the memorandum in particular).  
 
For instance, in response to the memorandum, Hamas’s leader Ahmad Yassin 
declared his movement’s determination to keep launching attacks at Israeli targets, 
notwithstanding the possible obstacles that might be set for the movements’ activities 
by the memorandum. Nayef Hawatmeh, the Secretary General of DFLP, warned of 
the negative repercussions of the memorandum on inter-Palestinian relations, while 
the Secretary General of PFLP George Habbash considered it a plan to keep Israel’s 
security.306 These Palestinian factions continued to believe in the right of Palestinians 
to combat the remaining parts of the occupation in WBGS, and some of them, 
particularly Hamas, considered every Israeli a target regardless of their status (e.g., 
armed forces or civil). Every Israeli, according to Hamas, was a potential soldier who 
could come one day to WBGS and kill Palestinians. Due to all of this, Hamas 
considered itself not to be bound by any law or agreement as long as Israeli 
occupation remained on WBGS. 
 
On 29 October 1998 a suicide bomber blew himself up on Israeli bus occupied by 
Jewish settlers travelling south of Gaza City. The attack left one Israeli dead and 
others injured. Arafat, concerned Netanyahu might refrain from meeting his 
commitments to the memorandum, condemned the attack and expressed suspicions 
over its goals; “the attack serves the goals of Israeli extremists who kill our people 
and stand opponents to our right to get our land back”.307 In a step which sought to 
exhibit the PA’s full determination to fulfil its commitments as stated in the 
memorandum, Arafat ordered his security forces to impose house arrest on Hamas 
leader Yassin, and to arrest no less than 160 Hamas leaders, supporters and other 
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Islamic activists.308 The wave of arrests jailed at least twelve top Hamas leaders and 
opposition activists.309  
 
Some of these detainees, who were denied legal defence, were tried before the State 
Security Court and were primarily sentenced for long-terms. As an example of such 
practice, on 19 January 1998 two Hamas members Nassim Abu al-Ras and Jasser 
Samaru were sentenced by the State Security Court in Jericho to 15 years of hard 
labour for their involvement in the preparation of various suicide bombings against 
Israeli targets. Human rights lawyer Moussa Shakarm denounced the trial and the 
sentence, declaring them serious violations of human rights.310  
 
Shakarma's comments to the court reflected his deep awareness of the unfair trial. The 
court had been founded on 16 February 1995, when Arafat issued his decision number 
49 concerning the establishment of the State Security Court. The court typically 
functioned in a manner that contradicted the criteria of fair trial and legal procedure, 
including the right to appeal and the right to legal representation. Trials in these courts 
usually occurred at night and their sentences, mostly long-term or in some cases death 
sentences, were passed and executed immediately; its mandate was to handle cases 
involving national security.  
 
The structure and the legal bases of the Palestinians State Security Court seemed to 
serve this purpose. At the head of the court stood Brigadier Abdel El Fatah Ramadan 
Al Ja’idi, and additional members were Colonels Hamdi El Rifi and Muhammad 
Karamah Issa, and the Judge Abdel Karim Musa Salman El Masri.311 To handle the 
related national security cases the court invoked the British Emergency Regulations of 
1945, which were also invoked by Israel to oppress Palestinians throughout year 28 of 
its occupation of WBGS. 
The Detachment of the PA from Society: The PA against Civil Society 
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The detention of opposition members, coupled with the establishment of the State 
Security Courts, was a clear indicator of the PA’s acquiescence to Israeli 
interpretations of incitement and terror and the PA’s gradual detachment from 
Palestinian society and its investments in the peace process as the source of its 
legitimacy. This fact was evident in the measures taken by the PA against civil 
society.  
 
Though civil society is among the most confusing of social terms, Gramsci’s 
conception of it might be the most constructed. In Gramsci’s perception, civil society 
is the sphere of social activities located outside the spheres of coercive relations 
(state) and production relations (economy).312 In this sense civil society comprises 
NGOs, professional associations, women's organizations, religious institutions, 
political parties, and other similar group-based social activities. Our understanding of 
the term includes the sphere of social activities that neither seeks political power nor 
economic profit. In this sense, political parties are excluded from civil society, and the 
term civil society is confined to NGOs, intellectuals, journalists, and professional 
associations. This sphere of social activities was the subject of various PA attempts to 
abrogate its developments and harass its leaders. The State Security Court, for 
instance, was used not only to try and stop the opposition from infringing on national 
security, but also to obstruct NGO representatives as well as intellectuals who stood in 
opposition to PA policies.  
 
On 18 May 1996 Dr. Iyad Saraj, a human rights activist and head of the Gaza 
Community Mental Health Programme, was arrested for having written an article 
(published in the New York Times) that criticised the PA. Dr. Saraj, who was detained 
for a week before being released, was arrested again on 10 June under the charge of 
“drugs’ possession”, before the Magistrates court ordered his release on bail on 13 
June due to lack of evidence. However, without prior notification given to him or to 
his legal representation, the State Security Court decided to keep him under arrest 
until 26 June, when he was finally released.313 Mohammed Dahman, a prominent 
public figure in Gaza and head of the Addameer Prisoner Support Association, was 
arrested on 12 August 1996 for having issued a press release condemning the death of 
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a Palestinian in a PA detention centre on 27 July 1996. On 15 August he was brought 
before the State Security Court and his detention was extended until 27 August, when 
he too was released.314  
 
In a similar case Fathi Soboh, a Gaza Professor of Education at Al-Zahar University, 
was arrested on 2 July 1997 by Preventive Security Forces for assigning examination 
questions that asked the students to analyze the corruption of and within PA 
institutions.315 The detention of El Saraj, Dahman, and Soboh, all of whom were 
brought before the State Security Court, reflected a wider policy of the PA which 
sought to restrict public freedoms and basic rights.  
 
This policy had been legally initiated when Ghazi El Jabali, head of Civil Police, 
declared (on 9 September 1994) a military order prohibiting those political meetings 
that took place without a permit obtained in advance from him.316 The policy was 
consolidated when Arafat ratified the “Law of Press” on 25 June 1995. The law, 
which comprised 51 articles, covered all aspects of publication, beginning with the 
definition of freedom of expression, continuing through to regulations pertaining to 
license issuance for any publication, and ending by stating sanctions to be imposed on 
persons who violated the law.  
 
Of greatest concern are articles VII and VIII of the law. The former prohibited, among 
other things, the publication of materials that contradict principles of freedom, 
national security, human rights, and respect of truth; “It is inadmissible to publish in 
the printed publication any materials which may contradict with the principle of 
freedom, national responsibilities, human rights, and respect of truth”. The later article 
included a code of conduct for journalists; “to refrain from publishing whatever may 
instigate violence, fanaticism, and hatred, or invites racism and sectarianism”.317
 
The chief problem of these articles is their lack of any clarification regarding the term 
national responsibilities. The vague nature of the terms enabled the PA to enjoy a 
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great deal of space in which to maneuver, and consequently allowed it — under the 
auspices of preserving national security — to commit grave violations against 
people's basic rights, including their right to freedom of expression. The PA, backed 
by the continued presence of the Israeli occupation in a large part of WBGS 
territories, was able to justify its practices with a preoccupation with the national 
agenda and the battle to liberate the remaining territories of WBGS. Thereby it could 
attack those who called for democratic transformation and accuse them of lack of 
patriotism.  
 
“Struggle against enemy” was thus the chief slogan used by the PA to justify its anti-
democratic practices. This slogan, typical of a one-party system (as Samuel P. 
Huntington observes),318 was the blanket used to stifle some Palestinians, e.g., 
blocking the opposition members’ access to politics. The PA, which entrusted itself 
with the right to decide what legitimate or illegitimate political action was, considered 
itself as having the ultimate power to decide who should be included and excluded 
from politics. Those who were included were the ones who supported the peace 
process upon which the PA legitimacy relied.  
 
This policy of inclusion/exclusion also covered issues related to freedom of 
expression. Opinions supporting the PA were strongly encouraged, while those 
opposing it were discouraged, if not prohibited. Usually such discouragement or 
prohibition was legally institutionalized through various laws and regulations, such as 
the press law mentioned above. The law, for instance, presented the PA with the 
pretext to detain and summon some 70 journalists, and to close or ban publishing 
some 15 licensed newspapers or press offices in the period of 1995-1998, according to 
the Gaza-based Palestinian Centre for Human Rights. 319  
  
In most of these cases, journalists with a background of publishing articles that 
criticized the PA were routinely subjected to interrogation, and some were tried by the 
State Security Court. Among the most notable of these cases was that of Sayyed 
Salem Abu Musameh, editor of the pro-Hamas periodical Al Watan (homeland); 
                                                 
318 Samuel P. Huntington. “Social and Institutional Dynamics of One-Party Sytsems”. In Samuel 
P.Huntington & Clement H.Morre (eds.). Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society: The Dynamics of 
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Sayyed Salem Abu Musameh was brought before the State Security Court on 13 April 
1995 and sentenced to two years on charges of incitement. On 9 July Ala’ 
Mashharawi, a Journalist for the El Quds daily, was arrested for ten days for having 
published a report critiquing the torture measures adopted by Palestinian security 
forces against Hamas and Islamic Jihad prisoners. On February 17 1996 Ala’ Saftawi, 
chief editor of the pro-Islamic Jihad periodical Al Istiqlal, was arrested by Palestinian 
security forces for publishing an article criticizing Arafat's rule.320  
 
These measures made journalists' jobs considerably more difficult, and left them 
terribly exposed to PA sensitivities and reactions toward what they wrote. 
Preoccupied with possible harassment from the PA, and at the same time unaware of 
what the PA liked or disliked, journalists began to self-censor at the expense of 
innovation, thinking, and genuine analysis.  According to a West Bank journalist who 
had been arrested and interrogated on the background behind his press activities: 
 
 “There are ‘red lines’ that no one is supposed to cross. What I understand from these 
red lines is that they are elastic. Their understanding (PA security forces) is 
mysterious. I do not understand what is forbidden and what is allowed anymore. 
Every time I write or compose something, I start thinking whether I will be caught... 
Journalism and the life of Journalists become difficult and full of worries.”321
 
The “red lines” hinted at by this journalist proliferated, and became more elastic with 
the conclusion of the Wye-River Memorandum, which committed the PA to prohibit 
all forms of incitement and violence.  Under the umbrella of this memorandum, the 
PA not only managed to oppress the opposition opinions, it also managed to restrain 
those who were seeking to transmit opposition activists’ views over political events to 
the public (e.g., journalists). On the same day the memorandum was signed, 11 
Palestinian and international Journalists were arrested by the Palestinian security 
forces as they tried to interview the Hamas leader Yassin about his reaction to the 
memorandum. Brigadier-General Abu Ahmd, from the police criminal investigation 
department, told the journalists that they “...would require permission to cover 
political or security issues”.322   
 
                                                 
320 Ibid. 
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The PA’s harassment of journalists was further institutionalised by the issuance of the 
so-called Executive Regulations by the General Information Agency. By virtue of 
these regulations the agency, which was established as an independent body by virtue 
of presidential decision no. 41 in 1996,323 was empowered with the rights to issue 
licences for foreign and local correspondents and to regulate press activities in the PA 
autonomous areas. These regulations, said to be formed on presidential verbal 
directive, seemed to add new restrictions to those provided for by the 1995 press law, 
with the aim of achieving full control over the right to freedom of expression. Yasser 
Abed Rabbu, Minister of Information, criticized these regulations as “damaging to the 
reputation of the PA and transforming it into oppressive intelligence authority that 
restricts the movement of foreign correspondents”.324  
 
Thought it is not clear whether these regulations were brought into force or not, their 
issuance under presidential sponsorship reveals a formal and deliberate trend of 
intensifying restrictions over the freedom of expression.  This trend was further 
consolidated by Arafat's promulgation of an “anti-incitement & violence” decree on 
19 November 1998. The decree, which aligned with those PA commitments stipulated 
by the Wye-River Memorandum, is considered to be the most prominent legal 
expression of the PA’s caving to Israeli and American pressure, and of the PA 
willingness to risk its relationship with its own society for the sake of the peace 
process. Among other things, the decree designated the following acts as being illegal: 
 
“Instigation towards racial discrimination and encouraging acts of violence that 
violate the laws; insulting various religions or using violence or instigation to use 
violence that harms the relations with brotherly and foreign countries; forming illegal 
associations that exercise or instigate towards crimes and abusing life and incite 
masses toward riot or internal conflict or breaching agreements held between PLO 
and brotherly or with foreign countries (Italics added).325
 
A careful reading of the decree reveals many deficits as far as the rights to freedom of 
expression and peaceful assembly are concerned. To start with, there is no doubt that 
opinions of racial and religious discrimination should be prohibited, and that their 
institutional expression should be outlawed. The problem with this decree begins with 
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the paragraph related to the “instigation to use violence that harms the relation 
with...foreign countries...and agreements held between PLO and... foreign countries”. 
It seems most unlikely that the paragraph addresses any country but Israel. Even if the 
paragraph meant foreign countries in general, this would still include Israel.  
 
Consequently the question which vividly emerges is: are opinions that support acts of 
national struggle considered to be the instigation to violence mentioned in the decree, 
and thus are they outlawed? Or is the term ‘instigation to violence’ confined only to 
opinions supporting suicide bombings? And if the term is confined to suicide 
bombings does it include those suicide bombings carried out against Israel’s military 
targets? Furthermore, are the opinions of the opponents of the Oslo process and its 
power-balance logic a form of incitement or otherwise? In addition, what are the 
parameters of the political agreements held between the PLO and foreign countries? 
Are these agreements confined to the Oslo accords, or do they include all the 
agreements the PLO had signed with other foreign countries since its establishment in 
1964?  
 
All of these issues were left vague by the decree in a manner that left all options open 
to the PA to decide what measures to take toward society, according developments in 
the peace process and its own interests. The decree, for instance, was issued around 
the same time that Israel completed the first phase of its redeployments stipulated by 
the Wye-River Memorandum (on 20 November, Israel transferred 2% from area “C” 
to “B”, and 7.1% from “B” to “A”).326  But later on 1 December, the Israeli Ministry 
of Housing declared a plan to build 450 housing units in the Kohaf Yakuf settlement, 
east of Ramallah. Arafat considered the plan a grave violation of the memorandum, 
and threatened a unilateral declaration of a Palestinian state on 4 May 1999.327  
 
In response, the Israeli government threatened to annex WBGS and announced its 
cessation of the implementation of the second phase of redeployments scheduled for 
18 December by the memorandum. Nabil Abu Rudinah, Arafat’s political advisor, 
denounced Israel’s threat to annex WBGS and considered it a “sign of Israel’s 
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underestimation of the political agreements, and of the international and American 
efforts exerted to save the peace process”.328
 
With this deadlock, the PA became willing to exhibit a more accommodative attitude 
toward society. On 23 December 1998, Arafat lifted the house arrest on Yassin and on 
28 December he announced law no. 12 concerning peaceful assembly. The law, 
comprising nine articles, worked in parallel to democratic standards concerning the 
right to peaceful assembly. Article 4 of the law, for instance, denied the police any 
right to intervene in any peaceful demonstration, except to determine the track and 
time of this demonstration for traffic purposes. This article — backed by art. 3, which 
denied police any right to permit or prohibit any peaceful demonstration329 — is 
considered a qualitative step toward consolidating public freedoms and civil rights.  
 
The removal of the house arrest on Yassin plus the law of peaceful assembly seemed 
gestures made not only against the deadlock of the peace process, but also against the 
civil society’s criticisms of the PA’s detention of tens of Palestinians who had set fire 
to American and Israeli flags to express opposition to the Joint American-British air-
raids on Iraq on 16 December 1998. Alongside the detention of these Palestinians, 
three Palestinian Radio and Television stations (Al Nasser, El Wattan, and Love & 
Peace stations) were closed after being accused of broadcasting anti-American 
programmes.330 At that time, the PA considered these acts to be harmful to its 
relations with the American administration, relations that gained strong momentum in 
the aftermath of Clinton’s historical visit to Gaza on 14 December, at which time the 
American President addressed some 450 members of the PNC who had gathered at 
the Gaza-based Rashad El Shawa Cultural Centre to amend the PLO charter.331  
 
However, the civil society’s criticisms of the aforementioned measures forced the PA 
to adopt some accommodative laws and measures, like the law of peaceful assembly 
and the lifting of the house arrest on Yassin. Nevertheless, these laws and measures 
did not imply that the PA was yet responsive to public will, nor did they imply that it 
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was willing to attach itself to society as the source of its legitimacy. The PA continued 
to consider the peace process to be the ultimate source of its legitimacy, and was 
prepared to risk its relation with society for the sake of this process.  
 
The way the PA received the result of the Israeli election of May 1999, when the 
Labour-hawk Ihud Barak took office via a 13% victory over Israel’s Prime Minister 
Netanyahu,332 and the measures that had been adopted toward society afterwards, 
substantiate our analysis. On the background of this election, the Palestinian 
leadership had refrained from the de jure declaration of a Palestinian state scheduled 
for May 1999, with the justification of a possible renewal of the peace process and as 
an attempt to not enable Netanyahu to use such a declaration in his election campaign.  
 
When Ihud Barak took office — in spite of Baraks’ declaration that he did not intend 
to negotiate over Jerusalem, did not intend to dissolve the settlements in the West 
Bank, and would not respect the pre-1967 borders333 — the PA received the results of 
the Israeli election with an optimism based on the assumption that Barak’s declaration 
concerning Jerusalem, settlements, and borders, was no more than propaganda to 
increase his leverage in the final status talks. Hassan Asfour, by then the PA’s 
Minister of State, declared that the Barak victory “had removed a political nightmare 
represented by Netanyahu and his “`terrorist coalition´”. Sa’eb Erekat, the chief 
Palestinian negotiator, considered the Barak victory a new start for the peace process; 
“it is better to deal with a hard negotiator instead of dealing with non-negotiable one 
(Netanyahu)”.334  
 
The rise of Barak to power therefore from the PA’s point of view, gave the peace 
process a new momentum and hence a new impetus for its legitimacy. In such 
situations the PA tended to quickly attach itself to the peace process, and to be more 
oppressive toward its own society to prove to other side (Israel) it’s eligibility to rule 
Palestinians and so consequently to assume control over further territories. On 6 
August 1999, accordingly, three top Hamas leaders Abdel Aziz Al Rantisi, 
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Mohammad Namer Hamdan, and Ismail Abu Shanab were arrested by Palestinian 
security forces and detained without charge.335
 
The arrest of these leaders occurred simultaneously with a wide-scale campaign 
against the civil society’s organizations, in particular against human rights 
organizations that opposed the PA’s illegal arrest campaigns. The campaign was 
initiated when, in early June, the PA set up a ministerial committee to report on 
Palestinian NGOs. The report was to serve as a foundation on which a future law 
concerning the NGOs would be drafted. Following the PA’s formation of the 
ministerial committee (whose report has not been made public until recently), the 
PA’s Minister of Justice Freih Abu Medein accused Palestinian NGOs of 
politicisation and financial mismanagement.336  
 
Abu Medien’s accusation came close on the heels of a report published by the Office 
of United Nations Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories in May 1999, in 
which no less than 100,725,612 USD was said to have been distributed by donors to 
the rule of law sector since 1994. The report pointed out fifteen separate sub-sectors, 
which make up the building blocks of the rule of law sector that had benefited from 
this aid.  The sub-sector which benefited the most were the Palestinian NGOs, which 
received the highest portion (16.7%, or 16,864,421 USD), in comparison to 15% or 
(15,083,692 USD) to the Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC), 14% to the Judiciary 
(14,101,585 USD), and 2.2% to the Ministry of Justice (2,217,580 USD).337 To some 
extent, the campaign was part of the PA’s attempts to monopolize aid distribution, and 
to deny NGOs — most of which had absorbed ex-members and supporters of leftist 
factions (e.g., the PFLP and the DFLP) — any financial autonomy.  
 
Against this background, Khalil El-Zebin — who was Arafat’s advisor on the media 
and editor of the bi-monthly of Al-Nashrah magazine published by the Presidential 
Office — wrote an article in June 1999 accusing some human rights activists, 
including the Director of the Palestinian Centre for Human Rights Raji Sourani and 
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the Director of the Law Institute Khadir Shikrat, of being paid hundreds of thousands 
of US dollars by Western powers in exchange of their “dirty role” of infringing on 
national security under the pretext of defending human rights and the rule of law. The 
PA's daily Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda made a similar accusation in the same month.338  
 
Human rights organizations, alongside other NGOs, considered the campaign part of 
that PA policy which sought to undermine their role in defending Palestinian human 
rights, to strengthen national unity, and support the steadfastness of Palestinians in 
their battle against the occupation.339 Therefore they called President Arafat to ratify a 
law on behalf of the NGOs as a means to secure their legal protection. The law, which 
constituted a major controversy between the PLC and NGOs on the one side, and the 
PA on the other, was passed in its third reading by the PLC in December 1998.340  
 
The third reading was passed by the PLC after Arafat refused to ratify the second 
reading of the law passed by the PLC in July of the same year. Arafat's refusal to 
ratify the second reading constituted a clear violation of the PLC’s Standing Order, 
which in article 68 provides thirty days for Arafat to ratify or comment on any law 
passed by the PLC in the second reading. In the case that these thirty days passed 
without statement from Arafat, the PLC was legally obliged to enact the law.341 The 
PLC refrained from such a step, and instead passed a third reading to Arafat for 
ratification.  
 
Once again, Arafat refused to ratify the law within the due legal period and, more 
importantly, rejected article 4 of the law that empowered the Ministry of Justice to 
licence any NGO in the PA’s autonomous areas. Arafat demanded the Ministry of 
Interior be empowered with this right. Arafat’s demand was rejected by the PLC in its 
fifth session of the forth term on 22 May 1999.342 Instead, the PLC insisted the 
Ministry of Justice act as the point of reference for any NGO. The PLC's position 
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enjoyed the support of Palestinian NGOs, for whom contribution to PLC’s version of 
the law was significant during the meeting held between NGOs representatives and 
members of the PLC’s political committee in Al-Bireh and Ramallah on 20 July 1998 
(the meeting being held to discuss the first reading of the law).343  
 
 Nevertheless, the debate over the law was settled when Ahmed Qrieh (better known 
as Abu Ala’) announced during a special session convened on 12 August 1999 by the 
PLC to discuss the PA’s 1999 budget that the law would incorporate Arafat's 
comments regarding force. However Qrieh, by then the PLC’s Speaker, claimed that 
the voting on Arafat's comments which had taken place during the 22 May session 
was insufficient; only 37 members out of the 50 who attended that session had vetoed 
the comments, making the vote unsuccessful for lack of the necessary absolute 
majority (half of the 88 PLC members + 1) stipulated in article 71 of the PLC’s 
Standing Order.344  
 
While Qrieh’s claim was correct from a legal point of view, it was also correct in that 
there was in fact no absolute majority present to accept the comments of Arafat. The 
time and the manner in which Qrieh made his announcement reflected this fact. 
Kamal al-Shrafi, who headed the PLC’s Monitoring Committee, pointed out that 
Qrieh’s announcement occurred “while members were leaving the hall at the end of 
the session...no one was paying attention”.345 Mawaia El Masri, a PLC member, 
confirmed al-Shrafi's observation by adding, that “…the law, including the comments 
of Arafat, had been approved without consulting PLC members”.346 In so doing, with 
the help of the PLC’s speaker the PA managed to impose it’s version of the law, and 
thus to place Palestinian NGOs under strict security supervision — in particular under 
Arafat's own supervision since Arafat, in addition to holding the PA’s chairmanship, 
held the post of Minister of Interior.   
 
On 16 January 2000 Arafat ratified the law, and since April 2000 the law has been in 
force.347 Article (3) of the law asserts that the Ministry of Interior “will set up a 
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competent department for the registration of the Associations and Organizations in 
coordination with the competent Ministry” (meaning that Ministry under the 
competence of which the activities of the NGO would fall). Article (4) added, “the 
founders of an Association or Organization submit a written application to the 
competent department for registration...the Minister of Interior had to issue his 
decision regarding the compliance of registration within a period not exceeding two 
months from the date of submission of the application...”348  
 
These developments revealed a deliberate PA policy to limit people’s collective 
action, and to undermine any independent bottom-up initiatives. This policy gained 
impetus with the conclusion of the Sharm- El -Sheikh Memorandum, which was 
signed on 4 September 1999. The memorandum set up a timetable of 4-5 months for 
the transference of a further 11% of West Bank territories to PA full/partial control, 
and provided for the extension of PA security jurisdictions over 7.1% of area “B”.349 
Soon after the conclusion of this memorandum, which was the first of it kind for the 
Barak government, the PA began to exhibit a more oppressive attitude toward civil 
society. On 6 October 1999 Arafat decreed the establishment of the Ministry of 
NGOs’ Affairs. Article (1) of the decree stipulated that: 
 
“The goal of the Ministry is to coordinate and organize the work between all 
Palestinian and foreign NGOs and governmental bodies based on transparency, 
participation, and complementary principles in planning, and implementing the 
overall national plan for the serve of Palestinian society”.    
 
Article (2) added: 
 
“To achieve its goals, the ministry is empowered to coordinate with the Ministry of 
Interior and other competent ministries with respects to NGOs licence and the follow 
up of their work...to coordinate between NGOs and other governmental bodies and lay 
dawn the mechanisms to achieve this...”350
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The two articles left the distinction between the powers held by the Ministry of 
Interior and those held by the Ministry of NGOs’ Affairs unclear when it came to the 
licensing of any NGO. For instance, it was not clear at which stage the Ministry of 
NGOs’ Affairs would have a right to intervene in the licensing of an NGO. Would the 
Ministry have the power to abrogate the decision of the Ministry of Interior to permit 
or prohibit the establishment of any NGO?  
 
Furthermore, how was the Ministry of NGOs’ Affairs going to follow up the work of 
Palestinian NGOs? And why in principle was such a ministry founded for this 
purpose, since the NGO law empowered the competent ministry with the right to 
follow up the work and activities of a given NGO (Art. 6), and obliges each 
Palestinian NGO to annually present to competent ministry its financial and activities 
reports (Art. 13)? These articles have already suggested the expansion of PA 
supervision of the work of any NGO. Consequently, it seems that the only motive to 
attach to the formation of the Ministry of NGOs’ Affairs was that of seeking further 
watch and control over Palestinian NGOs, and of limiting the prospects of any 
collective bottom-up initiative.  
The PA Mode of Governance: Toward a Neopatrimonial System  
 
The PA tendency to limit the prospects of any collective, bottom-up initiative is 
evident in the developments issuing from the “Statement of Twenty”. On 27 
November 1999 a statement titled A Cry of the Homeland, undersigned by twenty 
Palestinian public figures out of which eight were PLC members, was released to the 
public. The statement blamed the PA for following “a systematic methodology of 
corruption, humiliation and abuse against the people”, and described the Oslo 
agreements as “a barter trade to enrich a number of corrupt people in the Palestinian 
Authority”.351 The statement constituted the greatest blow to PA, whose cabinet’s 
Secretary-General Ahmed Abdel El Rahman described the signatories as “a mislead 
group who failed to figure out the truth”. Following this, the PA adopted harsh 
measures against those who signed the statement. The PA’s security forces arrested 
Abdel El Sattar Qassim, a professor of political science at Al Najah University of 
Nablus, Dr.Yasser Abu Safiah from Nablus, Adel Samara, a professor of Economics 
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in Ramallah, Dr. Abdel El Rahim Kittani from Tulkarm, and Ahmed Qatamesh, a 
national public figure and the man who had survived the longest Israeli administrative 
detention. Furthermore, house arrest was imposed on Bassam El Shaka, Nablus’s ex-
mayor.352 None of the PLC members who signed the statement were arrested, thanks 
to their immunity. 
 
On 28 November, however, Mawaia El Masri (a PLC member and one of the 
statement signatories) was shot three times in the foot by unidentified armed men. The 
incident occurred while El Masri was leaving Gaza, on his way back to Nablus after 
participating in an emergency session convened by the PLC; this session was called to 
condemn the statement, describing it as “attempt to drag Palestinians into civil 
war”.353  Quickly, Palestinians attributed the attack on El Masri to PA security forces 
and hundreds demonstrated in Nablus in support of El Masri and his colleagues.354 
Reinforcing their accusations, Palestinians pointed to the PA forces’ attack on Abdel 
El Jawad Salah, a PLC member and also a signatory, who was beaten while he was 
marching with others before Jericho prison in protest against the detention of some of 
the other signatories.355  
 
These developments, and the supportive popular reaction on behalf of the signatories 
of the “Statement of Twenty”, revealed the growing popular awareness of corruption; 
an August 1999 poll showed that no less than 35.8% of Palestinians believed that 
corruption had widely spread throughout PA’s institutions and apparatus.356 
Palestinians’ understanding of corruption did not imply unofficial payments to state 
officials in return for favours, or acts “to alter the prescribed implementation of 
administrative regulations placed by state”.357 Rather, their understanding focused on 
a misuse of power and the mismanagement of donors’ aid and other PA revenue by 
top politicians and senior officials of the PA.  
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In this sense, Palestinians were greatly alarmed by the 600-page report by the General 
Monitoring Commission (GMC)358 on corruption in the PA’s various institutions and 
apparatus issued in May of 1997. The report pointed out that some 323 million USD 
— almost 40% of the PA’s 1996 budget — had been misused or mismanaged by the 
PA’s politicians and senior officials. Jarrar Kidwa, head of the report compilers, 
asserted that part of this wasted funding went into the personal accounts of some 
ministers, without the knowledge of the Ministry of Finance.359  Among such 
ministers were Nabil Sha’ath, Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, and 
acting Foreign Minister Jamil El Tarafi (also Minister of Civil Affairs), as well as the 
Minister of Transportation Ali El Qawasmi.360  
 
The importance of this report derived from the fact that it was the first of its kind in 
the Arab world to publicly raise its issue of corruption. Following, the Palestinian 
legislative council set up a parliamentary committee to launch its own investigation 
into the matter.361  
 
After two months spent hearing accounts from representatives of the concerned 
ministries and other PA’s apparatuses, the committee presented its own report to the 
PLC in July 1997. The information in the GMC report was confirmed, and President 
Arafat was called on to consider reshuffling his cabinet, and to try those ministers 
accused of misusing their power and financial mismanagement. These findings 
constituted an intolerable blow to PA ministers. Accordingly, in a gesture that sought 
to express opposition to the GMC and PLC reports, sixteen ministers announced their 
resignation in December 1997.362  
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Unprepared to deal with the legal implications of these ministers’ resignations, Arafat 
disapproved the resignations and appealed to the ministers to assume their positions 
until changes to the cabinet were declared. In early August 1998363 Arafat declared his 
new cabinet. Surprisingly, instead of removing those ministers suspected of 
corruption, the new cabinet secured positions for them and increased the total number 
of ministerial positions from 23 to 31. Of the new seven ministers added, the most 
notable were Sa’di El Krunz, who headed the PLC committee that investigated the 
corruption, and Youssef Abu Safiah, another member of the same committee.  
 
Simply, Arafat assigned his most influential critics to the cabinet as a means of 
containing and absorbing them. In so doing, Arafat exhibited an unwillingness to 
handle corruption, and continued with his policy of either keeping those people 
suspected of corruption and misuse of power close to him so that he secured their full 
attachment to him as the source of their legitimacy, or containing and absorbing his 
critics by enabling them with some sort of new power.  
 
Nevertheless, Arafat’s continuous attempts to surround himself with “clients” and to 
play the role of their patron resulted in some failed situations. Abdel El Jawad Salah, a 
PLC member and one of Arafat's most vocal critics, turned down the position of a 
minister without portfolio, and described the new cabinet as “a real tragedy for 
Palestinians”.364 Also a PLC member and former Minister of Higher Education, 
Hanan Ashrawi refused to keep his position in the new cabinet in protest of Arafat’s 
reluctance to promote real reform; “what is needed, Ashrawi asserted, “is not to 
maintain the old structure...but substantial and comprehensive reform”.365 
Notwithstanding the critical voices swirling around in the new cabinet, the PLC 
passed a vote of confidence in it and consequently abrogated one of the most serious 
attempts at reform. Ali Abu El al-Reesh, a PLC member, expressed his frustration 
over the PLC vote of confidence and called on his colleagues “to apologize for those 
ministers suspected of corruption”.366  
 
                                                 
363 See presidential decree no.2 from the year 1998 concering the Cabinet in Al Waqaea’, op.cit., 
No.26, 5th  Year, 26/11/1998. 
364 Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 7 August 1998. 
365 Ibid. 
366 Al Ayyam on 10 August 1998. 
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However, the PLC vote of confidence in the new Cabinet did not imply the issue of 
corruption had been distanced from public concern. In fact, corruption remained 
widely discussed by the public. One of the chief concerns of the public had to do with 
the system of favouritism and nepotism that characterised recruitment to various PA 
ministries. Alongside this concern was another relating to PA officials’ use of public 
funds for private benefits, e.g., the construction of luxurious houses similar to those of 
former Palestinian Prime Minister Mohammoud Abbas (better know as Abu Mazen), 
Minister of Social Affairs Intisar El Wazir, and Muhammad Dahaln who headed 
Gaza's Preventive Security Forces at Gaza beach. Though these assertions are difficult 
to prove, they are also difficult to disapprove given the PA's lack of transparency and 
clear guidelines and regulations regarding public expenditure.  
 
Officially tolerated monopolies were interesting examples of institutional weakness 
within the PA. These monopolies were the Palestinian Company for Trade Services 
(Cement Company), the Palestinian Development and Investment Company, the 
Petroleum General Commission, and Tobacco Commission.367 These companies 
assumed monopolies over products like wheat, cement, flour, oil, fuel, iron, cigarettes, 
computers, dairy, and others. It is thought Muhammad Rashid, Arafat's economic 
advisor and the man who controlled most economic activities in the autonomous 
territories managed them. 
 
All of these monopolies operated outside the PA’s regular budget, and no one knows 
their exact annual revenue. Despite this, some estimate the figure at 300 million USD 
per year.368 Still, these estimations lack supportive evidence, and remain difficult to 
substantiate given the mysterious nature of the monopolies.  This mysterious nature 
also made it difficult to know whom among PA officials has connection to the 
monopolies.  A widely spread rumour among Palestinians asserts that Muhammad 
Dahaln and Rashid were the monopolists of cement and fuel trade, and some scholars 
point to Minister of Planning and International Cooperation Nabil Sha’ath having 
                                                 
367 Palestine Report. Vol.3, no.9, August 8, 1997.  
368 Rachel Ehrenfeld. “Where Does the Money Go? A Study of the Palestinian Authority”. New York: 
American Centre for Democracy, November 2002. Online <http://www.public-
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owned a computer monopoly, and Ahmed Qrieh as co-owner of the conserves, 
cigarette and dairy monopolies.369  
 
While the public exchanged these rumours they suffered severe economic conditions, 
mainly due to the Israeli policy of closure that denied the some 120,000 Palestinians 
employed by Israel in 1992 access to Israeli labour markets in 1996.370 The hard 
economic conditions facing these Palestinians were similar to those of the Palestinians 
absorbed by the PA service sectors (civil and security), whose number is estimated to 
have been 85,000 in 1998371 and whose average remuneration did not exceed 274 
USD/month (decreased to 135 USD/month if unpaid family members are taken into 
account).372 This monthly income of a Palestinian family barely covered its monthly 
expenditure, an average of which has been estimated to have been 579 Jordanian 
dinars (approximately 830 USD) in 1998.373 Adnan Samara, Deputy Minister of 
Industry, expected internal unrest if the economic conditions of those Palestinians did 
not improve; “the situation is very dangerous...the people have not seen any 
results...people have more difficulties now than before the authority was created...”374 
Samara's expectations became facts on the ground when basic products’ prices — 
including Fuel and Wheat prices — shifted at unprecedented rate in PA autonomous 
areas in late November of 1999.   
 
Hundreds of Palestinians protested this shift, and called on the PA to bring an end to 
their economic suffering. In the words of Anies Abu Muhsan, a shop owner: “people 
are very angry...the horrible shift of the prices promoted their protests”.375 The 
demonstrators, many of whom are landless refugees, took to the street with banners 
reading, “Lions starve in the refugee camps, and dogs eat the meat of sheep”. People 
placed the responsibility of this shift on PA officials who, according to Sara Adwan (a 
45-year-old teacher and mother of ten children whose husband was unemployed), 
                                                 
369 Ibid. 
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were “adding more suffering on the shoulders of our people”. In a political statement 
issued on 25 November, Fatah called these officials the Mafia that got rich at the 
expense of other people, pointing particularly at Mohammad Rashid as an octopus 
who “sucks our people’s blood and eats their meat and bones”. Fatah went further and 
called on Arafat “to immediately intervene...to bring end for monopolies and grafts 
grow at the expense of people’s basic needs”.376 Fatah's demand of Arafat to end 
monopolies on one hand implied his advocating the free market as area of fairness and 
justice, and on the other its awareness of the mode of government endorsed by the PA. 
 
This mode of government, which is in principle a presidential mode, concentrated 
extensive power in the hands of Arafat. The power includes the appointment of 
members of cabinet, the promulgation and veto of laws passed by the legislative body, 
the right to issue decree and decisions that enjoy the power of laws, the appointment 
of officials within PA security and civil sectors, the establishment and dissolution of 
civil institutions, the control of donor aid and it’s distribution, and the approval of the 
PA’s security and civil personnel payroll. Much of this power had been promoted by 
the Oslo accords.  
 
Article IV of Oslo II, for example, enabled Arafat to appoint members to cabinet, and 
article. XVIII enabled him to veto, promulgate, initiate, and issue legislations. In part, 
thus, it was the Oslo accord which promoted such a mode of government. Yet Arafat's 
opposition to institutionalization and his appetite for power as expressed by his 
control of “almost every decision” and his preference for “personally selecting each 
appointee to PA jobs of any importance”, were also factors which according to Barry 
Rubin blocked “PA activity...when Arafat is out of the country, or even away from his 
office for the day”.377
 
In assuming hegemony over the Palestinian decision making process, Arafat was 
backed by the Palestinian security forces, the majority of whom were affiliated with 
Fatah and whose commanders were his clients and loyalists. These security forces 
were only one of the many sources of Arafat power. Among the others was Arafat's 
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capacity to re-produce an elite atmosphere around himself by blending so called 
“insiders” and “outsiders”. To apprehend the importance of this latter source of 
Arafat’s power, one must first recognise the social and political ramifications of the 
term “outsiders” and “Insiders”. The issue of outsiders vs. insiders emerged when 
Israel, in parallel with the Oslo process, enabled nearly 500 PLO cadres and deportees 
to return to their homes in the territories. The vast majority of these cadres and 
deportees were affiliated with Fatah (only 40 were affiliated with the PFLP and the 
DFLP, both of which opposed the Oslo accords).378  
 
Among these cadres and deportees were those who had been socialized in the Arab 
world like Mohammoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), Ahmed Qrieh (Abu Ala’), Nabil 
Sha’ath, former Secretary General of the PA’s Cabinet Ahmad Abdel El Rahman, and 
Presidential Chief of Staff Tayeb Abdel Rahim. The most prominent member of this 
set is Abu Mazen, who would later become historicised as the first Palestinian Prime 
Minister. Born in Safed in 1935, like many Palestinians Abu Mazen fled Safad for 
Syria in the aftermath of the 1948 was.  Later he met Arafat, Salah Khalaf, and Khalil 
El Wazir, and with them established the foundation for Fatah. In 1980 he was elected 
to as a PLO executive committee member, and in 1984 he was appointed head of the 
PLO's Department of Arab Affairs before serving as PLO ambassador to Moscow, 
where on behalf of the PLO he signed a declaration of principles on 13 September 
1993. After less than two years, Abu Mazen returned to the territories and was 
appointed by Arafat as Secretary General of the PLO in July 1995.379   
 
Close to Abu Mazen is Ahmed Qrieh, who would also later be historicised — as the 
second Palestinian Prime Minister. Qrieh, considered one of the PLO technocrats, was 
born in Abu Dis village near Jerusalem in 1937.  He left Palestine after El Nakba, and 
in the 1960s joined Fatah; he was then appointed Director of the Sons of Martyrs 
Institute (Samad) in Lebanon in the 1970s. After the 1982 Lebanese war Qrieh, like 
most PLO cadres, moved to Tunisia where he was elected to as a member of the 
PLO's executive committee in 1989.380 In early 1993 Qrieh led the Palestinian team in 
their Oslo backchannel negotiations with Israeli government, and in 1994 he was 
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appointed Minister of Economics and Trade before he resigned in September of that 
same year.  In 1996 Qrieh was elected PLC speaker.  
 
Khalil Shikaki notes that Abu Mazen, Qrieh, and other old PLO cadres owed their 
positions mainly to Arafat, rather than to an independent source of power based in the 
local community.381 Most of these cadres, as mentioned, had been born in villages and 
towns now considered Israeli territory, and consequently most of them were 
unfamiliar with the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and had not experienced the Israeli 
occupation. 
 
Alternately, the term “insiders” indicates the Fatah activists who actually grew in the 
West Bank and in the Gaza Strip, and who organized as an underground movement in 
response to their victimisation by the Israeli occupation (which included detention and 
deportation). Typical figures from this elite are Muhammad Dahaln, Jibril Al Rajub, a 
PLC member and chief of Fatah West Bank Marwan El Barghuti,382 and Minister of 
Prisoners Affairs Hisham Abdel El Raziq. This elite enjoyed an independent source of 
power rooted in the local community, and consequently adopted different approaches 
toward society and the Arafat hegemony over the decision making process.   
 
Unlike the outsiders, who felt less reluctantly towards Arafat's hegemony over 
Palestinian decision-making, insiders strongly opposed this hegemony and called for 
the decision-making process to be opened to wider participation. Rubin Barry 
observes that the former elite (the outsiders) had allied with notables (ayan) and 
professionals who had broken with the conservative characteristics of the traditional 
ayan to espouse the national cause, and consequently were rewarded by being 
permitted to join the post-Oslo leadership.383
 
Nevertheless, Rubin notes the crystallization of the Palestinian elite into two camps — 
represented by the camp of PLO cadres plus ayan and professionals, and the camp of 
insider Fatah revolutionaries — did not imply unified supportive or opposing 
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positions toward Arafat among either camp’s members.384 In each camp, it was 
possible to find exceptions to their rule. Zakariyya al Agha, for instance, was 
considered to stand among the ayan, and was appointed by Arafat as Chief of Fatah in 
the Gaza Strip, and as Minister of Housing in the 1994 cabinet; this appointment was 
made as a reward for Zakariyya al Agha's support of the movement during the first 
Intifada. Former Minister of Justice Frieh Abu Medien (an insider deriving from a 
large nomad family) behaved similarly, supporting the movement during the Intifada. 
Alternately al Agha and Abu Medien, both of whom lacked a popular base, were 
uncritical of Arafat. Marwan Kanafi, one of Arafat’s advisors, stood among the 
outsiders but, in November 1997, he warned of the ramifications of Arafat’s 
hegemony over the decision-making process and called for building “a democratic 
apparatus in order to prevent problems arising in the days following Arafat’s 
departure”.385  
 
At the same time, among professionals and the ayan it was also possible to find some 
members who stood in opposition to Arafat's hegemony. Hanan Ashrawi (a 
professional), as we have seen, refused a position in the 1998 cabinet and called for 
structural adjustments to be made to the Palestinian political system. Haider Abdel El 
Shafi — one of the most respected public figures in Gaza Strip, head of the 
Palestinian team dispatched to the Madrid peace conference and Director of the 
Palestinian Red Crescent Society, as well as a former PLC member — resigned from 
the PLC on 28 September 1997 in protest of Arafat's semi-autocratic rule.386  
 
Mawaia El Masri, a member of a leading family in Nablus, was one of the signatories 
of the “Statement of Twenty”. Similarly, Rawia El Shawa derived from the most 
prominent family in Gaza Strip, and was elected to PLC in 1996 before she signed the 
“Statement of Twenty”. Moreover, the insider Fatah revolutionaries were not united in 
their opinion of Arafat. While Muhammad Dahaln, and Jibril El Rijub (derived from 
Middle Class families), along with their security forces, constituted a vanguard of 
Arafat's rule (or at least did in the pre-Al-Aqsa Intifada era, as far as Dahaln is 
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concerned), Al Barguthi (derived from one of the biggest families in Ramallah) stood 
in opposition to such a rule.  
 
On 25 October 1998 El Barghuti led a demonstration in Ramallah to protest the 
killing of one Palestinian by the Musa Arafat-commanded military intelligence during 
a raid on a Ramallah-based Fatah office. The demonstrators shouted “PA, PA, we 
want an end to torture, we want a freedom...”387 In a similar case, two Palestinians 
were shot to death by Abu Sharekh-commanded security forces in Rafah, south of the 
Gaza Strip, on 10 February 1999. The event took place when hundreds of Palestinians 
protested against the State Security Court's sentencing of three Palestinians to the 
death penalty, life imprisonment, and 15 years imprisonment.388  
 
The murder of these Palestinians, committed by outsider-general commanded security 
forces, might serve as an empirical case from which to infer the nature of outsider-
insider relationship. Having lived in relatively comfortable exile, and having enjoyed 
better living standards than the insiders, most of the outsiders were used to 
consumption values and consequently appeared less resistant to corruption and 
misusing their power. It was in their interest to preserve the Arafat's corrupted system, 
and even to protect it, despite the fact that this was necessarily done at the expense of 
the local community. On the other hand, the insiders’ long years of suffering under 
the occupation had promoted among them what might be called a utopia of homeland; 
through this, they dreamt of rule by a law-based political system, under which they 
would enjoy full political, civil, economic, and social rights in compensation for 
sacrifices made during the years of the occupation.  
 
However, this friction between insiders and outsiders the emerged over the proper 
mode of government did not imply friction over the peace process. Both insiders and 
outsiders supported the peace process, as both their interests were connected to it. 
Azmi Bishara notes that the peace process had privileged these Palestinians by 
enabling them to enjoy “exclusive status” as VIPs, consequently making them 
different from the majority of people who continued to suffer Israeli measures like 
closure, detention, and so forth. In so doing, Bishara goes on to state these elite had 
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become ‘a cliental network’ in regards to the peace process.389 Due to their 
convergence around the peace process, and their simultaneous divergence over the 
proper mode of government that should follow it, both insiders and outsiders 
considered Arafat to be the final arbitrator, their centre of gravity. Consequently, 
Arafat was able to play them off each other, and thereby to control the game, 
ultimately attaching insiders and outsiders to each other through their collective 
membership in the executive body.  
 
The Palestinian cabinet of 28 May 1994 was, for instance, a blend of outsiders and 
insiders. Out of seventeen ministers (including Arafat with the portfolio of Interior), 
seven were outsiders and nine were insiders. The outsider ministers were: Yasir Amr 
(Minister of Education), Yasser Abd Rabbu (Minister of Culture and Arts), Samir 
Ghusha (Minister of Labour), Ahmed Qrieh (Minister of Economic and Trade), 
Muhammad al-Nashashibi (Minister of Finance), Nabil Sha’ath (Minister of Planning 
and International Cooperation), and Intisar Al Wazir (Minister of Social Affairs). 
Insider ministers were: Abd al-Hafiz al-Ash’ab (Minister of Communication), Azmi 
al-Shu’abyi (Minister of Youth and Sport), Riyad al-Za’nun (Minister of Health), 
Zakariya al-Agha (Minister of Housing), Frieh Abu Medien (Minister of Justice), 
Sa’eb Erekat (Minister of Local Government), Ilyas Frayj (Minister of Tourism), 
Hassan Tahboub (Minister of Islamic Waqf), and Abdel A Ziz al Haj Ahmad 
(Minister of Transportation).390  
 
Of these sixteen ministers, eight were affiliated with Fatah — Ahmed Qrieh, Nabil 
Sha’ath, Sa’eb Erekat, Intisar Al Wazir, Frieh Abu Medien, Zakariya al-Agha, Riyad 
al-Za’nun, and Abdel Aziz al Haj Ahmad. Five had been categorized as independents 
(close to Fatah); two ministers (Yasser Abd Rabbu & Azmi al-Shu’abyi) were 
affiliated with Fida (a splinter group of the DFLP) and one attaching himself to the 
Popular Struggle Front known as Samir Ghusha.  
 
Consequently, Fatah dominated the major Palestinian executive body while at the 
same time that body was internally divided to enable Arafat to keep control. In a 
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sense, Arafat preferred his own party members to those of any other. However, he was 
constantly concerned about the potential emergence of a unified political front that 
might challenge his authority, and so encouraged a heterogeneous cabinet. 
 
The structure of the second Palestinian cabinet of May 1996 might substantiate the 
above analysis. A further nine insiders joined, and four insider ministers were fired: 
Faisal El-Husayni, Minister of Jerusalem (without portfolio); Abdel El Jawad Salah, 
Minister Agriculture; Imad Faljoui, Minister of Communication (replaced Abd al-
Hafiz al-Ash’ab); Hanan Ashrawi, Minister of Higher Education (new ministry); 
Maher El Masri, Minister of Economic and Trade (replaced Ahmed Qrieh); Ali El 
Qawasmi, Minister of Transportation (replaced Abdel A Ziz al Haj Ahmad); Abdel El 
Rahman Hamd, Minister of Housing (replaced Zakariya al-Agha); and Abdel Aziz 
Shahien, Minister of Supply (new ministry); and Jamil El Tarafi, Minister of Civil 
Affairs. Only two more outsiders joined the Cabinet: Bashir El Barghouti for Industry 
(a new ministry), and Talal Sadr as Minister of Youths and Sport (replacing Azmi al-
Shu’abyi).391
 
The 1996 cabinet, accordingly, was formed of up to 23 ministers (excluding Arafat), 
out of whom thirteen were insiders and ten were outsiders. Of these 23 ministers, 
twelve were affiliated with Fatah; six out of these twelve Fatah-affiliated ministers 
had served in the 1994 Cabinet (when Ahmed Qrieh and Al Haj Ahmed were no 
longer in cabinet), and six were new. The newly appointed ministers were: Faisal El 
Husayni, Ali El Qawasmi, Maher El Masri, Abdel El Rahman Hamd, Jamil El Tarafi, 
and Abdel Aziz Shahien. Seven ministers had been classified as independents, one 
affiliated with Fida (Yasser Abd Rabou), one attached himself to the Popular Struggle 
Front (Samir Ghusha), one (specifically Bashir El Barghouti) was affiliated with the 
People’s Party (originally the Palestinian Communist Party, but renamed in the 1990s 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union), and one had at one time been close to Hamas 
(Imad El Faljoui). 
 
The 1996 cabinet thus exhibited further domination of the Fatah over the executive 
body. Even the post of Secretary General, which had evolved at time, was entrusted to 
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the Fatah-affiliated Ahmed Abdel El Rahman. Moreover, Jamil Hilal noted that Fatah 
domination was not confined to the cabinet; it also extended over Palestinian 
bureaucracy. Out of the forty deputies and assistant deputy ministers of the Palestinian 
ministries, Halal observed that in 1996 thirty-three were affiliated with Fatah.392  
 
Usually appointment to these posts, and to any post of importance in Palestinian 
bureaucracy (e.g., a ministry's Director-General), had to be endorsed personally by 
Arafat. Political considerations, excepting some fields like finance and planning, were 
the chief factors deciding appointments. Those who were appointed to these posts 
usually lacked the necessary professional qualifications (in the narrow sense of the 
word) to fulfil their job. Their power was derived from their connection to Arafat, 
who punished/rewarded them according to their readiness to cooperate with him. 
Simply, their futures relied on Arafat who, if they cooperated, would be generous and 
privilege them in various ways (e.g., he would tolerate their misuses of power). The 
affair of a “forged citrus certificate” by the Ministry of Agriculture393 is a good 
example, showing not only how Arafat tolerated these officials' misuse of power, but 
also how their connection to Arafat encouraged them to rebel against their ministers.  
 
In October 1997 Minister of Agriculture Abdel El Jawad Saleh discovered the 
involvement of a number of his ministry's high-ranking officials in the production of 
false licences for Israeli citrus produce that allowed Palestinians to market their 
products in Jordan markets. Among said officials was Deputy Minister Azzam 
Tbeileh, an Arafat appointee and loyalist. Tbeileh denied the charge, and attacked 
Saleh with accusations that he was paralyzing the ministry’s work.394 Though Saleh 
presented a report on the issue to the PLC, no investigation was made and in fact 
Saleh was fired from his ministry the following year (Tbelieh stayed).  
 
In addition to the privilege of protection (as illustrated above), officials enjoyed the 
privilege of having their family members and people with whom they had connection 
enjoy a living standard higher than that of normal people — what Bishara calls 
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“exclusive status” or that of “VIPs”, with its derivative rights including free 
movement between the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, special treatment in cases of 
travel conducted outside the autonomous areas,395 special treatment in every contact 
they made with various PA public institutions, special medical services (e.g., being 
treated in Egyptian, Jordanian, and Israeli hospitals and, in some cases, even in 
European hospitals), in addition to other privileges.  
 
In doing the above, Arafat was willing to extend his system of patronage to the 
bottom level of society, and consequently divided that society between those who 
benefited from his patronage and those who were harmed by it. As a result, social 
conflict — in the sense of competition between well-organized interest groups that 
had access to political institutions and could influence state policies — disappeared 
from the Palestinian scene. Arafat's system of patronage discouraged such conflict, 
and instead promoted an unproductive version that is “...not channelled into a political 
institutions in a way that reinforce their primacy, but is instead fragmented and 
transferred into competition over patronage and access to the personalized...power 
within the PA apparatus”.396 Rex Brynen believes that this kind of conflict is a typical 
feature of a neopatrimonial system, in which state power and funds distributed by the 
patron (in our case, Arafat) become a means of gaining the loyalty of the clients, who 
engage from their side in stiff competition (fuelled by the patron) over this power and 
financial support.397  
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The origin of this system is rooted in the Ottoman era, when the central authority 
empowered the village Sheikhs with the right of tax collection in exchange for their 
loyalty and local influence. With the introduction of the Tanzimat (reform) in 1839, 
Ottomans reproduced their patronage system through administrative councils that 
enabled the ayan to assume the role of tax collection (See Chapter II, Pp.47-51).  
 
The end of Ottoman Rule in 1919 and the British assumption of power in Palestine 
were not followed by the disappearance of this system. Rather, the system was again 
invoked when British mandate tolerated the Muslim-Christian Association (MCA) 
and later set up the Supreme Muslim Council (SMC). Both institutions, as we have 
seen in chapter II (Pp. 52-53), were dominated by leading families permitted to claim 
full representation of Palestinians before the mandatory government. Under the Israeli 
occupation, the system was re-produced once again when Moshe Dayan, paralleling 
his policy of “non-intervention”, enabled Palestinians to organize municipal elections 
in 1972 that created a pliable indigenous leadership (see chapter II, Pp. 80-83). While 
the occupation realized its goals in the 1972 election, as we have seen in chapter II, it 
failed to do so in the 1976 elections (see chapter II, Pp. 88-92), and thus in the 1980s 
it turned to support the short-lived but still pliable local leaders (through the village 
league, see chapter II, Pp. 100-102), and franchised said leaders with limited power in 
exchange for loyalty.  
 
When Arafat and his authority arrived in the territories in 1994, the system had been 
invoked but in wide scale. Having enjoyed the status of the symbol of Palestinian 
nation, and at the same time, a long history of fighting for Palestinian cause, Arafat 
had little difficulties in asserting himself not only as PA leader, but also as a "father” 
of all Palestinians. In so doing, Arafat was backed by the traditional power-orientated 
(e.g., patriarchal) culture of Palestinian society, which strongly asserts values such as 
fatherhood  
 
It was this value system that created mixed feelings toward Arafat. Despite 
Palestinians’ criticisms of his semi “autocratic” rule, and his hegemony over the 
decision-making process, they continued to consider him as their only conceivable 
leader! In the words of Rawia El Shawwa, one of the signatories of the Statement of 
Twenty: “because he is the president...he behaves in a fatherly and authoritative 
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manner...Arafat’s manner is tolerated because he is the spiritual leader”.398 Even his 
opponents, like Hamas and Islamic Jihad, refrained from discussing issues related to 
Arafat's legitimacy as Palestinian leader. This value context prompted Arafat to 
address his people with words like “my people... the sons of my people and my clan, 
my brothers...my loved ones...”399 upon his arrival in the territories in July 1994.  
 
Though Arafat's relationship with his people, normatively speaking, should be a 
constitutional one and should be shaped through formal legal structures (e.g., not 
informal tradition-derived structures), Arafat ignored this in his speech by, for 
example, failing to employ words like citizens.  So Arafat was willing to assert 
customary law based on personal connections, at the expense of civil law based on 
legal and formal relations. Arafat went further even in November 1994, 
institutionalising this trend by setting up a “Presidential Department for Tribal 
Affairs” to adjudicate problems between families.400  
 
Arafat's blend of informal social structure with the legal para-state structure of the PA 
further manifested itself in the involvement of various PA officials in settling family 
disputes according to customary law. On 29 September 1995 rites of tribal 
conciliation between two families in the village of Shyukh in Hebron took place under 
the auspice of Colonel Abu Khalid al-Lahham, Arafat's advisor on Asian and Islamic 
world affairs. On 30 September a tribal conciliation ceremony was concluded between 
the Qaysia and Nisann families under the auspice of the Presidential Security Forces 
in Jericho, “with the blessing of the Authority”.401 Jamil Hilal asserts that Arafat's 
promotion of tribal coalitions and customary law sought to weaken voluntary 
associations (e.g., political parties) structured according to horizontal principles, and 
thereby was actually at odds with the basic principles of Arafat's neopatrimonial 
system; the cliental relations being based on vertical principles.402  
 
                                                 
398 Palestine Report. Vol.2, No.31, Jnauary 17, 1997. 
399 Jerusalem Post on 3 July 1994. 
400 See decision no.161 for the year 1994 in Al Waqaea’, The formal gazette of PA, no.3, 2ed year, 
20/2/1995. 
401 Hillel Frisch. “From Palestine Liberation Organization to Palestine Authority: The Territorialization 
of “Neopatriarchy”. In Sela & Ma’oz (eds.) The PLO and Israel, op.cit., Pp.58-59. 
 
402 Hilal (Arabic). El Nizam El Syasi, op.cit., Pp.86-88. 
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More importantly, however, the promotion of tribal coalitions would have negative 
ramifications on prospects for setting up a modern state-society relationship based on 
a group of abstract binding rules, as Joel Migdal suggests,403 and would instead 
emphasize personal connection as an instrument of access to state power and 
resources. The overall outcome was a state of affairs in which some social groups 
were underrepresented either in economic or political terms, and other groups (that 
accepted a cliental role) were represented in various state apparatus under patronage 
of their claimed “father” (Arafat).   
 
In 1998 Arafat showed further determination to keep his neopatrimonial system, when 
he maintained positions of those cabinet ministers suspected of corruption, and 
absorbed two members of the PLC committee who had investigated the corruption in 
the PA apparatus in 1997. Arafat expanded the cabinet positions from 23 to 31 
(including Arafat himself within the Ministry of Interior), and indirectly fired two of 
his most persistent critics (Hanan A shrawi, and Abdel El Jawad Saleh) after 
demoting Saleh to the position of a minister without portfolio.  He also orchestrated 
Ashrawi's resignation by enabling those ministers suspected of corruption to keep 
their positions in the new cabinet.   
 
In addition, Arafat founded three new ministries: the Ministry of Environment’s 
Affairs (Youssef Abu Safiah, member of the PLC committee to investigate corruption 
was appointed Minister), Ministry of Prisoners Affairs (Hisham Abdel El Raziq, one 
of insider Fatah revolutionaries was appointed minister), and Ministry of 
Parliamentary Affairs (Nabil Amr, a Fatah-affiliated outsider, was appointed 
minister). Moreover, Sa’di El Krunz, head of the PLC committee assembled to 
investigate corruption, was appointed Minister of Industry instead of Bashir El 
Barghouti, who remained in the cabinet but without portfolio. Alongside El 
Barghouti, Hassan Asfour, and Ziad Abu Ziyad, were appointed as ministers without 
portfolios. Afterwards, however, Asfour took over the newly emerged Ministry of 
NGOs’ Affairs. Furthermore, Arafat cancelled the Ministry of Youths and Sport, but 
                                                 
403 Migdal. Strong Societies, op.cit., p.19. 
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kept its minister Talal Sadr in the cabinet without a portfolio; he also appointed Mutri 
Abu Atia as Minister of Tourism, in place of Ilyas Ilyas Frayj.404
 
Some fourteen ministers of this new cabinet were outsiders (including Arafat), and 
seventeen were insiders. Of the thirty-one ministers, at least twenty were Fatah-
affiliated, and the remaining eleven were either affiliated with the FIDA, the People’s 
Party, or were Independents. Consequently, the cabinet was again structured to 
support Arafat's neopatrimonial system which, as we have seen, weakened/restrained 
civil society, excluded/co-opted opponents, selectively restrained basic freedoms like 
the freedom of expression, tolerated corruption, abrogated rule of law, and finally, as 





























                                                 




Chapter IV: The Palestinian Legislative Council (PLC) 
The Incomplete Democracy 
 
One of the most notable events of the interim period was the Palestinian elections of 
January 1996. The elections, were held for the Palestinian Legislative Council and for 
President of the PA, were promoted by article I of DOP, which stipulated that “the 
aim of the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations...is, among other things, to establish a 
Palestinian Interim self-Government, the elected council (the “council”), for the 
Palestinian people in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, for a transitional period not 
exceeding five years,....”.  
 
Article III of DOP elaborated: “in order that the Palestinian people in the West Bank 
and Gaza may govern themselves according to democratic principles, direct, free, 
general political elections will be held for the Council under agreed supervision and 
international observation....” Article III of Oslo II reasserted these elections; “the 
Palestinian council and the Rae’s (president) of Executive Authority...will be elected 
by the Palestinian people of the West Bank, Jerusalem and the Gaza Strip for the 
transitional period agreed in Article I of the DOP.”  
 
The protocol of elections, was parallel to Oslo II (Annex II), elaborated the basis of 
these elections, including the mode of agreed supervision and international 
observation; rules and regulations regarding election campaign; the qualifications of 
voting; nomination; the provisions of the election campaign; and so on. Art. 1 of the 
protocol provided a national Central Elections Commission (CEC) appointed by the 
PA for the purpose of supervising elections.405 The CEC was assisted by sub-
commissions at local level, which in turn set up a committee in each polling station 
with the aim of electoral registration (to register all persons qualified to vote).  
 
To be eligible to vote, every Palestinian must be 18 years old or older, having a 
permanent residence in the polling district (clearly to prevent Diaspora Palestinians 
from voting), and not subject to a sentence by a Palestinian court (Art. 2 of the 
                                                 
405 Annex II (Protocol Concerning Elections) in Oslo II op.cit. 
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Protocol). With respect to nomination, the protocol denied those who “commit or 
advocate racism; or pursue the implementation of their aims by unlawful or non-
democratic means”, the right to run for election (Art. 3). The Palestinian Electoral 
law, which Arafat ratified on 7 December 1995,406 reaffirmed these principles and 
established a majority voting system with 16 constituencies for the election of the 
Palestinian legislative council members.  
 
In this connection, the West Bank (including Jerusalem) was divided into eleven 
constituencies; Jerusalem, Jericho, Bethlehem, Hebron, Nablus, Jenin, Tulkarm, 
Qalqilya, Tubas, Silfeet, and Ramallah. Similarly, the Gaza Strip was divided into five 
constituencies; Jabalia, Gaza city, Deir El Balah, Khan Younis, and Rafah. Despite 
this, special regulation was made with regard to Nablus, where an additional seat 
among the 88 seats of PLC407 was reserved to the Samaritan sect (Art. 5). Also, six 
seats based on the quota system were reserved to the Christian community in the West 
Bank and Gaza Strip.  
 
The number of seats that each constituency contained was proportionate to the size of 
the population of the constituency compared to the total population. Though the 
decision of the number of seats each constituency elected and any other issues related 
to the elections, such as the nomination period and the date of elections, was supposed 
to be taken by CEC,408 it was Arafat who ultimately decided these issues. On 13 
December 1995, for instance, Arafat issued his decree no. 1 for the year 1995, 
designating 20 January 1996 as elections day and the nominee registration period as 
nine days starting on 14 December.409 On the following day (14 December) he issued 
his decree no. 2 distributing the 83 seats of the council among the sixteen 
constituencies as in the accompanying table: 
                                                 
406 The full text of the law is cited in Al Waqea’, op.cit.,, no.8, 2ed year, 11/12/1995. The same law was 
published by Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on  9 December 1995. 
407 Though Oslo II specified the number of Palestinian Council seats with 83 seats, Palestinians were 
permitted to expand the council to 88 seats. See Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 27 December 1995. 
408 Even the CEC, which appointed by Arafat on 21 December, was not neutral as Mohammoud Abbas (Abu 
Mazen) was commissioned to chair it. See Presidential decree no.3 in Al Waqaea’ op.cit., no.10, 2ed year, 
31/12/1995. 





Seats West Bank 
 
Seats 
Jabalia 7 Jerusalem 6 
Gaza City 10 Jericho 1 
Deir El Balah 5 Bethlehem 4 
Khan Younis 7 Hebron 9 
Rafah  5 Nablus 8 
Sub-total 34 Jenin 6 
  Tulkarm 4 
  Qalqilya 2 
  Tubas 1 
  Silfeet 1 
  Ramallah 7 
  Su-total 49 
Total   83 
 
Source: Decree no.2 for the year 1995 in Al Waqaea’. op.cit, no.10, 2ed year, 31/12/1995. 
 
When the Israeli government permitted Palestinians to expand the number of PLC 
seats to 88, Arafat was the one who decided on the distribution of the additional five 
seats when he issued his decree no. 5 on 28 December 1995, to assign one further seat 
to each of the following constituencies: Khan Younis, Jerusalem, and Hebron; and 
two seats to Gaza.410   
 
With respect to the election of the PA president, the WBGS (including east Jerusalem) 
were treated as one electoral constituency, not sixteen as in the case of the election of 
PLC members (Art. 60, Para. 4 of the electoral law). This entailed that each member 
of the electorate had one vote for the election of PA president, and as many votes for 
the election of PLC members as his constituency had seats in the council. For 
example, if a given constituency had seven seats in PLC, then each elector in this 
constituency could distribute their vote among all seven candidates for these seats or, 
if he preferred, among two or even one candidate. Electors thus had the option to vote 
for more than one candidate or party as well as for other candidates who might prefer 
to run in the election as independents, since the nomination of candidates was open to 
parties and independents as well. 
 
                                                 




The candidacy for presidency was opened to every Palestinian who had a permanent 
residence in WBGS and was 35 years old or older on the day of the elections. 
Meanwhile, the candidacy for PLC seats was opened for every Palestinian who was 
30 years old or older on the day of the elections and enjoyed also a permanent 
residence in WBGS (Art. 9 & 12 of the electoral law). Members of the PA cabinet, 
civil servants, members of municipal councils, and security forces personnel were 
denied the right to run in the election unless they resigned their positions ten days 
prior to the issuance of the final nominees lists (Art. 14).  
 
In the election of the president the candidate who receives the highest number of votes 
is elected. In case there is only one candidate, this candidate must receive more valid 
votes than there are blank or invalid votes (Art. 88). For the election of PLC, the best-
placed candidates win the seats of their constituency. But in case this constituency is 
among the partial quota-based constituencies ( for example, if two seats are reserved 
for Christians among, say, eight seats of a given constituency), then the two best 
placed among Christians win these two seats even if the counterpart Muslim 
candidates received a higher number of votes (Art.89). The same principle was 
applied in Nablus constituency, where one seat was reserved to the Samaritan sect.   
The 1996’s Palestinian Elections 
 
On 20 January 1996 1,132,235 Palestinians, registered as eligible voters, they were 
able to vote at any one of 1696 polling stations distributed between the West Bank 
(including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip. The aim was to elect 88 PLC members 
from 676 candidates who had nominated themselves. Nearly half of the eligible voters 
were women, whereas only 22 of the candidates were (3.25%).411 The table below 
shows the distribution of, polling stations, candidates, and registered voters between 
the West Bank and Gaza. 




No. of  Voters 
West Bank 1198 374 665,603 
Gaza Strip 498 302 347,632 
Total 1696 676 1,132,235 
   
                                                 
411 Al Bilad on 3 January & the London-Based of Al Hayat on 19 January 1996. 
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In the West Bank the polling stations, candidates and voters were distributed among 








No. of  Voters 
Jerusalem 163 54 76,000 
Jericho 22 6 12,737 
Bethlehem 88 33 54,534 
Jenin 145 37 82,850 
Hebron 230 72 131,983 
Ramallah 162 46 78,076 
Silfeet 34 11 18,890 
Tubas 25 12 15,972 
Tulkarm 99 37 56,101 
Qalqilya 54 12 27,270 
Nablus 175 54 111,020 
Total 1198 374 665,603 
                                         
Source: Al Bilad & El Nihar on 20 January 1996. 
 
As far as the Gaza Strip is concerned, the polling stations, candidates and voters were 




No. of Polling 
Stations 
No. of Candidates No. of Voters 
Jabalia 82 67 60,436 
Gaza 183 92 120,483 
Deir El Balah 72 50 54,538 
Khan Younis 106 66 69,472 
Rafah 55 27 42,703 
Total 498 302 347,632 
 
Source: Ibid. 
When the elections took place, at least sixteen parties and movements participated, the 
most important of which were Fatah with 77 candidates, Palestinian People's Party 
with 26 candidates, FIDA with 11 candidates, the National Democratic Coalition with 
5 candidates, and 503 candidates run the elections as independents. Approximately, 
87% of the registered voters in Gaza Strip had actually voted, while only 73% of the 
registered voters in West Bank (including East Jerusalem), voted.412 The high voting 
turnout of the Gaza Strip in comparison to the West Bank might be explained by the 
fact that Palestinians of the Gaza Strip- with exception to the elections of 1962 which 
                                                 
412 Figures from the official Webpage of PLC <http://www.pal-plc.org> 
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took place under the Egyptian rule and was confined only to the members of the local 
committees of the ANU (estimated at 345 persons, see chapter II, Pp. 64-65) - had 
been denied the right of wide-scale political participation up until January 1996.  
 
In contrast to the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip, the Palestinians of the West Bank had 
enjoyed this right under both the Jordanian rule and the Israeli occupation. In April 
1950, around 175,000 of West Bank’s Palestinians participated in the first legislative 
elections which held after the annexation of West Bank to Jordan (see chapter II, P. 
68). In October 1956 further tens of thousands of these Palestinians participated in the 
legislative elections which held at that time (see chapter II, P. 70). After the Israeli 
occupation of West Bank in 1967, these Palestinians were allowed to practice their 
right of political participation through the local elections of 1972 and 1976 (see 
chapter II, Pp. 80-81, 88-90). Because of this history of relative democratic freedom 
the West Bank Palestinians were not as hungry for their right to vote as their Gaza 
Strip counterparts. This is why, as it seems, the turnout was lower in the West Bank 
than in the Gaza Strip which follows a long historical precedent.  
 
Despite this, West Bankers were represented in the council more than Gazans, with 51 
seats went to them as against to 37 seats went to Gazans.413 The geographical 
differences between the members of West Bank and their Gaza Strip counterparts did 
not imply differences in the political orientation. The majority of these members 
(Gazans and West Bankers alike) were either affiliated with Fatah, or close to Fatah. 
The Fatah party had, in fact, dominated most of the PLC seats; 50 seats going to the 
party’s candidates, 36 seats to independents, out of which 21 were close to the party, 
and two seats to FIDA and National Democratic Coalition.414 Consequently, the 88 
seats of PLC were distributed as the following table illustrates. 
 
Political Affiliation Number of Seats 
Fatah 50 
Independent close to Fatah 21 
National Independent 15 
FIDA 1 
National Democratic Coalition 1 
 
                                                 
413   Ibid. 
414 Ibid. 
 172
The seeds of Fatah’s dominance over PLC were sown by the Palestinian electoral law, 
which stipulated, as we have seen above, the majority system instead of proportional 
representation, and divided WBGS into sixteen constituencies. In so doing the law left 
little chance for small factions and parties which enjoy little in the way of a national 
following to be represented in the council. In October 1995, three months prior to the 
elections, all Palestinian parties and factions (including PFLP, DFLP, Hamas, Islamic 
Jihad, and others) enjoyed a national following ranged between 0.1 and 10.7%,  
compared to more than 41% for Fatah.415  Fully aware of this, the main Palestinian 
parties after Fatah--Hamas, Islamic Jihad, PFLP, and DFLP--boycotted the elections, 
arguing that the law favoured Fatah and was structured in a way that would ensure 
Fatah dominance over the PLC.  
 
But it should be emphasized that these factions' and parties' boycott of the elections 
was not merely due to the structure of the electoral law, but it was in principle due to 
their opposition to the Oslo process, and what might be derived from such a process, 
including the elections. On 16 January 1996, just four days before the elections, 
Hamas declared that the elections should be boycotted because it; “represented the 
legitimisation of Oslo process, was to take place under the shadow of occupation 
through which the Israelis maintained control over all aspects of Palestinian liberty, 
and failed to take into account the Palestinian refugee population in the Diaspora”. 
Within two days of Hamas making their position public Islamic Jihad, PFLP, DFLP 
all concurred and published pamphlets to this effect.416  
  
Despite their principle opposition for Oslo process, the position of these parties 
toward the electoral law gained the support of some foreign institutions concerned 
with democratic process, including the International Commission of Jurists, which 
called on the PA to change the electoral law by introducing a proportional 
                                                 
415 JMCC’s Poll No.10 online <http://www.jmcc.org> 
416 In fact, rounds of negotiations were held between the PA and these parties, with Hamas in 
particular, in Cairo during December 1995 with the aim of convincing Hamas, which took the leading 
role in the opposition, to change its position. In these negotiations, the PA showed readiness to enable 
Hamas to take part in the government institutions within the context of the Oslo process. But this 
position was rejected by Hamas which considered itself unbound by the terms of Oslo, and which also 
refused to dissolve its military apparatus. This fact left the negotiations between the two sides 
unproductive, and therefore, Hamas declared boycott for the elections. For these rounds of negotiations 
see Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 11, 13, 18, 20, 21, 23 December 1995. And for the position of these parties 
on the elections see Al Nihar on 17 & 19 January 1996. 
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representation system. According to one international foreign observer “...90 percent 
of the abuses in the elections occurred well before the election itself and took place in 
full public view.”417  
 
Clearly, the majority representation system stipulated by electoral law paved the way 
for these abuses to take place. Usually, such a system is appropriate for an 
ideologically and socially homogenous community. However, in the case of an 
ideologically and socially heterogeneous community, like the Palestinian one, then the 
most appropriate system is proportional representation. Only this system guarantees 
the representation of various ideologies and groups in state institutions. 
 
The implementation of a system like the majority representation system, therefore, 
facilitates the representation of only the dominant ideology or social group, in this 
case the Fatah party, and the exclusion of other parties and factions from the 
government institutions. This was to give Arafat- who won the presidency of PA with 
more than 88% of the votes as apposed to 9.5% of votes for Samiha Khalil, one of the 
opponents of the Oslo accords, and ran for the presidency alongside Arafat-418 the 
freedom to implement his policy of exclusion/inclusion of his opponents/supporters, 
which he follows within the context of his “neopatrimonial” system (for this system 
see chapter III).  
 
In addition to this problem was the division of the West Bank and Gaza Strip into 
sixteen constituencies. Given the tribal nature of the Palestinian society, this division 
promoted a tribal or familial fanaticism particularly in the constituencies dominated 
by big families such as in Khan Younis where families like Al Aga, Al Farah, Al 
Astal, Barbakh, and Al Masri (among the ayan) enjoyed historical status.  
 
For example, during the elections one of these families sought to impose their own 
candidate through illegal means. This happened when relatives of Zakaria Al Aga 
(who ran the elections on Fatah ticket and won only 800 votes) discovered Al Aga's 
failure in the elections.  In reaction, they sought to replace the ballot box with forged 
ballots so that he would win. This action provoked the family of Barbakh whose 
                                                 
417 Robinson, op.cit., P.196. 
418 Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 22 January & Palestine Report. Vol. 1, no.35, January 24, 1996. 
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candidate won 7,000 votes, and was placed second after Abdel Al Karim Abu Saleh 
(who ran the elections on Fatah ticket, and won the highest number of votes estimated 
at 8,000). Though, legally speaking, Barbakh was the one who should be announced 
winner, the victor list excluded Barbakh to list Al-Aga instead. Clashes, accordingly, 
broke out between the members of Barbakh family and the Palestinian police, and left 
six of Barbakh family wounded.419
 
A similar incident occurred in Ramallah constituency when Mustafa El Barghuti, who 
ran for election on the People's Party ticket was announced as winner, but after about 
half an hour, the victors’ list was amended to list Marwan El Barghuti (running for 
election on the Fatah ticket), instead of Mustafa.420 Both incidents, promoted by the 
ideological division (alongside tribal lines), prove that the PA, through these 
elections, deliberately sought Fatah hegemony over the PLC, and the exclusion of the 
other political factions.   
 
More importantly, it showed that the action of some Palestinians remained guided by 
principles other than rational ones. The absence of rational-based action among some 
Palestinians would have negative impacts over the prospects of advancing complete 
free and fair elections. This problem was not confined only to the electors, but 
extended to include the candidates, some of whom arrived to the polling stations in 
the elections days with the intention of influencing the decision of the electors.421  
 
Parallel to these problems was the hostile attitude that the Israeli authorities adopted 
towards the election. This was most evident in Occupied East Jerusalem and took on a 
number of different forms. The Israeli authorities prevented the candidates from 
putting up posters or advertisements on cars. They further restricted the candidates’ 
capacity to reach the electorate by only allowing them to hold public meeting in 
certain places.422 On the 15th of January there also appeared a poster, written and 
distributed by the so called the ‘Young Generation of the Likud Party’. The poster’s 
clear intent was to dissuade voters from participating in the election. It threatened the 
                                                 
419 See Al Bilad on 22 January 1996. 
420 Lamis Andoni. “The Palestinian Elections: moving toward Democracy for one-Party Rule”. In Journal of 
Palestine Studies. Vol XXV, no.3 (Spring 1996), Pp.14-15. 
421 Al Nihar on 21 January 1996. 
422 Al Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 14 January, & Al Nihar on 15 January 1996. 
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voters that if they took part in the election they would have their Identification Cards 
removed. This was a particularly worrying claim to the Palestinian Jerusalemites as 
their I.D cards give them some extra rights and privileges though nothing like the 
rights and privileges enjoyed by Israelis.423  
 
Despite these problems, the elections had been described by Carl Lidbom, head of the 
European Union election observers, as “largely fair” and “accurately reflect<ing> the 
aspirations of the Palestinian voters”.424 On 12 February 1996, thus, Arafat swore 
himself in as the first elected president of the PA, and on 7 March the PLC, addressed 
by Arafat and Salim Za’nun, PNC acting president, was inaugurated. 
The PLC: Toward a Parliamentary Institution  
 
The inauguration of the Council raised great hopes and expectations among 
Palestinians. Mohammoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) declared that “the elected Council is 
five minutes away from the announcement of independence, and the Council will 
declare independence during its three-year term”.425 Upon its inauguration the Council 
began to institutionalise itself as a step towards its goal of Palestinian independence. 
Ahmad Qrieh was elected as council speaker, beating his closest rival, Haider Abdel 
El Shafi, by about 20 votes.426 A Standing Order, comprised of 115 articles, was laid 
down.427 Its preamble provided “the principle of separation of powers... the 
independence of legislative authority and its right to legislate and monitor and hold 
accountable the executive authority... is a first and necessary step toward 
independence and building a democratic society.”  
 
The Standing Order established the PLC’s internal procedures and structure as well as 
the mechanisms of legislation, accountability, and monitoring. Article 16 provided for 
the Council’s annual term, starting in March of every year, and divided it into two 
periods, each lasting for six months. Article 18 specified the attendance of an absolute  
                                                 
423 Al Nihar on 16 January 1996. 
424 Palestine Report. Vo. 1, no.35, January 24, 1996. 
425 Al Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 22 January 1996 & Ibid. 
426 Palestine Report, Vol. 1, no.42, March 15, 1996. 
427 The PLC’s Standing Order had been frequently revised. The most updated version had been approved by 
PLC on 7 June 2000. This version is the one upon which the discussion is based. For this version see PLC 
official webpage <http://www.pal-plc.org> 
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majority (half the council members plus one) as pre-condition for regarding any 
session as legal.428
 
Articles 2 & 4 stipulated that at the beginning of each term the council re-elect its 
“Office Commission” comprised of the council speaker, the speaker’s first and second 
deputies, and the council secretary-general. The Commission was empowered to 
supervise all the administrative, financial, legal, information, and public relations 
issues. More importantly, it was charged with following up the implementation of 
Council resolutions (Article 11).  
 
The head of the Commission (the Council speaker) is held to represent the Council, 
and to preside over its sessions. At the inaugural session Nahid Munir El Rayes and 
Mitri Abu Aita were elected the speaker’s first and second deputy respectively; Rawhi 
Fatoh was elected the Council’s Secretary-General.429 Furthermore, the Council set up 
its own committees to study and review plans, programmes, agreements, and to 
perform major tasks in such fields as legislation, accountability, and monitoring.  
 
Article 48 of the council’s Standing Order identified two kinds of committees; 
permanent committees and ad-hoc committees (formed for a specific purpose and 
terminated upon the conclusion of their work). According to the same article, 11 
permanent committees were set up: the Jerusalem affairs committee, the land and 
settlement committee, the refugees affairs committee, the political committee, the 
legal committee, the budget and financial affairs committee, the economic committee, 
the interior committee, the education and social affairs committee, the monitoring and 
human rights committee, and the Council’s affairs committee.  
 
Any member of the PLC is eligible to nominate themselves for any committees. 
Usually, the nomination for these committees takes place at the beginning of each 
term of the PLC. The Council Office Commission, whose members are denied the 
right to nominate themselves for these committees, is the body which supervises the 
                                                 
428 The Council sessions were to be alternated between West Bank and Gaza Strip, and two branches for the 
council were established so that the problem of closure, which denied several West Bank PLC members right 
to attend the inaugural session in Gaza, is overlapped. See Palestine Report. Vol.2, No.31, January 17, 1997. 
429 The Council Speaker as well as his two deputies and the secretary general were affiliated with Fatah. 
Qrieh was elected for Jerusalem constituency, while El Rayes, Abu Aita, Fatoh, were elected for Gaza, 
Bethlehem, and Rafah constituencies, respectively. See Palestine Report. Vol. 1, No.42, March 15, 1996. 
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process of elections for these committees, before presenting the final list of nominees 
to the Council for final approval (Articles 49 & 51).  
 
The Standing Order also laid down the procedure of legislation, monitoring, and 
accountability. Articles 65 & 66 stipulated that either the Cabinet or PLC members 
might propose a draft law, two readings of which would be required. In most 
circumstances both the relevant and legal committees of the council have the right to 
review a draft law passed by either the Cabinet or PLC members. Upon the approval 
of the draft law by these committees, it is presented to council members for first 
reading approval. An absolute majority is needed to approve the law in its first 
reading (Art. 69).  
 
Once the draft law is approved at the first reading, it is passed back to both the 
relevant and legal committees for further possible comments, before being presented 
to PLC members for second reading approval. If the draft law is approved at the 
second reading, it is passed to the PLC speaker, who, on behalf of the council, passes 
it to the PA President for ratification or comments (Art. 70).  By virtue of article 71, 
the President has thirty days to comment or ratify draft laws. If the thirty days passed 
without word from the President, a draft law is considered in force and formally 
becomes a law that bounds every Palestinian in the autonomous areas. The PLC’s 
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The law is enacted 
 
At the level of monitoring and accountability, article 15 of the Standing Order 
empowered the PLC to extend/withdraw confidence in the cabinet or in any minister. 
Article 74 gave the Council the power to approve the PA’s annual budget, and obliged 
the PA to present the next year’s budget for the PLC two months before the end of the 
fiscal year. Furthermore, article 75 enabled every member in the PLC to question any 
minister over any issue of concern, and to call these ministers to testify at the Council 
sessions.  
 
The PLC’s Standing Order thus set the necessary norms upon which any democratic 
relation between the executive and legislative body rested. Through these norms, the 
Standing Order sought to strengthen the principles of accountability and transparency, 
and more importantly, to transfer to the PLC much of the power that is concentrated 
in the hands of the PA, in particular in Arafat’s hands. From the council’s point of 
view, as the preamble of the Standing Order makes clear, this is a pre-condition for 
building a democratic Palestinian state and achieving independence. The PLC thus 
considered itself to be engaged in battles on two fronts; the defence of democracy and 
the struggle for Palestinian national rights.  
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Toward this end, over the first four years of its inception (March 1996-March 2000/ 
the last term before the outbreak of the current intifada) the PLC held  dozens of 
sessions and its committees convened vast numbers of meetings producing scores of 
reports, resolutions, and laws. In the first two years after its inception, for example, 
the PLC held no fewer than 30 sessions and its committees held around 260 meetings 
resulting in 72 reports, 92 resolutions, and 35 laws in different political, economic, 
legal, and social fields.430  
 
Among the most important laws approved by the PLC over its first four years were 
the basic law or constitution for the interim period, the law of judiciary, and the NGOs 
law. The developments concerning these laws, and the means by which these laws 
were approved by the PLC might serve as empirical evidence to assess the type of 
relation that developed between the PLC and the PA during the first four years after 
the PLC’s inception. 
The Basic Law, the Law of Judiciary, and the NGOs Law: Unsuccessful 
Attempts to Combat Arafat’s Neopatrimonial System 
 
A most vital and urgent task of the PLC was the draft of a constitution or basic law for 
the interim period. Article 3 of the electoral law stipulated that the PLC should, as 
soon as it was inaugurated, draft a basic law that organizes the relations among the 
three authorities on the one side, and the relation of these authorities to the people on 
the other side. Toward this end, the PLC in its session no. 19 of the second term 
which held in Ramallah on 17 September 1997 approved the law at the second 
reading and passed it to Arafat for ratification or comment as provided by Article 70 
of the PLC’s Standing Order.431 Arafat, in turn, failed to comment upon or ratify the 
law within the due legal period of 30 days as provided by article 71 of the PLC 
Standing Order. Instead of declaring the law in force, the PLC passed a third reading 
to Arafat in October 1997.432  
 
Once again Arafat failed to comment on or ratify the draft law within the due legal 
period, and from then until the outbreak of the current intifada in September 2000, the 
                                                 
430 Palestine Report. Vol. 4, no.38, March 13,1998. 
431 Minutes of session no.19 of the second term. 
432 Al -Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 2 October 1997. 
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law remained blocked, so that Palestinians of the autonomous areas continued to lack 
constitutional recourse. Arafat’s refusal to ratify the basic law implied his opposition 
to the principle of the separation of powers and the rule of law, since this principle 
was the most notable feature of the law that formed up to seven chapters with 112 
articles.433 Article 2 of the law, for example, considered the Palestinian people “the 
source of all power, which shall be exercised through legislative, executive, and 
judicial authorities based on the principle of separation of powers...”   
 
Article 5 structured the governing system as “a democratic parliamentary system 
based on political and party pluralism.... The government shall be responsible to the 
president and to the Palestinian legislative council.” Article 6 equalized the status of 
all Palestinians before the law; “the principle of the rule of law shall be the basis of 
government in Palestine. All authorities, powers, agencies, institutions and individuals 
shall be subject to law”. Article 9 lodged great stress on the principle of the rule of 
law when it considered “all Palestinians...equal under the law and judiciary, without 
discrimination because of race, sex, colour, religion, political views, or disability.”   
 
Articles 10-33 emphasized basic human rights including civil, political, economic, 
and social rights: the right to freedom of expression, the right to freedom of peaceful 
assembly, the right to freedom of belief and the performance of religious rituals, the 
right to fair trial, the right to appeal, the prohibition of torture, the right to freedom of 
movement, the right to proper medical treatment, the right to housing, the right to 
work, the right to education, the right to political participation, and so forth. While 
Articles 43-48 asserted the council’s main tasks of legislating, monitoring/accounting 
to the PA, and approving the PA’s annual budget, article 54 (2) enabled the council 
speaker to assume the powers and duties of president in case of the president’s 
absence for 60 days, during which free elections would be held for a new president.  
 
The power and authority of the PLC was balanced by that of the President. Article 55, 
for example, placed the Palestinian security forces under Presidential command. 
Furthermore, articles 57-65 & 100 enabled the President to propose, ratify, and 
promulgate laws, to issue decisions and decrees that have the power of laws, to enjoy 
                                                 
433 The English Text of the Basic Law is cited on 
<http://www.miftah.org/Display.cfm?Docld=790&CategoryId=10> 
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the right to pardon or to commute sentence, to appoint a cabinet not exceeding 19 
ministers, to appoint the PA’s representatives to foreign countries and international 
organizations, and to declare a state of emergency without PLC approval  for a period 
not to exceed one month, after which the approval of two thirds of PLC members is 
required. A self-standing chapter (Articles 88-100) was devoted to judicial authority, 
asserting the principle of rule of law and the independence of the judiciary. 
 
In short, Arafat seemed unwilling to tolerate any body rivalling his authority even if 
that body was democratically elected and, like the PLC, expressing the will of the 
people. Frustrated with Arafat’s position on the basic law, Haider Abdel El Shafi 
resigned from the PLC on 28 September 1997, protesting what he described as 
Arafat’s underestimation of the PLC role and his blocking of democracy: “My 
resignation came as a result of objective considerations and of contemplation as to our 
concerns and problems.... It is obligatory that the relationship of the Council with the 
president and his executive apparatus be one of coordination and cooperation on a 
constitutional basis organized by a basic law for the ratification of which we are still 
waiting.”434   
 
The basic law was but one sample of the many laws that had been approved by the 
PLC and remained awaiting Arafat’s ratification. Ra’fat El Najar, a PLC member, 
confirmed to me that 70-75 laws had waited Arafat ratification since PLC 
inauguration in 1996 up until 2000.435 Among these laws was one concerning the 
judiciary. There is no doubt that the independence of the judiciary is a vital condition 
for establishing the rule of law. The prospects of achieving independence of the 
judiciary is weakened when there is no law determines the duties of judges; the way 
they are appointed, paid, promoted, delegated; the procedure for their resignation, 
retirement, and so forth. These issues if left unspecified by law create the potential for 
executive authority to intervene in the judicial system, and consequently the 
independence of the judiciary is weakened, and thereby the rule of law is stifled.  
 
                                                 
434 Al Quds on 17 October, 1997 & Abdel Shafi’s letter titled “in the name of Duty and Honesty”, first 
appeared in Al-Hayat Al Jadeeda on 17 December 1997. An English translation of the same letter is cited in 
Palestine Report. Vol. 4, no.29, January 2, 1998. 
435 Interview on 7 October 2004. 
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Fully aware of this, the majority of the 78 PLC members who attended the eighth 
session of the PLC in Ramallah in the period of 23-25 June 1998 approved the law of 
judiciary in the first reading.436 In the following two months, the PLC intensified its 
deliberations over the law until it was approved at the second and third readings in its 
sessions held in Ramallah in the period of 10 August -2 September 1998. On 5 
December the council passed the law to Arafat, asking for his comments or 
ratification. But the fate of the law was similar to the one of the Basic law, as Arafat 
did not ratify or comment the law, and the law remained blocked during the interim 
period.437   
  
Arafat’s refusal to ratify the basic law, as well as others including the law of judiciary, 
prompted the PLC member Ziad Abu Amr to describe the PLC as “institution to draft 
laws...without capacity to pressure the PA to comply with these laws”.438 But even the 
right of the PLC to draft its own version of laws is sometimes denied it by the PA. An 
interesting example of this is the law of NGOs. The Law was approved in the second 
reading during the tenth session of PLC held in Ramallah on 28-30 July 199.439  In 
August, the PLC passed the law to Arafat for comment or ratification. Arafat failed to 
comment or ratify the law within the due legal period of the 30 days. Instead of 
declaring the law in force, the PLC passed a third reading to Arafat in December 
1998440   
 
Once again, Arafat refused to ratify the law within the due legal period and, more 
importantly, rejected article 4 of the law that empowered the Ministry of Justice to 
licence any NGO in the PA’s autonomous areas. Arafat demanded the Ministry of 
Interior be empowered with this right. Arafat’s demand was rejected by the PLC in its 
fifth session of the forth term on 22 May 1999.441 Instead, the PLC insisted the 
Ministry of Justice act as the point of reference for any NGO. The PLC's position 
enjoyed the support of Palestinian NGOs, for whom contribution to PLC’s version of 
the law was significant during the meeting held between NGOs representatives and 
                                                 
436 Minutes of the eight session of PLC third term, Al Quds on 25 June, and Al Hayat Al Jadeeda on 26 June 
1998. 
437 Minutes of eleventh & fourteen session of PLC third term. 
438 Interview on 9 May 1998. 
439 Minutes of the PLC third term sessions (March 1998-March 1999). 
440 Ibid. 
441 Minutes of Palestinian Legislative Council Forth Term’s sessions (March 1999-March 2000). 
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members of the PLC’s political committee in Al-Bireh and Ramallah on 20 July 1998 
(the meeting being held to discuss the first reading of the law).442  
 
Nevertheless, and in a surprising fashion the debate over the law was settled when 
Ahmed Qrieh (better known as Abu Ala’) announced during a special session 
convened on 12 August 1999 by the PLC to discuss the PA’s 1999 budget that the law 
would incorporate Arafat's comments regarding force. However Qrieh, by then the 
PLC’s Speaker, claimed that the voting on Arafat's comments which had taken place 
during the 22 May session was insufficient; only 37 members out of the 50 who 
attended that session had vetoed the comments, making the vote unsuccessful for lack 
of the necessary absolute majority (half of the 88 PLC members + 1) stipulated in 
article 71 of the PLC’s Standing Order.443  
 
While Qrieh’s claim was correct from a legal point of view, it was also correct in that 
there was in fact no absolute majority present to accept the comments of Arafat. The 
time and the manner in which Qrieh made his announcement reflected this fact. 
Kamal al-Shrafi, who headed the PLC’s Monitoring Committee, pointed out that 
Qrieh’s announcement occurred “while members were leaving the hall at the end of 
the session...no one was paying attention”.444 Mawaia El Masri, a PLC member, 
confirmed al-Shrafi's observation by adding that “what happened evidences the 
partnership that had developed between PA and the council speaker and other 
members”.445   
 
The partnership between the PA and some members of PLC was necessary for Arafat 
to implement his system of neopatrimonial. As we have seen in chapter III (Pp. 161-
174) the success of this system is reliant on the absence of any prescribed legal norms 
that might restrains the patron’s action. In our case the prescribed legal norms were 
the Basic Law, the law of Judiciary, and the PLC version of the NGOs law. The 
blockage of the basic law meant that Arafat was free from any constraints over his 
action. While the blockage of the law of judiciary meant that there was no 
independent judiciary, and thus, the abrogation of the central pillar of the rule of law. 
                                                 
442 Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 21 July 1998. 
443 “PLC’s Standing Order”, op.cit. 
444 Interview on 6 September 1999. 
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Furthermore, the enactment of the NGOs law according to Arafat version meant that 
Arafat had personal supervision and control over the work of these institutions since 
he was the one who held the interior profile. All of this would enable Arafat to:  
 
1. Rule by law instead of the rule of law. In the later case all citizens are treated 
as equal before law, while in the former case the law is selectively invoked 
and implemented according to Arafat’s own interests. In such circumstances 
Arafat’s clique or ‘clients’ benefit the most, since they can stand above the 
law, and thereby enjoy enormous privileges. 
 
2. The previously mentioned situation encourages a social conflict in which 
various social groups engage in stiff competition to gain the patronage of the 
patron (or Arafat) since this is the only way to enjoy access to power and 
wealth. Consequently, the patron can remain the centre of gravity, and the one 
who ultimately controls the strings of the game. But because the sustainability 
of this system remains reliant on the ability of the patron to control the public 
fund, and to control the decision with regards to its distribution, Arafat and his 
authority, as we will see in the next section, abrogated PLC’s attempts to 
regulate the decision making process with regards to how the budgets are 
presented and approved.  
On the Budgetary Conflict between PLC and PA 
 
According to article 74 of PLC’s Standing Order the Cabinet is legally obliged to 
present the next year’s budget to PLC two months before the end of the fiscal year.446 
In October 1996, the PLC called the Cabinet to pass the 1997’s budget so that it could 
comment or approve it. The Cabinet turned PLC’s demand down, and let five months 
elapse before it passes the budget to PLC on 16 March 1997.447 The Cabinet decision 
to pass the budget came against a PLC stormy session held in Ramallah early  
 
                                                 
446 On 3 August 1998, Arafat ratified the so called “the law of Public finance”. Article 3 of the law obliged 
the cabinet to present the next year’s budget to PLC two months before the end of the fiscal year. In case the 
budget, for one reason or other, had not been approved by PLC, then Minister of Finance is empowered to 
spend at rate of around 8% (1/12) of previous year’s monthly expenditure for up to three months (art. 4). See 
Al Waqaea’, op.cit., no. 25, 5th year, 24/9/1998. 
447 Al Ayyam on 17 March 1997. 
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February 1997 during which a threat to pass non-confidence motion if the budget was 
not presented within two weeks, was made.448  
 
In early March, PLC convened the session scheduled to pass a motion of non-
confidence in the Cabinet after the later failed to pass the budget by the set deadline. 
But no vote to withdraw confidence took place after Qrieh, PLC speaker, informed 
PLC members that he received a letter from Ahmed Abdel El Rahaman, Secretary 
General of the Cabinet, asking for further time slot to pass the budget. Dawood Al Zir, 
the secretary of budget and financial affairs committee, considered the letter an 
“indicator of the Cabinet’s manipulation and underestimation of PLC’s role...449  
However, the Cabinet was granted the required time slot. On 16 March, the Cabinet 
passed the budget to PLC, which turned it to the committee of budget and financial 
affairs that is chaired by Sa’di El Krunz. 
 
The PLC’s Standing Order obliges the committee to report the PLC over the budget, 
so that PLC could decide whether to approve/disapprove it. Toward this end, the 
committee convened a meeting for its members on 23 March after which a report on 
the budget was presented to PLC.450  In its report, the committee asserted that most of 
the non-tax revenue (the revenue collected by the ministries and various public 
institutions in return for services provided for people) is not supplied to the treasury of 
the ministry of finance.  
 
In addition, the committee highlighted the revenue of the semi-monopolies- like the 
Palestinian Company for Trade Services (Cement Company), the Palestinian 
Development & Investment Company, the Petroleum General Commission, and 
Tobacco Commission. In this connection, the committee asserted that the revenue of 
these monopolies was not connected to the central auditing system of ministry of 
finance according to the law,451 and consequently, it asked the ministry of finance to 
pass a report on such revenue and the non-tax revenue within three months from the 
date of the PLC’s approval of the budget. Nevertheless, the committee had not made 
                                                 
448 Al Hayat Al Jadeeda & Al Quds on 5 February 1997. 
449 Al Ayyam on 7 March 1997. 
450 Ibid, on 24 March 1997. 
451 Extraction of the committee report is cited in Palestine Report. Vol. 3, no.1, June 13, 1997. 
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the PLC’s approval of the budget conditional on this being done. The PLC, therefore, 
approved the budget on 27 May 1997.452  
 
The approval of the PLC for the 1997’s budget, notwithstanding the budget’s deficits 
highlighted by the financial affairs committee, might be justified since the 1997’s 
budget was the first to be debated between PLC and PA, and therefore the PLC might 
seek to avoid confrontation with the PA, in the hope that it (Cabinet) would respect 
the due legal time and not committee the same mistakes in presenting the 1998’s 
budget. But the developments concerning the 1998’s budget showed that the ministry 
of finance had neither corrected the deficit of the 1997’s budget, nor the Cabinet 
respected the due legal time for the presentation of the budget.  
 
In a similar fashion to 1997’s budget, the Cabinet passed the 1998 budget to PLC in 
March 1998, five months after it was legally due.453 Accordingly, the PLC’s speaker 
entrusted Sa’di El Krunz to develop a report over the budget so that PLC could decide 
whether to approve it or not. On 21 April 1998, El Krunz held a meeting with 
representatives of the ministry of finance, to discuss the budget. At that meeting El 
Kruz proposed the same amendments he proposed for 1997’s budget, and further 
suggested to add some US$ 14 million to ministry of education’s allotment.454 
However, the Cabinet failed to revise the budget according to El Kruz’s proposals, 
and consequently, the PLC scheduled a session for 14 June to pass motion of non-
confidence in the Cabinet.455  
 
On 14 June, the PLC convened its scheduled session. But in a similar fashion of 
1997’s budget, PLC speaker informed PLC members that he received a letter from 
Arafat asking for further time slot, and promising a Cabinet reshuffle at the end of 
June. Accordingly, PLC refrained from passing motion of non-confidence in the 
Cabinet waiting the promised reshuffle. Though the promised reshuffle was not 
announced before August, PLC, after being informed by Al Kruz that the Cabinet 
approved most of the committee amendments but not those related to the semi- 
                                                 
452 Al Hayat Al Jadeeda, on 28 May 1997. 
453 Minutes of the third session of PLC third term on 30 March 1998.  
454 Al Hayat Al Jadeeda on 22 April 1998. 
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monopolies, approved the budget on 29 June with majority of 37, 22 objections, and 6 
abstentions.456    
 
PLC’s approval of 1998’s budget, and its failure to adopt any serious measure against 
PA’s disregard of the legal norms, encouraged the Cabinet, once again, not to respects 
these norms, and to pass 1999’s budget on 5 April 1999, six months after it was 
legally due.457 At this time, Azmi al-Shu’abyi, minister of Youth and Sport in 1994’s 
Cabinet, and the one who was elected to PLC on FIDA ticket, was chairing the PLC 
financial affairs committee instead of Al Kruz who was appointed minister of Industry 
in 1998’s Cabinet.  
 
In a report presented to PLC on 21 April, al-Shu’abyi criticized the high rate of the 
PA’s operational expenses (e.g., postage, phones, business travel, utilities and 
printing, and so forth), and the irrational appointments in the Palestinian bureaucracy 
which, according to him, were very harm to PA treasury, and denied important 
ministries like health, and education, the sufficient fund to supply people with proper 
health, and education services. Consequently, he called PA to rationalize the 
bureaucracy through enacting a civil service law, and to connect the revenue of the 
semi-monopolies to the central auditing system of ministry of finance according to the 
law. 458  
 
Al-Shu’abyi’s criticisms of the budget forced the Cabinet to amend some of the 
budget’s items through allocating further NIS 2 million (about US$ 500,000) to the 
ministry of health, and cutting some NIS 36 million (about US$ 9 million) from the 
operational expenses.459 These amendments, which promoted a PLC cancellation of a 
session scheduled for mid-July to discuss the financial affairs committee report, were 
welcomed by PLC, and considered by Qrieh as “a positive development from the 
Executive Authority and a major step in the Authority’s handling of the budget”. 
Dawood Al Zir, secretary of PLC’s financial committee, went further and hinted the 
possibility of cancelling the committee report on the light of the Cabinet 
                                                 
456 Arabic News on I July 1998. Internet English edition 
<http://www.arabicnews.com/ansub/daily7day/980701/1998970118.html> 
457 Al Ayyam, Al Quds, Al Hayat Al Jadeeda, on 6 April 1999. 
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amendments.460 Nevertheless, al-Shu’abyi adopted different position recommending 
not approving the budget up until the mentioned amendments (mainly the enactment 
of a civil service law) are implemented. Consequently, PLC decided to postpone 
voting on the budget after the summer recess.461
 
In November, upon a various meetings held with representatives of PA apparatuses 
including the ministry of finance, al-Shu’abyi confirmed to PLC, during a session 
held to discuss the extent of the Cabinet commitment to the proposed amendments, 
that the Cabinet failed to implement any of the proposed amendments, and 
consequently, he recommended, in a report presented to the PLC speaker Qrieh, to 
pass motion of non- confidence in the Cabinet.462 However, Qrieh turned al-
Shu’abyi’s report down, and refrained from circulating it to PLC members for their 
comments. Angry with Qrieh’s clear underestimation of his report, al-Shu’abyi 
announced resignation as head of financial affairs committee on 14 November. On 24 
November 1999, Qrieh endorsed al-Shu’abyi’s resignation, and appointed Dawood El 
Zir as head of the financial affairs committee.463
 
The developments concerning the budgets of the first three years (1997, 1998, 1999), 
and the budget of the forth year (2000) which was passed to PLC in January 2000, 
three months after it was legally due,464 show clearly how PLC, over the first four 
years of it’s inception, failed to force the PA to comply with the legal norms that were 
laid down to organize both authorities’ relation.  Of particular concern were those 
developments which are related to 1999’s budget. The failure of PLC to adopt any 
measure against Qrieh’s refusal to circulate al-Shu’abyi’ report for its members’ 
comment, and it’s endorsement of al-Shu’abyi resignation meant a PLC approval of 
the budget despite the fact that it was severely overdue, and included many deficits as 
the report of the financial affairs committee pointed. At another level, these 
developments strongly highlighted the weakness of PLC vis-à-vis PA, and its failure 
to combat PA’s continuous attempts to marginalize its role. 
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PLC’s Weakness vis-à-vis PA: Factors and Conditions 
 
Continuously, PLC members blame PA for blocking democratic transformation and 
stifling the rule of law. Youssef Abu Safiah, a PLC member, described the relation of 
PLC with PA as “abnormal....since most of PLC resolutions, and some of its laws, had 
not been implemented....it is well known that there is always competition between the 
executive and legislative authority...in the Palestinian situation PA is seeking to 
marginalize the PLC”.465 Though Abu Safiah’s statement are well supported by the 
empirical realities explained in the above-mentioned discussion with relation to the 
basic law, NGOs law, the law of judiciary, and the annual budgets- his statement 
revealed only one side of the coin.   
 
The failure of PLC to pressure the PA to comply with its Standing Order, and to enact 
the basic law and other laws, was not only due to PA’s underestimation of democratic 
principles, but also to PLC’s structure and its failure to build strong ties with its 
constituencies. While the former factor (PLC’s structure) left PLC missing the will to 
adopt any serious measure against PA’s regular underestimation of democratic 
principles, the later factor (its failure to build strong ties with its constituencies) left it 
as a victim to PA’s manipulations. Similar to any legislature, the PLC was franchised 
right to hold the executive body accountable by means of motions of no-confidence, 
ad-hoc committees of inquiry, and other methods of monitoring. But the problem of 
PLC in this respects is that it is neither structurally nor culturally able to effectively 
use such  methods.  
 
At the head of PLC stood the Fatah affiliated Qrieh as speaker, and Rohi Fatoh as 
secretary. Both men are considered as loyalists to Arafat, and were elected speaker 
and secretary respectively for four consecutive years. The other two members of PLC 
Office Commission were either a Fatah-affiliated or close to Fatah. During the first 
term, for example, Nahid El Rayes (a Fatah affiliated PLC member) and Mitri Abu 
Aita (independent close to Fatah) were elected the first and second deputies of the 
speaker respectively.466 During the second term, the same members of the Office 
Commission were re-elected. And during the third and forth terms Ibrahim Abu El 
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Naja (a Fatah affiliated PLC member) replaced El Rayes, and in the forth term Ghazi 
Hanina (close to Fatah) replaced Abu Aita as the speaker’s second deputy.467
 
As far as the political affiliation of PLC members is concerned, most of PLC 
members, as we have seen, are affiliated with Fatah or close to Fatah. Furthermore, all 
the Palestinian factions and parties that might challenge Arafat’s policy and rule (like 
PFLP, Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and so on) had not been represented in the PLC after 
they boycotted the elections. This fact, according to Abu Safiah, left the structure of 
PLC as “[a] one-party structure...and consequently, PLC lacked a well organized bloc 
of opposition.”468  
 
However, the fact that PLC is dominated by Fatah affiliated members does not imply 
an organized bloc of support for PA or Arafat. In the words of Hanan Ashrawi, who 
ran the elections as independent and won the highest number of votes after Qrieh for 
Jerusalem constituency, “everybody who is in the council is not really part of the 
opposition in the sense that they are against the peace process. Those in the traditional 
opposition did not participate in the election. So what you have are different degrees 
of agreement and different perspectives and approaches...”469 In some occasions it is 
possible to find voices of criticism against PA’s policies among Fatah affiliated or 
close to Fatah members. Nevertheless, these voices remain expressing personal views, 
and often leave no significant influence on the overall relation of PLC with PA.  
 
On 8-9 May 1996, for example, PLC held stormy session in Rafah south of Gaza 
strip, addressing the day-to-day problems of Palestinians. Among the issues which 
were discussed were Hamas’ prisoners in PA’s various detention centers. At that 
session the PLC adopted a resolution calling PA to release these prisoners and 
others.470 In June, Salah Ta’mari, a former Fatah affiliated activist, and head of the 
land and settlement committee of PLC, called PLC not to extend confidence in 
Arafat’s Cabinet unless PA implemented the PLC resolution that demanded the 
release of Hamas prisoners.471  
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When Arafat presented his Cabinet to PLC in June 1996, Marwan Kanafi, former 
advisor of Arafat who was elected for Gaza constituency on Fatah ticket, protested 
PA’s disregard of PLC’s resolutions, and attacked Arafat by accusing him of breaking 
the electoral law stipulating 80% of cabinet ministers from PLC. Only 60% of the 
ministers in Arafat’s 1996 Cabinet were PLC members.472  In spite of Ta’mari, and 
Kanafi’s criticisms of Arafat’s policy, the PLC voted in favour of Arafat’s Cabinet.  
 
The debate around the 1996’s Cabinet might reveal important fact about PLC’s 
structure. Although some PLC members might stand as opponents for PA’s disregard 
of the democratic principles and legal norms, these members remain missing the 
support and backing of their colleagues in the council. Most of these colleagues, who 
prefer not to go in direct confrontation with Arafat, refrain from supporting any 
serious measure against PA like the passing of motion of non-confidence. Abed Rabu 
Abu Uwn, a PLC member, estimates the number of these colleagues at 53 out of 84 
PLC members (three PLC members died, and one resigned “Haider Abdel El Shafi”). 
This means that no less than 63% of the PLC members are considered, in the words of 
Abu Awn, “Arafat loyalists and clients”.473 Because they are Arafat loyalists, they 
tend to justify even Arafat/PA’s disregard of democratic principles.  
 
The PLC member Nabil Amr, for instance, ruled out Arafat’s failure to ratify the basic 
law as indicator of his disregard of democratic principles. In his view, Arafat failed to 
ratify the law “because the law dealt with issues that are of dispute with Israel”.474 
Abdel Karim Abu Saleh, head of PLC’s legal committee, went in the same vein, when 
he pointed out that; “The law deals with issues like Jerusalem, and Palestinian 
refugees...these issues had not been settled with Israel...that is why the law is 
blocked”.475 Amr, Abu Salah, and other similar members like Qrieh and Fatoh, are 
considered PA’s vanguard in PLC. Through these members PA succeeded to 
penetrate the PLC and divided it around itself in a manner that left it unable to adopt 
any serious measure toward PA’s disregard of legal norms and democratic principles.   
 
This fact was accompanied with the rise of networks of interests between some other 
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PLC members and PA officials. These networks of interests were the logical outcome 
of a PA deliberated policy sought to block the media reports on PLC activities. Due to 
this policy, people were very little aware over PLC achievements and activities, and 
consequently, their attitude toward PLC was a negative one. The voice of Palestine, 
the official Radio of PA, is the only media station that is permitted to cover PLC 
sessions.476 In its coverage, Voice of Palestine is very selective, and usually covers 
those sessions which are attended by Arafat. The rest of PLC sessions are usually not 
covered, and local press reports over these sessions are obtained at warp-up press 
conference made by PLC speaker at the end of each session. This weakened PLC’s 
creditability among public, and prompted no less than 48% of Palestinians to think 
that PLC is useless and has no effects.477
 
Even when PLC seeks to work out its own media station so that general public 
became fully aware over its activities and achievements, its endeavours in this regards 
are abrogated. In 1997, for instance, the PLC, with financial support from USAID 
(United States Agency for International Development), established its own Television 
Station in Al Quds Education University to broadcast its sessions and activities. No 
less than six sessions of PLC were aired, before the broadcasts being jammed off by 
the Palestinian Broadcasting Company (PBC), the official T.V of PA. Following this, 
Dawood Kuttab, a Palestinian with American citizenship who was entrusted to run the 
station, was detained by the Palestinian security forces for a week before being 
released upon American intervention.478 All the equipments and materials of the 
station were destroyed by Palestinian security forces, and thus, the station stopped 
working, and the sessions of PLC are no longer aired.  
 
Being unaware over what PLC is, and what PLC’s major tasks are, general public 
pressured PLC members to play intermediary role between them and policy/law 
implementation officials, including bureaucracy’s officials. PLC members, seeking to 
recruit public support for their “battle” with PA, welcomed this role, and 
consequently, their tasks were confined, in some occasions, to assist public and their 
relatives in finding job in a given ministry, or to facilitate these public/relatives’ 
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contact with a given ministry or public institution. As the PLC member Rawia El 
Shawa pointed out; “People weak awareness over the role of PLC...forced PLC to 
play other roles alongside its roles of legislation, accountability, and monitoring”.479 
Although this enabled some PLC members to claim popular support, it left negative 
impacts over the PLC as independent legislature, and consequently, weakened PLC’s 
capacity to hold PA accountable. 
 
The Tasks of Monitoring and Accountability: The PLC as Client for PA 
 
Similar to any legislature the PLC owned enjoyed the methods that would enable it to 
hold the executive body accountable, and to set limits on it’s transgressions.  These 
methods were institutionalized by PLC’s Standing Order, and basic law. Among these 
methods were the questions, the ad-hoc committees of inquiry, and motion of non-
confidence. Over first four years of it’s inception, the PLC directed hundreds of 
questions to ministers, security officials, and other policy/law implementation 
officials on different issues related to the operations of their ministries and services 
provided to people. During the second term, for instance, the PLC directed around 
183 questions to these officials.480 In 1997, the PLC questioned Ghazi El Jabali, head 
of civil police, Mohammad Dahaln, head of Gaza Preventive Security forces, and 
Jibril Al Rajub, head of West Bank Preventive Security forces, over the operations of 
their forces.481  
 
In some occasions, PLC went further and directed questions to policy/law 
implementation officials over issues related to misuse of power and corruption. But 
these questions remained a matter of parliamentary practice without being followed 
by effective measures punishing those who were said to be involved in misuse of 
power and corruption. 
 
On 23 January 1997, for instance, the PLC questioned the minister of supply Abdel 
Aziz Shaheen over the so called “the flour scandal”, in which Shaheen alongside the 
minister of finance were said to be involved in a scheme led to the selling of 5,000 
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tons of expired flour to public. Though Shaheen testified before PLC at that session, 
he refrained from attending another session scheduled for further discussion over the 
same issue. No measure was taken against Shaheen or the minister of finance, despite 
the assertion of some PLC members, like Kamal al Shrafi, head of the monitoring 
committee, that “an amount of the flour was donated to our people and we are 
interested to know where that mount went. Did the money go to the PA or to pockets 
of some officials”?482  
 
In the same token, the PLC formed several ad-hoc committees of inquiry over issues 
related to misuse of power and corruption. But the findings and resolutions of these 
committees remained unimplemented, either due to PLC’s failure to follow up these 
findings and resolutions, or to PA’s underestimation of these resolutions. Of particular 
concern in this regard is the PLC ad-hoc committee which was formed in 1997 to 
investigate corruption and misuse of power in various PA ministries and apparatus. 
The committee was inspired by the 600 pages report of General Monitoring 
Commission (GMC) which pointed out that some US$ 323 million-almost 40% of 
PA’s 1996 budget- were misused and mismanaged by PA’s politicians and senior 
officials.483 It formed up ten PLC’s members; Sa’di El Krunz (head), Youssef Abu 
Safiah, Hikmat Zied, Azmi al Shu’abyi, Fakhri Shaqqura, Marwan El Barghuti, 
Kamal al Shrafi, Hatem Abdel El Qader, Jamal El Shati, and Hassan Khrisha (for the 
membership).484  
 
On 31 May 1997, the committee initiated its investigation. In it’s investigation, the 
committee was assisted by sub-committees set up for the purpose of carrying out field 
investigation in all ministries and public institutions mentioned by GMC report, and 
gathering the necessary documents and reports that might serve the committee in it’s 
investigation. In addition, the committee sent at least 40 letters for all the ministers 
and public officials who were said to be involved in corruption and misuse of power 
by GMC’s report, asking them to testify before it. Some of these ministers and 
officials had testified before the committee, and other refused. Among these ministers  
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was Nabil Sha’ath, minister of Planning and International Cooperation, who was 
interrogated for about six hours by the committee.485  
 
On 29 July, the committee reported its findings to PLC. In its report, the committee 
asserted that some ministers, in particular to Nabil Sha’ath, Ali Qawasmeh, minister 
of Transportation, and Jamil El Tarafi, minister of Civil Affairs, were involved in 
misuse of power and corruption. Consequently, it called Arafat to dismiss these 
minister and others suspected of corruption, and to form new Cabinet from 
“technocratic and qualified professionals”.486  
 
Furthermore, the committee highlighted the institutional weakness of PA as far as 
PA’s financial system is concerned. In this regards, it mentioned to the ministry of 
finance’s lack of well defined procedure with respect to public expenditure. In 
addition, the committee criticized the involvement of some PA officials in trade 
activities in violation for the law. In this respects, it shed light on the semi-monopolies 
that operate outside PA’s regular budget, and demanded to subjecting the revenue of 
these monopolies to the central auditing system of ministry of finance.487  
 
The findings of the committee were the hardest blow for PA’s ministers and officials, 
most of who refused to deal with them, asserting them “lies” and far from reality. Due 
to the ministers opposition of the findings, Arafat called PLC to set up another 
committee to review the findings of the former one, and to invite all ministers 
opposing the findings of the first committee to justify themselves before the new 
committee. Accordingly, a committee of nine PLC members was set up, and held 
various rounds of hearing with all the concerned ministers. According to El Krunz, 
and Abu Safiah, who joint the new committee, these rounds of hearings left little 
doubt among the committee’s members that those ministers had been involved in 
misuse of power and corruption.488  
 
Following the two PLC ad-hoc committee findings, PLC convened various meetings 
with Arafat pressuring for fundamental reform. Arafat, who promised a Cabinet 
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reshuffle, was in a serious stalemate when some sixteen ministers of his Cabinet 
preceded the promised reshuffle, and announced resignation in December 1997.489 To 
release himself of such pressure, Arafat turned the resignation of the ministers down, 
and on 7 March 1998, he declared that “the Palestinian National Authority...has been 
playing a key role in what are difficult circumstances...the record reflects both 
achievements and failure, and this is the nature of government”.490  
 
Corruption and misuse of power for Arafat, therefore, are a matter of mistakes that 
might take place in any government. Though Arafat’s view might be correct, it is 
incorrect that those accused of corruption and misuse of power should be not 
punished. Arafat’s Cabinet of 5 August 1998 implied the contrary.491 In other words, 
the structure of the Cabinet implied Arafat’s disbelieve on the necessity to punish the 
corrupted officials and ministers. All Ministers accused of corruption and misuse of 
power, like Nabil Sha’ath, Jamil El Tarafi, and Ali Qawasmeh, had kept positions in 
the new Cabinet.  
 
Furthermore, and in clear violation for article 65 of the Basic law stipulating that “the 
Cabinet shall comprise of Ministers not to exceed Nineteen Ministers...,” Arafat 
stepped up the ministerial positions from 23 to 31. New seven ministers were added, 
most notable were Sa’di El Krunz, who chaired PLC’s committee to investigate 
corruption, and Youssef Abu Safiah, member of the same committee. Moreover, two 
of his most critics were fired; Abdel El Jawad Salah, who was demoted from minister 
of Agriculture to minister without Portfolio, and therefore, refused to join the new 
Cabinet; and Hanan Ashrawi, who turned the post of minister of Tourism down.  
Simply Arafat bought off the allegiance of the most active members of PLC 
committee to investigate corruption (El Krunz and Abu Safiah), and release himself 
from the pressure of those who are committed to real reform (Saleh and Ahsrawi).  
 
When PLC, in a special session held in Ramallah on 5-9 August 1998, and attended 
by 86 members, approved the Cabinet with a majority of 55 members, 28 in 
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opposition, and 3 abstentions,492 Ahsrawi and Saleh were the most critical of Arafat 
new Cabinet. Ashrawi, for instance, considered it as as an indicator of Arafat’s 
reluctance to initiate real reform; “what is needed, Ashrawi asserted, “is not to 
maintain the old structure...but a substantial and comprehensive reform”.493  Saleh 
went further and described the new cabinet as “a real tragedy for Palestinians”.494 
Although similar voices of criticism could be heard from other members,495 these 
voices remained expressing personal view, and did not reflect the overall position of 
the PLC as a legislative institution. 
 
In fact, here lies the tragedy of Palestinians. It is true that PA’s policies are blocking 
the democratic transformation in Palestine. But this does not imply that PLC members 
were very committed to democratic transformation. In fact the contrary was the case. 
For instance, around 49 PLC members, according to Ra’fat El Najar, committed not to 
vote in favour of the ministers who were charged by misuse of power. These members 
did so during a private meeting of PLC members convened just few days before the 
scheduled date of the PLC session which passed motion of confidence in Arafat 
cabinet. However, and in a surprising fashion, at least 25 out of the 49 PLC members 
failed to meet their commitments and voted in favour of Arafat’s cabinet.496 In 
explaining the reasons of these members’ refrain from meeting their commitments, El 
Najar highlighted Arafat’s policy of buying off the allegiance of people through 
distributing various favours and privileges.497  
 
Consequently, the crisis of democratic transformation in Palestine is not only related 
to PA’s failure to respect the democratic norms, but extended to include the failure of 
PLC members to respect these norms including the basic law which stipulates, for 
instance, the Cabinet with 19 Ministers not 31 as the PLC-approved Cabinet showed. 
In approving the Cabinet, PLC, therefore, was participating in an equal footing with 
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PA in disregarding these norms, and confiscating the right of Palestinians to have 
legitimate political institutions. As El Najar pointed to the German Neue Zürcher 
Zeitung “how could anyone expect the Rais (Arafat) to take this body seriously...when 
it does not even implement it’s own decisions and the motion of censure?.”498  
 
Furthermore, in approving the Cabinet the PLC was unwilling to response to people’s 
wishes and demands. At least 38% of Palestinians believed that the PLC should not 
pass vote of confidence in the Cabinet, as against 31% who believed the opposite. In 
addition, 33% of them believed that the new Cabinet will increase corruption in 
various PA apparatus, as against 23% who believed the opposite. Moreover, 32% 
supported the resignation of Ashrawi and Saleh as against 26% who opposed it.499 
Therefore, PLC members’ approval of the Cabinet was to detach PLC further from its 
people.  
 
More importantly, the approval of the Cabinet meant the release of PA from any 
constraints imposed on it by what Jose’ Maravall and Adam Przeworski call 
“horizontal mechanisms”500 of accountability. These mechanisms (e.g., motion of 
non-confidence), seek to set limits on the government transgression, make it possible 
to predict the government action according to institutionally prescribed norms. When 
these mechanisms are absent or ineffective, the government becomes unrestrained in 
its action, and thus, it becomes difficult for the one to predict its action. In this case, 
only the government interest, decided by the government itself, restrains the 
government transgressions, and the law turned to be an instrument in the hand of the 
government instead of being framework of constraints on its action. This was the case 
of PA following the PLC approval of the Cabinet in August 1998. The sequence of 
the events which followed the assault of some PLC’s members by PA’s security 
forces on 26 August 1998 might substantiate our analysis.  
 
The assault took place while these members, alongside human rights activists, 
journalists, and others, were assembling before the house of a Hamas activist escaped 
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a Preventive Security Forces detention centre in Jericho. The assembly was protesting 
a siege imposed on the family of this activist by the preventive security forces. While 
PLC members were protesting against this measure, a number of West Bank 
preventive security forces attacked them. These members were; Abed Rabu Abu Uwn 
(elected for Rafah constituency), Jamal El Hindi (elected for Jenin constituency), 
Suleiman El Roumi (elected for Rafah constituency), Ahmad El Batish (elected for 
Jerusalem constituency), and Hassan Abdel El Qader (elected for Jerusalem 
constituency).501 In Abu Awn’s view, the attack was a planned one as these members 
were the ones who concluded the involvement of the head of the West Bank 
preventive security forces Jibril Al Rajub in a scheme led to the handing over six-
Palestinian activists to Israeli occupying forces. The conclusions of these members 
were stated in a report presented to PLC just few months before the attack takes 
place.502
 
However, from PLC’s point of view, the attack was an unprecedented event, and clear 
underestimation of its members’ immunity. Consequently, PLC held special session in 
Ramallah on 30 August in which a committee to investigation the event was set up.503 
The committee comprised of the speaker, head of the Interior Affairs committee 
Fakhri Shaqqura, head of the legal committee Abdel El Karim Abu Saleh, and Head 
of the monitoring committee Kamal Al Shrafi.504 In its investigation, the committee 
held several meetings with Palestinian security officials, among whom were Amin El 
Hindi, commander of General intelligence, and Ismail Jabr, head of Palestinian 
Security forces in Jericho. In spite of this, the committee failed to meet with Jibril Al 
Rajub, head of West Bank Preventive Security forces, and whose forces are the party 
that was held responsible on the assault of PLC members.505  
 
The committee meetings with the mentioned security officials had, as it seems, bore 
no fruit since, following these meetings, the case was brought before a Military court 
to decide on the issue. Ironically, the court treated the assaulted PLC members on 
equal footing with those who were accused of the attack, and summoned both parties 
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to show up. Having heard the testimonies of both parties, the court was said to adopt 
some measures against those involved in the attack but not against the head of West 
Bank preventive security forces Jibril Al Rajub who commands these forces.506  
 
As Abu Awn himself pointed out; “in the aftermath of the attack, I was called by 
Arafat for a meeting with him…During our meeting I told him what happened. Arafat 
in turn promised to punish Al Rajub. But unfortunately, no measure was taken against 
Al Rajub, and the findings of the PLC committees which called for trying him were to 
no vein”.507  The words of Au Awn, coupled with the assault of PLC members by 
Preventive Security Forces, and PLC’s failure even to question Al Rajub over the 
event, revealed the intolerable weakness of PLC vis-à-vis PA, and the dilemma faced 
by PLC in its battle for democracy and rule of law. This dilemma had further 
escalated with the elapse of the interim period on 4 May 1999. 
PLC:  Loosing Legitimacy 
 
Despite it’s failure, over the first three terms (March 1996-March 1999), to enact a 
constitution (the Basic Law), and other important laws like the law of judiciary, and to 
hold the PA accountable, the PLC remained (at least theoretically speaking), 
representing the public will, and therefore, was a legitimate body. But from 4 May 
1999 onwards, PLC was no longer enjoying this privilege. As Article III of Oslo II 
stipulated, PLC and the president of the executive authority should be elected for the 
transitional or the interim period that elapses on 4 May 1999. Article II of the 
Palestinian electoral law reaffirmed the mandate of both PLC and the president of PA 
for a period no exceeds the interim period.  
 
Consequently, the Oslo process and the electoral law, according to which the PLC 
was elected, confined PLC’s mandate to the interim period. The main problem is that; 
both Oslo process as well as the electoral law had not hinted what should be done 
after the elapse of this period. In other words, it was not clear whether Palestinians 
should hold new elections, or whether new bodies would replace the interim period-
created bodies like the PLC.  
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This legal dilemma resulted mainly from Oslo process’ assumption stipulating that by 
4 May 1999, negotiations over the third status issues (Jerusalem, refugees, 
settlements, borders, water, international relations, and others) would be concluded 
with agreement ensuring the implementation of the UN security council resolutions of 
242, 338, and consequently, with a Palestinian state with new political institutions and 
constitution. Therefore, it seems that both Palestinian and Israeli negotiator were 
guided by this assumption, and thus, were unaware over other possible scenarios like 
the elapse of the interim period without an agreement over the final status issues. 
 
The elapse of the interim period without Palestinian state on WBGS promoted serious 
legal questions as far as the future and legitimacy of the interim period-created 
institutions are concerned. On 20 April 1999, the political committee of PLC 
announced the termination of these institutions’ mandate, and called for new 
presidential and parliamentary elections on 4 May, 1999.508 The call of the political 
committee for new elections was not the first in kind, as Marwan Kanafi, a PLC 
member, was asking since January the Central Election Commission (CEC) to 
schedule these elections for May 1999.509  
 
The call of the political committee and Kanafi for new elections sought to renew 
PLC’s mandate and legitimacy. But their demand in this regards was missing the 
support of PLC itself which failed to make any single move toward new legislative 
and presidential elections.510 The failure of PLC to organize these elections meant the 
denial of the right of people to “…reward or punish the incumbent government 
conditional on its action in office”.511 The only way to secure people with this right is 
the regular elections. The absence of regular elections implies the absence of the 
second pillar of any democracy: vertical accountability. PLC’s failure to promote 
vertical accountability, complemented its failure to promote a horizontal 
accountability (as we have seen above), and thus, left the principle of check and 
balance, which locates at the heart of any democratic system, very much questionable.  
 
With this failure, coupled with it’s loss of the main source of it’s legitimacy (the 
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people), the PLC started attaching itself to PA as the only source of it’s legitimacy. 
The way the PLC turned against it’s members who signed the “The Statement of 
Twenty” in November 1999 might be the best example that shows not only how PLC 
had attached itself to PA, but also how some of PLC members became looking for 
other institutional formula far from PLC to express their discontent and frustration 
with PA’s policies.  
 
On 27 November 1999, eight PLC members512 alongside twelve public figures 
published to public a statement accusing PA by following “a systematic methodology 
of corruption, humiliation and abuse against the people”, and described Oslo 
agreements as “a barter trade to enrich a number of corrupt people in the Palestinian 
Authority”.513 The statement, titled “A Cry of the Homeland”, and locally known as 
the “Statement of Twenty”, promoted what might be described as a political 
earthquake in the West Bank and Gaza Strip.  
 
Following this statement, PA security forces initiated a large-scale wave of arrest 
against those who signed it including; Abdel El Sattar Qassim, a professor of political 
science at Al Najah University of Nablus, Dr.Yasser Abu Safiah from Nablus, Adel 
Samara, a professor of Economics in Ramallah, Dr. Abdel El Rahim Kittani from 
Tulkarm, and Ahmed Qatamesh, national public figure, and the one who survived the 
longest ever under Israeli administrative detention. Furthermore, a house arrest was 
imposed on Bassam El Shaka, Nablus’s ex-mayor.514 None of the PLC members who 
signed the statement was arrested. The task of punishing those members seemed to be 
entrusted to PLC itself.  
 
On 28 November, PLC held a stormy session in Gaza to discuss the measures that 
should be taken against these members. The session concluded with a manifesto 
describing the statement as “attempt to drag Palestinians into civil war”, and 
threatened to leave immunity over PLC members who signed it if they did not retreat 
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their accusation, and apologize for Arafat.515 PLC’s statement seemed insufficient 
from PA’s point of view, as in the same day when PLC declared it’s condemnation of 
the statement, Mawaia El Masri, a PLC member, and one of signatories, was shot in 
foot with three bullets by unidentified armed men.”516 Following this, Abdel El Jawad 
Salah, a PLC member, and other signatory, was beaten by PA’s General Intelligence 
Forces while he, and others, were marching before the Jericho’s detention centre in 
protest against the detention of some of the signatories.517  
 
Ironically enough, the “Statement of Twenty” had only reaffirmed what had been 
stated in GMC report, and the report of PLC’s committee to investigate corruption in 
1997. Both reports were approved by the PLC, and the latter one was drafted by PLC 
members. Consequently, there was no reason for PLC to condemn the statement 
unless it turned against itself and against it’s committees that constitute the building 
blocks of its institutional identity as a legislature. Actually this happened. Once the 
PLC condemned the “Statement of Twenty”, it condemned the report of its committee 
to investigate corruption, and any other report and resolutions calling for the 
rationalization of the Palestinian public institutions.  
 
Providing this, one will have little doubt over the failure of PLC committee (which 
was formed on 24 December 1999 to investigate the attack on Saleh,518) to pressure 
the PA to comply with its resolutions and to hold those accused of the attack 
accountable. According to Mawaia El Masri, the committee convened several 
meetings with a number of security officials, and questioned the security personnel 
who were held responsible on the attack. Some of these personnel admitted their 
involvement in the attack, while the head of the General intelligence in Jericho 
confirmed the attack but accused Saleh of attacking the security personnel first.519 
Hassan Khrisha, member of the committee, confirmed El Masri’s comments, adding 
that those involved in the attack will be brought before justice.520  
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However, it seems unlikely that those accused of the attack were brought before 
justice since Khrisha statement was made after around nine months of the attack, and 
therefore, if this long period passed without bringing those accused of the attack 
before justice, when one should expect this will happen? Even if those accused of the 
attack were brought before justice, are they the only party which is to be held 
responsible on the attack or there are other parties like their commanders, and head of 
Intelligence in Jericho? Whether those parties involved in the attack were brought 
before justice or not, the occurrence of the attack, which was the second in kind, 
displayed further PLC’s failure to protect its members and to preserve their immunity. 
PLC’s failure to do so culminates a long series of failures accumulated over the first 
four years of its inception.  
 
Over these years, PLC failed to enact a constitution that governs the relation of the 
ruling authorities from one side, and the relation of these authorities with people from 
the other side. PLC’s failure in this regards went in parallel to its failure to bound PA 
with the legal procedure of handling the annual budgets, and implementing hundreds 
of its resolutions.  
 
Although the PLC enjoyed the tools that would enable it to hold PA accountable, the 
PLC, as it seems, lacked the will to use these tools. Mawaia El Masri pointed out that 
“the PLC did not use the motion of non-confidence in any session of the first four 
terms (1996-2000)...a matter which confirms its lack of will to do so”. 521
 
PLC’s approval of Arafat’s Cabinet of 1998 might be the most telling illustration of 
PLC’s crisis in this respect. In spite of the fact that the Cabinet included the ministers 
who were charged with corruption by the 1997 PLC committee to investigate 
corruption, the PLC, surprisingly bowed for PA’s wishes and approved the Cabinet. 
This fact encouraged PA to escalate it’s violation of the legal norms. The escalation of 
PA’s violation of the legal norms was very evident when PA’s security forces 
attacked PLC members in August 1998.  
 
With the elapse of the interim period, and the failure of PLC to force the PA to hold 
                                                 
521 Interview on 20 August 2000. 
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new legislative and presidential elections, PLC’s identity as elected legislature that 
represents public will have collapsed. Consequently, the PLC had no options but to 
attach itself to PA as its main source of power, and therefore, to become client for PA. 
This was clear when PLC threatened to leave immunity on its members who signed 
the statement of twenty, though the statement was not more than a re-affirmation of 
what had been stated in the report of the PA-created GMC, and the followed report of 
PLC committee to investigate corruption.  
 
Accordingly, when Abdel El Jawad Saleh was attacked by the General Intelligence 
Forces in December 1999, PLC’s chance to hold those who were accused of the attack 
accountable was very weak. Because of this and other things, the PLC member Ra’fat 
El Najar did not hesitate to declare in April 2000 that “the situation in the Palestine 













                                                 
522 Neue Zürcher Zeitung on 22/23 April 2000, op.cit., 
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Chapter V: The Oslo Autonomy 
A Functional Perspective 
 
“The necessities of governmental operation require large-scale organization of a 
bureaucratic type, with definite internal hierarchical arrangements, well-developed 
functional specialization, and qualification standards for membership in the 
bureaucracy.”523   
 
One of the most prominent features of the modern world is the participation of an 
extensive full-time body of officials in the day-to-day conduct of public affairs. This 
body is called the bureaucracy. Bureaucracy is defined as an organization that has the 
following characteristics: “(1) hierarchy, (2) differentiation or specialization, (3) 
qualification or competence”. Other characteristics such as the division of labor, a 
civil service system (including a clear set of grades for personnel throughout the civil 
service based on their qualifications), and impersonal nature of interpersonal 
relationships might be added to this list.  Nevertheless, hierarchy, differentiation, and 
competence, remain the central characteristics of any bureaucratic organization.524  
 
Although this paradigm of the characteristics of a bureaucratic organization is 
universally accepted, thus making it possible for us to distinguish bureaucratic 
organizations from other organizations, it focuses only on the structural elements of 
the bureaucracy. Therefore, it makes it difficult for us to distinguish one bureaucracy 
from another, since most of the world’s countries (developed and developing 
countries alike) enjoy systems of bureaucratic organization with the above mentioned 
structural traits. To overcome such a dilemma, we must think about what the 
bureaucratic organization should do. Or to put it differently, we must think about the 
function of bureaucratic organizations.  Fred W. Riggs (1966) made an early attempt 
toward this end when he defined the bureaucracy as “[a] concrete organization, 
composed of hierarchically related roles, serving formally as an agent for a larger 
social entity or system.”525  
 
                                                 
523 Heady, op.cit., P.80. 
524 See Ibid., Pp.74-79, and see also B.Guy Peters. The Future of Governing: Four Emerging Models. 
USA: University Press of Kansas, 1996, Pp.3-13. 
525 Fred W. Riggs. “Administrative Development: An Elusive Concept”. In John D. Montgomery & 
William J. Siffi (eds.,) . Approaches to Development: Politics, Administration and Change. New York, 
London, Sydney and Toronto: McGraw Hill, 1966, P.227. 
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According to Riggs, what matters is the extent to which a bureaucracy engages in 
administrative functions, as a bureaucracy may serve other functions alongside the 
administrative ones, such as social, economic, and political functions. Bureaucracy 
engages in an administrative function insofar as its role is the application of rules. 
Alternatively, its role may be confined to the process of deciding the actions, steps, 
and responsibilities necessary to implement the goals and policies set by politicians or 
the authoritative body. Toward this end, bureaucracy should release itself from any 
values (including any partisan allegiances) other than loyalty to the politicians or the 
authoritative body who/which are supposed to set goals and espouse policies for the 
welfare of society.  Only this makes the bureaucracy eligible to work for the welfare 
of society.526
 
The bureaucracy, thereby, is considered to be the agent that translates the decisions 
made by the authoritative body into concrete manifestations on the ground - that is, to 
deliver goods and services to citizens without discrimination.  This is what the 
bureaucracy’s function should be, and this is what Peters meant when he defined the 
bureaucracy in functional terms as “…the process through which general social rules 
are converted into specific decisions for individual cases”.527
 
The amount of services, and the manner in which these services are supplied to 
citizens, shape, to a large extent, citizens’ attitudes towards their political system. 
Often the output of any political system has two components; quantitative (objective) 
and qualitative (subjective). The quantitative component refers to “…what the 
political system actually provides the citizens in the way of gratifications and 
deprivations”, and the qualitative component refers to “…the style in which those 
gratifications and deprivations are delivered to the individual…”528  In this regard, 
bureaucracy emerges as the most influential variable in determining the subjective 
components of the political system, since it is the body which decides the way in 
which these services are supplied to citizens.  This is so to the extent that a 
bureaucracy shows competence, effectiveness, and consideration for citizens’ interests 
                                                 
526 Ibid., pp.227-230. 
527 B. Guy Peters. The Politics of Bureaucracy: A Comparative Perspective. New York & London: 
Longman, 1978, P.2. 
528 Ibid. Pp.11-12. 
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in supplying these services, and to the extent that citizens show respect for the 
political system.    
 
To do so, bureaucracy, as mentioned above, should release itself from any 
considerations other than loyalty to politicians/authoritative body. This is a very 
important condition, if the bureaucracy is to offer and deliver services to citizens in 
the best quantitative and qualitative way. In other words, a bureaucracy works best 
when confined to an administrative role, to the extent that this determines its ability to 
serve society. Only this would secure a good evaluation of a state’s public policy.  
 
But the ability of bureaucracy to function properly varies from one country to another. 
Its ability to release itself from any values or considerations other than loyalty to the 
authoritative body or politicians, and thus to perform the function of rule application, 
varies from one country to another.529 In developing countries, the role of the 
bureaucracy is highly overemphasized and overlaps with the rule application to 
include political roles. 
 
Most of the leaders of these countries found themselves confronted with huge 
challenges in the post-independence era. The most important of these challenges is 
how to achieve the task of nation-building whilst simultaneously promoting the 
economic and social progress of the local population. Given the widely diffused 
kinship networks in most of these countries, these leaders encountered huge 
difficulties in integrating and mobilizing their people within a territorial state-based 
moral framework (as the task of nation-building necessitates), and hence, have been 
failing to achieve the task of nation-building. 
 
The failure of these leaders to achieve the task of nation-building has been 
compounded by their failure to promote the social and economic progress of their 
people. Often, social and economic progress requires strong political institutions (e.g., 
political parties, interest groups, legislative bodies) that are able to articulate peoples’ 
                                                 
529 Metin Heper. “The State and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative and Historical Perspective.” In 
Metin Heper (ed.). The State and Public Bureaucracies: A Comparative Perspective. New York, 
Westport, Connecticut, & London: Greenwood Press, 1987, Pp.10-13. 
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economic and social demands to policy-makers. Meanwhile, it requires a minimum 
state intervention in economy.530   
 
In the developing countries, the above-mentioned conditions were not fulfilled. Most 
of these countries experienced single-party rule, which suggests a strong executive 
authority and weak political parties, interest groups, and legislative body. In the 
meanwhile, most of these countries adopted an import-substitution macroeconomic 
policy which assumes state-led economic central planning. This fact inhibited the 
development of market economy, and left the public sector of these countries as the 
chief source of employment. The result was an overstaffed and politically oriented 
bureaucracy.531 As Joseph Lapalombara critically remarked about the situation of 
these countries; “a significant problem in many of the ex-colonial areas is not that 
bureaucracy is too weak, but that, as a result of the colonial experience itself, the 
bureaucracy in the post-independence period is the only sector of the political system 
that is reasonably coherent and able to exercise leadership and power.”532  
 
The situation in developing countries is one of imbalance of power between the 
bureaucracy and the traditional political institutions. This imbalance negatively affects 
the political development of these countries. Therefore, reducing the bureaucracy’s 
power (by rationalizing it) seems to be very important for achieving political 
development (political development means the development of the capabilities of the 
political system to cope with challenges).  
 
The reduction in the bureaucracy’s power must take place whilst simultaneously 
strengthening the traditional political institutions such as political parties, interest 
groups and legislative bodies. This allows these institutions to be able to monitor and 
scrutinize the actions of the bureaucracy, and hence, to achieve the intended political 
balance, and thereby, the political development which is necessary for meeting the 
challenges of nation-building, and economic and social progress. 
                                                 
530 Francis Fukuyama. The End of History and the Last Man. New York: Avon Books, 1992, Pp.98-
108. 
531 Heady, op.cit., Pp.290-301. 
532 Joseph Lapalombara. Bureaucracy and Political Development. Princeton: Princeton University 
Press, 1965, P.23 
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The Rise of the Palestinian Bureaucracy: Challenges and Parameters 
 
A major aspect of the Palestinian bureaucracy of the West Bank and Gaza Strip is its 
youth.  Since 1994, and by virtue of Oslo agreements/accords, the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip had enjoyed their own bureaucratic system. Previously, Palestinians from 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip were denied the right to such a system. The foreign 
rulers which governed the territories (Ottomans, British, Egyptians, Jordanians, and 
finally Israelis) relinquished the responsibilities of supplying the main services and 
utilities to the Palestinians of West Bank and Gaza Strip. While the Ottomans 
assumed such responsibility up to 1919, the British assumed it from 1919 up to 1948 
when the state of Israel was established over more than half of historic Palestine.  
 
The West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Gaza Strip, the only remaining 
Arab territories after 1948, were placed at that time under Jordanian civil rule and 
Egyptian Military administration, respectively. Both the Jordanians and the Egyptians 
undertook, at that time, to supply the Palestinians of West Bank and Gaza Strip with 
the basic utilities and services. In the meantime, UNRWA was established in response 
to the refugee crisis in December 1949.  It joined the Jordanians and the Egyptians in 
supplying the main utilities and services to Palestinians. This state of affairs lasted up 
to 1967, when Israel took control over the West Bank and Gaza Strip. With the start 
of the Israeli occupation of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, the Jordanian and 
Egyptian role of supplying Palestinians with these services disappeared, and the 
responsibility lay mainly with Israel and UNRWA. 
 
The signing of the Oslo agreements, and the subsequent establishment of the PA in 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1994, formally put an end to the Israeli 
responsibility of supplying Palestinians with basic utilities and services, and 
transferred this responsibility to the PA. The year of 1994, therefore, witnessed, for 
the first time in Palestinian history, the rise of a Palestinian bureaucratic system over 
the Palestinian territories. The first signs of this system started to appear on the scene 
with the founding of Palestinian Economic Council for Development and 
Reconstruction (hereinafter PECDAR) in late 1993.   
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The idea of establishing an institute like PECDAR was stimulated by the Oslo peace 
process, which promised economic prosperity for the Palestinians of the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. Towards this end, approximately 50 delegations representing 50 states 
and international organizations held their first conference in of support of Middle East 
peace in Washington, in October 1993. In that conference, which was the first donor 
conference to support Palestinians in their efforts to build their state, the 50 states and 
international organizations committed US $2.3 billion to assist Palestinians in their 
development and reconstruction efforts during the period of 1993-1998.  By December 
1998, some US$ 2.1 billion had been received by the Palestinians.533  
 
Thus the rationale for establishing PECDAR was so that it would lead to 
reconstruction, by having strategic control of the process, and also so that it could 
coordinate and distribute the resources donated to Palestinians. Arafat’s decree of the 
31 October 1993 relating to the establishment of PECDAR had specified this remit for 
PECDAR when it asserted that the main job of PECDAR was to “…set priorities for 
economic and social development and reconstruction and, specifically, priorities for 
development projects and the direction of their implementation on the basis of 
transparency, clarity and competence”.534 On 20th November 1998, Khalid Nijim, 
Director-General of projects department of PECDAR revealed that PECDAR had 
completed 1745 projects since its establishment. These projects were related to 
infrastructure development, increasing economic growth, encouraging investments, 
health, education, social welfare, and so forth.535  
 
The majority of these projects were completed in coordination with the concerned 
ministries, which began to appear after 1994.  By virtue of the Oslo Accords the PA 
was empowered to handle civil issues. Article VI of the Declaration of Principles 
(DOP) signed on 13 September 1993 promised the transfer of all the civil powers of 
the former Israeli military government and its civil administration to the PA. The 
same article promised the transfer of Israeli powers in five civil spheres to the PA 
(education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism) soon after 
the entry of the PA into the Gaza Strip and Jericho. Article IV (Para, 2) of the Cairo 
                                                 
533 Financial Times on 1 December, 1998. 
534 Arafat Decree with relation to the establishment of PECDAR. 31 October 1993. 
535 See Al-Quds on 21 November 1998. 
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Accord, signed on 4 May 1994, gave the PA the right to “administer the departments 
transferred to it”, and to establish other departments and other administrative units “as 
necessary for the fulfillment of its responsibilities…” in the above mentioned civil 
spheres and any other similar ones. 
 
The responsibilities of the PA in the civil spheres included; policy formulation, 
supervision of policy implementation, employment of staff, establishing departments, 
authorities and institutions, conclusion of contracts, keeping and administering 
registers and a record of the population, issuing certificates, licenses and documents 
(Article VI, Para 1, c-d of Cairo accord). Annex II of the Cairo Accord (Protocol 
Concerning Civil Affairs) promised the extension of the PA’s responsibilities over a 
further thirty-three civil spheres alongside the above-mentioned five spheres.  
 
The new civil spheres included; interior affairs, fisheries, surveying, statistics, labor, 
housing, assessment, parks, religious affairs, employee pensions, commerce and 
industry, transportation, agriculture, employment, land registration, nature reserves, 
electricity, public works, postal services, population registry and documentation, 
government and absentee land and other immovable, telecommunications, 
archaeology, water and sewage, planning and zoning, indirect taxation, environment 
protection, gas and petroleum, insurance, and treasury.  
 
Though the Oslo accords, in particular article VI of the DOP, promised the transfer of 
the Israeli civil powers in education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, 
and tourism soon after the arrival of PA to Gaza Strip and Jericho (in May 1994 the 
PA arrived Gaza and Jericho), the PA was required to go through a round of 
negotiations with the Israeli government to put this article into effect. On 29 August 
1994, the PA concluded with the Israeli government the “Agreement on the 
Preparatory Transfer of Powers and Responsibilities”.536 The agreement put article VI 
of the DOP into effect, and therefore, enabled the PA, since that time, to take over 
education and culture, health, social welfare, direct taxation, and tourism. Over time 
the PA took over the thirty-three civil spheres specified in Annex II of the Cairo 
Accord.  With this control over most of the Israeli civil authority, the PA was asked to 
                                                 
536 The full Text of the agreement can be found in <http://www.usembassy-
israel.org.il/publish/peace/empow.htm> 
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set up the ministries and public institutions that were necessary for the fulfillment of 
its responsibilities in such spheres. In setting up these ministries and institutions, the 
PA encountered a complicated institutional context at the economic, social, and legal 
level.  
 
The PA had in fact to deal with the negative economic repercussions of the economic 
policy which was pursued by Israel over the 27 years of its occupation of the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip. In seeking to subordinate the economy of the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip to her priorities and needs, Israel discouraged the development of 
large-scale industrialization.  It dealt with the WBGS as a market for its products, and 
as a source of cheap labor. Due to this policy, the economy of the WBGS became 
very much connected to the Israeli economy, and the livelihood of a large segment of 
the Palestinian society became dependent on employment inside Israel. With the 
policy of closure pursued since 1991, the economy of the WBGS was in serious 
stagnation.  Due to this policy, the WBGS labor force, employed inside Israel before 
the closure, either lost their work, or became engaged in more casual labor on a 
daily/weekly basis, depending on whether they were granted a permit, and if so the 
duration of the permit (see Chapter III, pp. 118-119). 
 
In dealing with the problem of Palestinian workers who lost employment inside Israel, 
the PA had to bear in mind the weak and fragmented Palestinian private sector. This 
weakness and fragmentation was the direct result of the economic policies pursued by 
Israel over the 27 years of its occupation of these territories. The Palestinian private 
sector, therefore, was unprepared to provide answers to economic questions like the 
problem of unemployment. This meant that the public sector was the sole agent upon 
which this responsibility fell. 
 
Moreover, the public sector was asked to provide the answer to the question of how to 
absorb exiled Palestinians who had been allowed to return to their homes in the 
WBGS after Oslo. Some of these Palestinians were born in the WBGS, but were 
deported from the WBGS due to their active participation in the resistance against the 
occupation.  Others fled Palestine after the 1948 war (outsiders) and contributed to the 
resistance during their own period of exile. In June 1994, the number of these 
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Palestinians was estimated at 500. Most of them were affiliated with Fatah.537 Their 
long years of exile and contribution to resistance stamped them with revolutionary 
ethics rather than those of statespersons. In other words, these Palestinians- who felt 
after Oslo that they were entitled to job security and status after years of hardship and 
sacrifice- enjoyed much expertise with regard to how to lead a resistance campaign 
but very little expertise with regard to how to build state institutions.  
 
Alongside them were those Palestinians who fled Palestine, after the 1948 war or the 
1967 war, but were not affiliated with the various PLO factions. Some of these 
Palestinians, who were denied the right to return to the WBGS in the pre-Oslo era, 
had become involved in the civil life of the countries they fled to, and practiced 
various professions like medicine, engineering, teaching, and so forth.  They had 
started to return to the WBGS since 1994 reaching a total, in 1997, of over 165,000 
(6% of the WBGS population at that time).538 Parallel to these Palestinians were 
thousands of local university/graduate-degree holders seeking employment. Their 
number had shifted steadily since PA arrival to WBGS to reach to 147,372 in 1997.539   
 
The PA was not only asked to absorb these Palestinians within its civil apparatus, but 
also to absorb thousands of Palestinian detainees released from Israeli jails in the post-
Oslo era. The first transfer of these detainees was provided by Article XX of the Cairo 
Accord, and was estimated at 5,000.  Most of these detainees- who had broken with 
their education due to their active participation in resistance against the occupation- 
were affiliated with Fatah, and enjoyed little expertise in respect of how to build state 
institutions. In this sense, they were similar to the PLO cadres and members who 
returned to the WBGS after Oslo.  
 
Parallel to the challenge of how to absorb those unemployed Palestinians, or those 
who had returned to the WBGS or had been released from Israeli jails- into the 
various civil or security apparatus- the PA was asked to meet their demands for basic 
services like health care, education, social needs, infrastructure, and so forth. More 
                                                 
537 Jerusalem Post on 19 June, 1994. 
538 Figures Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). Statistical Abstract of Palestine. . 
Ramallah/Palestine, November, 2003, No.“4”, P.196. 
539 Nazieh Arman & Wafiq-Al-Natour. The Eductaional System and Labor Market Demand. 
Ramllah/Palestine: PCBC, In-depth Analysis Study Series (01), May 2002, P.47 
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important was meeting the increasing demands for these services posed by the high 
natural growth rate of the local population. This rate, estimated at 5 % for the Gaza 
Strip, and 4.1% for the West Bank in 1991, was to add some 1.2 millions Palestinians 
to the 2 million already living in the WBGS (including East Jerusalem) by 2000, and a 
further 720,000 Palestinians by 2004.540   
 
To meet the local and incoming population’s demand for services, the PA had to 
encounter the bitter empirical realities of the Oslo agreements. This included the 
Israeli control over the key resources (e.g. water), external security, and 
approximately 40% of the Gaza Strip and 72% of the West Bank (this includes the 
borders, the Jewish settlements in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, the military posts, 
and the bypass roads surrounding these settlements).  
Moreover, the PA had to encounter the bitter economic realities of the Oslo Accords, 
including the restrictions imposed on its economic freedom by the Protocol on 
Economic Relations signed on 29 of April 1994. Among these restrictions was the 
denial of the right to issue an independent Palestinian currency, and the imposition of 
the Israeli currency (New Israeli Shekel, NIS) as official tender in the territories. This 
denied the PA the capacity to design its own monetary policy, particularly with 
respect to establishing interest rates and currency values. This meant that the 
Palestinian economy was continually victimized by, and at the mercy of, Israeli 
currency fluctuations (see chapter III, P. 120).  
 
The restrictions of the Protocol on Economic Relations were not only confined to PA 
monetary policy, but extended to include the PA’s sources of income. Though the 
protocol empowered the PA to impose direct tax and indirect tax (a fact that was to 
secure to it some US $360-420 million annually) as well as right to receive annually 
some US $180 million of the income taxes deducted by Israel from Palestinian 
laborers employed inside Israeli territories, the PA’s enjoyment of these sums, in 
particular the US$ 180 million, remained subject to Israel’s good will, as well as the 
                                                 
540 Figures from PCBS. Statistical Abstract, op.cit., P.189, & the World Bank. Developing the 
Occupied Territories: An Investment in Peace.  Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, Human Resources 
and Social Policy, Vol. 6, September 1993, P. xi, 
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political winds of the region, and in particular to any advances in the peace process 
(see chapter III, Pp. 117-118). 
 
The PA, therefore, had to suffer Israeli restrictions on sources of income which were 
necessary to meet expenditure in civil spheres. To deal with this dilemma, and other 
bitter empirical realities of the Oslo agreements, the PA had no option but to rely on 
the international community as a crucial source of aid necessary for building its 
institutions, and for covering its expenditure in the civil spheres. The PA, in fact, 
placed significant hope in the international community to develop the Palestinian 
autonomous areas. In July 1994 Arafat told a news conference in Cairo that “Israeli 
colonization has destroyed the Palestinian infrastructure. We have to start from 
scratch in everything and this is the responsibility of the international community.”541   
 
In response, the international community showed considerable generosity, and 
allocated approximately $525 million to the PA in the first year of its existence 
(1994). The highest portion of these funds was allocated to building the PA security 
forces (10.5%), and following this was the education sector (10.2%); institutional 
building (6%) and the health sector (5%). The remaining funds were allocated among 
sectors like agriculture, transportation, human rights and democratic development, 
women, private sector development and others.542  
 
This funding was the green light that enabled the PA to start forming its ministries and 
public institutions, and to assume the responsibility of supplying Palestinians with 
services like health, education, social services and so forth. Hence, seventeen 
ministries were working on the ground by the end of 1994. These ministries, which 
still operate today, were: Ministry of Health, Ministry of Education, Ministry of 
Social Affairs, Ministry of Culture and Arts, Ministry of Labor, Ministry of 
Economics and Trade, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Planning and International 
Cooperation, Ministry of Communication, Ministry of Youth and Sport, Ministry of 
Housing, Ministry of Justice, Ministry of Local Government, Ministry of Tourism, 
Ministry of Islamic Waqf, Ministry of Transportation, and Ministry of the Interior.543   
 
The difficulties that these ministries had to overcome in order to properly function 
were not only confined to the above-mentioned parameters (Palestinian 
                                                 
541 Jerusalem Post on July 3, 1994.  
542 MOPIC’s 1997 Third Quarterly Monitoring Report of Donor Assistance. Gaza: MOPIC, October 
1997, (unpublished report). 
543 Rex Brynen.” The Dynamics of Palestinian Elite Formation”. In Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. 
XXIV, no.3 (Spring 1995), P.39. 
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unemployment, and the limited sources of the PA’s income) but extended to include 
these ministries’ lack of any legal system organizing their operation as the following 
section discusses. 
The Palestinian Bureaucracy:  Legal Dimension 
 
It is commonly accepted that any bureaucratic system should have legal system and 
rules organizing its staff employment; including the methods of recruitment, 
compensation (pay), promotion, retirement, dismissal, clear set of grades for 
personnel throughout the civil service based on their qualifications. This legal system 
is commonly known as the civil service law. The Palestinian civil law, which was 
supposed to fulfill this goal, was ratified by Arafat on 28 May 1998,544 and consisting 
of 108 articles. The law sets down the mechanisms of building a professional 
bureaucracy. Article 4 (Para. 2-4), for instance, asked all the ministries to develop an 
annual organizational chart specifying the functions of each department and to 
indicate  job specifications and descriptions of any vacancies the ministry seeks to fill.  
 
Upon the approval of the Cabinet of the organizational chart and the vacancies in a 
given ministry, the ministry is obliged to coordinate with Diwan El M’wadfeen 
(Personnel Agency)545 with regard to the procedures of filling the ministry’s vacancy 
(art. 7). Following this, as article (19) provides, the ministry is obliged to announce, in 
the local daily newspapers, about any vacancy and to notify the Personnel Agency 
over this. The announcement should include the job description and person 
specifications of the vacancy.  
 
Then a joint committee representing the given ministry and the Personnel Agency is 
formed to select qualified applicants (to be determined through an assessment of their 
academic qualifications, Art. 26). After deciding on the qualified candidates, the 
committee calls them for a written examination. The best-placed candidates are 
employed by this committee. If two applicants received the same grade in the 
examination, the committee should select the one who enjoys more work experience. 
(Art. 20-22) 
 
                                                 
544 The full text of the law is cited in Al Waqaea’, op.cit., 4th year, no. 24, 1/7/1998. 
545 The Diwan El M’wadfeen was founded by viture of the presidential decsion no.131 on 11 October 
1994. It was empowered with authorities of supervising all the administrative issues of PA civil 
servants. See Ibid, 2ed year, No.2, 8/1/1995. 
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Those selected by the ministry are asked to assume their responsibilities within one 
month from the date of informing them of their selection, otherwise their appointment 
is revoked, and the next candidates in line is invited to fill the post. Usually, the 
candidate is recruited for one year for a trial-period, before a final decision to employ 
him is concluded by the relevant ministry. His name is then placed on the PA payroll 
and the Personnel Agency is informed (Art. 25, 30-31).  
 
Alongside this clear mechanism of recruitment, the law sets down clear mechanisms 
of promotion. Article (9) of the law classified PA civil servants into five classes; 1) 
the “Special class” includes ministers; 2) the “First-Class” includes legislators like 
Deputy-Ministers, Assistant-Deputy Ministers, and Director-Generals; 3) the 
“Second-Class” includes technocrats like professionals, technicians, associate 
professionals, accountants, and so forth; 4) the “Third-Class” includes clerks, 
secretaries, archive staff, and so forth; 5) the “Fourth-Class” includes services staff 
like janitors, and so on. With the exception of the Special class, each class is divided 
into a number of levels. Usually, the civil servants are enrolled at each level according 
to their qualifications.  
 
The movement to a higher level of the same class is conditional on the civil servant’s 
completion of a specific period of time in the assigned level.  This period of time is 
specified by the law, and varies from one level to another. For example, movement 
from level six to level five of the second class (whose staff must have a University or 
graduate degree at minimum) requires five-years working in level six, as a minimum. 
At the same time, movement from level five to level four of the same class requires at 
least five-years working in level five; while the movement from level three to level 
two of the same class requires four-years working in level three, at the minimum.  
 
The same rules are applied to civil servants of the “Third-Class”. In principle they are 
asked to have a two-year diploma or the General Secondary Education Certificate 
Examination (Tawjihi). If a civil servant of this class continued his studies, and 
obtained a university degree with relation to his work, this civil servant is moved to 
the second class, but enrolled at a level with income equal to that one before his 
promotion. As far as the civil servants of the “Fourth-Class” are concerned, their 
promotion to the third class is possible upon their completion of Tawjihi or obtaining 
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a two-year diploma. If the promoted civil servant receives the salary of the level to 
which he was promoted or his pre-promotion salary, depending on which salary is 
higher (Art. 10-13, & Table “1” annexed in the law).  
 
Though the law sets a clear mechanism for promotion, it denies Palestinians other 
than those loyal to Arafat the right to have access to top posts in the Palestinian 
bureaucracy. For example, the civil servants of the special class, and the first class, 
were said to be appointed directly by the PA president (Art. 16, 17). The law, 
therefore, was designed to legitimize the de facto situation, as it facilitated the 
dominance of Fatah affiliated deputy and assistant deputy ministers over thirty-three 
posts out of forty deputy-ministers and assistant-deputy minister posts in 1996.546  
 
Nevertheless, the law signified a fundamental administrative development when it 
considered academic qualifications and work experience as the basis for recruitment 
and promotion in the Palestinian bureaucracy. In so doing, the law constituted a 
protest against the system of nepotism which existed in the Palestinian bureaucracy 
(as we will see later), and called for a reconsideration of the remuneration of 
thousands of civil servants who were subjected to injustice as result of this system. 
 
To bring the law into force, therefore, the PA was obliged to allocate millions of US 
dollars to cover the financial implications of the law. To deal with this dilemma, the 
PA adopted gradual implementation of the law.  In November 1998, the PA 
implemented the law on teachers and “Fourth-Class” civil servants, with a cost of NIS 
30 million (7.5 million USD) monthly, according to Mohammad Abu Jarad, deputy-
minister of finance.547 This phase was the first and was going to be followed by 
another phase covering the civil servants of the third and second class to be 
implemented in December 1998. In late December 1998, the teachers received their 
salaries plus the increase provided for by the law. However, the financial bonus given 
for work experience, and the financial rate given to cover the inflation rate, were 
deducted from their salaries.548  
 
                                                 
546 Hilal (Arabic). El Nizam El Syasi, op.cit., P.190. 
547 Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 8 December, & Al-Quds on 9 December 1998. 
548 Al-Ayyam on 28 December 1998. 
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The same happened with the civil servants of the third and second class. Accordingly, 
a series of protests were organized by PA civil servants calling for a correct 
implementation of the law. On 8 January 1999, in response to these protests, Arafat 
declared that the PA would refrain from implementing the law until the financial 
implications of it were reconsidered.549 As a result, the law remained unimplemented 
until the outbreak of the current intifada in September 2000. 
The Palestinian Bureaucracy: Institution Building - a Functional 
Perspective 
 
As mentioned before, seventeen ministries were set up at the end of 1994.  It is 
beyond the scope of the present research to describe in perfect detail the institutional 
process of building each of the ministries. In tracing the development of the 
Palestinian bureaucracy, therefore, I shall focus my attention on three ministries; the 
Ministry of Health, the Ministry of Education, and the Ministry of Social Affairs. As 
they are commonly known, health, education, and social services, are the most 
important services supplied to citizens.  
 
In the Palestinian case, these services were the most ones supplied by the Israeli 
occupation (1967-1993) and UNRWA. This fact makes it easier to find out what 
difference the establishment of the PA in the WBGS made as far as the enjoyment of 
Palestinians of these services is concerned. The three ministries serve as three 
empirical cases through which my findings and conclusions about the Palestinian 
bureaucracy will be formulated. To start the discussion, I will start with the ministry 
of health, as the health sector (as the next section reveals) was the most 
underdeveloped sector on the eve of the PA’s arrival to WBGS. 
 
The Palestinian Health Sector: Background 
 
Historically speaking, the Israeli civil administration, together with UNRWA, and 
some Palestinian grassroots organizations, was the major provider of health services 
to WBGS Palestinians. While UNRWA and the Palestinian grassroots organizations 
provided mainly primary health services (e.g. prenatal health care, immunization, 
health promotion, treatment of minor illnesses, control of infectious diseases, health 
care education, among others) the Israeli civil administration provided secondary 
health care (e.g. internal medicine, maternity, cardiac care, urology, intensive care, 
general surgery, and so forth) alongside primary health care.  
 
                                                 
549 See Qanun El Khidmah Al Madinyah: Ba’yn El Nazriyah wa El Tatbieq. (The Civil Service Law: 
Between Theory and Practice). Gaza: Palestinian Centre for Human Rights (PCHR), Series Studies 
(17), September 1999, pp.16-18. 
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On the eve of the PA’s arrival to WBGS, UNRWA was operating a total of 42 
primary health care centers (9 in the Gaza Strip, and 33 in the West Bank) alongside 
some dental clinics, feeding centers, and a 34 bed hospital (located in West Bank 
camp of Qalandia). Around 950,000 of the WBGS’ registered refugees benefited from 
UNRWA services (offered free of charge) in 1992.550 Meanwhile Palestinian 
grassroots organizations were operating some 132 clinics in 118 communities, which 
served nearly half of the population in 1992, offering their services free of charge or 
with minimum charge.551  
 
Around the same period, the Israeli civil administration was operating a network of 
primary health care centers consisting of up to 200 centers (171 in the West Bank, and 
29 in the Gaza Strip).552 Parallel to these centers, the civil administration operated 13 
hospitals (five in the Gaza Strip, and eight in the West Bank) with a total of 1,596 
beds for a secondary health care. The number of the beds operated by the civil 
administration formed up to 60% of all hospital beds in the West Bank, and 90% of all 
beds in the Gaza Strip.553 The governmental (civil administration) sector, therefore, 
was the main sector offering secondary health care.  
 
However, and in a quantitative sense, this sector was characterized by poor 
performance. The number of hospitals, and beds available (13 hospitals with 1,596 
beds) was very small in relation to the demand posed by 2 million Palestinians living 
in the territories in 1991. In that year, only one hospital bed was made available for 
every 1253 Palestinians. Even so, not every one of the 1253 Palestinian was eligible 
to enjoy hospital services.  
 
Only those who joined the government health insurance scheme were eligible for 
these services. This included Palestinians employed in the Israeli civil administration, 
Palestinians employed in local government institutions, and Palestinian laborers 
officially working inside Israel. These Palestinians (alongside their family members) 
                                                 
550 the World Bank. Developing the Occupied Territories, op.cit., Pp. xiv-xiii 
551 Robinson, op.cit., P. 49. 
552 See Theodore H.Tulchinsky. “Judea-Samaria and Gaza: Twenty Five Years of Changing Health, 
1967-1992”. In Manfred Waserman & Samuel S.Kottek (eds.). Health and Disease in the Holy Land: 
Studies in the History and Sociology of Medicine from Ancient Times to the Present. Lewiston, 
Queenston, & Lampeter: the Edwin Mellen Press, 1996, Pp.417-418. 
553 Ibid, Pp. 428-429. 
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were obliged to join the government health insurance scheme once they started their 
job.554 According to World Bank estimates, the number of these families did not 
exceed 75,800 families in 1992.555 Bearing in mind that the average size of a 
Palestinian family is estimated at 6.4 according to the most up-to-date statistics,556 it is 
possible to conclude that some 485,000 Palestinians were enrolled in the Israeli health 
insurance scheme in 1992.  
 
Providing the fact that the population-as mentioned elsewhere- was estimated at 2 
million in 1991, and the natural growth rate is estimated at 5 % for the Gaza Strip, and 
4.1% for the West Bank in the same year, one can conclude that the population of 
WBGS is estimated at 2.13 Million in 1992. This implies that the rate of the 
Palestinians enrolled in the Israeli health insurance scheme is nearly 22% of the total 
population, in 1992.  Though the health insurance scheme, introduced in 1978, was 
optional for Palestinians other than the employees of the civil administration and local 
government institutions, and those officially working inside Israel - the subscription 
fees made it difficult for these Palestinians to join the Israeli health insurance scheme.   
 
Sara Roy estimates the fees at nearly NIS 10 per month for a single person, with an 
additional NIS 2.5 for each family member in April 1985. Within nine months (April 
1985-January 1986), these fees, according to Roy, were doubled to NIS 22 for a single 
person and an additional NIS 5 for each family member.557  The following years 
(1986-1993) witnessed a further increase. In the early 1990s, Palestinians were asked 
to pay a sum of NIS 111 as monthly insurance subscription fees.558 This sum, which is 
equivalent to US$ 35 (at that time each NIS 3 were equivalent to US$1) was relatively 
high if it is taken into account that the average income of the Palestinian family was 
estimated at some US $1,882 annually, or US $157 monthly.559     
 
                                                 
554 Interview with Mohammad Abu Hashiesh, Director-General of Health Insurance Directorate. Gaza: 
Ministry of Health, 19 September 2004. 
555 The World Bank. Developing the Occupied Territories, op.cit., P. xii. 
556 PCBS. Statistical Abstract, op.cit., P.202. 
557 Roy. The Gaza Strip, op.cit., P.106. 
558 Interview with Mohammad Abu Hashiesh, Director-General of Health Insurance Directorate.  Gaza: 
Ministry of Health, 19 September 2004. 
559 Figures from Palestine-Israel Journal. No. I (Winter 1994), P. 106. 
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The vast majority of Palestinians (78% of the population), therefore, were without 
health insurance. These Palestinians were asked to pay for their own medical 
treatment. Roy estimates the daily hospitalization cost in the governmental hospitals 
at NIS 207 in 1985. This covers the services of in-patient (NIS 130.4), delivery (NIS 
65.20), and consultation (NIS 12.26) services.560 Bearing in mind that the health 
insurance subscription fees had increased by nearly 405% (from NIS 22 in 1986 to 
NIS 111 in early 1990s), it is possible to conclude that the cost of the daily 
hospitalization had also increased by approximately the same rate. This suggests 
approximately NIS 837 (approximately US$ 292) as a daily hospitalization cost in 
early 1990s.  
 
Even with this high cost of medical treatment Palestinians were denied the right to 
proper and efficient hospital services. The main reason for this was the limited funds 
Israel made available to health in WBGS. In 1975, for instance, Israel’s health budget 
for the entire West Bank was equivalent to only 60% of the typical budget for one 
260-bed hospital in Israel.561 Israel’s failure to allocate sufficient funds for 
governmental hospitals blocked the development of these hospitals’ facilities. For 
example, the five governmental hospitals of the Gaza Strip (El Shifa, Radwan, Naser, 
Breij, and Radwan Eye) failed to secure more than one bed for every 548 Gazans in 
1984. Also, they failed to secure more than one doctor for every 2200 Gazans, and 
one nurse for every 900 Gazans in the same year.562  
 
Alongside the shortage in the human resources necessary to operate these hospitals, 
there was a serious shortage in the technical infrastructure and equipment necessary 
for efficient delivery of health services in relation to hematology, cardiac care, 
dialysis, among others. El Shifa hospital in Gaza, for instance, lacked equipment and 
facilities such as X-ray machines, dialysis units, electro-cardiogram units, cardiac 
monitor, and so forth.563 This shortage in material and human resources left hospitals 
in the WBGS unable to supply health services in an efficient and effective manner, 
and so shifted the infant mortality rate to 70 per 1,000 live births.  By comparison, the 
                                                 
560 Roy. The Gaza Strip, op.cit., P.107. 
561 Figures from the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees’ webpage 
<http://www.upmrc.org/content/health/content/health/main.html> 
562 Roy, The Gaza Strip, op.cit., P.108. 
563 Ibid., Pp. 108-109 
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rate was 14 per 1,000 in Israel, 55 per 1,000 in Jordan, and 60 per 1,000 in Syria in 
the same year. 564  
 
The health conditions of Palestinians seemed unlikely to improve in the following 
years (1987-1993). These years were the ones which witnessed the first intifada. The 
intifada, was the spontaneous uprising against the occupation, encompassing all 
segments of the population; young and old, male and female, rich and poor, 
intellectual and uneducated, religious and secular, villagers and urban dwellers. It 
expressed Palestinians’ protest against their humiliating conditions under the 
occupation, and their desire for a complete disengagement from its control (see 
chapter II, Pp. 102-108).  
 
In response to the intifada, Israel adopted extremely harsh political, security, and 
social measures against the Palestinians. These measures included the 
disproportionate use of force, collective punishments such as curfews, sieges, 
blocking sick and wounded patients from having access to health care, raiding health 
facilities on the pretext of searching for intifada activists, prohibiting doctors’ 
movement during the curfews unless they have a permit, and more importantly, 
forcing doctors to hand over the names of all the injured admitted to the hospitals. 
This was a particularly worrying measure for the injured of the intifada, and left the 
majority of them reluctant to seek medical care in the governmental hospitals because 
of the high possibility of arrest by the army, and fearing that the injury would serve as 
evidence of “guilt”.  
 
Owing to these deteriorating security conditions, Israel did very little to improve the 
health situation of the territories. In the period of 1987-1990, there were no notable 
changes in the hospital facilities. In fact, this period witnessed further deterioration in 
the health situation, in the Gaza Strip in particular. In 1990, for instance, only one 
nurse was made available for each 1052 Gazans (9.5 per 10,000), as against one nurse 
for every 900 Gazans in 1984. Furthermore, only one physician was made available 
for each 2083 Gazans (4.8 per 10,000).565 Though the conditions of West Bank 
                                                 
564 Figures from the Union of Palestinian Medical Relief Committees’ webpage 
<http://www.upmrc.org/content/health/content/health/main.html> 
565 Tulchinsky, op.cit., Pp.414, 434. 
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hospitals seemed relatively better than the ones of their Gaza Strip counterparts, these 
hospitals continued to suffer shortages in some resources, in particular in nursing 
staff, as only one nurse was made available for every 1250 West Bankers in the same 
year.566   
 
After the closure policy (adoped in 1991 onward), many Palestinians (including those 
enrolled in the Israeli health insurance scheme) were denied the right to medical 
treatment in Israel. These Palestinians were obliged to have permits. To obtain such a 
permit they were subjected to strict security scrutiny, and in most cases, the permit 
was denied. Providing for the very large difference between the range and quality of 
health services available in WBGS and in Israel, the denial of the permit meant 
risking the life of these Palestinians, as this would leave them at the mercy of local 
hospitals which lacked the appropriate material and qualified human resources 
necessary to deal with serious diseases like cardiac, cancer, and cardiovascular 
problems. In 1994 or so (around the same period of the PA’s arrival to the territories), 
at least 20% of the crude death rate in WBGS resulted from cardiac diseases, and 
another 11% and 9% resulted from cardiovascular and cancer diseases, 
respectively.567
 
The PA, therefore, inherited a regressive health sector from Israel, and had to deal 
with huge health problems resulting from the health policy of Israel towards the 
WBGS over the 27 years of the occupation of these territories. It is possible to sum up 
the main features of the Palestinian health sector on the eve of the PA’s arrival to the 
territories with the following:  
•  Understaffed, in terms of qualified human and appropriate material 
resources. 
•  Unable to cover the majority of Palestinians with the health insurance 
services, and thereby,  
•  Unable to supply health services for the majority of Palestinians. 
                                                 
566 Ibid. 
567 See Ministry of Health (MoH). Health Status in Palestine: Ministry of Health Annual Report.  Gaza: 
Ministry of Health, July 2004, P. xxix. 
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The Palestinian Ministry of Health (MoH): Does it make a Difference? 
 
One can trace the history of the institutional building of the Palestinian ministry of 
health to 1992, when the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks in Washington were underway 
(for these talks see chapter II, Pp. 105-106). These talks, and before it the Madrid 
peace conference of 1991, gave rise to strong hopes among the concerned parties for a 
possible and close settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Inspired by these 
hopes, Palestinians started to lay down the nucleus of their state-institutions, among 
which was the ministry of health.  
 
In the same year that the Washington talks were underway, the PLO founded the 
Palestinian Health Council (PHC) as an institutional framework gathering all 
Palestinian health expertise (inside the territories and in the exile alike). Upon its 
establishment, the PHC gathered between 500-600 Palestinian experts in various 
health fields such as medicine, nursing, health promotion, pharmacology, and so 
forth.568 The aim was to create a plan for developing the health care situation of the 
WBGS. Towards this end, the PHC convened several workshops and conferences, and 
looked to other Arab health experts, Egyptian ones in particular. In this connection, 
Fathi Arafat, President Arafat’s brother, and the one who directed the PHC, took the 
leading role in building channels of communication with Arab expertise, and health 
ministries and organizations.        
 
In so doing, Fathi Arafat benefited from the various networks he built with these 
ministries and other health Arab health organizations over four decades of working as 
Director of the Palestinian Red Crescent Society (PRCS). As we have seen in chapter 
II (P. 99), the PRCS assumed the responsibilities of supplying the Palestinian diaspora 
with health services. By 1979, it had been operating no less than 30 hospitals and 100 
clinics in Lebanon, Jordan, Egypt, and other Arab countries.569 These hospitals and 
clinics employed thousands of doctors, nurses, paramedics, administrators, and so 
forth.  
                                                 
568 Interview with Abdel El Rahman El Barqawi.  Director-General of Ministry of Health, Gaza: 
Ministry of Health, 28 October 2004. 
569 See Social, Economic and Political Institutions in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. New York: 
United Nations, 1982, P.22. 
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Parallel to the diaspora health personnel were the local health personnel, or those 
whom Palestinians employed in Israel’s civil administration. Article II (B, 6) of 
Annex II (Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs) of the Cairo Accord committed the PA 
to retain all the Palestinian personnel of the Israeli civil administration. Unfortunately, 
the most current data with relation to the number of these Palestinians are not 
available. However, Meir Shamgar (1982), and Sara Roy (1986), present us with 
some helpful data in this respect.  
 
According to Shamgar, there were 2,799 Palestinians (1,403 from West Bank, and 
1,396 from Gaza Strip) employed in the health sector of Israel’s civil administration 
in 1980.570 The number of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip employed in the health 
sector was, therefore, similar to the number of their West Bank counterparts. Sara Roy 
estimates the number of Palestinians from the Gaza Strip in the civil administration 
health sector at 1,475 (232 physicians, 566 nurses, 165 paramedics, and 512 
administrators) in 1984.571 This implies an increase rate of nearly 5.5% within 4 years 
(from 1,396 personnel in 1980 to 1,475 in 1984).   
 
Bearing in mind that the number of West Bank Palestinians in the civil 
administration’s health sector was more or less similar to the one of Gaza Strip 
counterparts, it is possible to conclude that the number of West Bank Palestinians in 
the civil administration’s health sector had shifted by the same rate (5.5% or 79 
Palestinians) during the same period (1980-1984). Thus, the number of West Bank 
Palestinians employed in the civil administration’s health sector could be estimated at 
1480 in 1984. Therefore, the number of Palestinians (from both West Bank and Gaza 
Strip) employed by the civil administration could be estimated at 2,955 in 1984. 
 
In the period of 1985-1987, it seems unlikely that there were any notable changes in 
the number of Palestinians employed in the civil administration’s health sector, given 
the small increase rate change in the number during the period of 1980-1984. The 
same analysis is applied for the period of 1987-1993. As mentioned elsewhere, this 
period was the intifada period in which Israel did very little to improve the health 
                                                 
570 Shamgar (ed.). op.cit., P.444. 
571 Roy. The Gaza Strip, op.cit., P.108. 
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conditions (in terms of improving and developing health personnel and equipment) in 
the territories.  
 
Therefore, if there was any change in the number of the Palestinian personnel of the 
civil administration’s health sector, this change would not be significant. Thus, it is 
possible to assume that the numbers of Palestinian health personnel remained as it was 
in 1984, or witnessed some slight changes in the period of 1987-1993. In both cases, 
this number is not expected to exceed 3,000 (or 2,955 if remained as it was in 1984) in 
1993.  Therefore, we would assume that there were 3,000 Palestinian health personnel 
at the PA’s disposal in 1994. 
 
These local health personnel, alongside their diaspora counterparts (mainly the 500-
600 who formed the nucleus of PHC) were to enable the PA to assume a smooth and 
rapid takeover of health service delivery. However, they were not sufficient to meet 
the increasing demand for health services posed by the high natural growth rate of the 
population. This rate- as mentioned elsewhere- was to add some 1.2 million 
Palestinians to the 2 million already living in the WBGS by 2000, and a further 
720,000 Palestinians by 2004.  
 
Consequently, the ministry of health, once it took over the health sphere in 1994, had 
to face the challenge of building human resources capacity. For this purpose, the MoH 
founded the Human Resources Development Directorate (HRDD) in 1994. The 
directorate, whose main goal was to upgrade the already existing health skills, was 
entrusted with many powers such as (1) running training courses and organizing 
workshops and study days for health professionals; (2) organizing examinations for 
local physicians to assess their professional skills; and (3) nominating health staff for 
fellowships and high studies diplomas in various Arab and European countries.572  
 
Within one year (1994-1995) the number of the health personnel in the WBGS shifted 
from 3,000 to 4,758 (an increase rate of nearly 59%). The 4,758 health personnel were 
employed by the MoH, and were classified as follows: 963 physicians (including the 
dentists & pharmacists), 1,634 nurses, 804 paramedics and 1,357 administrators. This 
                                                 
572 Source: Palestinian Health Information Center (PHIC). Gaza: Ministry of Health. 
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implies a ratio of health personnel to population of one per 447 persons. As far as the 
health professionals are concerned, the figures imply a ratio of one physician per 
2,208 persons, one nurse per 1,301 persons, one paramedic per 2,644 persons, and one 
administrator and worker per 1,567 persons.573  
 
In the period of 1995-2000, the number of health personnel shifted to 7,458- an 
increase rate of almost 56%.  The following table illustrates the number and the ratio 









































































Source: MoH. Health Status, op.cit., P.45 
 
As the table shows, there was a rapid increase in the number of MoH personnel in the 
period of 1995-2000. Of particular concern is the number of physicians (including the 
dentists & pharmacists) and nurses. It has been shown that that no changes occurred in 
the health personnel’s general number in the period of 1984-1994. Since the number 
of physicians and nurses of Gaza Strip was 794 (232 physicians, 566 nurses,) in 1984, 
and since the number of the health personnel of the Gaza Strip was similar or so to 
that one of the West Bank in the same year, then it is possible to assume that the 
number of the West Bank’s physicians and nurses was also 794 or so in 1984. (See 
our above-mentioned discussion on the Palestinian health personnel employed by 
Israeli civil administration). 
 
Furthermore, since the general number of health personnel in both the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip did not witness any changes in the period of 1984-1994, it is possible to 
                                                 
573 MoH. Health Status, op.cit., P.45. 
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assume that the number of physicians and nurses of both the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip remained without changes. This means that the number of physicians and nurses 
in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip can be estimated at some 1,588 (464 physicians 
and 1,132 nurses) in 1994. In 1995, the number of physicians, as the table shows, rose 
to 963, an increase of more than 107%. Meanwhile, the number of nurses rose to 
1,634, an increase of more than 44%.  
 
In the period of 1995-2000, the number of physicians rose to 1,631, a further increase 
of more than 69%, while the number of nurses rose to 2,457, a further increase of 
more than 50%. The graph below shows the changes in the number of physicians and 



















Person per Physician 
 
Source: The Palestinian Health Information Center (PHIC). Gaza: Ministry of Health. 
 
Parallel to the rapid increase of the number of physicians in the period of 1995-2000, 
was a rapid increase in the number of nurses. The graph drawn shows the increase in 
the number of nurses, and the changes in the ratio of nurse per person during the 























ith a total of 1,596 beds since 1967 up to 1994, 
hen the PA arrived to the WBGS.  
ds were 
istributed among fifteen hospitals operated by the MoH by the same year.574  
 
                                                
 
 
Thus, it is safe to claim that the first five years of the PA’s existence witnessed 
significant quantitative development in the health personnel of the MoH. Parallel to 
this development was the one which is related to health establishments, mainly to the 
number of beds available to each person. We have seen before how the Israeli 
government (or the civil administration) operated only 13 hospitals (five in the Gaza 
Strip, and eight in the West Bank) w
w
 
Since the PA’s arrival to WBGS, the hospitals and beds available to Palestinians had 
been expanded to a notable degree. Within two years (1994-1996) the number of 
hospital beds shifted to 1,710 (an increase rate of nearly 7%). The following years 
(1996-2000) witnessed further increases, with an average increase rate of 8.5% 
annually. This pushed the number of hospital beds to 2,303 by 2000. These be
d
 
574 Two new hospitals were opened soon after the outbreak of the second intifada in september 2000. 
The first one was the “The Gaza European Hospital”. The hospital was built as a result of finanacial aid 
from the Euopean Union. It started operating on 15 Ocotober 2000, with 134 beds, and planned to serve 
some 276,000 Palestinians.  The second one was “El Najar Hospital”. It started operating on 26 
October 2000 with 60 beds, and planned to service the Palestinians of Rafah City- south of the Gaza 
Strip. Figures from the Palestinian Health Information Center (PHIC). Gaza: Ministry of Health. 
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The number of beds operated by the MoH formed approximately 44% of the required 
hospital beds (estimated at 5,250 beds in 2000), and more than of 54% of actual 
hospital beds in the WBGS.575 Though this number implies a bed-population ratio of 
1-1389 in 2000 (the population of the WBGS is estimated at 3.2 million in 2000576), 
and consequently, suggests some deterioration when compared to the occupation era, 
when one bed was available to every 1,253 people, it must be recalled that only 22% 
(as shown above) of the 1,253 people were eligible to occupy a hospital bed under the 
Israeli occupation. The main reason for this was the high subscription fees of the 
health insurance.  
 
As explained above, these subscription fees denied the majority of Palestinians access 
to governmental (civil administration) hospitals, and led to a situation where the bed 
occupancy rate-according to World Bank estimation- was 62%.577 The low bed 
occupancy rate under the Israeli occupation had been changed under the PA, after the 
subscription fees of health insurance were reduced, and thus, enabled the majority of 
Palestinians to join the health insurance scheme. From 1994 (when the PA arrived) up 
until 2000, the number of Palestinian families enrolled in the health insurance scheme 
rose from 75,800  (as it was on the eve of the PA’s arrival to the territories) to 
174,866 households.578  
 
These families ranged between the families of those employed in the PA civil and 
security apparatus (compulsory insurance), families of voluntary insurance (voluntary 
insurance), families of those employed inside Israel, families insured by contract 
(contract insurance), and social welfare health insurance (this includes the families for 
whom health insurance subscription fees are paid for by the Ministry of Social 
Welfare due to their poor economic conditions). The table below illustrates the 
number of each type of family, and the revenue collected from each type in 2000. 
 







                                                 
575 It is worth mentioning that the Palestinian grassroots organisations operated 25 hospitals, with 1,442 
beds, while the private sector operated 22 hospital with 453 beds. As well, UNRWA operated one 
hospital with 38 beds in 2000. Figures from Ibid. 
576 PCBS. Statistical Abstract, op.cit., 189. 
577 The World Bank. Developing the Occupied Territories, op.cit.,  P. xiii. 































30, 090, 000 
 
Source: concluded from MoH. Health Status, op.cit., Pp. 48-49 
 
On average, thus, the family’s monthly health insurance subscription fees did not 
exceed US $ 14.3 under the PA. This formed approximately 40% of the family’s 
monthly health insurance subscription fees under the Israeli occupation (estimated, as 
we have seen, at US $35 monthly). The notable development in this connection is not 
only related to the reduction in the health insurance fees, but also by the much larger 
number of families who are covered by the health insurance.  
 
Dr. Mohammad Abu Hashiesh, Director-General of Health Insurance Directorate at 
the ministry of health confirmed to me that there are, alongside the abovementioned 
families-, thousands of families covered by the health insurance free of charge.  He 
estimates the number of these families at 140,000.579 If his figures are accurate, the 
total number of Palestinian families covered by the health insurance is estimated at 
314,866 families in 2000. Bearing in mind that the Palestinian population was 
estimated at 3.2 million in 2000, and also that the average Palestinian family size is 
estimated at 6.4 (as mentioned above), then it is safe to claim that nearly 63% of the 
population had been covered by health insurance by 2000.    
 
Drawing on the above figures, it is possible to provide a table showing the amount of 
the health insurance subscription fees and the percent of population covered on the 
eve of the PA’s arrival to the WBGS (or up to the end of the occupation era), in 
comparison to the amount of the health insurance fees and percentage of the 
population covered in 2000. 
 
Health Insurance Fees 
 
                % of population  Covered
On Eve of PA arrival 
(1993-1994) 
In 2000 
Health Insurance Subscription fees US $ 35 US $ 14.3 
% of Population Covered 22 63 
                                                 
579 Interview on 19 September 2004. 
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The expansion of the number of Palestinians covered by the health insurance, whilst 
simultaneously a reduction in health insurance subscription fees, as the table shows, is 
owed mainly to a Directorate (the directorate of health insurance) of no more than 83 
civil servants (33 in the Gaza Strip, and 50 in the West Bank) with an average 
monthly remuneration of US$ 450 for each civil servant.580  The directorate runs its 
work through two offices (one in the West Bank and the other in the Gaza strip).  Due 
to the closure it has encountered difficulties in coordinating the two offices’ activities. 
Nonetheless, the directorate has managed, since its establishment in 1995, to grant the 
majority of Palestinians access to health insurance with low fees.  
 
Mainly, this was due to the directorate’s system of administration. The directorate, 
which enjoys autonomous status from the ministry of health, operates what might be 
called a “bottom-up model of management”, with a strong emphasis on consultation 
and accountability. The decision making process is a collective one, in which all civil 
servants (junior and senior alike) contribute to the process. Without exception these 
civil servants were recruited after they had passed through a long process of 
professional scrutiny.  
 
The process starts with an initial diagnosis of the academic qualifications and 
expertise of the candidate. If the academic qualifications and expertise fit with the job 
specifications, the candidate goes through a “trial-period” in which he performs the 
job responsibilities for a given period. Should he pass the “trial-period” successfully, 
he is recruited to the directorate.581 As a result, all the directorate’s civil servants 
enjoy some sort of professional power, and therefore, strongly favor the “bottom-up” 
model of management.  
 
The wishes of the directorate’s civil servants to operate this model do not clash with 
the wishes of their superiors. The contrary is the case. Both directors of the 
directorate’s two offices (Abu Hashiesh for the Gaza-based office, and Dr. Fahmi El-
Sayad for the West Bank-based office) had sown the initial seeds of this model when 
they founded the above-mentioned recruitment system, and stood as opponents to any 
form of intervention in their work, even if this was against the health minister or 




deputy-minister’s wishes. Ironically, one of the two directors (Abu Hashiesh) had 
been supported by Israel’s foreign ministry to continue his post-graduate studies and 
to read for his Masters in health insurance at the Hebrew University in Israel (1974-
1976).582 The man who had been supported by Israel operates today one of the most 
successful public institutions (as the abovementioned figures tell us) among PA public 
institutions. 
 
Due to the directorate’s success in providing the majority of Palestinians with health 
insurance, the number of Palestinians seeking medical care in MoH hospitals and the 
occupancy rate of hospital beds had risen considerably since the PA’s arrival to the 
WBGS. In 2000, for instance, the number of Palestinians who sought medical care in 
the MoH hospitals is estimated at 185,356 (5.7% of the population). Of this, 180,357 
(5.6% of the total population) were discharged by MoH hospitals. Out of the 
discharged patients, 55,943 went through surgical operations. This raised the 
occupancy rate of the hospitals beds to 72% in the same year,583 as against to 62% on 
the eve of the PA’s arrival to WBGS (as we have seen before).  
 
However, the high number of patients discharged, and the resultant high occupancy 
rate of hospital beds, did not imply, by any means, proper and high quality health 
services. Out of the 180,357 Palestinians discharged by MoH hospitals, were 2,886 
hospital deaths,584 constituting more than 60% of the total deaths in the WBGS in 
2000.585 This high rate of hospital deaths was to strengthen the negative Palestinian 
attitude toward MoH hospital services, and to promote further Palestinian mistrust and 
suspicion of MoH hospital professionalism. In August 1999, for example, nearly 16% 
of the population had already believed that the health care provided to them was 
weak, compared to 8.6% who believed the opposite.586  
 
In this respect, Palestinians are strongly concerned about thousands of Palestinian 
students who left the WBGS in the late 1980s, and early 1990s, to continue their post-
secondary studies and to read for their degrees in medicine, nursing, and other health 
                                                 
582 Ibid. 
583 Figures from MoH. Health Status, op.cit., P.42. 
584 Ibid. 
585 The deaths in the WBGS is estimated at 4,767 in 2000 (2,903 in the West Bank, and 1,864 in the 
Gaza Strip). See PCBS. Statistical Abstract, op.cit., P. 211 
586 See JMCC Public Opinion Poll No.32. Online <http://www.jmcc.org> 
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fields in former republics of the Soviet Union and other Eastern European countries 
(Ukraine, Lithuania, Romania, and so forth). A rumor among Palestinians claims that  
several of these students managed to bribe their professors, and consequently, to pass 
their examinations with very little effort. In so doing, the rumor goes, these students 
benefited from the poor economic conditions, and the resultant wide spread 
corruption, in these countries. 
 
Unfortunately, we lack any evidence substantiating this rumor. But of particular 
concern for us is the fact that most of these students were recruited by the MoH upon 
the completion of their studies. In so doing, the MoH sought to deal with local 
community pressure demanding the employment of these students, whilst 
simultaneously carrying out decisions made by the political leadership to absorb these 
students into the ministry.  In the words of Abdel El Rahman El Barqawi, Director-
General of the MoH: 
 
 “Due to the problem of unemployment, and the pressure which we are subjected to 
from these students’ families, alongside the political leadership’s pressure to create 
jobs for these students, we had no alternatives but to recruit them in the ministry, 
though the ministry was in no need for many of them.”587
 
During the first five years of the PA’s existence (1995-2000) the number of MoH 
physicians shifted from 963 in 1995 to 1,634 in 2000 (an increase rate of nearly 70%). 
In the meanwhile the number of nurses shifted from 1,634 to 2,457 (an increase rate 
of more than 50%), and the number of the administrative staff shifted from 1,357 to 
2,527 (an increase rate of nearly 87%). (See the table above with relation to MoH 
personnel in the period of 1995-2000). 
 
Because of the way in which some of these personnel are recruited, most Palestinians 
are convinced that MoH personnel, in particular doctors, take the sole responsibility 
for the high rate of hospital deaths. Bearing in mind the countries from which the 
majority of these doctors had graduated (Eastern countries), such conviction turned 
out to be an “institution of knowledge and culture” (to borrow the neo-institutionalism 
                                                 
587 Interview on 28 October 2004. 
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concept)588 in which Eastern countries’ educational systems in general are labeled 
with poor performance by the WBGS Palestinians. Because of this “institution of 
knowledge and culture”, most WBGS Palestinians prefer Israeli or Arab 
hospitalization (mainly the Jordanian and Egyptian ones), and, of course, Western 
Europe hospitalization, over MoH and former Eastern-bloc country’s hospitalization. 
 
Aside from this, the PA’s tendency to overstaff the MoH, as a means of solving the 
unemployment problem, led to a situation where most of the MoH budget is spent on 




activities 1997 1998 1999 2000 
Salaries 41,102 (44.4%) 39,054 (46%) 39,354 (47.6%) 45,500 (45.3%) 
Drugs & Medical 
Disposables 
23,940 (25.9%) 22,417 (26.4%) 21,411 (26%) 24,616 (24.5%) 
Special Referral 
abroad 
14,062 (15.2%) 9,326 (11%) 6,095 (7.3%) 6,200 (6%) 
Operating Cost 13,280 (14.3) 13,799 (16.3%) 15,739 (19%) 24,020 (24%) 
Total 92,384 84,596 82,599 100,336 
 
Source: Reproduced from MoH. Health Status , op.cit.,  P.49 
  
As a result of spending such a large portion of the MoH budget on staff salaries, the 
MoH experienced a serious financial deficit in the period of 1997-2000. As the table 
shows, the MoH spent nearly US$ 360 million in the period of 1997-2000. This 
exceeded what had been actually allocated to it by ministry of finance by nearly US$ 
35 million.589 This fact left the MoH unprepared to offer Palestinians with equipment 
and facilities necessary to deal with serious diseases, such as: Cancer, Heart disorder, 
and so on. Palestinians suffering these diseases had no option other than to seek 
treatment in Israeli, European, or neighboring Arab countries (mainly Egypt & 
Jordan).  
 
                                                 
588 For discussion on  the “neoinstitutionalism” doctrine see Ronald L.Jepperson. The Development and 
Application of Sociological Neoinstitutionalism. Italy: Badia Fiesolana & San Domenico, 2001. 
589 In 1997 the Palestinian Ministry of Finance allocated nearly US$93.9 Million to MoH. This sum 
decreaed to US$86.86 million, to US$ 74.6 million, and to US$ 70.48 Million  in 1998, 1999, and 2000 
respectively. Source: Ministry of Finance. Gaza. 
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Instead of working at finding the facilities (human and material alike) necessary to 
treat these diseases, the MoH allocated part of its budget (under the label of “Special 
Referral Abroad”, as the table above shows), for the help of Palestinians suffering 
these diseases. In so doing, the MoH demotes the sustainable development of the 
health sector, and promotes, instead, a situation where citizens became fully attached 
to it, not as a source of health care, but rather as a source of the necessary funding to 
cover the cost of their medical treatment abroad.  
 
There is a very complicated formal bureaucratic procedure Palestinians have to go 
through before their request for financial support for medical treatment abroad is 
approved.590  Thus many Palestinians - bearing in mind their culture stressing 
informality at the expense of formality - tend to use informal channels to have their 
request approved. This leads to some Palestinians (mainly those who have 
connections with the PA and other power centers) enjoying this privilege and the 
denial to others of this privilege (i.e. those who lack connections with the PA). All of 
this sustains the “neopatrimonial” system (discussed in full in chapter III), which, 
among other things, asserts the customary law based on personal connection at the 
expense of civil law based on legal and formal relations. 
 
The Palestinian Education Sector: Background  
 
A major aspect of the school system in the WBGS is its four-phase structure. Students 
have to go through four phases before attending higher academic institutions. The first 
phase is the kindergarten education for children four to five years old. The second 
phase is elementary education for children aged six or more. The successful 
completion of this phase, which lasts for six years, enables students to move to the 
three-year preparatory phase. Upon the successful completion of the three-year 
preparatory phase students start the three-year secondary phase. With the completion 
of this phase, and the student’s success in the General Secondary Education 
Certificate Examination (or Tawjihi as Palestinians call it), students become eligible 
to attend higher academic institutions.  
 
                                                 
590 MoH. Health Status, op.cit., P.51. 
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Similar to health services, education services are supplied by three sectors: (1) 
UNRWA, (2) the governmental sector, and (3) the private sector. While the private 
sector operates mainly fee-paying kindergartens, secondary and vocational schools,591 
UNRWA - as discussed in chapter II- undertook to supply Palestinians with education 
services soon after the inception of the state of Israel in 1948 without charge.  
 
Since then UNRWA has operated two educational programs: a) the Six Year 
Elementary Program; and b) the Three Year Preparatory Program. UNRWA did not 
operate any secondary school program, excluding some vocational programs. In that 
time- as we have seen in chapter II-most of the secondary schools were private ones, 
run by some Christian and religious institutions and concentrated mainly in Ramallah 
and Jerusalem. In that time, only the ayan had access to these schools. 
 
After the Israeli occupation of the WBGS in 1967, Israel was inspired by political 
considerations to make secondary education available to all refugees (see chapter II). 
Israel operated these schools parallel to some elementary and preparatory schools 
(mainly for the original residents of the WBGS). While Israel did so, UNRWA 
remained, operating the six-year elementary program alongside the three-year 
preparatory program, mainly for refugees. 
 
In the academic year 1989-1990, UNRWA operated 251 schools with 3,326 class 
sections distributed among elementary, preparatory, and vocational education. In that 
year, no less than 136,254 students enrolled in UNRWA schools with a pupil-school 
ratio of nearly 543 pupils per school, and pupil-class ratio of 40.9 per class. The 
following table illustrates figures relating to pupils at each education level in schools.  
                                                 
591 In the academic year 1979-1980, for instance, the private sector operated 195 educational 
institutions (kindergarten, vocational and secondary schools) with 930 classes enrolled by 48,180 
pupils. See Meir Shamgar (ed.). Military Government in the Territories Administered by Israel, 1967-
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Total 251 136,254 3,326 542.8 40.9 
 
 
Statistical Yearbook 1989-1990. Vienna/Austria: Department of Education /UNRWA, No. 26, 31 
December 1990, P.16. 
 
 As a general rule, UNRWA follows the same curriculum as the government 
schools of the countries in which it operates. Since the West Bank and Gaza Strip 
were under the Jordanian and Egyptian rule respectively in the period of 1948-
1967, UNRWA followed the Jordanian curriculum and examination system in 
the West Bank, and the Egyptian curriculum and examination system in the 
Gaza Strip. This was in the period of 1948-1967. When Israel occupied the 
WBGS in 1967, Israel wanted to allow Palestinians to enjoy some sort of 
autonomy in the civil fields, among which was the education field. This tendency 
went in parallel with Moshe Dayan’s policy of “non-intervention” in Palestinian 
civil affairs (as we discussed in chapter II). Accordingly, UNRWA continued to 
follow the Jordanian and Egyptian curriculum and examination system in the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip respectively.  
 
Most of UNRWA’s teaching staff was recruited from among the local community. In 
the academic year 1989-1990, there were 4,130 Palestinian teachers working in 
UNRWA schools (2,535 in elementary schools, 1,445 in preparatory schools, and 168 
in vocational schools). Of the 4,130 teachers, 1,414 were from the West Bank (838 in 
elementary schools, 481 in preparatory schools, and 95 in vocational schools), and the 
 241
remaining 2,716 were from the Gaza Strip (1697 in elementary schools, 964 in 
preparatory schools, and 73 in vocational schools).592 Some of these teachers were 
trained by UNRWA within the context of “pre-service teacher training”, or “in-
service teacher training”. In 1989, UNRWA spent approximately US$ 35,718,000 on 
the salaries of Palestinian teachers employed in its schools and on training these 
teachers, within the context of the above mentioned programs. The table below 
illustrates the items of UNRWA expenditure in 1989. 
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  - Preparatory  
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Teacher training 














Total  35,718,823    
   
Source: Ibid, Pp. 15, 16, 28. 
Parallel to UNRWA schools were the governmental schools. The Israeli government, 
as mentioned above, operated schools for the three education levels; elementary, 
preparatory, and secondary. While the government’s elementary and preparatory 
schools were confined only to the original residents of the WBGS, the government’s 
secondary schools were available to refugees as well. In the academic year of 1979-
1980, for instance, the Israeli government operated 894 schools in which 264,065 
pupils were enrolled, distributed between West Bank and the Gaza Strip as the table 
below shows. 
 











West Bank 790 5,761 199,437 252.5 34.6 
Gaza Strip 104 1,659 64,632 621.5 38.5 
Total 894 7420 264,065 295.3 34.6 
 
Source:  Shamgar (ed.), op.cit., P.445. 
 
 
                                                 
592 Statistical Yearbook 1989-1990, op.cit., P.16. 
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At least 10,786 Palestinians (8,316 in the West Bank, and 2,470 in the Gaza Strip) 
were employed by the government as teachers and administrators to run these 
schools.593 It seems highly unlikely that the number of government schools in the 
WBGS witnessed any increases during the period of 1980-1994. In fact the contrary 
might be the case. Sara Roy, for instance, noted a breakdown in the number of schools 
operated by the government in the Gaza Strip in this period. According to Roy, there 
were only 87 schools operated by the government in the academic year of 1984-1985.  
These schools, which formed up to 1,683 classes, were distributed among the three 
education levels as following; 42 schools for elementary education, 23 for preparatory 
education, and 22 for secondary education. The government schools in 1984/1985 are 
illustrated by the following table. 
 






Elementary 42 992 40,889 973.5 41.2 
Preparatory 23 278 10,820 470.4 38.9 
Secondary 22 413 16,466 748.5 39.9 
Total 87 1683 68,175 783.6 40.5 
 
Source: Based on Roy. The Gaza Strip, op.cit., P.93 
 
Roy’s figures might serve as a solid base to infer the overall educational policy of 
Israel toward the WBGS from 1980 onwards. As discussed in chapter II, this period 
was the period of the Right Wing (the Likud party) rule in Israel. During this period, 
Israel radicalized its measures towards Palestinian autonomous institutions, among 
which were the educational ones. Thus, the Israeli Civil Administration was founded 
in November 1981 to administer Palestinian civilian affairs. The civil administration 
was subjected to, and authorized by the area commander to issue second hand 
legislation in issues related to the civil affairs of Palestinians (See chapter II). 
 
Drawing on these authorities and powers, the Israeli Civil Administration assumed 
strict control and supervision over Palestinian civil affairs, and their institutional 
manifestations including schools. Accordingly, we can assume that Israel had no 
interest in developing schools in this period. This implies that the total number of 
government schools for all education levels is estimated at no more than 877 schools 
                                                 
593 Shamgar (ed.), op.cit.,  P.444 
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(790 in the West Bank, as Shamgar concluded in 1980, and 87 in the Gaza Strip as 
Roy concluded in 1985).  
 
Bearing in mind the civil administration’s attitude towards Palestinian autonomy as 
discussed above, and parallel to the eruption of the intifada in the period 1987-1993, 
we can assume that the number of schools operated by the government witnessed no 
changes in the period 1984/85-1993/94. In other words, the number of governmental 
schools remained the same in the academic year 1993/94 as it was in the academic 
year 1984/85 (877 schools). Given this number, we conclude that there was a 
breakdown in the number of government schools in the period of 1980-1994 (from 
894 in 1979/80 to 877 in 1993/94). This breakdown led to a high ratio of pupils per 
class (the ratio was 34.6 pupils per class in 1980, rose to 40.5 in the Gaza Strip in 
1984/85, and of course- providing our above-mentioned conclusions- also rose in the 
period of 1984-1994 in both the West Bank and Gaza Strip). 
 
The difficulties encountered within the Palestinian education system under the 
occupation were not confined only to the high pupil-class ratio, but also included the 
strict watch of the Israeli civil administration over the educational materials employed 
in the schools. All books and subjects that dealt with Palestinian history, geography, 
politics and folklore, were banned. The word “Palestine” was removed from school 
maps, and replaced by the word “Israel”. In addition, the civil administration denied 
Palestinian schools the right to enjoy the educational facilities and equipment 
necessary for any educational process concerning subjects such as efficient sewage 
system, computer labs, chemical materials, adequate class buildings, and laboratories 
Ali Khalifa, Director-General of Education Planning at the Palestinian Ministry of 
Education, who worked as an educational instructor under the occupation, pointed 
out: 
 
“The overall goal of the occupation’s educational policy was the destruction of the 
Palestinian national identity, through weakening the national consciousness among 
Palestinians. The means for realizing this goal was the education curriculum. The 
occupation reproduced this curriculum to support its interest over that of Palestinians. 
In the meanwhile, they did very little to improve and develop the educational 
facilities, in a manner that left the whole educational process suffering.”594
 
                                                 
594 Interview.  Gaza: Ministry of Education., 25 September 2004. 
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During the first intifada (1987-1993) the conditions of Palestinian schools 
deteriorated considerably. As we have seen in chapter II, the occupation -in parallel to 
the policy of collective punishment- imposed formal mass closure on the West Bank 
schools and spot closures on the Gaza Strip schools from February 1988. This 
measure deprived thousands of Palestinian pupils of their right to education, and 
thereby, endangered their academic future.   
 
Israeli measures toward Palestinian schools were similar to their measures toward the 
higher academic institutions. Most of these institutions, emerged in the early 1970s, 
suffered the same restrictions as schools. The civil administration, for instance, 
empowered itself with the right to license the Palestinian universities annually. No 
university was allowed to operate new departments, programs or colleges without 
prior permission from the civil administration. In most cases, such permission was 
denied. In a similar fashion to its measures against schools, the civil administration 
assumed strict watch over the universities’ educational materials, and many books in 
fields like philosophy, Palestinian history, politics and folklore were banned.  
 
Furthermore, the civil administration used to close these institutions regularly, and to 
deport their college members under the pretext of security. In the period of December 
1986-April 1987, the civil administration’s measures against these institutions were 
extremely radicalized when three students from Beir Zeit University were shot to 
death by the occupation forces (For more details on Israeli measures towards the 
higher academic institutions see chapter II). During the intifada, the occupation 
authorities completely closed these institutions, thus causing serious difficulty in 
enrolling the more than 40,000 Palestinian students who had graduated from 
secondary schools during the four year period when the universities were closed.595  
 
Similar to the health sector, therefore, the PA inherited a very regressive education 
sector from Israel, and thus was required to address very complicated problems in the 
education system. Among these problems was the lack of equipment and facilities 
necessary to run schools, and more importantly, as Khalifa pointed out, the lack of 
adequate and qualified teaching staff. The later problem resulted from the occupation 
                                                 
595 See UN. Life of the Palestinians Under Israeli Occupation. Report of the Special Committee to 
Investigate the Israeli Practices Affecting the Human Rights of Palestinians People and other Arabs of 
the Occupied Territories, January 1992, P.27. 
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policy which denied all Palestinian teachers the opportunity to pursue advanced 
training courses, and excluded University-degree holders from employment in the 
schools in favor of Tawjihi (General Secondary Education Certificate Examination) or 
two-year diploma holders.596  
The Palestinian Ministry of Education: A New Chapter in the Educational 
Life of Palestinians 
 
During the first three years of the PA’s existence (1994-1997) donors disbursed 
approximately US$ 237,904,000 for the support of the PA education sector. This 
formed up to 71.6% of the total Donors commitment to the same sector (US$ 
334,775,000) for the same period.597 The majority of these funds was invested in 
implementing education projects like the establishment of new schools and school 
maintenance. In this regard, the Palestinian Economic Council for Development and 
Reconstruction, or PECDAR, played a crucial role in implementing these projects in 
coordination with the ministry of education and donors (the European Union, 
Germany, Japan, France, and Switzerland were the chief financial supporters of the 
education sector during this period.)598  
 
As result of this, the number of government schools in the WBGS had increased 
significantly. From the academic year 1994/95 to the academic year 2000/2001, the 
number of government schools for all education levels increased from 1084 to 1343 
schools.599 Bearing in mind that the Israeli civil administration operated 877 schools 
around the date of the PA’s arrival to the WBGS, it becomes clear that there was a 
rise in the number of government sector schools by more than 19.4% by the academic 
year 1994/95, and by more than 53% by the academic year 2000/01. 
 
This development implies an expansion in the number of classes available to pupils, 
and thereby, a reduction in the ratio of pupils per class in comparison to the 
occupation era. In the academic year 1995/96, the pupils-class ratio in the government 
                                                 
596 Interview.  Gaza: Ministry of Education., 25 September 2004. 
597 See MOPIC’s 1997 Third Quarterly Monitoring Report of Donor Assistance. Gaza: MOPIC, 
October 1997, (unpublished report). 
598 Ibid. 
599 Figures from Palestinian Ministry of Education. <http://www.mohe.gov.ps> 
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elementary and preparatory schools is estimated at 36.2 pupils per class. The ratio 
shifted down in 2000/01 to 36.1 pupils per class. The conditions of the secondary 
schools seemed relatively better, as only 32.3 pupils occupied one class in the 
academic year 1995/96. The number shifted down in 2000/01, with only 31.5 pupils 
per class. The figure below illustrates the changes in the number of schools, pupil-
school ratio, and pupil-class ratio, in the period of 1995/96-2000/01. 
 
Year 
             Education level 
1995/96 2000/01 
 Secondary 
             No. of schools 
               No. of Pupils 
              Pupils-school ratio 











Basic(Elementary & Preparatory) 
       No. of schools 
      No. of pupils 
     Pupils-school ratio 













Source: Based on Palestinian Ministry of Education <http://www.mohe.gov.ps> & PCBS. Statistical 
Abstract, op.cit.,  Pp. 227, 228, 230, 234. 
 
Parallel to the reduction in the pupil-class ratio, there was an increase in the number 
of teachers per pupil. In the academic year (1995/96) the number of teachers is 
estimated at 14,742. The number shifted in 2000/2001 to reach 22,953,600 and thereby, 
the ratio of pupils-teacher decreased to 26.8 pupils per teacher.  
 
The improvement in the education sector was not confined to the expansion in school 
establishments, but extended to include the higher academic institutions. By the 
academic year 2000/2001, the number of these institutions is estimated at 40.  There 
were 11 universities, 5 colleges (offering four-year Bachelor’s degrees), and 24 
community colleges (offering two-year diplomas). At least 4,838 Palestinians were 
employed in these institutions.601 This included the teaching staff (2,343) and the 
administrative staff (2,495). These employees run a post-secondary educational 
system that in 2000/2001 provided for over 80,543 students.602  
 
                                                 
600 PCBS. Statistical Abstract, op.cit., P.233. 
601 Figures from Palestinian Ministry of Education. <http://www.mohe.gov.ps> 
602 Ibid 
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In the 2000/2001 academic year the ministry of education was running an educational 
process for no less than 696,101 Palestinians (615,558 in primary and secondary 
education & 80,543 in higher education). To run the process successfully, the ministry 
organized more than 1,653 training courses and workshops covering a total of 12,680 
working days in the period of 1995-2000. 37,700 teachers/administrators benefited 
from the ministry’s training courses and workshops in the same period. Furthermore, 
at least 1,970 Palestinian headmasters were trained by the ministry in the same 
period.603  
 
Parallel to its efforts aiming at developing human resources capacity, the ministry 
revised the recruitment policy as far as teachers are concerned. Unlike the occupation 
era when the preference was given for the Tawjihi (General Secondary Education 
Certificate Examination) two-year diploma holders, the ministry recruited school 
teachers mainly among university or graduate degree holders. In the academic year 
2000/01, for instance, at least 63.3% of the total ministry school teachers were 
university or graduate degree holders (out of the 22,952 teachers, 12,828 were 
university-degree holders, 1,029 graduate-diploma holders, and 459 Masters 
holders).604   
 
Alongside this policy was the ministry’s policy of supplying schools with equipment 
and facilities necessary for any education process like; laboratories, computer rooms, 
chemical materials, adequate libraries, class buildings, and so forth. Up to the 
academic year 1999/2000, for instance, approximately 1,842 new classes were added 
to government schools (not to mention the new schools built by the ministry). In 
addition, at least 412 classes were improved, and 150 sewage units were built. 
Furthermore, new libraries were opened in 40% of government schools, and new 
science laboratories in 42%, and computers labs were introduced to 30% of 
government schools.605   
 
                                                 
603 See Ministry of Education. Al Khita El Khamsyah Li El Ta’leem fi Falistine (The Five-year Plan for 
Education in Palestine). Gaza: Ministry of Education, December, 2000, P.12. 
604 See Ministry of Education. El Ta’leem Li El Jame’a: El Waqie’ wi El Tahdyaat.  (Education for All: 
Facts and Challenges). Gaza: Ministry of Eductaion, 1th part, 2004, P.55. 
605 Ministry of Education. Al Khita El Khamsyah, op.cit., Pp12-13. 
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Of vital importance was the ministry’s success in convening the first unified 
examination of Tawjihi for the West Bank and Gaza Strip under full Palestinian 
supervision. This was in the academic year 1994/95. Up to that year Palestinians from 
the West Bank and Gaza Strip had experienced two systems of examination (the 
Egyptian system for Gaza Strip Palestinians, and Jordanian system for West Bank 
Palestinians). From that year onwards, the ministry assumed the responsibility of 
designing the examination system of Tawjihi, and Palestinian teachers began to 
correct Tawjihi exams (in the past Egyptian teachers corrected the exams for the Gaza 
Strip students, while Jordanian teachers corrected exams for the West Bank students).  
 
Since its foundation, therefore, the Palestinian ministry of education had succeeded in 
setting up new schools, building new classes, raising educational human resources 
capacity, and improving education conditions (in the sense of pupil-class ratio, pupil-
teacher ratio, and education facilities and equipment). To achieve all this, the ministry 
divided itself into seventeen General-Directorates, out of which thirteen run school 
education (elementary, preparatory, and secondary education), and four run higher 
education (university, college education). In each Palestinian governorate (the WBGS 
are divided into sixteen governorates, out of which eleven governorates are in the 
West Bank, and 5 governorates are in the Gaza Strip) an education directorate was 
founded. The minister, who is considered the highest authority at the ministry, is 
assisted by a deputy minister, who is in turn assisted by three assistant deputy 
ministers.  
 
The three assistant deputy ministers directly supervise the educational process.  Two 
of them supervise the educational process at the primary and secondary school level; 
one for the Gaza Strip, and the other for the West Bank. For this reason the directors 
of each education directorate were appointed at the governorate level to facilitate 
reporting to the two assistant deputy ministers.  The third assistant deputy minister 
supervises higher education. In this regard, he directs the four General-Directorates of 
the higher education at the ministry (D.G. of higher education, D.G. of scientific 
research and development, D.G. for university education, D.G. for technical and 
vocational training).  
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The three assistant deputy ministers are required to report regularly to the deputy 
minister, who, alongside his duties to follow up the work of his three assistants, 
supervises five committees in the ministry (examination committee, educational 
committee, curriculum committee, accreditation and quality assurance committee, and 
committee for loans). The deputy minister reports to the highest authority, the 
minister, who directly supervises the council for higher education and the council for 
scientific research in addition to his supervision of his deputy.606
 
The ministry recruited 5,910 Palestinians to run its work. This number excludes 
ministry teachers but includes administrators (3,263), technicians (531), employees 
(83), and janitors/cleaning staff (2033).607 As with the case of the ministry of health, 
the spending on staff salaries consumed the largest portion of the ministry’s 
expenditure since its establishment in 1994.  In 1997/98, for instance, the spending on 
staff salaries (including teachers) was estimated at US$ 130 million. This formed up 
to 67% of the ministry’s total expenditure for the same year (estimated at US$ 194 
million). The same trend is noticed in the following years of 1998/99, 1999/00, and 
2000/01. In these years, the spending on staff salaries is estimated at 75.2% (US$ 140 
million), 74% (US$ 157 million), and 73.2% (US$ 189 million) of the ministry’s total 
expenditure for these years respectively (the ministry’s total expenditure was US$ 186 
million, US$ 212 million, and US$ 284 for 1998/99, 1999/00, 2000/01 
respectively).608
   
As result of spending a large portion of its budget on staff salaries, the ministry of 
education experienced a serious financial deficit in the period of 1997-2000. As we 
mentioned above, the ministry’s total expenditure is estimated at US$ 876 million in 
the period of 1997-2001. This exceeded the US$ 433.385 million that had been 
allocated to it by the ministry of finance in the period of 1997-2001).609   
 
                                                 
606 See the ministry’s organizational chart on the official webpage of the ministry 
http://www.mohe.gov.ps 
607 Ministry of Education. El Ta’leem Li El Jame’a, op.cit., P.56. 
608 Ministry of Education. Al Khita El Khamsyah, op.cit., P.28. 
609 The allocation of the Ministry of Finance to Ministry of eductaion  in the period 1995-2000 was as 
follows: US$ 111.781 million in 1995, US$ 118.788 million in 1996, US$ 137.221 in 1997, US$ 
145.936 Million in 1998, US$ 48.522 million in 1999, US$ 51.032 million in 2000, and US$ 50.672 
million in 2001. Source: Ministry of Finance, Gaza. 
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Though donors allocated US$ 164.2 million to the education sector in the same period 
or so, this allocation was not sufficient to cover the ministry’s deficit.610 Because of 
this, the ministry failed to provide 60% of governmental schools with libraries, and 
58.4% with science laboratories. In the meanwhile, it failed to introduce computers 
labs in 76% of West Bank schools, and 65% of Gaza Strip schools by 2000 or so.611   
 
To deal with this problem and other similar ones, the ministry envisaged a five-year 
plan (2000/001-2004/05) for the development of primary and secondary education in 
2000. The plan set up five goals, the most important of which were to improve the 
quality of education and to rationalize the ministry’s system of administration. To 
realize its first goal, the plan proposed training programs to develop human resources 
capacity, and projects to develop material resources capacity. At human resources 
capacity level, the following training programs were proposed; 
 
- A training program for in-service teachers and headmasters with a total of 30 
training hours annually, and a training program for newly employed teachers with a 
total of 60 training hours annually.  
- A training program for the ministry’s junior and senior staff, with a total of 45 and 
90 training hours annually respectively. 
- Training courses in leadership covering no less than 25% of the Palestinian schools 
annually, and finally; 
- 100 (within-country) scholarships every year, for graduates studies programmes for 
teachers.612  
 
At the material resources capacity level, the plan proposed, among other things, the 
following projects; 
A) Building 4 training centers for teachers, 10 resources centers, one technological 
center, and one center for documentation. 
B) Equipping 150 schools with libraries, 150 schools with science laboratories, 
250 schools with computer rooms, upgrading 100 existing libraries, and 100 
laboratories, and a minimum of 250 schools with computer labs.613  
                                                 
610 Ministry of Education. Al Khita El Khamsyah, op.cit., P.31 
611 Ibid.P.13. 
612 Ibid., P.21. 
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To meet the expected demand for educational services in the period of 2000/01-
2004/05, the plan proposed the construction of a further 243 schools with 3,539 class 
rooms, and the recruitment of a further 5,500 teachers.614 The cost of constructing 
these facilities, over and above the expenditure on staff salaries (including teachers) 
and the cost of realizing the above-mentioned sub-goals, and other plan goals, were 
estimated by the ministry at US$ 1,433 million.615 In fact this high budget remained 
the chief obstacle for the plan’s success. To cover this budget, the ministry proposed 
an increase in its share of the total PA budget from 17% to 19.5%, to be effective 
from 2000 onward.   
 
More importantly, the ministry proposed a significant increase in the donors’ 
allocation to the education sector over the plan’s years, in a manner that leaves the 
donors’ commitment equal to the ministry’s expenditure by 2004/05.616 But bearing in 
mind that the donors’ disbursement or allocation to education sector is estimated at 
71.6% of their commitment to the sector for the period of 1994-1997 (as mentioned 
above), it seems unlikely that the donors were going to allocate as much as they 
(donors) committed. This can be better understood if it is known that the ministry 
asked donors to allocate any future funds for the planed activities only.  
 
Fully aware of the donors’ possible reluctance to support the plan, the plan’s 
designers proposed the rationalization of the ministry’s system of administration as a 
step toward rationalizing ministry expenditure, and thereby, securing part of the funds 
necessary to cover the planed budget.617 This goal, set up as one of the plan’s chief 
goals (as noted above), reflected the awareness of the plan’s designers of the negative 
ramifications of the absence of definite internal hierarchical arrangements, and a well-
developed functional specialization in the ministry. Though the ministry is considered 
the least corrupt among various PA ministries and public institutions (in terms of 
ministry recruitment criteria and procedures) it continued to suffer from duplication 
                                                                                                                                            
613 Ibid., P.22. 
614 Ibid. P.25 & Al Khita El Khamsyah Al-Tatwiryah Al-Olah, 2001/2005: Mwjz Tawdihi (The first 
developmental five-year plan: brief description). Gaza: Ministry of Education, P.3 
615 See Ministry of Education. Al Khita El Khamsyah, op.cit., P.33. 
616 See Ibid., Pp.29-31 
617 Ibid., P.23. 
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and the lack of demarcation among the roles and responsibilities of its civil servants 
and various departments.618   
 
Consequently, the plan’s designers called for the reconsideration of the ministry’s 
civil servants’ functions and mandates, and for a redefinition of the ministry’s internal 
regulations and rules.  The main obstacle for realizing this goal was the absence of the 
qualified human resources to carry out the program of rationalization (reform), 
notwithstanding the availability of thousands of Palestinian personnel of former 
Israeli civil administration at the ministry’s disposal. Though these personnel 
accumulated some professional skills due to their work in the Israeli civil 
administration, most of them were still missing skills necessarily located at the heart 
of any administration – such as the ones in relation to policy formulation, planning, 
decision making, and so forth.619 Most of them were denied senior management posts 
in the Israeli civil administration, and thus, were unprepared to create fundamental 
changes in the system of administration of PA ministries.  
 
In addition to the lack of necessary human resources to make it successful, the 
program itself clashed with the will of the political leadership which - as we have seen 
in chapter III - had sown the seeds of the “neopatrimonial” system with its features 
such as the importance of interpersonal relationships in the bureaucratic system, and 
the operation on the basis of informal criteria for hiring and promotion at the expense 
of the formal-legal criteria. 
 
The plan, therefore, had to encounter challenges at three levels; the financial level, 
human resources level, and finally the political level. With the outbreak of the Al-
Aqsa intifada on 28 September 2000, the future of the plan became uncertain, and the 
plan seemed unlikely to be implemented. The execution of the plan became 
conditional on the Israeli measures imposed on Palestinians during the intifada.  
 
                                                 
618 On 27 February 1997, the local daily of Al-Risalah published an interview with Jarrar Kidwa, head 
of the General Monitoring Commission (GMC) in which he asserts that most PA ministries and public 
institutions suffered the overlapping of their civil servants’ responsibilities. Despite this, he considered 
the ministry of education as the least among these ministries and instutions to recruit its empolyees 
through informal channels (e.g, nepotism). See Al-Risalah on 27 February 1997.  
619 Yezid Sayigh & Khalil Shikaki. Strenghtening Palestinian Public Institution. Task Force: Council 
on Foreign Relations, June, 1999, P.44. Online <http://www.cfr.org/pdf/palinstfull.htm1> 
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These measures - the most humiliating of which consisted of the military checkpoints 
on the main roads between the towns, cities, villages, and camps of WBGS - denied 
Palestinians the right to free movement between their cities, towns, villages, and 
camps. Without exception all Palestinians were affected by this measure including; 
the general public, PLC members, PA senior & junior officials, university and school 
students, merchants, businessmen, and in some cases PA ministers and heads of PA 
security forces. The checkpoint system, together with the regular shelling of and the 
incursions into the camps, towns, and cities, have created an environment in which it 
has become increasingly difficult for any ministry to execute its plans and programs, 
and even to assume its daily responsibilities. 
The Palestinian Ministry of Social Affairs: Ineffective Social Security 
Scheme 
 
In October 1991 the UN’s special committee to investigate Israeli practices affecting 
the human rights of Palestinians people and other Arabs of the Occupied Territories 
concluded its annual report on the political, security, economic, and social conditions 
of the Palestinians of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The report pointed out that 
Israel-since its occupation of the WBGS in 1967- had adopted systematic measures of 
violating the basic human rights of Palestinians.  
 
These measures included the destruction of Palestinian houses, ill-treatment and 
torture of Palestinians under detention, including children and minors, collective 
punishment and mass arrest, the confiscation of Palestinian land for settlement 
purposes, the interference in the Palestinians system of education, economic and 
social development, and the denial of the Palestinian right to freedom of religion.620 
The report asserted that these measures had escalated since the outbreak of the first 
intifada in 1987, leaving 53.7% of the Palestinian land and 83% of the water 
resources under the Israeli control by 1990.621  
 
Parallel to this was the Israeli occupation forces’ policy of firing at both Palestinian 
civilians and members of the resistance. During the period of December 1987-1992, at 
least 1,032 Palestinians - the report documented- were killed (most of them by 
                                                 
620 See UN. Life of the Palestinians, op.cit., P.9. 
621 Ibid., Pp.17-18. 
 254
shooting), and over 121,000 were injured by Israeli occupation forces. Also, more 
than 15,000 Palestinians were placed under administrative detention for periods up to 
six months without charge or trial during the same period. Moreover, 66 Palestinians 
were deported for “security reasons” (more than 1,300 since 1967). As far as the 
curfew days and house destruction are concerned, the report documents over 11,000 
days of curfews, and the destruction of over 21,000 houses.622  
 
Israeli measures brought hardship to the economic life of Palestinians as well. Due the 
policy of curfew which confined Palestinians, on a 24-hour basis, to their homes for 
several weeks at a time, many Palestinians were cut off from their jobs (employment 
inside Israel for instance), and the number of those employed by Israel decreased by 
2% in 1989 in comparison to the pre-intifada era.623  
 
With the outbreak of the first Gulf-War in 1991, and the supportive attitude of the 
PLO to the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, Gulf rulers cut off their donations to the PLO, 
and dismissed thousands of Palestinians employed in their countries. In so doing, Gulf 
rulers deprived Palestinians from the WBGS of some US$ 576 million - the estimated 
drop in remittances from Palestinians employed in these countries.624 This fact, 
coupled with the policy of closure, adopted since 1991, which effectively denied 
thousands of Palestinians the ability to work inside Israel, brought serious hardship to 
the living conditions. It left no less than 18.2% of WBGS Palestinians (the estimated 
rate of unemployment due to the closure policy in 1994 or so625) without any source 
of income. 
 
Within the context of these difficult economic and social conditions the Palestinian 
Ministry of Social Affairs was asked to operate from 1994. The ministry was asked to 
deal with the serious social problems resulting from the occupation’s measures 
(economic, political, and security measures). As we have seen, hundreds of 
Palestinian families lost their sons, fathers, and other relatives since the Israeli 
occupation of the WBGS. Tens of thousands of others suffered from the detention of 
                                                 
622 Ibid., P.59. 
623 Ibid., P.23. 
624 Ibid., P.33. 
625 See PCBS. Labour Force Survey (April-June, 2004) Round (Q2/2004). Ramallah/Palestine: July 
2004, P.17 
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their relatives by the Israeli forces. Hundreds of thousands of Palestinians were 
injured, out of which tens thousands were left disabled.  
 
Two factors enabled the ministry of social affairs to assume a rapid and relatively 
smooth takeover of services delivery in the social sector; (1) the availability of nearly 
400 Palestinian personnel of the former Israeli civil administration’s social sector, and 
(2) the return of no less than 60 personnel of the employees of the PLO’s social affairs 
department to the WBGS in 1994. These personnel, together with some 200 local 
social specialists- formed the nucleus of the ministry.626  
 
Over the years of their work, these personnel accumulated skills concerning the 
delivery of social services. The 400 personnel of the former Israeli civil 
administration, for example, used to run 5 centers for blind and handicapped children, 
and 15 juvenile centers under the Israeli civil administration’s supervision. In a 
similar fashion, the 60 personnel of the PLO’s social department used to supply social 
services for more than 25,000 Palestinian families (mainly the families of martyrs) in 
the diaspora.627
 
The availability of these skills enabled the ministry to set up its first building block; 
the Higher Council for Policy Formulation (HCPF). The HCPF was franchised right 
to set up the ministry’s overall goals, and strategies. Within this context, the HCPF-
which consisted of the minister, deputy-minister, and eight director-generals, set up 
no less than fourteen goals, the most important of which were to alleviate poverty, to 
support families of martyrs, injuries, and detainees, to defend children and women’s 
rights, and to achieve social development. The means to realize these goals were a 
group of programs for the support of needy families, families of martyrs, the injured, 
and detainees, as well as women and children, the handicapped, and orphans.628  
 
To carry out these programs, twelve directorates were founded in the ministry. At the 
same time, in each Palestinian governorate an office for the ministry was founded 
(sixteen offices were founded in the sixteen Palestinian governorates of the WBGS). 
                                                 
626 Interview with Mahmmoud Muteer, Acting Deputy-Minister of Social Affairs. Gaza: Ministry of 




Each directorate was divided into several departments, with an average of six 
departments for each directorate. A director-general stands at the head of each 
directorate, controlling and supervising the heads of his directorate’s departments. In 
this sense the ministry has twelve directors-general (for the directorates), and seventy 
department heads (for the departments).629  
 
Together with the junior staff, the number of the ministry’s civil servants is estimated 
at 1,438 civil servants.630 These servants are asked to carry out their daily 
responsibilities specified by the HCPF to realize the above-mentioned goals of the 
ministry. During the period of 1995-1999, these servants dealt with over 73,108 cases 
serving 275,642 Palestinians.631  
 
Of this, were approximately 29,477 cases (excluding the families of martyrs, the 
injured, and detainees) receiving constant monthly material, cash, and health aid. 
These cases ranged between the handicapped, divorced and widows, aged personnel, 
and others. The following table illustrates the type of each targeted group, and the 































Source: Cabinet Office. Cabinet Reports on PNA Ministries: 1997-1998. Palestine: Cabinet Office, 
September 1998, P.101. 
 
 
The aid provided to each of these social cases is estimated at NIS 80 as monthly 
material aid, NIS 180 as monthly cash aid, NIS 40 as monthly health insurance aid, 
and  NIS 50 as monthly education aid for each student of the needy families (the 
                                                 
629 Ibid. 
630 The ministry of social affairs is ranked the first among other PA ministries and public institutions as 
far as the number of female civil servants is concerned. Out of the 1438 of the ministry’s civil servants, 
there are 634 femal (more than 44%) in comparsion to 795 male (more than 55%). Source: Ministry of 
Social Affairs, Gaza. 
631 Source: Ibid. 
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number of needy families students is estimated at 69,000 students).632 Combining 
these figures with the number of cases, the following table illustrates the total cost of 
each type of aid for all cases per month and year: 
 
Type of Aid Monthly cost per 
case (in NIS) 
Annual cost/case 
(in NIS) 
Annual cost for all 
cases (in NIS) 
Value of  Annual 
cost in US $ (US$ 1= 
NIS 4) for all cases
Material 80 960 28,297,920 7,074,480 
Cash 180 2,160 63,670,320 15,917,580 
Health Insurance 40 480 14,148,960 3,537,240 
Education 50 600 41,400,000 10,350,000 
Total 350 4200 147,517,200 36,879,300 
  
 
In addition to aids provided to these social groups, were the aids and care provided to 
families of martyrs, the injured, and detainees. These aids and care are provided 
mainly by the Institute of Martyrs, Injured, and Detainees’ Families. Since its 
foundation in 1994, the institute – which follows the minister directly – had dealt with 
approximately 7,178 cases, out of which were 3,774 martyrs’ families, 1,445 injured 
persons’ families, 1,570 detainees’ families, and 398 others. These families enjoyed 
cash, health, and education care. At least NIS 345 is the estimated monthly cash aid 
for each case. Furthermore, nearly NIS 40 is spent on each case as monthly health 
insurance aid, while martyrs’ sons are exempted from the education fees. The table 
below illustrates the items of cash spending on these families, and the number of 
families of each type: 
 






Total Annual aid 
NIS 
Value in US$
Martyrs’ Families 3,774 294 3,526 13,314,672 3,328,668 
Injured Persons 1,445 256 3,072 4,439,040 1,109,760 
Detainees 1,570 602 7,224 11,341,680 2,835,420 
Others 3,98 227 2,724 1,084,152 271,038 
Total 7,178 1,379 16,548 30,179,544 7,544,886 
  
                                                                        Source: Ibid. P.108. 
 
 
                                                 




Together with the health aid of these families (estimated at NIS 287,000 monthly),633 
the total monthly aid for these families is estimated at NIS 2,763,615 monthly (NIS 
2,476,615 as average monthly cash aid plus 287,000 as monthly health aid), and NIS 
33,163,380 annually. This totals some US$ 8,290,845 annual cash and health aid for 
these families. Together with the annual aid provided to the handicapped, divorced, 
widows, and the aged (US$ 36,879,300 annually as mentioned above), there will be 
approximately US$ 45,170,145 as the average annual expenditure of the ministry on 
the needy families, aged, handicapped, divorce, widow, families of martyrs, injuries, 
detainees, and others.   
 
The care and services provided to these social groups are not confined to cash, health, 
and education services, but extend to include - in some cases - housing and 
consultation services. For example, out of the 5,827 cases of aged persons, there were 
36 cases hosted by a ministry-run house with a monthly cost of NIS 500 per case. In 
addition to this house, there are 21 institutes operated by the ministry that offer 
consultation services for aged persons. Similar services are provided to juvenile, 
within the context of the ministry’s protective and rehabilitation programs. At least 80 
juvenile benefit from these programs monthly, with average monthly aid of NIS 
700/case. The handicapped and blind children enjoy also consultation services 
alongside health and cash aid. The ministry set up seven schools and institutes for 
supporting the handicapped and blind children.  
 
These schools and institutes are: the Casablanca Handicapped Institute in the West 
Bank city of Salfeet (includes 58 children), the A’lai’a Blind School in Bethlehem 
(includes 40), the Hebron Handicapped Institute (includes 65), the Gaza-Blind 
Institute (includes 80), the Gaza Handicapped Center (120), the Dier El-Balah Blind 
Institute (includes 28), and Khan-Younis Blind institute (90). Alongside the health 
and consultation aid, are feeding services supplied by the ministry with a monthly cost 
of NIS 350/case.634 This implies NIS 168,350 as a total monthly feeding cost, and NIS 
2,020,200 (US$ 505,050) as a total annual feeding cost.  
 
                                                 
633 Ibid., P.108. 
634 Ibid., Pp.104-105. 
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Of vital importance were the ministry’s programs of rehabilitating the ex-detainees. 
These programs were first begun in July 1995 when the European Union, Switzerland, 
and Italy, disbursed US$ 18 million for the support of ex-detainees.635 The assistance 
of these countries enabled the ministry to implement these programs. During the 
period of 1995-98, approximately 24,418 ex-detainees benefited from these programs. 
The services provided to these ex-detainees varied and ranged between the coverage 
of their health insurance fees, vocational training, partial coverage of their university 
education fees, loans, jobs creation, and others. For example, approximately 12,688 
ex-detainees enjoyed health insurance free of charge for one year. Other 7,000 
received vocational training, and 50% of the university education fees were covered 
for 1,800 ex-detainees. In addition, loans (ranging between US$ 2,500-5,000) were 
granted to 1,400, and jobs were created for 1,500 ex-detainees.636  
 
 
The above-mentioned quantitative survey of ministry services and the various social 
groups benefiting from these services does not imply a ministry success in reaching 
all the needy social groups. In 1998, for instance, 20.5% of the Palestinian families 
were categorized as needy families.637 Bearing in mind the size of Palestinian 
population estimated at 2,958,579 in the same year,638 and the average size of the 
Palestinian family estimated at 6.4 (as mentioned above), then it is possible to 
conclude that there were about 462,277 families in the WBGS in 1998. Of this, there 
were 94,766 (20.5%) needy families. Providing the number of families enjoying 
constant monthly aids from the ministry in 1998 (estimated at 36,655 families 
including families of martyrs, detainees, the injured, handicapped, aged, widows, 
divorcees, and so forth, see above), it is safe to claim that only 38.6% of the needy 
families were covered by the ministry’s services up to 1998. The coverage of these 
families by the ministry services did not mean their enjoyment of proper living 
standard. As we have seen above, the average monthly aid (excluding the health and 
education aids which covered directly by the ministry in coordination with the 
concerned ministries) of the families of martyrs, the injured, and detainees is 
estimated at NIS 344 (US$ 86), while the average monthly aid (excluding health and 
                                                 
635 Ibid, P.109. 
636 Ibid. 
637 Al-Ayyam on 21 August 2000. 
638 PCBS. Statistical Abstract, op.cit., P.189. 
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education aids) of the handicapped, the aged, widows, divorcees, and others, is 
estimated at NIS 260 (US $ 65).  
 
This monthly aid covered only 10.3% of the total monthly expenditure of families of 
martyrs, the injured, and detainees. Also, it covered only 7.8% of the total monthly 
expenditure of families of handicapped, widows, and divorcees, in 1998.639  In 
addition to the fact that they lacked the minimum level of income necessary to live 
properly, these families - like other Palestinian families - suffered from the conditions 
owing to the high rate of housing density. For example, there was only one room 
available to each two persons in comparison with one room to each 0.9 person in 
Israel in 1999.640  
 
The housing conditions (in term of housing density) of the Palestinian families 
witnessed little improvement in 2000, as one room was made available to each 1.9 
persons. Despite this, the housing conditions in terms of the availability of living 
facilities remained unimproved. In 2000, at least 1.2% of the Palestinian families 
remained without a cooking stove, 1.4% lacked a kitchen, 2.3% lacked a bathroom, 
7.2% lacked a refrigerator, 10.2% lacked a connection to the public water network, 
15.5% lacked a washing machine, 31.3% lacked a solar boiler 47.2% lacked a 
connection to the public sewage network, and 97.2% lacked central heating.641  
 
These figures are clear indicators concerning the ministry’s failure to promote an 
effective social security system. It appears that two factors contributed to this failure: 
(1) the irregularity and inadequacy of the ministry’s budget, and (2) the ministry’s 
under-qualified staff. The irregularity and inadequacy of the ministry’s budget was 
clear during the period of 1995-2000. In 1995, for instance, the ministry of finance 
allocated some US$ 34.89 million to the ministry of social affairs. In the period of 
1996-1998 this sum increased to US$ 42.96 millions (in 1996), and to US$ 47.72 
million (in 1997), and to US$ 52.12 million (in 1998). But in 1999, it dropped to US$ 
50.67 million, and in 2000 it further dropped to US$ 44.14 million.642  
                                                 
639 The average monthly expenditure of the Palestinian family is estimated at 579 Jordanian Dinars 
(approximately US$ 830) in 1998. See Al-Ayyam on 24 July 1998. 
640 PCBS. Statistical Abstract, op.cit., Pp. 177,273. 
641 Ibid., Pp.271-273. 
642 Source: Ministry of Finance, Gaza.  
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This irregularity of the ministry’s budget promoted financial uncertainty, and 
therefore, made it difficult for the ministry to develop clearly defined plans. In 
addition to this problem was the inadequacy of the ministry’s budget in a manner that 
left the ministry unable to cover its annual expenditure. As the above-mentioned 
figures tell, the average annual allocation of the ministry of finance to the ministry of 
social affairs, over the period of 1995-2000, was US$ 45.4 million. 
 
Bearing in mind the ministry of social affairs’ annual expenditure on the needy 
families, families of martyrs, the injured, and detainees, and others (US$ 45,170,145 
as mentioned above), in addition to its annual expenditure on feeding the handicapped 
children hosted by its various handicapped institutes and schools (US$ 505,050), then 
we would have some US$ 45.67 million as the ministry’s annual expenditure. The 
ministry expenditure (excluding its expenditure on staff salaries and the operating 
costs) on these social groups, therefore, exceeds what is allocated to it annually by 
some US$ 270,000 (US$ 45.7 million-45.40 million)  
 
The ministry deficit increases when its expenditure on staff salaries is taken into 
account. In fact we lack any data relating to the value of the ministry expenditure on 
staff salaries. However, some statistics allow for some admittedly imperfect 
extrapolation. In 1997, for example, the average monthly salary of Palestinian civil 
servants is estimated at NIS 1,440 (US $ 360).643 Bearing in mind the number of the 
ministry’s civil servants (1,438 as mentioned before), then it is possible to estimate 
that the ministry spends approximately US$ 517,680 monthly, and US$ 6,212,160 
annually on staff salaries. This would push its annual financial deficit to some US$ 
6.5 million (on the plausible assumption that average salaries remain constant across 
ministries), not to mention the operating cost.  
 
A significant portion of the ministry expenditure on staff salaries was irrational. 
Mahmmoud Muteer, acting deputy-minister of social affairs, confirmed to me that the 
ministry-since its foundation in 1994-had recruited approximately 170 employees, 
under the label of job creation. The majority of these employees, Muteer states, were 
                                                 
643 See Majed Sbieh & Ma’moun Abu Alia. Characteristics of the Empolyees in Public & Private 
Sectors. Ramallah/Palestine: PCBS, August 2002, P.44. 
 262
ex-detainees recruited in the ministry through presidential decrees.644 According to 
above-mentioned figures these “civil servants” cost the ministry US $ 61,200 monthly 
and US$ 734,400 annually. The ministry crisis is exacerbated when it is known that 
no less than fifteen of these ex-detainees held senior management posts in the ministry 
(e.g. director-generals of a given directorate or department).645  
 
This fact has negative ramifications on the ministry’s work in two respects: (1) the 
involvement of these ex-detainees in formulating the ministry’s policy despite their 
lacking of the professional skills necessary for that (since they are revolutionaries 
rather than state builders. Most of these ex-detainees had ended education during the 
period of their detention, and thereby, failed to accumulate any professional skills); 
and (2) due to their lack of professional skills, these 15 ex-detainees, alongside those 
ex-detainees who do not held senior posts, would have little loyalty to their office. 
Together with their feeling of alienation accumulated over long years of hardship 
under detention, these ex-detainees would deal with their work in the ministry as a 
source of income without feeling any commitment towards their daily responsibilities.  
 
As far as the remaining staff of the ministry are concerned, none of them was 
recruited through a newspaper advertisement specifying the job description and the 
specifications of the vacancy. It is up to the candidate to visit the ministry and ask for 
a job. Usually, the ministry receives the applications of those seeking employment, 
and keeps them until the occasion for a job arises. In each case, the ministry calls the 
best-qualified candidates and interviews them, before selecting one or two depending 
on the number of vacancies.  
 
Interestingly enough, the ministry was highly influenced by the candidate’s living 
place when it makes a hiring decision. For example, if the ministry seeks an employee 
to fill a vacancy in its office in Ramallah, then it tends to choose among those 
applicants living in Ramallah, even if there is a more qualified applicant in Nablus. 
The reason for this is financial. In choosing the candidate from Ramallah not Nablus, 
the ministry would not have to cover the cost of his transportation, and therefore, 
                                                 
644 Interview on 27 September 2004, Gaza: Ministry of Social Affairs.  
645 Ibid. 
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would release itself from some financial burden on its limited budget. In the words of 
Muteer: 
 
 “We have a notable increase in the labor force, and at the same time, a notable 
increase in the needy families’ number. We have to absorb as much of the labour 
force as we can…but at the same time we have to meet the increasing demand for the 
ministry’s services. That is why we have to plan our limited budget so that we cover 
the demand for the ministry services whilst simultaneously contributing to the 
employment of the increasing labour force.”646
 
Though this would enable the ministry to save part of its budget for the service of 
other purposes, it left it in part bereft of the qualified personnel necessary to carry out 
its daily responsibilities, and thus promoted its failure to cover all the needy families 
with its services.  
The Palestinian Bureaucracy: Features and Characteristics 
 
On 26 February 1998, the Palestinian daily of Al-Risalah published some figures 
relating to the number of PA civil servants and their annual salaries. According to 
such figures, the number of PA civil servants and security personnel in 1996 was 
estimated at 72,000 (39,000 civil servants & 33,000 security personnel). At least US$ 
481.24 million (approximately 51.3% of PA’s 1996 budget) was spent on these 
salaries (61.7% of the was spent on civil servants and 38.3% on security personnel). 
 
Many of these civil servants - Al Risalah continued - were recruited without clearly 
defined job descriptions and task specifications. This led to a situation where these 
civil servants are on the PA’s payroll, but at the same time do nothing in their office- 
if they have any in their ministry. As a Palestinian civil servant declared: 
 
 “I have a colleague who works in the same department as mine. I see him very 
seldom in the department, twice monthly perhaps. When he comes to office he stays 
for a while, only to drink tea and to ask about the latest developments with relation to 
work. He might have another job in another place”.647  
 
 
Mostly, these “civil servants” are recruited through informal channels. These channels 
are available only to those who have relatives or other connections to personnel 
                                                 
646 Ibid. 
647 Quoted in Al-Risalah on 26 February 1998. 
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occupying senior posts in the civil and security apparatus. As demonstrated in chapter 
III, these senior civil and security personnel derived their power mainly from their 
connection to Arafat, who punishes/rewards them according to their readiness to 
cooperate. In the event of their cooperation, Arafat exhibited generosity, and 
privileged them in various ways, which included the recruitment of their relatives and 
those with whom they have connections in various PA civil and security posts.  
 
This culture of favoritism which permeates the PA has facilitated, in turn, a culture of 
systematic inefficiency in many aspects of the authority’s work. The following figures 
might support our view. In 1997, at least 60% of the WBGS thought that favoritism 
existed through the various PA civil departments, while 63% were forced to ask for 
the help of some PA officials to facilitate their contact with a given ministry or public 
institution.648
 
Due to this culture, the number of PA civil and security personnel rose steadily to 
reach nearly 98,000 personnel in 2000.649 Mohammad Abu Jarad, the deputy-minister 
of finance, asserted that thousands of these personnel were not recruited through 
institutionalized recruitment methods according to clearly defined job descriptions 
and task specifications. He estimated their number to be 20,000 by 1997.650 According 
to Abu Jarad, the PA sought to create jobs for these personnel after they lost their jobs 
inside Israel (due to the problem of closures), or failed to find a job in the private 
sector. In this sense, Abu Jarad suggests, the PA sought to help its people, and to 
promote their welfare.651
 
Though Abu Jarad’s words might reveal part of the truth, the remaining hidden part of 
such truth - admitted by Abu Jarad himself - is that the PA was from the very 
beginning preoccupied the pressure exerted by the opponents of the Oslo agreements 
(mainly Hamas and Islamic Jihad). As a result, it tended to spend a large portion of its 
revenue on recruiting support for its cause (the peace process with Israel). Through 
                                                 
648 Ibid. 
649 Concluded from  Nazieh Arman & Wafiq-Al-Natour. The Eductaional System and Labor Market 
Demand. Ramallah/Palestine: PCBC, In-depth Analysis Study Series (01), May 2002, Pp.23-24 
650 Interview. Gaza: Ministry of Finance, 21 October 2004. 
651 Ibid. 
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this spending -referred to by Abu Jarad as “politicized spending”652  - the PA 
succeeded in buying the allegiance of thousands of people after it recruited them in its 
civil and security apparatus.653
 
 
Due to this form of recruitment, it may be argued, a significant portion of PA revenue 
was wasted in an irrational way. Nevertheless, PA spending on the salaries of this 
staff was not the only from of PA irrational payoffs. Alongside it was the huge 
amount of money spent on renting governmental buildings. In 1997, for instance, the 
ministry of finance paid more than US$ 138 million to cover the cost of renting some 
PA premises for a six-month period. The sum formed up to 12.5% of the total sum 
needed for the construction of governmental complexes for all ministries.654 Parallel 
to this was the high spending on other operating costs like postage, phones, business 
travel, utilities, printing, and so forth.655 Because of this cost inefficient spending, 
important ministries like health, and education were denied the adequate funds for 
their operation, and thereby, were unable to supply people with proper services - as 
demonstrated above.  
 
The administrative anarchy of the PA’s bureaucracy, and the subsequent inefficient 
high spending, was mainly due to the absence of the political will needed for enacting 
the civil service law. As we have mentioned before the law remained not enacted up 
until the outbreak of Al-Aqsa intifada in September 2000. The PA’s failure to enact 
the law left many of its ministries lacking a clearly defined organizational structure 
that facilitated demarcation of roles. Also, it left these ministries lacking clearly 
defined job descriptions and task specifications, and a transparent mechanism for 
promotion. Consequently, thousands of PA civil servants suffered unjust work 
conditions, while thousands of others (backed by the PA) continued to enjoy extra-
privileges.  
 
Continuously, the PA justifies its inaction on implementing the civil service law by 
the lack of adequate financial resources. This justification is unreasonable, if 
considered in light of the following figures with relation to the PA’s annual revenue. 
                                                 
652 Ibid.  
653 Ibid. 
654 Al-Risalah On 27 January 1998. 
655 Palestine Report. Vol. 3, No. 1, June 13, 1997 & Vol. 6, no.8, August 11, 1999. 
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According to Abu Jarad, the deputy-minister of finance, the PA revenue from income 
tax, VAT, customs, and transfer of income taxes deducted by Israel from Palestinian 
laborers employed inside Israeli territories, is estimated at US$ 95 million monthly in 
the period of 1994-September 2000.656 This implies US$ 1.140 billion annually for 
the same period. Adding this sum to donors’ annual disbursement whose average is 
estimated at US$ 500 million in the first decade of PA existence (1994-2004),657 then 
we will have some US$ 1.640 billion annually. Adding this sum also to the revenue of 
the officially sanctioned monopolies such as the Palestinian Company for Trade 
Services (Cement Company), the Palestinian Development and Investment Company, 
the Petroleum General Commission, and Tobacco Commission,658 (the annual revenue 
from whom is estimated at some US $ 300 million annually), 659 then we will have 
approximately US$ 1.940 billion as the PA’s annual revenue in the period of 1994-
2000.  
 
This sum is not only adequate to cover the financial implications of the law, but also 
to supply Palestinians with high quality services, in particular health, social, and 
education. As we have discussed before, the cost of implementing the law for teachers 
and fourth class civil servants is estimated at US$ 7.5 million monthly (See P. 230). 
Assuming that the cost of implementing the law at the second and third class is similar 
or higher (since these servants receive higher salaries than teachers and fourth class 
civil servants), then the cost of implementing the law for all PA civil servants will be 
between US$ 15-20 million monthly, and US$ 180-240 million annually.660  This sum 
forms between 9.2-12.3% of PA annual revenue in the period of 1994-2000.  
 
Consequently, the financial justification of the non-implementation of the law should 
be ruled out. The only reason - in my view - for not implementing the law was 
political. As discussed in chapter III (Pp.156-169) the sustainability of the 
                                                 
656 Interview. Gaza: Ministry of Finance, 21 October 2004. 
657 Herald Tribune on 17 December 2004. 
658 As discussed in chapter III, these monopolies operate outside the regular budget of PA, though they 
are owned by the PA. For more details over these monopolies see chapter III. 
659 Ehrenfeld. “Where Does the Money Go, op.cit.  
660 The number US$ 15 million was obtained by adding the cost of implmenting the law for teachers 
and fourth class civil servants (US$ 7.5 million monthly) to the cost of implementing the law for third 
and second class (US$ 7.5 million monthly) assuming both costs are equal. If the cost of implmenting 
the law on the second and third class is higher, it is not expected that such costs will exceed US $ 10 
million monthly.  
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“neopatrimonial” system is reliant on the absence of any prescribed legal norms that 
might restrain the patron’s action, and weaken his capacity for using public funding 
and institutions as an instrument to gain peoples’ loyalty. The civil service law with 
its formal mechanism of recruitment and promotion emerges at odds with the patron’s 
wishes since it weakens his capacity of using the bureaucracy as an instrument to gain 
peoples’ loyalty. The patron, therefore, promotes instead an administrative anarchy 
where the misuse of office and public funds are tolerated.  
 
It is this administrative anarchy which promoted irrational appointments and 
spending- as we have seen above. It is also the one which prompted top PA officials 
to misuse or mismanage almost 40% of the PA’s 1996 budget, and to use it for their 
own benefits, according to Jarrar Kidwa, head of the General Monitoring Commission 
(GMC).661 More importantly, this administrative anarchy was the one that encouraged 
some PA officials to risk the health of the public, by supplying them with 
approximately 5,000 tons of expired flour.   
 
The issue of the expired flour dates back to the summer of 1996 when the PA 
imported 5000 tons of flour from Italy’s black markets at a very high price. The PA 
decision to buy flour from Italy’s black markets was determined, according to Abdel 
Aziz Shaheen, former minister of supply, after Israel - the chief supplier of flour to the 
WBGS since 1967 - stopped supplying Palestinians with flour due to an international 
flour crisis in that year.662  
 
The PA, therefore, was forced to buy the flour at high prices in order to meet the local 
demand for flour. However, Israel quickly re-supplied itself with high quality flour, 
and, at the same time, relatively cheap flour to the WBGS following the end of the 
crisis, months later. The ministry of supply, accordingly, preferred to stop supplying 
the imported flour in the markets in order to avoid loss.  This meant that the ministry 
should store the flour until the occasion to sell it arose. However, the ministry’s lack 
                                                 
661 The names of some of these officials were mentioned by the GMC report of 1997. Among these 
officials were Nabil Sha’ath, Minister of Planning and International Cooperation, and acting Foreign 
Minister, Jamil El Tarafi, Minister of Civil Affairs, and Ali El Qawasmi, Minister of Transportation. 
See Jerusalem Post on 25 May, 1997, & Palestine Report Vol.3, no.8, August 1, 1997 
662 Interview, 28 October 2004. 
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of proper storage places forced it to turn to the municipality of Nablus and to use the 
municipality headquarters as storage place.663  
 
The municipality of Nablus headquarters was used to store the 3000 tons assigned to 
the West Bank, out of the total of 5000 tons. Nevertheless, the fact that the 
municipality was not designed as a flour storage place caused the 3000 tons to be 
spoiled. Despite this, these tons, together with the remaining 2000 tons which were 
assigned to Gaza, were sold to merchants after having passed their expiry date. 
Moreover, they were sold to merchants without following the formal biding 
procedure. The picture looks worse when it is known that the ministry, after selling 
the flour to merchants, shut down the PA territories preventing Israeli flour from 
gaining access. In so doing, the ministry failed to implement free market principles, 
and enabled these merchants to sell the expired flour to citizens. An investigation and 
subsequent report, conducted and written by a PLC committee supported this claim in 
1997.664
 
The negative ramifications of this administrative anarchy in the Palestinian 
bureaucracy were not only confined to misuse of public funds and offices, but 
extended to include the promotion of conflicting power centres in some ministries. 
The affair of “forged citrus certificates” of the ministry of agriculture was a clear 
manifestation of this. In 1997 the most senior posts in the ministry of agriculture (the 
minister and the deputy minister posts) were occupied by Abdel El Jawad Saleh (the 
minister), and Azzam Tbeileh (the deputy-minister). While the former is considered to 
be one of the most prominent critics of Arafat, the later was an Arafat appointee and 
loyalist.  
 
In October 1997, Saleh accused Tbeileh of being involved in producing false licences 
for Israeli citrus products so that they can market Palestinian products in Jordan’s 
markets. Saleh considered this act as one of corruption, and harmful to Palestinian 
agriculture. Tbeileh denied the charge and attacked Saleh by accusing him of 
paralyzing the ministry’s work by concentrating all the authority in his hands and 
refusing to recognize the deputy-minister post. Tbeileh publicly admitted this tense 
                                                 
663 Ibid. 
664 See Palestine Report. Vol.2, No.33, January 24, 1997 & see also Al Quds on 27 March 1997. 
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relationship between himself and the minister and complained that the minister 
refused to coordinate with him in respect of the ministry’s operations.665  
 
Consequently, the values which the Palestinian bureaucracy protected were the 
interests of top officials and politicians at the expense of public interest and welfare. 
Because of this normative foundation of the Palestinian bureaucracy, Palestinians 
were denied proper and adequate services (including health, education, social, and so 
forth). Palestinians  were even denied the right to enjoy the material donations offered 
to them by other countries, like the Olive Oil sent by Greece in 2000. This oil, which 
was suppose to be distributed to the public free of charge, was sold to merchants by 
the ministry of agriculture, before being sold to the public. The ministry of agriculture 
justified this action by invoking the costs of transportation and storage as reasons that 
forced it to sell it to merchants.666  
 
The ministry’s lack of adequate funding resulted mainly from the PA’s policy of 
overstaffing its ministries, and the resultant high expenditure on staff salaries. This 
fact grouped the PA along with other oft criticized systems in place in developing 
countries where the government is: 
 
“…a major employer…especially for the relatively small professional and educated 
segments of the society. It is difficult for any government to dismiss existing workers, 
but it also may perceive the need to hire additional, politically loyal personnel. It may 
make sense to dismiss existing employees, however, if they have been compromised 
by their participation in a regime with serious human rights abuses.”667  
 
The Local Government System under the PA: Toward a Client Model of 
Local Authority 
 
So far we have discussed the PA bureaucratic system that is responsible for supplying 
social services to Palestinians, and concluded the following features with relation to it: 
  
•   Overstaffed in the quantitative sense, whilst simultaneously understaffed in the 
qualitative sense.. 
                                                 
665 See Al-Hayat Al Jadeeda on 20 October & Al Ayyam on 21 October 1997. See also Palestine 
Report. Vol. 3, no.20, October 24, 1997. 
666 Al-Risalah on 8 June 2000. 
667 Peters. The Future of Governing, op.cit., Pp. 9-10. 
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•  Related to the above mentioned factor is the high spending on staff salaries, 
and the resultant deficit of this system budget, and the negative ramifications 
of this deficit on the right of Palestinians to enjoy proper services.  
•  More importantly was the system’s lack of a legal rules and regulations 
governing its operation and work. This promoted administrative anarchy, and 
stimulated aspects of misuse of office and public funds. 
 
The local government system is responsible for supplying the main utilities (water & 
electricity supply, refuse or waste collection, roads paving, and so on). As mentioned 
in chapter II (Pp. 47-51), the first signs of this system started to appear in the scene in 
the second half of 19th century, when the Ottoman ruler-within the context of 
Tanzimat (reform)-enacted two laws in 1867 (Vilayet law), and in 1876 to introduce 
municipal councils in 22 towns and large villages. Though these councils were said to 
be elected, the voting qualifications were so demanding, and only the ayan (well-to-
do and socially prominent families) could have access to these councils. 
 
These families are the ones which historically cooperated with the Ottoman rulers. In 
this sense, the Ottoman ruler preferred them over any segment of society, and 
consequently, enabled them to control these councils when it stipulated a narrow 
electoral base. The Ottoman ruler, thus, helped these families to reproduce their power 
and influence over the population (See chapter II, Pp. 52-53). 
 
Under the British Mandate (1919-1948), we witnessed the same trend. In other words, 
the British mandate relied also upon these families to rule the population. In 1927, 
thus, they introduced municipal elections with a narrow electoral base so that only 
these families can vote and nominate themselves to these councils. The British rulers 
had reasserted the narrow electoral base in its 1934 municipal law, whilst 
simultaneously conferring sweeping powers on the British high commissioner (see 
chapter II). 
 
Though British rule had enacted two ordinances to promote local councils at the 
village level (in 1921, and in 1941), some cultural and political factors impeded these 
councils from being effective tools of political participation.  These councils, at the 
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end of the day, were dominated by the village Sheikhs and mukhtars under full British 
control and supervision (see chapter II). 
 
After the creation of the state of Israel in 1948, and the dispersion of Palestinian 
society through the Arab world and other countries, the Gaza Strip and West Bank 
(the only remaining Arab territories after 1948) came under Egyptian military rule and 
Jordanian civil rule respectively. While Egyptian rule tended to appoint local councils 
(at both village and town level) among the loyal ayan of Gaza Strip, Jordan 
promulgated the 1955 municipal law. The law revived several restrictions over the 
right to vote, and granted the ayan more chances than others to be elected to these 
councils. At the same time, the law conferred sweeping powers on the central 
authority in Amman, and therefore, enabled it to use these councils as instrument to 
assert its rule in the West Bank, and to reproduce the power of the loyal ayan (see 
chapter II). 
 
When Israel occupied the WBGS in 1967, the Labour-led Israeli government, parallel 
to its policy of “co-existence”, introduced municipal elections based on 1955 
municipal law in 1972. As we have discussed in chapter II (Pp. 80-83), the Labour 
government sought through these elections to promote pliable indigenous leadership 
as against PLO leadership. The Israeli goal of these elections was realized when the 
pro-Hashemite elements dominated these councils at the expense of the pro-PLO 
elements who boycotted the elections of 1972. 
 
But in 1976, the PLO took lessons from the 1972 elections, and consequently, 
encouraged its supporters to take part in the municipal elections of that year. In these 
elections, Israel extended the voter franchise to property-less females and young 
males. This fact, coupled with the socio-economic transformation and regional 
political developments which the Palestinian territories witnessed in 1970s (for these 
transformations and developments see chapter II, Pp. 82-88), enabled the pro-PLO 
elements to rise to office (see chapter II, Pp. 88-92). Nevertheless, these elements 
remained derived from the same socioeconomic background of the pro-Hashemite 
elements. In other words, they were among the well-to-do and socially prominent 
families (ayan) as we have mentioned in chapter II. 
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With the rise of the Likud-Party to office in 1977, Israel’s policy toward Palestinian 
autonomous institutions was radicalized, and many councilors and mayors were 
dismissed from their office. Since then until up to 1994 (the year of the PA arrival in 
the WBGS) the mayors and councilors were appointed ones (see chapter II). 
 
Consequently, when the PA assumed responsibilities in the WBGS in 1994, it had to 
deal with appointed local government institutions dominated by pliable socially 
prominent families.  Hence, the PA was asked by Palestinians to revise this situation, 
and to promote the prerequisites for having an effective and widely representative 
system of local government. Among these prerequisites were legal ones; the PA was 
asked to reconstitute the laws and regulations which historically governed the local 
government system.  However, the PA - out of fear of possible legal anarchy - made 
no quick fundamental changes in the legal status quo upon its arrival. On 20 May 
1994, accordingly, Arafat - in his capacity as PA president - issued his decision no. 1 
in which he declared all the laws and regulations of the pre-Israeli occupation era to 
be in force.668  
 
The decision implied the continued use of the 1934 municipal law as far as the Gaza 
Strip municipalities are concerned, and the 1955 municipal law as far the West Bank 
municipalities are concerned. As we have mentioned in chapter II, these two laws 
confer sweeping powers on the ruler, including the appointment of mayors and 
councilors. Having enjoyed this power, Arafat made the first appointment for a 
municipal council in the post-Oslo era, in particular on 26 July 1994. This 
appointment was for the Gaza city municipal council. Interestingly enough, at least 
eight (including the mayor Uwn El- Shawa) out of the ten councilors of the 
municipality were among the ayan.669  
 
On 24 September 1994, Arafat vested his authorities over the local government 
institutions into the newly emerging ministry of local government. This happened 
when he ratified law no. 1 for the year 1994. The law brought all the issues related to 
local government institutions under the ministry’s control and responsibilities.670 
                                                 
668 See Al Waqaea’, op.cit., No. 1, 1st year., 20/11/1994. 
669 Decsion No. 4 for 1994 in Ibid. No. 1, 1st year, 20/11/1994. 
670 Ibid, No. 2,  2ed year, 8/1/1995. 
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Therefore, the ministry became the official body responsible on any issue related to 
local government institutions, including the initiation of regulations and laws 
governing these institutions. Nevertheless, the ministry-due to Arafat decision no. 1 
which kept all laws and regulations of the pre-occupation era in force- lacked the legal 
right to advance any legislation with relation to local government institutions other 
than the 1934 municipal law for the Gaza Strip, and the 1955 municipal law for the 
West Bank.  
 
To deal with this dilemma, Arafat ratified Law no. 5 concerning the transfer of 
powers and authorities of the former regimes to the PA in 1995. Article one of the law 
reads; “all the powers, and authorities stated in the legislation, decrees, and ordinances 
that were in force before the arrival of PA on 19 May 1994, are vested in the PA”.671 
The ratification of this law implied the empowerment of the ministry of local 
government with the legal right to initiate new legislation and regulations relating to 
local government institutions. This fact revived great hopes among Palestinians, and 
gave rise to the impression that the appointment policy of the municipal councils will 
be revised and that fair and transparent municipal elections would be introduced, so 
that a wide-segment of society other than the ayan would have access to these 
institutions after such access had been blocked for decades.  
 
In April 1996, the ministry of local government declared its decision to organize 
municipal elections in more than 450 towns and large villages by the end of 1996.672 
The elections were promised to be held according to a new municipal law. The law – 
which was supposed to be announced afterwards - would be applied in both the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip, and therefore, would unify the regulations which govern the 
local government institutions, after these institutions were subjected to various 
regulations since the inception of the state of Israel in 1948.  
 
To pave the way for these elections, the ministry of local government divided the 
WBGS into sixteen governorates (eleven in the West Bank and five in the Gaza Strip). 
The governorates of West Bank are as follows: Jerusalem, Jericho, Bethlehem, 
                                                 
671 Translated from Ibid, No. 4, 2nd ed. year, 6/5/1995. 
672 Al Nihar on 19 April 1996. 
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Nablus, Ramallah, Heborn, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, Slifeet, Tubas, Jenin.673 The Gaza 
Strip governorates are: Jabalia, Gaza, Dier El Balah, Khan Younis, and Rafah. Each 
governorate has at least one municipal council. Furthermore, fourteen new local 
councils and committees were created in the Gaza Strip,674 and twenty-seven new 
local committees were founded in the West Bank. In addition, a new municipality was 
evolved in the West Bank to assume responsibilities over seven villages.675
 
The governor, who is appointed by and accountable to the minister of interior (in our 
case Arafat who held the interior portfolio in the period of 1994-2000), enjoyed no 
powers or authorities over the local committees or the municipal council of his 
governorate. However, Arafat, who appointed the minister of local government, could 
do so through the minister himself. De facto, therefore, the local councils and 
committees were indirectly controlled by the ministry of interior, or Arafat.  
 
In a clear manifestation of this fact, Arafat appointed three municipal councils in the 
Gaza Strip governorates of Rafah, Khan Younis, and Jabalia on 19 August 1996. As it 
was expected, most of these councilors were either among the ayan, affiliated with 
Fatah, or have relatives occupying top posts in the PA civil and security apparatus. 
Take for example the mayor and his deputy of Khan Younis. The mayor was Usamah 
Al Farah (from among the ayan). His deputy was Salah Abu Shamalah (relative of 
Majd Abu Shamalah, a colonel in the Gaza-Strip preventive security forces).  
 
The same approach was applied to the councilors. Three of them were among the 
ayan (Usamah Barbakh, Nasser El Masri, Majd El Astal). The remaining eight were 
among the ayan, but also have relatives occupying top posts in PA civil and security 
apparatus.  They included Abdelhamid Sha’at (father of the former assistant-deputy 
minister of Planning and International Cooperation and the present assistant-deputy 
minister of transportation Ali Sha’at), and Ahmad Dahaln (a relative of Mohammad 
Dahaln, head of the Gaza Strip preventive security forces).676  
 
                                                 
673 At the begining the West Bank was divided into nine governorates and two districts. But in 
November 1999, the PLC decided to abolish the districts and to assign to the West Bank eleven 
governorates. See Al Ayyam on 30 November 1999. 
674 Ibid & Al Nihar on 20 June 1996. 
675 Al Quds on 11 October 1996. 
676 Ibid, Al Nihar, & Al Ayyam on 20 August 1996. 
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We can also notice the same trend in the Rafah municipal council. Sa’id Zu’rub 
(among the ayan) was the mayor, while Mohammad El Dibari (close to Fatah) was the 
deputy. Most of the councilors were close to Fatah: Izzat Abu El Khier, Ahmad El 
Qadi, Suliman Abu Samhadanah, and Imad Sha’at.677  
 
Furthermore, the majority of the newly created fourteen local councils and 
committees were appointed. On 2 November 1996, for instance, Arafat appointed four 
local committees for Bani Suhlia, Abasan El Kabira, Abasan El-Saghira, and 
Kheza’a.678 Interestingly enough, the appointment policy pursued by Arafat was not 
confined to the Gaza Strip, but extended to the West Bank which historically enjoyed 
elected councilors (at least until up to 1977). On 7 September 1996, two new 
municipal councils were appointed in the towns of Bitunia, and Dier Daboon.679  
The Local Government System: Electoral Perspective 
 
The appointment policy of Arafat raised great deal of concern among Palestinians 
over the negative ramifications of this policy on the possibility of having widely 
representative local government institutions. In December 1996, Uwn El Shawa, 
mayor of Gaza, considered this policy very harmful to Palestinians, and a clear 
indication of the local government ministry’s reluctance to organize local elections.680 
Nevertheless, the ministry considered this policy to be a very necessary one providing 
the involvement of many of the dismissed municipal and rural councils in 
corruption,681 and the lack-until up to that time-of a Palestinian legal procedure 
governing local elections.  
 
The ministry, therefore, ruled out these appointments as an attempt from its side to 
deny Palestinians the right to decide on their civil issues, and re-scheduled the local 
elections for June 1997. The ministry justified the new elections date by the failure of 
                                                 
677 Ibid. 
678 Al Ayyam & Al Quds on 3 November 1996. 
679 Al Nihar & Al Hayyat Al Jadeeda on 8 September 1996. 
680 Al Hayat Al Jadeed on 26 December 1996. 
681 In May 1996, the ministry of local government discovered the involvement of three municipal 
councils, and eight rural councils in misuse of office and public funds. According to the ministry, at 
least US$ 1 million was wasted by these local government institutions since May 1994 until up to that 
time. See Al Hayat Al Jadeeda on 25 September, and Al Ayyam on 17 & Al Bilad on 18 & Al Quds on 
21 October, 1996. 
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the PLC to approve a law for local council elections up to that time. Accordingly, the 
ministry states, it was difficult to organize the local elections on the scheduled due 
date682 (the end of 1996 as mentioned before).  
 
On 16 December 1996, Arafat ratified the local council elections law after the PLC 
approved it in the legal readings.683 The law set up the voting and nomination system 
of the local council elections. Article 3 of the law empowered the minister of local 
government with the right to call for free and direct elections for the mayors, and 
councilors. The law provides that the mayors and councilors (who supposedly elect 
the mayor deputy) are to be elected for a period not exceeding four years (articles 51, 
53). Article 4 enabled the minister of local government to postpone the local elections 
for a period not exceeds two weeks if this was in the public interest and for 
transparent elections. Article 8 expanded the electoral base of these councils when it 
enabled every Palestinian aged 18 or over and living in the municipality’s jurisdiction 
to vote in the municipal elections even if he or she did not enjoy tax-paying 
qualifications.  
 
As far as those who wish to run the elections are concerned, article 24 enabled every 
Palestinian aged 30 or over and with tax-paying qualifications to run for the 
mayoralty, and every Palestinian aged 25 or over with tax-paying qualifications to run 
for the council’s membership. Those who run for the mayoralty should pay 
approximately Jordanian Dinar 500 (approximately US$ 714) as a refundable sum 
upon their winning. In the meanwhile those who run for the council’s membership 
should pay approximately Jordanian Dinar 100 (approximately US$ 140) as a 
refundable sum upon their winning (article 22).  
 
The law also sets down the procedure to be followed when there was a vacancy in the 
local council. Article 55 provides for new elections for the mayoralty in the case of 
the mayor’s departure or resignation. The election is to be public and direct, and held 
within one month from the date of the mayor’s departure or resignation. During this 
month, the deputy takes over the mayoralty. In case of a councillor’s departure or 
resignation, the one who won the highest number of votes after those who won the 
                                                 
682 Al Nihar on 16 December 1996, & Al Ayyam on 20 January 1997. 
683 The full text of the law cited in Al Waqaea’, op.cit, No. 16, 4th year, 30/1/1997. 
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council seats occupies the vacancy. But when more than half of council posts were 
vacant, a direct and public election is held for the all of the council seats article 56. 
 
Though the law might be criticized for the relatively high sum it imposes (as a 
refundable sum) on anyone wishing to nominate himself for the mayoralty 
(particularly if it is taken into account the extremely deteriorated economic conditions 
of Palestinians), the law - it should be admitted - signified a step forward as far the 
electoral base of these councils are concerned. Nevertheless, the law lacked any 
clarification concerning the functional jurisdictions and relationship of these councils 
with the central authority, the ministry of local government. To remedy this deficit, 
Arafat ratified the law of local government institutions on 12 October 1997.684
 
A careful study of the law shows that it confers sweeping powers on the ministry of 
local government, whilst simultaneously limiting the functional jurisdiction of the 
local councils to a delivery of certain services.  Article 2, for example, empowered the 
ministry with the right to lay down the overall policy of these councils. Article 4 went 
further and enabled the ministry to recommend the jurisdictions, formation, and 
structure of these councils to the cabinet’s approval/disapproval. The same article 
enabled the ministry to approve/disapprove the abolishment, annexation, separation, 
and the expansion of the functional jurisdiction of any council.  
 
The powers of the ministry over these councils extended further to include the 
approval of these councils’ annual budgets (art. 31), the approval of the by-laws, taxes 
(including property tax) fees, and discounts (art. 15, B), the approval of the loans of 
these councils (art. 21), the approval of any cancellation, reduction or alternation in 
the fees and taxes imposed by these councils (art. 28), the approval of any council’s 
deviation from the prescribed annual budget (art. 31), the approval of the selling, 
yielding, or mortgaging of immovable property for a period exceeding three years 
(art. 20).  
 
Furthermore, the ministry enjoys powers to approve or disapprove the council’s 
decision of dismissing any of the council members (art. 13). The powers of the 
                                                 
684 The full text of the law is cited in Al Waqaea’. op.cit, No. 20, 4th year, 29/11/1997. 
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ministry cover the councils’ staffing, including their right to set up the procedure of 
recruiting, promoting, punishing, and dismissing these councils’ employees (art. 19).  
 
While the law empowers the ministry with sweeping powers and authorities over 
these councils, it also limits the functional jurisdictions of these councils to very few 
civil domains including: town and road planning, regulation the construction of 
buildings, supplying water and electricity, regulating public markets and stalls, 
regulating sanitation, collecting waste, regulating health, parks, museum, clubs, 
cinema, public parks, cultural and sport institutions, weights and measures, 
advertisements, hotels, eliminating the phenomena of beggary, supervising 
slaughterhouses, in addition to any other function specified by the law (art. 15, A).  
Though the law enables local councils to perform these functions, it denies them any 
right to perform functions in other important civil domains such as, for example, 
regional planning. This function is performed by the ministry of local government 
itself (article 2, Para. 2) in coordination with the concerned ministries like the ministry 
of Planning and International Cooperation.  
The Local Government System: The Status Quo 
 
As we have seen the law of local government institutions of October 1997 
institutionalized a centralized model of government, in which the central authority 
(ministry of local government) assumes strict control over local authorities, whilst 
simultaneously performing some functions located at the heart of the local authorities’ 
work.  
 
However, some municipalities managed to release themselves from such control, and 
assume autonomous actions. These municipalities could do so not because of the 
law’s encouragement of autonomous actions, but because of their informal connection 
with some power centres in the central authority (i.e., the PA). For example, Uwn El 
Shawa, Gaza Mayor, and married from Rawia El Shawa, a PLC member and a much 
respected public figure, could initiate independent channels with donors, and solicited, 
within two years, approximately US$ 57 million for the support of various 
developmental projects in Gaza city far from the ministry intervention.685 Other 
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municipalities (weak municipalities so to speak) whose mayors and councillors do not 
enjoy strong political connections could not even perform the functions nominally 
given to them.  
 
In June 1999, nine out of the thirteen councillors (including the mayor) of Beit Jala 
city of West Bank resigned from the council protesting the council’s deteriorated 
conditions, and the council’s failure to perform its basic functions like the enactment 
of its by-laws, and the organization of building construction in the city. They were 
among the national independents and not close to Fatah, the PA party. In this sense, 
they followed a different ideological line from the one of Fatah. In the meanwhile, the 
mayor, Raji Zaydan, was a loyalist of Fatah. Though the mayor expressed sympathy 
with the resigned councillors, and even placed part of the responsibility for the 
council’s failure on the PA which, according to him, exhibited little readiness to 
cooperate with the council,686 he quickly turned against them and accused them of 
paralyzing the council’s work, and of seeking to achieve political and personal 
gain.687 Surprisingly, the mayor’s statement was made after the appointment of new 
nine councillors688 in grave violation of article 56 of local elections law, which 
requires new elections for the entire council in a case where more than half of its seats 
become vacant.  
 
Such developments show clearly how the ministry of local government sought to 
control these councils, and to assume strict supervision over them. This policy was the 
instrument through which the ministry emasculated the right of certain councils 
(mainly the non-loyal councils) to perform the functions entitled to them under the 
1997’s local government institutions law. Against this background, the ministry’s 
regular postponement of the municipal elections should be examined. The absence of 
municipal elections would ensure the ministry would have the legal justification to 
block the work of certain councils under the pretext of their not being elected 
councils, whilst simultaneously, using the pliable appointed councils as an instrument 
to pass its policies. As Abdulnasser Mekky, former coordinator-general of the West 
Bank local elections, points out: 
                                                 
686 Al Quds on 2 June & Al Risalah on 3 June, & Al- Ayyam on 5 June 1999. 
687 See Al-Ayyam on 24 July 1999. 
688 Al Istiqlal on 2 July 1999. 
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 “Technically, there has been no implementation of the law…because, by its terms, 
responsibilities and powers are granted to elected councils and chairpersons. Since 
such elections have not yet taken place, the assumption of responsibilities by the 
councils under the 1997 law of local government is not yet legally applicable.” 689
 
 
In the following months the ministry made a further appointment for the mayoralty of 
the West Bank town of Silfeet.690 In so doing, the ministry showed further 
determination to keep working its appointment policy, and to refrain from organizing 
local elections. Thereby, the ministry was not going to respond to the wishes of 63.8% 
of Palestinians calling for immediate local elections.691
 
Of course, the ministry would never admit the real reasons for its appointment policy 
and the frequent postponement of local elections. In September 1999, the deputy-
minister of local government Husein Al Araj, justified this policy and the regular 
postponement of elections by the political winds of the country, in particular the 
failure of Israel to implement the political accords with the PA, and to redeploy from 
further Palestinian territories.692
 
Ironically, Al Araj made his statements while the PA was in actual control of the main 
West Bank’s cities (Ramallah, Bethlehem, Nablus, Tulkarm, Qalqilya, and Jenin, 
Hebron), and approximately 450 West Bank’s towns and villages, in addition to the 
largest part of the Gaza Strip. The only reason for postponing the local elections, it 
would appear, was the ministry’s goal of controlling these councils as means to 
prevent the rise of PA opponents (mainly Hamas and Islamic Jihad) to office. Only 
the appointment policy could ensure the realization of this goal. In this sense, the 
ministry, backed by the PA, tended to politicize local government offices at the 
expense of these offices’ professionalism.  
 
One indication of this politicization was the ministry tendency to overstaff these 
offices. For example, the number of the Gaza municipality’s employees increased 
from 1269 to 1500 within one year only (April 1997-April 1998). Only 180 (12%) 
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employees were university-degree holders in April 1998.693 Despite this, the political 
connections of the Gaza city mayor enabled the municipality to deal with the resultant 
increase in its expenditure on staff salaries without lowering the level of its services to 
people. This fact can be inferred from a municipality decision exempting the 
detainees’ families from the highest rate of electricity and water fees in March 
1998.694  
 
However, this was not the case of other municipalities like the municipality of Anabta 
in the West Bank. In January 1999, the employees of this municipality went on strike 
protesting the municipality’s failure to pay their salaries at the increased rate, 
including those increases covering inflation, and the deterioration in the value of the 
New Israeli Shekle (NIS) against the US dollar.695 The same applied in the 
municipality of Khan Younis of the Gaza Strip. In fact, the municipality was a victim 
of a series of unnecessary appointments (at least 300 personnel) in a manner that 
increased its financial deficit to about NIS 1000,000 (US$ 250,000), and 
consequently, left it unable to pay the salaries of its staff as they came due.696  
The Local Government System: A Failed scheme for Supplying Utilities 
 
The politicization of the local councils did not only have negative ramifications on the 
financial situation of these councils, but also on the ability of these councils to supply 
people with basic utilities. In 1996, for example, at least 80% of Khan Younis’ 
population (estimated in that time at more than 150,000) were infected by parasitical 
diseases due to the city’s lack of wastewater collection and disposal system.697 The 
city of Khan Younis is only one example from many other cities and towns without a 
wastewater collection and disposal system. At least 40% of the main cities and towns 
of the WBGS did not enjoy a wastewater collection and disposal system in 1999.698
 
In case this system was available in a given city, few Palestinians enjoyed, or enjoy, 
its services. This is mainly due to the relatively high fees (estimated at NIS 1000 or 
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US$ 250) imposed by the municipality on anyone who wished to enjoy these services. 
In September 2000, a municipal employee was killed while he was fixing wastewater 
collection pipes (without the knowledge of his municipality) for a Palestinian family 
in the Gaza Strip town of Dier El Balah. The death of this employee was mainly due 
to the high fees mentioned above. The fees forced that family to work around the law, 
and to convince the municipal employee to fix these pipes in exchange for a given 
sum.699
 
Parallel to the cities and towns which do not enjoy wastewater collection and disposal 
system were the Palestinian refugee camps. The majority of these camps (19 in the 
West Bank and 8 in the Gaza Strip) do not enjoy this system. Though UNRWA is the 
official body responsible for supplying the refugees’ camps with these utilities, at 
least half of these camps are located within the functional jurisdiction of the 
Palestinian municipalities.700 Consequently, the Palestinian municipal system takes 
part of the responsibility for denying these camps access to these utilities. 
 
Other towns and villages suffered not only the lack of wastewater collection and 
disposal system, but also a lack of running water. Good examples of this are the West 
Bank villages of Dier Ghasasnah, Bani Zied, Kafer A’in, Beit Rema, and El Nabi 
Salah. In 1996, the population of these five villages had been denied access to running 
water for three months. During these months, these residents had to walk for some 
kilometres to obtain water from other pools.701 The same thing occurred in the Moraj 
neighbourhood in the Gaza Strip city of Rafah.702  
 
To a large extent Israel takes the responsibility of the water problem in the WBGS. As 
discussed in chapter III, the Oslo accords affirmed Israel’s control over the key 
resources in the territories. Water was among these resources. This clause enabled 
Israel to pump large quantities of WBGS water to its settlements inside the territories. 
At least 80% of the territories’ water reserves had been pumped to the benefit of 
settlers inside the territories. This shifted settler consumption of water to more than 
300 litres daily, as compared with 40 litres daily for Palestinians in 1999. 
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Nevertheless, the Israeli pumping of large quantities of water to settlers does not 
release the Palestinian municipal system from its responsibilities. For instance, at least 
20% of the water available to Palestinians is wasted due to the lack of proper 
networks for supplying water.703
 
In tandem with the irregularity of water supply was the irregularity of electricity 
supply. The irregularity in the electricity supply is considered to be one of the most 
worrying problems in the WBGS, and in the Gaza Strip in particular. This is due to 
certain historical reasons. As discussed in chapter II (P. 72), the Palestinian Jerusalem 
District Electricity Company (JDEC) was founded in 1956 to supply the West Bank 
cities and towns with electricity. When the Oslo accords were signed (in particular the 
Cairo accord on 4 May 1994), Israel allowed this company to keep supplying the 
West Bank with electricity. In this regard, the situation of the Gaza Strip was 
fundamentally different from that of the West Bank. Historically speaking, the Gaza 
Strip was denied the right to have its own electricity company. In fact, Israel had 
supplied the Gaza Strip with electricity since 1967. Because of that, the Cairo accord 
provides for Israeli supply of electricity to the Gaza Strip until an alternative system 
there is established (Article II, B. 24 of Annex II “Protocol Concerning Civil Affairs” 
of the Cairo Accord). 
 
Unlike the West Bank, therefore, the Gaza Strip was left at the mercy of Israel as far 
as electricity is concerned. This fact left the role of municipalities confined to the 
collection of bills, and the maintenance of electricity delivery networks in the Gaza 
Strip. Even in these very narrow spheres, the municipalities had certain failures. In 
2000, for example, the rate of the wasted electronic power was estimated at 25% in 
the WBGS. The rate was above the internationally accepted standard  by 16%.704
 
Of course one of the chief reasons for the municipalities’ failure to ensure effective 
and proper maintenance of the electricity networks was their lack of particular skills 
for this purpose, in addition to the overlapping of their role in this regard with the role 
of the Gaza Strip-based Palestinian Electricity Distribution Company. The company 
was founded after the PA’s arrival to the WBGS and subordinated to the ministry of 
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energy.  It is also responsible for collecting bills, and carrying out maintenance 
activities. In March 2000, Yihya Shamia, Director-General of the company, warned of 
the negative ramifications of the company’s failure to cover the bill of the Israel 
electricity company (estimated at NIS 17.5 million for a month) due to the fact that 
people refrained from paying the electricity fees.705  
 
During the recent intifada (which erupted on 28 September 2000) the municipalities 
were denied the right to perform any function relating to the provision of electricity, 
and the company became the only official body responsible for the electricity issues 
of the Gaza Strip. 
 
The Gaza Strip-based Palestinian Electricity Distribution Company provides us with 
another example of the centralized model of government where the central authority 
seeks to perform some functions located at the heart of local authorities’ work. 
Because of this model of government, Palestinians failed to establish independent 
energy generation station for the Gaza Strip in the period of 1994-2000. Palestinians 
of Gaza Strip had, therefore, to keep suffering the irregularity of electricity over the 
years of the interim period (1994-1999). But in early 2000, some efforts were made to 
end this suffering when the Swedish and Spanish governments granted the PA 
approximately US$ 50 million as a loan to start building an energy generation station 
for the Gaza Strip at a cost of US$ 93 million.706  
 
The station, due to be in operation from the end of 2000, was to ensure a regular 
supply of electricity for the whole Gaza Strip, and to eliminate the monopoly of Israel 
over Gaza Strip energy. Unfortunately, the outbreak of the recent intifada postponed 
the execution of this project, and the Palestinians of the Gaza Strip had to keep 
suffering the irregularity of electricity over the years of the intifada. This fact prompts 
us to ask about the reasons that led to such late implementation of this vital and 
important project, which left Gazans suffering the irregularity of electricity since 1994 
until present.  
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What would be the case, for instance, if the Spanish and Swedish governments 
refused to offer financial support for the project? Was the PA missing the adequate 
funds to immediately initiate a vital project like that without their assistance? As 
concluded in the discussion on the features and characteristics of the Palestinian 
bureaucracy, the PA annual revenue is estimated at US$ 1.940 billion (see P. 269). 
The PA, therefore, was in a financial position to immediately initiate this project 
without the help of donors. The only reason for such a delay was the system of 
government itself.  
 
The system - mainly the neopatrimonial system - leaves a free hand for the ruling 
elite, and of course their patron, to politicize the use of public funds, bureaucracy, and 
impede altogether the development of any autonomous action such as those of local 
government institutions. The politicization and impediments took place under the 
pretext of certain laws and regulations founded mainly to sustain this system, and to 
legitimize it. The outcome of this situation is the deprivation of the majority of people 
of adequate and proper services and utilities, and of right to access to political 
institutions.  
The Opponents’ Para-State Institutions: Toward a Grassroots Model 
 
In protest against the neopatrimonial system, the PA’s opponents (mainly Hamas, 
Islamic Jihad, and PFLP) broke with the PA’s para-state institutions, and tended either 
to strengthen their already established institutions, or founded new ones. Through 
these institutions, the PA’s opponents managed to practice para-state functions, and 
consequently, to supply Palestinians with Para-state services similar to those of the 
PA. 
 
It was shown, in chapter III, how these opponents stood against the Oslo accords, and 
ruled out these accords as a fair and just solution for the Palestinian problems. 
Emphasising their position, they pointed out that the Oslo process did not spell out a 
total Israeli withdrawal from the WBGS, and maintained the right of Israel to control 
the majority of these territories. Consequently, they state, the Oslo arrangement 
denied the Palestinian right to statehood and independence. Inspired by this belief, 
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they boycotted the Palestinian parliamentary and presidential elections of January 
1996, as discussed in chapter IV.  
 
With the failure of the PA to conclude the interim period with a Palestinian state over 
the WBGS, these opponents were empowered with another reason to keep applying 
their “non-peace policy” with Israel. More importantly, as discussed in chapter III, IV, 
and this chapter, were the PA’s various failures at the internal level, including its 
failure to promote the rule of law and human rights, to build viable government 
institutions, and to promote wide-scale political participation as well as people’s 
welfare.   
 
This fact, coupled with Arafat’s policy of leaving them their social 
institutions/military infrastructure (as discussed in chapter III), promoted them as a 
serious alternative to PA, and enabled them to gain wide constituencies of support in 
the WBGS.  In July 1994, for instance, the opposition factions enjoyed the support of 
2.2-10.8% of Palestinians as against 40.9% supported Fatah, the PA party. But in 
April 2003, Fatah enjoyed the support of only 22.6% of Palestinians as against 2-22% 
supporting the opposition factions.707 The increasing support for the opposition 
factions as against Fatah was mainly due to the PA failure to bring about any 
fundamental changes in the life of Palestinians (at the political, economic, and social 
level), and to the success of these factions to alleviate some of the Palestinians’ 
economic and social suffering. The means to do so were these factions’ charitable 
societies.   
The Islamic Society 
 
The history of the Islamic Society dates back to the 1970s, when Palestinians decided 
to break with the formal state institutions (like the municipal offices) under Israeli 
occupation. As seen in chapter II many PLO affiliated grassroots institutions were 
emerging onto the scene. Parallel to the PLO affiliated institutions were the charitable 
societies affiliated with the Islamic movements, mainly with the Muslim Brotherhood 
(and later on in 1989 onward Hamas). Among these societies was the Islamic Society. 
The founders of this society (mainly Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, the former leader of 
                                                 
707 See JMCC Poll no. 5 in July 1994, & Poll No. 48 in April 2003. Online <http://www.jmcc.org> 
 287
Hamas) were inspired by two motivations. The first was political, while the second 
was religious.  
 
According to Ahmad Bahr, the current head of the Society, the political motivation 
was to counter the impact of the Israeli occupation policy against the Palestinian 
social and economic life. In this sense, Bahr says, the fact that the Islamic Society 
sought to alleviate Palestinian suffering resulted from Israeli measures that included 
wilful killings, destruction of houses, ill-treatment and torture of Palestinians under 
detention, collective punishment and mass arrests, the confiscation of Palestinian land 
for settlement, and so on. Accordingly, Bahr concludes that the political motivation 
goes in harmony with the Islamic principles which assert values like social solidarity, 
and caring for orphans and the weak.708    
 
As mentioned above, the Israeli measures over the years of the occupation left 
thousands of Palestinians dead, thousands others were injured, and thousands of 
others disabled. This fact left thousands of Palestinian children as orphans having no 
source of livelihood. When the PA arrived to the WBGS, the Islamic Society 
(alongside other charitable societies of course) was permitted to keep its operations, 
and was licensed by the ministry of the interior so that it could take part of the 
responsibility of helping these Palestinians. 
 
Though this policy relieved the PA and its ministries from some burdens, it enabled 
the opponents to assume wider constituencies through their services to community. 
The Islamic Society, for example, operates approximately 43 kindergartens with a 
total of 7000 children. In addition, the Society operates several clinics, providing 
primary health services without charge or with minimum charge. Moreover, the 
Society organizes several summer camps for over 6,200 children aged 8-16 
annually.709  
 
In addition to these institutions, which enable Hamas to diffuse its ideology among 
these children, the Society offers permanent aid and care (financial and material alike) 
for approximately 7,800 needy Palestinian families, orphans and poor children. The 
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Society’s aid and care to these families goes in parallel with its annual charitable 
activities (in the winter and in the Muslim holy month of Ramadan mainly). In each 
winter at least 5,000 needy families benefit from Society aid (in the form of clothes). 
Also, the Society supplies approximately 7,500 children with school bags annually, 
and feeds around 40,000 needy families each Ramadan.710
 
The role of this Society, and other similar ones, was very prominent during the most 
recent intifada. The Israeli measures adopted against Palestinians during the intifada 
caused a huge death toll among Palestinians, and brought serious hardship to their 
economic life. In 2002, a study concluded by the United States Agency for 
International Development (USAID), showed that approximately 55% of the 
Palestinian households were cut off from food for at least one complete day, while 
more than 52% of Palestinian households borrowed money to buy food, and another 
17% were forced to sell their personal property to buy food. Furthermore, the study 
pointed out that approximately 66% of Palestinian households were unable to feed 
themselves due to lack of money.711  
 
 In response to these deteriorating economic conditions, the Islamic Society had 
evolved the “Emergency Aid Program” since the outbreak of the current intifada. The 
program offers material and financial help for those influenced by Israeli measures, 
supports some 3,000 Palestinian families annually.712 Mainly, the Society depends on 
the funds distributed by a number of international and Palestinian benefactors. This 
fund is managed and operated by some 200-300 personnel, the estimated staff of the 
society. 713
 
Interestingly enough, as the PA tended to politicize its bureaucracy, the Islamic 
Society tended to politicize its staff.  In other words, most of the estimated 200-300 
personnel of the Islamic Society seem to be affiliated with Hamas. Any conclusion in 
this regard depends on observations of the Islamic Society. During my field visit to 
the society I was treated with some suspicion, and the head of the society (Ahmad 
Bahr) refused to release much information with regards to society staff, in particular 
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their ideological background. Nevertheless, the way I was treated is a typical 
treatment of Hamas members to anyone who does not belong to their party. The 
second reason which prompts this opinion was the way in which the interview with 
Bahr went.  
 
Though Bahr and some of his staff were detained by PA security some years ago, and 
details about this issue were published by local newspapers and human rights 
organizations,714 he refused to give details about this issue considering it one of the 
Society’s secrets. Nevertheless, he admitted the detention, explaining that it happened 
because of his staff embracing Islam.715 This is considered as another feature of 
Hamas members. In other words, they are extremely sensitive to their security, in a 
way that makes them sometimes irrational (as in this case). To some extent they are 
justified, in particular in recent times, as their civil and military infrastructure are 
considered one of the chief targets of Israeli measures (including the shelling and the 
Israeli policy of extrajudicial executions).  
El-Salah Islamic Association 
 
The association, affiliated with Hamas, was founded in 1978. Similar to the Islamic 
Society, the declared goals were to support deprived people, to support orphans, and 
needy families, and to alleviate suffering of Palestinians resulting from Israeli 
measures toward the WBGS over the years of the occupation.716 After the PA arrival 
to the WBGS the association was licensed by the ministry of interior in 1996 to 
become one of the chief charitable associations in the WBGS. In a similar fashion to 
the Islamic Society, the association provides services in various civil spheres 
including education, health, and social spheres.  
 
Unfortunately, the association lacks any documentation with regard to the number of 
the beneficiaries since its foundation.  This was one of the chief problems I 
encountered during my field research. All the surveyed societies and associations 
(excluding the newly emerging “Friends of the Martyrs” association as we will see 
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later) lack any documentation regarding the number of beneficiaries since their 
foundation.  
 
Accordingly, the data mentioned with relation to the Islamic Society, and that data 
which will be mentioned with relation El-Salah Islamic Association, deals only with 
the last ten years (1994-2004). During this period, the Association offered permanent 
material and financial aid for some 8,000 needy families, orphans, needy students, 
handicapped, and other deprived Palestinians. In the meanwhile, it operates two 
schools for elementary, preparatory, and secondary education. At least 720 students 
among the orphans (including the sons of those killed by Israeli forces) and needy 
children benefit from these two schools annually. Parallel to these schools are eight 
kindergartens serving 2,000 children annually.717
 
 The education services provided to these children are free of charge. The services 
include exemption from the education fees, covering the cost of books, the school 
uniform, the transportation cost, and a daily lunch. Surprisingly, the association’s 
schools are empowered with well advanced computer labs, libraries, laboratories, 
sports halls, and video conference facilities. In this sense, the education facilities of 
the association are more advanced than those of the government schools, the majority 
of which lack similar facilities. On the health level, the association operates four clinic 
centres serving approximately 15,000 Palestinian monthly. The association operates 
these institutions in addition to 30 centres for teaching the Muslim’s holy book (the 
Kora’n) to children. 718
 
Approximately 200 personnel run the various activities of the association. The 
decision concerning the recruitment of these personnel, promotion, dismissal, is made 
by a board consisting of eleven members.719 The majority of the board members are 
affiliated with Hamas. These members are responsible for soliciting funds for 
association operations. In this regard, they rely upon local benefactors (institutions 
and individuals as well), and international benefactors (institutions and individual 
also). 





The Friends of Martyrs Society 
 
This society was founded only in 2001. The society, affiliated with Islamic Jihad, was 
founded in response to the Israeli measures against Palestinians in the current intifada. 
These measures left thousands of Palestinians dead, other tens of thousands injured, 
tens of thousands under detention. In addition hundreds of homes were demolished, 
and large stretches of agricultural land razed. In addition to the huge death toll, and 
the losses in property, was the deterioration of the economic condition of most 
Palestinians, as mentioned before. The society is concerned mainly with the families 
of martyrs, and to a lesser extent detainees and needy families, orphans, and needy 
students.  
 
The Society provides only financial and material help. It runs no schools or health 
centres. This might be explained by the Society’s young age. Currently, it offers 
financial and material help to nearly 4,000 families, out of which 3,000 are martyrs’ 
families. The remaining beneficiaries range between detainees and needy families, 
orphans and needy students.720 The estimated financial help for each martyr’s family 
is between US$ 75-250 monthly, while the estimated financial help for each 
detainee’s family is US$ 100 monthly. In the meanwhile, the estimated financial help 
for the needy families is between US$ 50-200 monthly.721 As far as the financial aid 
for needy students is concerned, this took the form of covering the education fees of 
these students in coordination with the concerned academic institutions.  
 
Unlike the Islamic Society and El-Salah Association, the Friends of Martyrs Society 
solicits its funds only from international benefactors (institutions and individuals). 
Among these institutions are the Danish-Lebanese Friendship society in Denmark and 
the Society for the Deprived People in Belgium.722   
 
The fact that this Society, and other similar ones (El Salah association, Islamic 
Society, etc) are permitted to carry out their activities, did not imply that they are far 
from PA watch. In fact, the contrary is the case. As we have seen, these societies (the 
                                                 




Islamic Society for example) were subjected to PA harassment, including the 
detention. In the aftermath of the events of September 11, the PA harassment for these 
societies escalated.   
 
The events brought about fundamental changes in the international mood, and left the 
issue of combating terror at the top of US and Western countries’ agenda.  Within this 
context, Islam was viewed by such countries as being mixed with terror, and most 
charitable Islamic organizations and societies became subjected to strict watch by 
most of the world countries. This fact, signals clear bowing to and acceptance of the 
new international order dominated by the US.  This world order left the global future 
of the Islamic charitable organizations and societies under serious threat.  
 
Palestinians were not immune from the impacts of these events, and most of their 
charitable societies and organizations suffered the repercussions of these events. On 
24 August 2003, the PA decided to freeze the accounts of 39 charitable societies 
working in the territories.723 The PA decision to freeze the accounts of these societies 
would effectively deny thousands of deprived Palestinians basic education, health, 
and relief services.  Because of that, the Palestinian High Court ordered the release of 
these societies accounts on 21 March 2004. Despite this, the PA refused to execute the 
court order, and these societies were asked since then to refer to the minister of the 
interior in order to withdraw from these accounts.724  
 
Parallel to PA measures against these societies were the Israeli measures, including 
the shelling of their property. Continuously, Israel claims that these societies support 
the families of the suicide bombers, and consequently, encourage “terrorist activities”. 
In May 2004, the Israeli occupying forces shelled the Friends of Martyrs Society.  The 
Israeli army spokesman claimed that the society is considered as the vanguard of Iran 
and the Lebanon-based Hizb Allah (the party of Allah) in WBGS, and accused it of 
diffusing terrorist ideas, and recruiting individuals for carrying out terrorist 
operations.725  
 
                                                 
723 See PCHR press release on 21 March 2004.  
724 See Ibid, on 31 March, & 8 April 2004. 
725 Yediot Ahronot on 15 May 2004. 
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While these societies were subjected to PA harassment, other opponents’ grassroots 
institutions, mainly those affiliated with the PLO factions like Union of Health Work 
Committees could operate within a relatively comfortable environment. 
Union of Heath Work Committees (UHWC) 
 
We have discussed in chapter II how the UHWC, parallel to other grassroots 
institutions like the Union of the Palestinian Medical Relief Committees (UPMRC), 
Union of Health Care Committees (UHCC), and the Health Services Council (HSC) 
emerged on the scene from 1979 onward. With the exception of the UHWC, these 
grassroots health institutions were affiliated either with the Palestinian Communist 
Party (and later People’s Party) or Fatah. In this sense, these institutions were not to 
be considered as the future institutions of the PA opponents. Only the UHWC, which 
is affiliated with PFLP, was to be considered so. Because of that, I shall focus my 
attention only on UHWC as a secular opponent institution. 
 
This institution was founded in 1985. The institution was an organizational 
manifestation of the Palestinian desire to disengage from the occupation, and to 
accentuate the Palestinian national identity (as discussed in chapter II). The founders 
of this institution were concerned about deprivation, and the denial of Palestinians’ 
right to adequate and proper health services (due to the high subscription fees of the 
health insurance under the occupation). Motivated by this concern, they established 
their first clinic centre for primary health care in Ramallah, and then later (in 1989) in 
Beit Hanoun village, in the north of the Gaza Strip.726
 
Over time, they succeeded in establishing other clinics, and expanded the health care 
provided to community to include secondary health care. Around 1994, the UHWC 
was operating approximately 25 clinic centers and health programs. The health care 
provided by these centers and programs covered many health domains including: 
gynecology and obstetrics, ENT, endocrinology, dermatology, internal medicine, 
dentistry, general surgery, urology, pediatrics, plastic surgery, neurology, respiratory 
diseases, cardiology, allergy, orthopedic, health awareness, and others. In addition, 
                                                 
726 Interview with Muna El Farah, Director of the Community Health Department, Gaza: UHWC, 
headquarter, 5 September 2005. 
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these centers and programs provide para-medical services including x-ray, ultrasound, 
laboratory, and pharmacy services.727  
 
According to Muna El Farah, director of the community health department, the 
estimated number of the beneficiaries of these centers and programs is 150,000-
180,000 annually.728 These centers depended on the funds distributed by a number of 
international and Palestinian benefactors, offered their services with minimum charge. 
After the PA’s arrival to the WBGS, the UHWC was permitted to keep operating its 
health programs, and accordingly, three additional clinic centers were established 
(two in the West Bank and one in the Gaza Strip) in 1996. More importantly was the 
establishment of Al Awda Hospital in the northern area of the Gaza Strip in the same 
year.729  
 
This hospital was established mainly to provide secondary health services to 
approximately 220,000 Palestinians (the estimated number of the population of the 
Gaza Strip northern area).  It played a vital role in ensuring these Palestinians with 
short-distance health care, particularly during the recent intifada, which witnesses 
regular confrontations between Palestinians and the Israeli occupation forces 
necessitating on-call health care. Because of its close location, the hospital managed 
to serve 125,395 Palestinians in 2002. Furthermore, around 28,210 Palestinians 
benefited from the services of the hospital’s outpatient department. In addition, 2,416 
medical operations, and nearly 1,470 deliveries were performed by the hospital.730
 
Mainly, the UHWC recruits its members from among the middle class and 
intellectuals. Most of the UHWC are supporters or affiliated with PFLP. In 2002, the 
UHWC recruited approximately 238 personnel, out of whom there were 16 volunteers 
(nearly 7%), 10 privately-contracted staff (4.2%), 42 rewards-job staff (17.6%), 6 
part-time staff (2.5%), 88 full-time staff (nearly 37%), 9 on-call staff (3.7%), and 62 
others (26%).731
 
                                                 
727 See UHWC. The 1995’s Annual Report. Gaza: UHWC headquarter, 1995. 
728 Interview. Gaza: UHWC headquarter, 5 September 2005. 
729 See UHWC. The 1996’s Annual Report. Gaza: UHWC headquarter, 1995 
730 See UHWC. The 2002’s Annual Report: Despite the Siege. Gaza: UHWC headquarter, 2002, Pp.8-9. 
731 Ibid. P.52. 
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Unlike the tense relation of the Islamic charitable societies with the PA, the UHWC 
enjoys a relaxed relation with the PA. For example, none of the UHWC staff have 
thus far been subjected to any form of harassment by the PA, and on more than one 
occasion the UHWC coordinated its activities with the PA concerned bodies (e.g., 
ministry of health).732 The reason for this relaxed relationship is of course a political 
one. Despite the divergence of the PFLP with PA as far as the Oslo process is 
concerned, it converges with the PA on the goal of building a secular state in the 
WBGS. This convergence is backed by both parties’ agreement that the PLO is the 
sole representative of Palestinian people wherever they are.  
 
The picture looks fundamentally different when it comes to the Islamic movements 
(so to speak Hamas and Islamic Jihad). Unlike the PFLP, Hamas and Islamic Jihad 
advocate the establishment of an Islamic state on the whole of the Mandatory 
Palestine and claim Palestine as Waqf land owned by Muslims all over the world. 
Consequently, no one should have the right to negotiate any part of it. In this sense, 
they make no separation between the Palestinian land which occupied during the 1948 
war or the 1967 war. This position prompted their failure to recognize the PLO with 
its political program of a secular state on WBGS as the sole representative of 
Palestinians.   
 
Based on this position, they introduce themselves as an alternative to the PLO/PA. In 
so doing, they are supported by their own militias (e.g., the Hamas affiliated Izz El 
Din El Qassam Brigades) which operate far from PA control. This fact contributes to 
the picture of “State within State” in the WBGS. Ironically, this picture is similar to 
the one of the PLO situation in other Arab countries (mainly in Jordan, and later in 
Lebanon) in the pre-Oslo era.733 Therefore, history seems to re-write itself, but this 





                                                 
732 Interview with Muna El Farah, 5 September 2005. 
733 For an excellent assessment of the PLO’s history see Cobban, op.cit., 
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Chapter VI: The Al-Aqsa intifada 
The Struggle for Reform 
 
The 28th of September 2000 witnessed a turning point in the history of the Oslo peace 
process and in Palestinian-Israeli relations. It was on this day that Ariel Sharon, then 
the Israeli opposition leader, visited Al-Haram Al Sharif (Temple) in East Jerusalem, a 
step considered by many Palestinians and by the international community as a highly 
provocative one. The visit sparked what become to be known as the Al-Aqsa Intfiada 
(Al-Aqsa being a mosque at Al-Haram Al-Sharif). The Al-Aqsa intifada started with 
clashes between some Palestinians praying at the Al-Aqsa Mosque and hundreds of 
Israeli soldiers who had accompanied Sharon during his visit to Al-Haram. Some of 
the Palestinians fell victim to lethal force, which ignited the clashes to extend to most 
Palestinian cities, villages and camps. 
 
In the early stages of these clashes, the Israeli occupying forces used heavy and 
medium calibre machine guns against Palestinians. After less than a month (on 12 
October 2000), these forces started deploying - for the first time since the occupation 
of WBGS in 1967 – the weapon of helicopter gunship, naval gunboats and tanks to 
shell and to carry out large scale ground incursions into cities, towns and refugee 
camps.  
 
The shelling of and incursion into Palestinian cities and towns were paralleled with a 
policy of collective punishment, including the installation of military checkpoints and 
roadblocks between the cities, towns, villages and camps of WBGS, to curtail the 
movement of Palestinians between them. Without exception, all Palestinians were 
affected by this measure: the general public, PLC members, PA senior & junior 
officials, university and school students, merchants, businessmen, and in some cases, 
PA ministers and heads of PA security forces.  
 
The checkpoint and roadblock system tightened the noose around Palestinians who, 
due to the closure imposed on WBGS since 1991, had been denied access to 
Jerusalem (including East Jerusalem) and Israeli territory, and forbidden to move 
between the West Bank and Gaza Strip without a permit. With the random closure of 
the Rafah International Terminal (the only outlet for Gazans to the outside world), and 
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Al Karamah International Terminal (the only outlet for West Bankers), some 3.2 
million Palestinians -the estimated population of WBGS in 2000734 - were besieged in 
their cities, towns and villages. 
 
The Israeli measures did not only target Palestinians, but also their property. In a 
report prepared by the Social and Economic Committee of West Asia and submitted 
to the UN Social and Economic Council, in its 59th session convened in New York on 
23 June 2004, nearly 1,370 houses were destroyed or damaged by the Israeli 
occupation in the period of 2002-03. In addition, at least US$370 million were the 
estimated losses of the Palestinian economy in the period between September 2002 
and April 2003. Of this were US$217 million losses to the agriculture sector, resulting 
from the Israeli measure of razing large stretches of Palestinian agricultural land. The 
remaining losses resulted from the Israeli measures of checkpoints and closure, the 
dismissal of thousands of Palestinian employees from Israeli labour markets, and the 
Israeli decision to freeze the transfer, to the PA, of the taxes collected from the 
Palestinian labours on behalf of the PA. All of this increased the unemployment rate 
of the WBGS to 63% by 2004.735  
  
The economic losses of Palestinians paralleled their losses in human life: 2,726 
Palestinians died in the period between September 2000 and December 2003. Around 
20.2% of these Palestinians were killed by direct ammunition fired at the head and 
neck, 13.8% at the chest and 38.9% at the upper parts of the body. Most of these 
Palestinians were killed by live bullets (67%), by shrapnel (6.5%) and in explosions 
(13.7%).736 The majority of those killed in explosions (bombs fired by helicopters or 
tanks) were allegedly wanted by Israeli occupying forces. In this sense, they were 
assassinated. The assassination policy, formally pursued by Israel against Palestinian 
activists since the 1970s,737 was the instrument invoked by Israel to combat intifada 
activists, including members/leaders of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and Al-Aqsa Martyrs 
Brigades, the newly emerged military organization affiliated to Fatah. At least 349 
Palestinians were assassinated in the period of December 2002-December 2003. 
Among them were 137 civilians (out of whom were 35 children and 25 women) by-
                                                 
734 PCBS. Statistical Abstract, op.cit., P.189. 
735 Excerpts of the reprot were published by the London-based daily of Al-Hayat on 31 July 2004. 
736 MoH. Health Status, op.cit., P. 111. 
737 Cobban, op.cit., P.55. 
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standards. While some 3,000 Palestinians were killed from the outbreak of the 
intifada up to December 2003, no more than 950 Israelis were killed during the same 
period.738 In the meantime, only 6,000 Israelis had been injured since the outbreak of 
the intifada as compared to some 24,000 Palestinians.739  
 
These figures show clearly how Palestinians were no match for Israel, and 
accordingly, how they would suffer dearly if the intifada lasted. However, the longer 
the intifada lasted the more Israel was going to lose, especially insofar as its status in 
the international community was concerned. As a result of Israel’s excessive and 
lethal use of force against Palestinians, the United Nations Human Rights 
Commissioner (UNHRC) adopted a resolution condemning Israel for the 
disproportionate and indiscriminate use of force, and accused it of war crimes on 19 
October 2000.740 A month later, the UN Human Rights Commissioner Mary Robinson 
strongly condemned Israel for its determination to use lethal and excessive force 
against Palestinians, and blamed it for the continuous suffering of Palestinian 
civilians.741   
 
The growing international criticism of Israel's excessive and lethal use of force against 
Palestinians, such as the broadcasting of Israeli soldiers killing 12-year-old 
Mohammad Al Durra in his father’s lap on 30 September 2000, which influenced 
Israel's international image, prompted Israel to consider the media as another weapon 
with which to fight Palestinians. The Labour-led Israeli government under Ihud Barak 
began a media campaign seeking to de-legitimatize the internationally recognized 
right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. The campaign blurred the 
distinction between Israeli measures against civilians/children and its war against a 
standing army. 
 
 The campaign operated on two levels: the first was at the family level. In this regard, 
the Barak-led government blamed Palestinian parents for encouraging their children 
to fight an ‘adult war’. On this level, the Barak government, benefiting from its 
                                                 
738 the London-based daily of Al-Hayat on 31 July 2004. 
739 Source: the official webpage of the Palestinian Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
<http://www.mofa.gov.ps/Statistics/index.asp> 
740 Marwan Bishara. Palestine/Israel: Peace or Apartheid. London & New York: Zed Books, 2001, 
P.35. 
741 Ibid., Pp35-36. 
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advanced and developed media system, achieved considerable victory. Palestinians 
suddenly had to defend the love of their children and to prove to the international 
community that Israel was the one responsible for the suffering of their children, not 
the other way around.   
 
The second level of the campaign focused on Palestinian military organizations, 
mainly the tanzim. Tanzim is the Arabic word for organization. It is commonly used 
by people to refer to Arafat’s party, Fatah. The Barak government accused tanzim 
members of shooting at Israelis and consequently blamed their leader, Arafat, for the 
unrest in the region. Interestingly, while some of the estimated hundreds of young 
people shooting at Israelis belonged to the tanzim, the majority had no connection to 
the tanzim, nor did they claim to.742
 
In this sense, the tanzim did not constitute an organized or self-standing military 
formation. Some of the young people shooting at Israelis may belong to Hamas, 
others to Islamic Jihad, and others to PFLP or DFLP, or they may not belong to any 
faction.  Some of these young Palestinians bore the brunt of the occupation and 
suffered its consequences, including the fatal shooting of their relatives and the 
destruction of their houses. Others were themselves subjected to humiliating 
measures, such as ill-treatment and torture under detention, and the confiscation of 
their land for settlement purposes.  
 
Far from this, these Palestinians were told of the justice and fairness of their cause by 
the UN Security Council and General Assembly resolutions 242, 338, 194, 3236 and 
others.743  These resolutions confirm the right to an independent Palestinian state on 
the land occupied in the 1967 War (WBGS including East Jerusalem), to self-
determination, and to return for refugees. Therefore, these Palestinians were 
empowered with the weapon of justice and fairness to fight the occupation and to 
convince the international community.  
 
                                                 
742 Ibid., Pp.36-42. 
743 For these resolutions see George J. Tomeh (ed.). United Nations Resolutions on Palestine and the 
Arab-Israeli Conflict. Beirut: Institute for Palestine Studies, 1975. 
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However, their lack of an advanced media strategy, together with little awareness of 
the security implications of the intifada’s militarization, enabled Israel to commit 
grave breaches of the laws and customs of war against Palestinians under the pretext 
of the security threat of Palestinian military factions, whilst simultaneously blaming 
them (the Palestinian military organizations) for these war crimes. In so doing, 
Israel’s argument was supported by the suicide bombings committed mainly by 
Hamas and Islamic Jihad against Israeli civilians.  
 
These bombings, strategically causing more harm than benefit to the Palestinian 
cause, empowered Israel with reasons for its intensive military actions against 
Palestinians. Consequently, Israel was able to recruit international support for its 
alleged battle to maintain Israeli security. While Israel was recruiting human and 
financial resources to gain further international support for its claimed battle, 
Palestinians did very little to offset the effect which Hamas' and Islamic Jihad’s 
bombings had on the international community’s image of Palestinians, or on the 
Israeli media campaign.  
 
Israel maintained its determination to achieve a sweeping victory on the media front. 
During this time, Israel was not only backed by a strong and advanced media strategy, 
but also by some international developments, mainly the events of September 11th in 
2001. These events took place less than a year after the rise to office of the Likud 
party under Ariel Sharon. They brought about fundamental changes in the 
international mood and put the issue of combating terror at the top of the American 
agenda.  Within this context, Islam was perceived as being inherently associated with 
terrorism and most branches of the Islamic movement were labeled as terrorists.  
 
Taking advantage of the anti-terrorist international mood and of the continuing attacks 
by Hamas and Islamic Jihad against Israeli civilians, the Likud-led Israeli government 
encountered little difficulty in blurring the distinction between the Palestinian 
resistance against the occupation, which is legitimate under international law, and the 
terror outlawed by international norms. Paradoxically, the right-wing Israeli 
government was doing so with the blind support of one of the most democratic and 
liberal states - the USA - led by a right-wing Republican administration with George 
Bush at the helm. The lot of the besieged and humiliated Palestinians, therefore, was 
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to endure Israeli war crimes backed by the Americans and tolerated by the Europeans 
and the Arabs, all the while being blamed for these crimes. 
The Reform: Between a Palestinian Vision and an American-Israeli One 
 
The blind support of the American administration for the Likud-government, and its 
failure to restrain this government’s lethal actions against Palestinians, coupled with 
European and Arab acquiescence, were key factors which encouraged Sharon to 
launch one of the most full-scale military campaigns against Palestinians in March 
2002. In this campaign, Israeli forces reoccupied most of the West Bank cities 
(Ramallah, Beit Jala, Bethlehem, Jenin, Qalqilya, Tulkarm, Nablus, and Silfeet) in 
addition to other towns and villages. The declared goal of the campaign, which 
marked the death of the Oslo process, was to destroy the infrastructure of terror and to 
arrest all those accused of facilitating suicide bombers' operations.  
 
The slogan, therefore, was the fight against terror and against its supporters, including 
the democratically-elected PA president, Arafat. From the Likud government’s point 
of view, Arafat was no longer a peace partner because he stepped aside and allowed 
his people to express themselves freely. Since he did so, the Likud government 
argued, Arafat became the patron of incitement and terror against Israel and therefore 
was to be excluded from any peace negotiations.  
 
Needless to say, neither Arafat, nor any other political leader, can control his people’s 
anger and their strong desire to revolt against their humiliating conditions when they 
decide to do so. The Al-Aqsa intifada was in fact a protest against the humiliating 
conditions and the balance of power inherent in the Oslo process. Due to this logic, 
principles like international legality and justice were marginalized, and consequently, 
Palestinians were left to the mercy of the Israeli interpretation of this process.  This 
interpretation implied the legitimisation of Israel’s control over the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip by besieging the Palestinian populated centres by Jewish settlements whilst 




According to the Israeli Information Centre for Human Rights in the Occupied 
Territories (B’Tselem), the number of settlement housing units in WBGS had steadily 
increased since the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993 to reach 31,400 by 2000. The 
increase in the number of housing units was accompanied with an increase in the 
number of settlers from 100,500 in 1993 to 191,600 in 2000 (a growth rate of 90%). 
This excludes the settlements of East Jerusalem where the number of settlers is 
estimated at 176,900 in 2000 as against 146,800 in 1993.744 These Jewish settlers, 
according to the Foundation for Middle East Peace (FMEP), are distributed in no less 
than 130 settlements in the West Bank (excluding East Jerusalem), 21 settlements in 
the Gaza Strip, and 11 settlements in East Jerusalem.745
 
It is this backdrop against which the intifada must be examined. The fact is that the 
Oslo process failed: to halt settlement activities, to stop humiliating measures against 
Palestinians (like closure, detention, torture and fatal shootings), alongside its failure 
to bring about the promised economic prosperity.  This led to an accumulation of 
anger and frustration among Palestinian civilians. When Arafat decided to step aside 
and allow his people to release their anger in protest against these conditions, Israel 
turned against him and treated him as the patron of terror.  
 
Under this pretext, the Sharon-led government besieged Arafat in his compound (Al-
Muqatah) in Ramallah during its military campaign of March 2002. The siege, which 
lasted until Arafat’s departure on 11 November 2004, sought to physically isolate the 
man, to disconnect him from the external world and, therefore, to prevent Palestinians 
from achieving any gain in the diplomatic arena - the only arena that can provide them 
significant progress. In addition, the siege sought to influence Arafat’s image in the 
eyes of his people and therefore to weaken Arafat’s capacity to make authoritative 
                                                 
744 B’Tselem. Land Grab: Israel’s Settlement Policy in the West Bank. Jerusalem: B’Tselem, May 
2002, P.12. Can be found <http://www.btselem.org/english/Publications/Summaries/land-Grab-
2002.asp> 
745 Fmep. Israeli Settlement in the Occupied Territories: A Guide. Fmep, A special Report of the 
Foundation for Middle East Peace, March 2002, Online 
<http://www.fmep.org/org/reports/2002/sr0203.html> 
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decisions and to lead his people.746 As Sharon pointed out, “the Israeli government 
has a standing decision to remove Arafat from any position of influence.”747  
 
While the Sharon government took the responsibility of removing Arafat from “any 
position of influence,” the Bush administration began a diplomatic campaign aimed at 
convincing the international community that Arafat was the source of Palestinians’ 
problems. After less than three months of Sharon’s siege of Arafat, Bush gave a 
speech at the White House (on 24 June 2002), clarifying his administration’s vision of 
the Middle East peace process. In this regard, he declared that  “peace requires a new 
and different Palestinian leadership, so that a Palestinian state can be born.  I call on 
the Palestinian people to elect new leaders.”748 The new leadership must build viable 
political institutions, and "build a practicing democracy, based on tolerance and 
liberty. If the Palestinian People actively pursue these goals, America and the whole 
world will actively support their efforts.”749
 
Thus, the message for Palestinians was clear: political progress was conditioned on 
the new security environment and on institutional reform, and, consequently, a regime 
change was essential. If Palestinians were to have their own state they must engage in 
new security arrangements to fight “terror”, reforming their political institutions based 
on principles of transparency, of accountability, of demarcation of power, and of 
promoting a pluralist civil society and free market economy. This was not going to 
happen, in Bush’s point of view, if the current leadership had not been changed. 
Arafat, therefore, was the one who, in the US administration’s point of view, blocked 
the road towards a Palestinian state, since he blocked democratic transformation in 
WBGS. Hence, the US policy of fighting Arafat became the key, in their eyes, to 
carrying out reform. This policy complemented the slogan of “patron of terror” 
adopted by Israel to describe Arafat during the Al-Aqsa intifada. 
 
                                                 
746 Lev Grinberg. “The Arrogance of Occupation”. In Middle East Policy. Vol. IX, no.1, March 2002, 
P.47. 
747 Quoted in Graham Usher. “Moving Toward a Cease-Fire?” In Middle East International. No. 713, 
21 November 2003, P.12. 




Ironically, the patron of terror and the blocker of democratic transformation (Arafat as 
viewed by Israel and the US administration) was the same person who cooperated 
with Israel and the US to fight “terrorism” and any form of resistance against the 
occupation during the interim period. He was also the same person who launched 
dozens of arrest campaigns against members of Hamas, Islamic Jihad and their 
supporters for the sake of Israel’s security (See chapter III). 
 
As well, he was the person who limited basic freedoms such as the freedom of 
expression, and who arrested civil society activists and tried them before the State 
Security Court founded in 1995 (See chapter III), with Israeli and American support 
as provided by the Wye-River memorandum signed in 1998 (for this momorandum 
see chapter III). Furthermore, Arafat was the one who undermined the role of the 
PLC, and who tolerated and sometimes even promoted corruption and misuse of 
power (as was shown in in chapter III, chapter IV, and chapter V) under America's 
and Israel’s watch.  
 
Was the reform not a necessity for Palestinians? Certainly, it was. But the reform 
desired by Palestinians is fundamentally different from that desired by the US and 
Israel. From the very beginning, Palestinians and their representative institutions were 
concerned with reform. On more than occasion, as we have seen in chapter IV, the 
PLC expressed its concerns over Arafat’s semi-autocratic rule and demanded new 
political arrangements based on the principles of transparency and accountability.   
 
On more than one occasion, the PLC, backed by civil society, also stood against the 
PA’s illegal arrests of opposition members and supporters (see chapter III, and chapter 
IV), and demanded the release of all political prisoners. As well, the PLC, joined by 
some PA institutions (like the GMC, as we have seen in chapter IV), stood against 
corruption and called on Arafat to try all those accused of misusing their office and 
power. Even during the intifada and Palestinians’ preoccupation with Israeli measures 
against them, the issue of reform gained a great deal of attention from Palestinians, 
manifested in the PLC document on reform published on 16 May 2002.  
 
The document, including comprehensive institutional arrangements, aimed at 
structural adjustments in the financial, security, judicial and administrative sectors. 
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The overall goal of these measures was to produce a functioning political system, 
based on the principles of separation of powers, transparency, accountability and the 
rule of law. Among these measures were: 
• to immediately ratify the Basic Law and implement PLC resolutions; 
• to immediately enact the law of the judiciary; 
• to hold legislative and presidential elections at the beginning of 2003; 
• to amend the 1995 electoral law in a manner that ensures wide representation 
in political institutions; 
• to initiate the preparation of the local council’s elections and to schedule a date 
for these elections;  
• to limit the number of ministers in cabinet to not more than 19, in accordance 
with article (65) of the Basic Law; 
• to merge and/or close those ministries with similar duties and to limit, as much 
as possible, any establishment of independent administrations and, instead, to 
include them in existing ministries; 
• to unify the finances of the PA in the general treasury account, to carry out and 
publish accounts for all revenues from government properties and for 
investments made by the PA, and to procure all revenues in terms of fees, 
loans, grants, taxes, and others incoming to the PA through its activities. No 
amount of money from the general treasury should be allocated or spent for 
any purpose unless decided by law; 
• to place all revenues from officially sanctioned monopolies (the Palestinian 
Company for Trade Services [Cement Company], the Palestinian 
Development and Investment Company, the Petroleum General Commission 
and the Tobacco Commission) under the supervision of the ministry of 
finance, in accordance with the law; 
• to restructure the security apparatus by enacting laws governing the work of 
the security services and the conditions of their recruitment, and by defining 
their jurisdictions and authority in a manner that minimizes redundancy of 
duties; and 
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• to streamline security services, to place them under the control of the ministry 
of interior, and to limit the term of the heads of security services to four 
years.750 
 
PLC concerns with reform were similar to those of the cabinet, as manifested in the 
“100 Days Plan of the Palestinian Government” concluded by the “ministerial 
committee for reform and development” formed by Arafat in the same year. The plan, 
approved by Arafat a day before the invasion of West Bank cities in March 2002, 
went in the same vein as the PLC reform document and set down measures that are 
necessary for a functioning political system based on the principles of rule of law, 
transparency and accountability. Furthermore, it called for the restructuring of the 
Palestinian security apparatus, and for their subjection to the supervision of the 
ministry of interior. In addition, the plan unified the finances of the PA in the general 
treasury account and procured all PA revenues in terms of fees, loans, grants, taxes 
and others incoming to the PA through its activities.751
 
The Palestinian concern with reform was not confined to formal political institutions, 
but extended also to include civil society, which adopted a reform plan in 2002 
asserting the above reform measures.752 The general public was also concerned with 
reform. On more than one occasion, the public expressed opposition to Arafat’s semi-
autocratic rule. On 25 October 1998, hundreds of Palestinians protested against the 
murder of a Palestinian by the Palestinian security forces in Ramallah. The protestors 
shouted, “PA, PA, we want an end to torture, we want freedom.”753 In a similar 
fashion, hundreds of Palestinians protested against the sentences of death, of life 
imprisonment and of 15 years imprisonment handed down by the state security court 
to three Palestinians convicted of killing Rifat Mohammed Joudeh, a Sergeant in the 
Preventive Security Forces, on 10 February 1999.754  
 
                                                 
750 E’Alan Sadir An El Majlis El Tashri’e Li Tatweer wa Islah Moasasat El Sultah El Watanya El 
Filistinya (A declaration published by the PLC to reform and develop the Palestinian National 
Authority Institutions). Palestine: PLC, 16 May 2002. An English translation of the same document can 
be found <http://www.aman-palestine.org> 
751 For the “100 days plan of the Palestinian government” see <http://www.aman-palestine.org> 
752 For civil society vision of reform see Ibid. 
753 Jersualem Post on 30 October, 1998.  
754 PCHR’s releases on 2 February & 10 March 1999. 
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Thus, Palestinians were very interested in reform. At the same time, however, they 
sought a type of reform that would not contradict their national aspirations. As 
Graham Usher points out, “Palestinians are not uninterested in democratic change. 
They are simply not prepared to trade domestic reform for the national 
independence.”755 For Palestinians the reform process implies a practicing democracy, 
based on transparency, accountability, rule of law and respect for human rights, under 
a strong leadership capable of realizing their national aspirations of independence, 
self-determination and return.  This was, and still is, the Palestinian vision of reform. 
Though Arafat failed to realize Palestinians' aspirations in a democratic and rule of 
law-based political system, he strongly opposed any surrender of their national 
aspirations, demanding an independent state with East Jerusalem as its capital, self-
determination and return.  Arafat’s position in this regard was very clear in the Camp 
David II summit which took place under the auspices of former American President 
Bill Clinton during 11-24 July 2000.  
 
Long overdue, the summit dealt with final status issues, including the future of the 
Palestinian refugees, Jerusalem and borders. The three main actors of the summit 
were under pressure and in urgent need of an agreement over these issues. President 
Clinton was about to leave office, a fact that compelled him to call for the summit so 
that his political legacy could culminate with a historical achievement: the settlement 
of one of the longest and most complicated global conflicts. 
 
Then Israeli Prime Minster Ihood Barak also needed an agreement, as he had already 
staked his political future on a historical agreement with Palestinians. At the same 
time, Palestinians had already announced their intention to declare a Palestinian state 
by September 13 of that year. Such a declaration would have had great momentum if 
there was agreement over the final status issues.756  
 
Though the three actors had the desire to conclude an agreement, Israel, backed by 
US, was unprepared to settle the conflict on the basis of UN resolutions 242 and 194. 
While the former resolution provides for a total Israeli pullout from the land occupied 
                                                 
755 Graham Usher. “Israel, Arafat, and the US occupation”. In Middle East International. No. 711, 24 
October 2003, P.11. 
756 Al-Quds Al-Arabi on 11, 12, 14 July 2000. 
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during the 1967 war, including the WBGS and East Jerusalem, the latter also provides 
for the return of all Palestinian refugees to their land.  
 
Instead of these resolutions, it was said that Israel proposed a settlement to the conflict 
based on an Israeli withdrawal from 85% of the West Bank after the conclusion of the 
final status agreement, with an additional withdrawal from a further 7% of the West 
Bank within a couple of years. In exchange for this withdrawal, Israel would annexe 
the main West Bank settlements (up to 8% of the West Bank) under its sovereignty. 
With regard to the border between the West Bank and Jordan, Israel proposed 
Palestinian control over 80% of it, and Israeli control over the remaining 20% (mainly 
the borders close to the Dead Sea). 
 
As far as East Jerusalem was concerned, it was said that Israel proposed the city’s 
division into three zones. One zone would be under complete Israeli sovereignty, 
another under some form of Palestinian sovereignty. The remaining zone would enjoy 
the same status as areas “B” in the West Bank, where Palestinians enjoy civil 
authority, while Israel enjoys authority over security affairs. As far as the Al-Aqsa 
Mosque was concerned, Israel proposed its internationalisation while Palestinians 
would be allowed to raise their flag above it. In the meanwhile, Israel refused to admit 
its moral and legal responsibility for the problem of the refugees - estimated at 3.5 
million worldwide - notwithstanding its readiness to allow thousands of them to return 
to the “state of Palestine” within the context of “family reunion”.757    
 
According to reported information, what Israel sought was a new form of the Oslo 
process with its “interim attributes” that were disastrous for Palestinian national 
aspirations. Because of that, Israel did not hesitate to accept the American proposal of 
postponing the issue of Jerusalem to future negotiations while signing an agreement in 
relation to other issues. The American proposal, aimed at offsetting Arafat’s rejection 
of the Israeli proposal, was in vein, as Arafat turned it down, insisting on full Israeli 
withdrawal from the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the Palestinian right 
to return.758   
 
                                                 
757 Ibid, on 21 July 2000. 
758 Ibid., on 22/23 July 2000.  
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Because of his position in Camp David II, Arafat was besieged and suddenly became 
a  patron of terror and a blocker of democratic transformation,759 notwithstanding his 
readiness to implement an “unconditional cessation of violence” and to “immediately 
resume security cooperation” with Israel as it was manifested in the conclusions of the 
Sharm-El Sheikh summit convened on 17 October 2000, the Mitchell Report of 30 
April 2001, Tenet Plan of June 2001,760  and the peace initiative of the Saudi Crown 
Prince Abdullah in 2001. The initiative, adopted by the Arab League summit in Beirut 
on 27 March 2001, provided for a complete Israeli pullout from WBGS in return for 
normalized diplomatic relations between Arab states and Israel.761
 
Nevertheless, the continued attacks of Hamas and Islamic Jihad against Israeli 
civilians- despite, and because of, Israeli security measures, including excessive and 
lethal use of force against Palestinians - left little room for Arafat to manoeuvre.  
More importantly, they promoted frustration among Israelis in a manner that enabled 
Sharon to win the premiership from Barak.  
 
Sharon's rise to power put an end to the Oslo Accords and left the whole peace 
process without any terms of reference. This fact was manifested on the ground with 
Sharon’s siege of Arafat and with his total refusal to deal with Arafat as a peace 
partner.  Ironically, Sharon’s position towards Arafat was the one upon which Bush's 
administration formulated its vision of peace in the Middle East, as we have seen 
above. In other words, Bush and his administration adopted the same position as 
Sharon, rejecting Arafat as a peace partner. But unlike Sharon, the US administration 
expressed its opposition to Arafat by besieging him politically, under the pretext of 
reform, which was used as an instrument to diminish Arafat’s authority in favour of 
more pliable elite, ready to surrender the Palestinian national aspirations for 
independence, self-determination and return. 
                                                 
759 Grinberg op.cit., Pp.47-51. 
760 The Sharm El Sheikh summit, convened under US auspice, searched for possible means to halt 
violence immediately. The summit proposed a “fact-finding committee” to investigate the reason for 
the unrest. The committee concluded its report on 30 April 2001. The report, known also as Mitchell 
Report (after the name of the committee’s head), called for an immediate halt of violence, and 
resumption of security cooperation. The same applied to the Tenet Plan (George Tenet was the CIA 
director) which calls for the immediate cessation of violence, and the resumption of security 
cooperation. For Mitchael Report and Tenet Plan see <http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/pal> 
761 The full text of the initiative is cited in Middle East Policy. Vol. IX, no.2, June 2002, Pp.25-26. 
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Reform: Arafat’s Bow to the “Winds” 
 
In early 2003, a peace plan for settling the Israeli-Palestinian conflict was debated by 
members of the Quartet Committee, comprised of the US, the European Union, 
Russia, and the United Nations.  The plan, which would come to be known as the 
“Road Map”, was formally submitted to Israelis and Palestinians on 30 April 2003762 
and proposed a three-phase settlement of the conflict. Each phase was marked by a 
particular timeframe and placed reciprocal obligations on both Israelis and 
Palestinians. The movement from one phase to the next depended on both parties’ 
success of meeting the obligations placed on them by the assigned phase. The extent 
of each party’s success in meeting its obligations in the assigned phase was to be 
decided by the Quartet Committee. The plan’s three phases and commitments for each 
party were as follows: 
 
Phase I (February-May 2003) 
 Palestinian Responsibilities 
• Declaring an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism, 
arresting all groups attacking Israelis anywhere, and resuming 
security cooperation with Israel. 
• Rebuilding the security apparatus and collecting illegal 
weapons. 
• Consolidating all security forces into three forces reporting to 
the minister of interior. 
• Introducing a package of reform measures, including a new 
constitution for Palestinian statehood, presidential and 
parliamentary elections, and premiership post, alongside an 
effective bureaucratic system. 
Israeli Responsibilities 
• Withdrawing from all Palestinian cities, towns and villages 
occupied on 28 September 2000. 
                                                 
762 The full text of the “Road Map” Plan is cited on <http://www.al-
bab.com/arab/docs/pal/roadmap2003.htm> 
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• Freezing settlement activities and dismantling settlements 
erected since March 2003, conditioned upon the progress of 
security cooperation. 
• Taking measures to improve the humanitarian situation of 
Palestinians, including lifting curfews and restrictions on the 
movement of persons and goods. 
 
Phase II (June-December 2003) 
 
In this phase, efforts were to be exerted with the aim of paving the way for an 
independent Palestinian state with provisional borders and attributes of sovereignty. 
All of this was conditioned on the success of Palestinians to meet the obligations 
placed upon them in phase I: to build a functioning democracy, to fight terror, to end 
all forms of violence, to rebuild their security apparatus, to hold presidential and 
parliamentary elections, and to appoint a prime minister. Could the Palestinians meet 
these obligations? An international conference will be convened by the Quartet 
Committee, in consultation with the concerned parties, about the Palestinian 
economy’s recovery after the Palestinian elections.  
 
Phase III (2004-2005) 
 
The completion of phases I and II would leave Palestinians owning their own 
sustainable political institutions and economic systems. Phase III, accordingly, 
proposed a second international peace conference with the aim of arriving at a 
comprehensive permanent status agreement that would end the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict in 2005 through a settlement negotiated between the parties, based on UN 
Security Council resolutions 242 and 338. 
 
The “Road Map” was an international declaration of the death of the Oslo process and 
its terms of reference, and the birth of new terms of reference. However, the plan was 
inspired by the same philosophy as the Oslo process, namely, a phases-oriented 
settlement to the conflict. Furthermore, and as usual, the plan placed huge 
commitments on Palestinians while making Israel’s obligations conditional on the 
satisfaction of Palestinians' commitments.  
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More importantly, the plan lacked any “enforcement mechanisms”. In other words, it 
is not clear whether the Quartet Committee had the power to force both parties to 
implement the plan, notwithstanding its power to decide the extent to which both 
parties have succeeded in meeting their obligations. The role of the Quartet 
Committee was, therefore, a supervisory one, without any power to enforce the plan’s 
clauses. This left the future of the plan subject to balance of power logic.  Thus, we 
are talking about the same philosophy of Oslo process; the balance of power. 
However, Arafat was in no position to turn the plan down. Two factors made Arafat 
unable to turn the plan down: 
 
• The US administration's preparation for an invasion of Iraq gave rise to a 
strong belief in a possible second Gulf war. Drawing on this belief, Arafat was 
concerned about the future of the Palestinian cause in the event of a Gulf war. 
An outbreak of war would mean the US administration’s full attention would 
be on the Gulf region rather than on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. This would 
have two interrelated negative ramifications on Palestinians: it would reduce 
international concern for Palestinian suffering at the hands of Israel and, at the 
same time, increase concern over the developments of the Gulf war. 
Accordingly, Israel would have a free hand to escalate its measures against 
Palestinians beyond international scrutiny. To counter this possibility, Arafat 
intended to jump-start the peace process by accepting the “Road Map” 
notwithstanding the humiliating conditions included therein. 
 
• Arafat's belief was reinforced by the Arab and European failure to pressure 
Israel to stop its excessive and lethal use of force against Palestinians. Coupled 
with Sharon's siege of Arafat, and the continued economic and social suffering 
of Palestinians resulting from the Israeli measures, this failure was the second 
reason that prompted Arafat’s acceptance of the “Road Map”. 
 
As part of his acceptance of the “Road Map” plan, Arafat announced his decision to 
appoint a prime minister on 14 February 2003.763 This decision was intended to 
transform the Palestinian political system from a presidential one (discussed in 
chapter III) to a presidential parliamentary system. However, this intended 
                                                 
763 Al-Ayyam & Al Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 15 February 2003. 
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transformation lacked any constitutional recourse. In other words, there was nothing 
in the Basic Law, the Palestinian constitution during the interim period, which 
provided for a premiership.  
 
In fact, Arafat was the one who formed the cabinet, presided over its meetings, 
approved/disapproved ministers’ resignations, held ministers to account, and 
dismissed them. Though the PLC enjoyed the right, in principle, to hold ministers to 
account, the status quo showed that Arafat was the only one who could do so in fact 
(as we have seen in the chapters III, Pp. 156-168, and IV, P. 183). Palestinians, 
therefore, had to amend their constitution (the Basic Law) to accommodate the new 
developments.  
 
On 8 March 2003, Arafat appointed Mohammoud Abbas (better known as Abu 
Mazen), the secretary of PLO’s executive committee, to the premiership and called 
the PLC for an emergency session to approve the creation of the position and the 
appointment. Accordingly, the PLC was convened on 10 March, and added new 
articles to the Basic Law clarifying the prime minister’s powers.  
 
According to these articles, the prime minister would be appointed by the PA 
president. The prime minister became empowered to form the cabinet with a number 
of ministers not exceeding 24 (in the past, the Basic Law provided for a number of 
ministers not exceeding 19, see chapter IV, P. 183) and would be required to do so 
within three weeks from the date of his selection by the PA president. Furthermore, 
the prime minister became empowered to call cabinet meetings, to preside over these 
meetings, and to dismiss and hold to account any minister in his cabinet. He, together 
with his cabinet, became accountable to the PLC who had the right to 
extend/withdraw confidence in him, his cabinet or any minister in his cabinet. If the 
PLC withdrew confidence in the prime minister or the cabinet, the PA president 
would be asked to appoint a new prime minister for the PLC's approval within a 
period not exceeding three weeks from the date of the PLC's withdrawal of 
confidence in the former prime minister or cabinet.  
 
While the prime minister and his cabinet became accountable to the PLC, only the 
prime minister became accountable to the PA president who would 
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approve/disapprove his resignation. As far as the ministers are concerned, only the 
prime minister would have the right to approve/disapprove their resignation. The PA 
president would no longer have power in this connection. 
 
Nevertheless, the PA president continued to enjoy the right to propose draft laws for 
the PLC’s approval and to ask the prime minister to call a cabinet meeting when one 
was necessary. More importantly, while the prime minister became responsible for 
maintaining order and public security, following up implementation of laws, 
proposing annual budgets, proposing draft laws, supervising foreign policy, 
appointing personnel to senior posts in the PA civil apparatus, and creating new 
public institutions, he lacked clear authority over security forces, which remain under 
the control of the PA president who assumes the post of commander-in-chief.764  
 
Thus, the Basic Law left unclear who controlled the security forces. While the prime 
minister (or the minister of interior) became empowered to maintain order and 
security, which implies that these forces should be at his disposal and that the heads of 
these forces should be appointed by him, Arafat remained the one who controlled 
these forces and appointed their heads. On 18 March 2003, Arafat ratified the Basic 
Law with its new amendments765 and consequently laid dawn the legal foundation of a 
presidential parliamentary system. Mohammoud Abbas, therefore, was legally obliged 
to start forming his cabinet.  
 
To form the cabinet, Abbas had to overcome huge difficulties. Abbas, very well 
known for his condemnation of violence against civilians (Israelis and Palestinians 
alike), is considered to figure among the wise and moderate old guards of the PLO. 
He stands against suicide bombings of Israeli civilians and against the militarization 
of the resistance against the occupation.766 Abbas’s position in this regard clashes with 
the strategy of the main Palestinian factions like Hamas, Islamic Jihad and PFLP, all 
of which support the militarization of the resistance against the occupation and oppose 
                                                 
764 The amendments of the Basic Law were published by  Al-Ayyam on 8, 10 March, Al-Hayat A -
Jadeeda & Al Quds on 11 March 2003. 
765 Al-Ayyam on 19 March 2003. 
766 See for example Al-Ayyam daily’s  interview with Abbas on 16 February 2003. 
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the “Road Map” plan. This fact made it difficult for Abbas to reach an agreed national 
formula with these factions and, therefore, to form a national unity government.767  
 
Abbas encountered difficulties not only with opposition factions, but also with PA 
President Arafat. On 13 April 2003, Abbas proposed his cabinet, naming himself as 
minister of interior.768 For Abbas, the post of minister of interior, in line with the 
Road Map, implied full authority over the eleven Palestinian security forces. This was 
strongly opposed by Arafat who wanted these forces under the command of a 
Palestinian national security council with himself in chair.  
 
The conflict between the two men was not confined to this issue, but extended to 
include the post of minister of state for security affairs. While Abbas proposed 
Muhammad Dahaln, the former chief of the Gaza Strip Preventive Security Forces, 
for this post, Arafat opposed this proposal. Dahaln, a very well known loyalist to 
Arafat during the interim period, was considered one of the few Palestinian political 
figures to win Israel's favour. CNN quoted the Israeli Prime Minister’s spokesman, 
Rannan Gissin, on 24 April 2003 as saying that "Dahaln is a man of action. He is not 
going to be a marionette for Arafat. It is not surprising that Arafat has been opposing 
him.” 
  
Not only did Dahaln win Israel's favour, he also built a power centre (in his function 
as the former chief of the Gaza Strip Preventive Security Forces) and gained the 
loyalty of thousands of young Gazan militants, far from Arafat’s satellite of control. 
This fact enabled Dahaln to turn on Arafat and to become one of Arafat’s most 
prominent critics during the Al-Aqsa intifada.  
 
These two issues (Dahaln and the security authorities) left the future of the 
government uncertain and almost brought about the premature demise of Abbas' 
endeavour to form his own government. However, international pressure (mainly 
from the European Union) coupled with local pressure (mainly from the PLC) forced 
both men to reach an agreement, assigning the post of minister of state for security 
affairs to Dahaln (who, with the minister of interior, assumes direct responsibility for 
                                                 
767 Al-Ayyam, and Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 31 March 2003. 
768 Al-Ayyam on 14 April 2003. 
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the Preventive Security Forces, Emergency Services and Rescue, and Civil Police) 
while leaving Arafat as commander-in-chief of the security forces (who assumes 
direct responsibility for General Intelligence, Military Intelligence, Public Security 
Forces, Presidential Security, Military Police, Air Guard, and Special Security).769 
Arafat's and Abbas’ deal enabled the PLC to exercise its authority and to extend 
confidence in the Abbas government with 51 members in favour, 18 in opposition and 
3 abstentions on 29 April 2003.770  
Abbas' Government: Between the Palestinian and Israeli Traps 
 
The PLC's vote of confidence in Abbas' government, in a sense, put it on trial. The 
challenge was twofold: affecting political reform and ending the violence. In others 
words, Abbas’ government was asked to bring about structural adjustments in the 
financial, security, judicial, and administrative sectors, whilst simultaneously ending 
the violence, and disarming the various factions.   
 
While Abbas’ government was to be tried mainly by Palestinians (as far as the first 
matter was concerned), Israel, backed by the US, was to try Abbas and his 
government on the second matter. Aware of these facts, Abbas initiated immediate 
reform measures. In this connection, Abbas’ government merged approximately 78 
independent commissions and administrations into the ministries to eliminate 
duplication among the roles and responsibilities of these commissions and 
administrations. 771  
 
More important was Abbas' decision to expand the “ministerial committee for reform 
and development” formed by Arafat in 2002. Initially, upon its formation, the 
committee comprised ministers only, but under Abbas' government, other ministers, 
PLC members, and civil society and private sector representatives were added. The 
most notable of these ministers were Salam Fayyad, Nabil Kassis, Ziad Abu Amr and 
Ghassan El Khatib. With the exception of Fayyad, the three remaining ministers are 
                                                 
769 For the structure of Abbas government see Ibid & Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 23 April 2003. See also 
the Presidential Decree no.7 for 2003 with relation to the government on 29 April 2003. In Al Waqaea’. 
The formal gazette of PA, 10th year, no.46, 16/8/2003. 
770 Al-Ayyam & Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 30 April 2003. 
771 Al-Hayyat on 19 July 2003. 
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former professors at the prestigious and highly regarded Bir Zeit University, in the 
West Bank. The most notable PLC members of the committee were Hanan Ashrawi, a 
very well known advocate of reform, and Azmi al-Shu’abyi, an advocate of financial 
transparency (see chapter IV). Furthermore, the committee included Raji El-Sourani 
and Mustafa El Barghuti, both human rights activists.772  
  
The composition of the committee was a clear indication of Abbas' intention to 
initiate comprehensive reform touching every sector of society: political, legal, 
administrative, financial, human rights, and economic. Toward this end, Abbas 
empowered the committee to set down the intended reform plan but at same time, left 
a free hand for the Minister of Finance Fayyad to adopt any urgent reform measures.  
 
Fayyad, considered an independent in the political sense, and a well known financial 
expert, was born in Nablus in 1952 and holds a Ph.D. in Economics from the 
University of Texas, in Austin. In the period of 1987-1992, he served as assistant to 
the Executive Director of the IMF before serving as advisor to the IMF Executive 
Director in the period of 1992-1995. In the period of 1996-2002, he served as regional 
director of the Arab Bank, before resigning his post to be appointed by Arafat as the 
minister of finance in June 2002.773  
 
Since his appointment to the post of minister of finance, Fayyad concluded a number 
of decisions aimed at improving the financial conditions of PA civil servants and 
security personnel. Among these was the decision to cancel the deduction of 5% from 
the salaries of the PA civil servants and security personnel. This 5%, said to be 
deducted to support the jobless Palestinians and families of martyrs, was subject to a 
complaint by PA civil servants and security personnel, particularly in light of the low 
remuneration of these servants/personnel, which did not exceed US$274 per month 
and which decreases to US$135 per month when unpaid family members are taken 
into account.774  
 
                                                 
772 Al-Ayyam on 7 July 2003. 
773 Fayyad Profile is cited on the official wepbage of PA <http://www.pna.gov.ps> 
774 Office of the Special Coordinator in the Occupied Territories. The West Bank and Gaza Strip 
Private Economy, op.cit., P.14. 
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Furthermore, all security personnel were asked to draw their salaries from Palestinian 
banks and not from their commanders as was the case before. This decision was taken 
to bring the salaries of the security forces (with the exception of salaries of Amn Al 
Ri’asa, or Presidential Security, which remained in an independent budget) under the 
supervision of the ministry of finance and, therefore, to unify the finances of the PA in 
the account of the general treasury.775 Under Abbas’ government, these decisions 
were executed, and the Palestinian civil servants and security personnel, starting with 
the pay period of July 2003, enjoyed the 5% which had been deducted from their 
salaries in the past. As well, the security personnel started to draw their salaries from 
the banks.776  
 
Moreover, Fayyad, supported by Abbas’ government, managed to address many of 
the negative features of the Palestinian bureaucracy, like irrational appointments (for 
these appointments see chapter V). During Fayyad’s term, no one was permitted to be 
enrolled on the PA’s payroll unless he was recruited through institutionalised 
recruitment methods according to clearly defined job descriptions and task 
specifications. In 2003, for instance, at least 800 Palestinian personnel were dismissed 
from their jobs after it was discovered that they were appointed through illegal 
means.777  
 
Of vital importance was Fayyad’s “war” against the officially sanctioned monopolies.  
As we have mentioned in chapter III (Pp. 159-160), these monopolies assume control 
over the basic products like wheat, fuel, cement and so forth. During Fayyad’s term, 
these monopolies were brought under the supervision of the ministry of finance. This 
fact manifested itself institutionally, according to Farid Ghanam, Director-General of 
public finance, in the evolution of the Palestinian Investment Fund (PIF). The PIF fell 
under the ministry of finance, was run by a seven-member board (including the 
minister of finance, minister of economics and representatives of the private sector), 
supervised all PA merchandise and investments, and managed these activities 
                                                 
775 Al-Ayyam & Al-Quds on 13 April 2003. 
776 See Al-Quds on 22 June 2003. 
777 Al-Ayyam, Al-Quds, Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 8 July 2003. 
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transparently.778 In this sense, the revenue of the officially sanctioned monopolies had 
been connected to the ministry central auditing system.779  
 
Having enjoyed authority over these monopolies, Fayyad cancelled the high fees 
imposed by these monopolies on any private company which sought to import these 
products (fuel for example) to WBGS.780 This high fee prevented any private 
company from moving into the market and, therefore, enabled these monopolies to set 
whatever prices they wanted for the products. In others words, due to these 
monopolies Palestinians were denied the opportunity to enjoy free market privileges 
and, therefore, were subjected to grafts (see chapter III, Pp. 159-160).  
 
Fayyad’s cancellation of these fees reflected his awareness of the free market as an 
arena of fairness and justice, and as an efficient instrument that ensures people with 
good and services at minimum prices. Due to his decision, the quantities of benzene 
sold to the public increased by nearly 83% in the period of May (when the ministry 
assumed supervision on these monopolies) to July 2003. In addition, the quantities of 
diesel sold shifted by about 228% during the same period. This shifted PA revenue 
from taxes on fuel by about 56% in the same period, despite the low price of fuel, 
when compared to the period before May 2003.781  
 
This increase in PA revenue from taxes on fuel took place simultaneously with an 
increase in PA revenue resulting from Fayyad’s rational appointment policy, which 
eliminated a high portion of the PA’s inefficient spending. Together with the other 
collected fees and taxes (income taxes for example), the monthly average PA revenue 
from taxes and fees is estimated at US$17 million during the first half of 2003. This 
sum, alongside the estimated Israeli monthly transfer in the same period (US$31 
million), monthly donor aid (US$19 million), and some US$28 million formerly 
frozen by Israel but relinquished to the PA in the first half of 2003, enabled the PA to 
                                                 
778 Interview with Farid Ghanam, Director-General of Public Finance. Gaza: Ministry of Finance, 15 
September 2004. 
779 Ibid. 
780 The Petroleum General Commission, for instance, used to impose fees of 20% on fuel imported to 
Gaza Strip,  and 30% on fuel imported to West Bank. See Al-Ayyam, Al-Quds, and Al-Hayat Al-
Jadeeda, on 16 July 2003. 
781 Al-Quds on 11 August 2003. 
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cover its monthly expenditures estimated at US$93 million for the first half of 
2003.782  
 
Nevertheless, Fayyad’s reformist revolution did not address all the negative features 
of the Palestinian administration, among which were nepotism & favouritism. These 
two features remained serious problems in spite of Fayyad’s endeavours to eliminate 
them. For instance, while I was leaving the ministry of finance after having 
interviewed Ghanam, I met with tens of Palestinian graduates who were marching 
before the ministry headquarters in protest against the ministry's failure to employ 
them. Some of them told me that they had been looking for a job for over three years, 
and not one of the PA officials was prepared to help them. When I asked them how 
PA officials failed to help them, all of them answered “because we do have no 
connections with high ranking officials or personnel occupying senior posts in PA 
civil and security apparatus.” Surprisingly, these graduates were chanting, “Oh, our 
Brother Arafat, come and end our suffering. Oh, our Brother Arafat, they (PA 
officials) used your siege to enrich themselves at our expense.”783  
 
Paradoxically, the person on whom the graduates were calling to end their suffering 
and to streamline the bureaucracy was the same one who blocked Abbas' endeavours 
to reform PA civil and security apparatus. As we have seen above, Fayyad succeeded 
in initiating some reform measures, and his success was partly attributable to Abbas 
who supported Fayyad in these endeavours. As a result, Palestinian popular support 
for Abbas grew, with an April 2003 poll showing that 28.7% of Palestinians believed 
that Abbas would continue with the reform process as against 17.4% who believed the 
contrary.784 Abbas' growing legitimacy in the eyes of Palestinians coincided with his 
growing legitimacy in the eyes of the European Union and the US, both of which 
expressed sympathy with him and satisfaction with his appointment to the 
premiership.785  
 
                                                 
782 Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 11 August 2003. 
783 Spot interview with some Palestinian graduates, Gaza: before the Minsitry of Finance headquarter, 
15 September 2004. 
784 See JMCC’s poll no.48, April 2003. Online <http://www.jmcc.org>  
785 See Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 8,14 March & Al-Ayyam on 1 April 2003. 
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Abbas' dual legitimacy constituted a serious threat to Arafat’s status in WBGS and in 
the international arena, which should be understood in light of Sharon’s siege on 
Arafat and the resulting deterioration of Arafat’s influence over the “rules of the 
game” in the WBGS and over regional and international actors. Thus, Abbas 
threatened to build a strong power centre away from Arafat's sphere of control and, 
consequently, to emerge as a de-facto alternative to Arafat. 
 
To combat this possibility - and to spoil Sharon’s plan to remove him from the 
political scene - Arafat tried to weaken Abbas at the internal level in order to offset 
his status at the international level. As Hani al-Masri, a Palestinian political analyst, 
emphasized, “Arafat has deliberately … prevented the emergence of an alternative 
Palestinian political leadership to ward off Sharon’s decision to remove him.”786  
 
The means of achieving this end was to block Abbas' reforms. The affairs of the 
“Authority of Aviation” and the “Diwan El M’wadfeen” (the Personnel Agency) of 
July and August, respectively, may substantiate our analysis. In July 2003, Arafat 
appointed Fayez Zaydan as Minister of the Authority of Aviation and Suliman Haleeb 
as Deputy-Minister.787 As discussed above, only the prime minister, by virtue of the 
amendments to the Basic Law, was empowered to appoint personnel to senior posts in 
the PA civil apparatus and to create new public institutions.  
 
In this sense, Arafat enjoyed no legal right to make the mentioned appointments, and 
only Abbas or someone on his behalf, in this case the minister of transportation, had 
any such right. Bearing in mind that the Authority of Aviation was merged with the 
ministry of transportation, in line with Abbas's policy of merging commissions and 
administrations with similar duties to the ministries, it can be concluded that Arafat’s 
appointments meant that there would be two aviation authorities: one connected to the 
minister of transportation and the other to Arafat.  
 
In other words, there would be one under the cabinet and another under the president. 
This, of course, would lead to an overlap of duties, prevent a clear demarcation of 
roles and consequently turn the clock back to the administrative anarchy that marked 
                                                 
786 Quoted in Usher. “Israel, Arafat, and the US occupation”, op.cit, P.11. 
787 See Al-Risalah on 24 July 2003. 
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Palestinian bureaucracy. In turn, the administrative anarchy would bring about 
weakness in Abbas’ government since its legitimacy derived mainly from its success 
in initiating reform measures.  
 
The Diwan El M’wadfeen affair is another case showing how Arafat deliberately 
sought to weaken Abbas’ government by blocking reform. On 27 August 2003, 
Abbas' government decided to appoint Sakhr Basiso, Secretary of the Revolutionary 
Council of Fatah, as General Director of the Diwan El M’wadfeen instead of Abdel 
Aziz Abu Shari’a, an Arafat appointee and loyalist.788 In fact, Abu Shari’a had 
assumed the post of general director of the Diwan El M’wadfeen since its foundation 
in 1994. In this sense, he oversaw all administrative issues of PA civil servants, as the 
Diwan El M’wadfeen is empowered to manage the administrative issues of PA civil 
servants, as shown in chapter V (Pp. 219-220). Because of that, Abu Shari’a was 
regarded by Palestinians as being responsible for many illegal appointments in the PA 
bureaucracy. In this sense, Abbas’ government considered its decision as a reform 
measure.  
 
On 30 August, Basiso went to his office to assume his responsibilities as general 
director of the Diwan El M’wadfeen. There he encountered tens of young armed men 
and was forced to leave the place under the threat of violence. The armed men 
justified their act as one in support of Arafat’s decision to keep Abu Shari’a in the 
post. Consequently, Abu Shari’a remained in his post, and the decision of Abbas’ 
government was not executed.789 The event shows how the Abbas government, 
notwithstanding the authority it enjoyed, lacked the power to implement its decisions 
mainly due to Arafat’s continued control over the source of coercion - an issue that 
remained most controversial between Abbas’ government and Arafat during the 
Abbas government’s short term (April-September 2003).   
 
Apart from Arafat’s attempts to abrogate his reformist measures, Abbas' whole reform 
strategy was conditioned on his ability to maintain the unilateral cease-fire with the 
opposition factions. In June 2003, Hamas and Islamic Jihad endorsed Abbas’ demand 
for a unilateral cessation of hostilities against Israel. The cease-fire included the 
                                                 
788 Al-Ayyam on 28 August 2003. 
789 Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 31 August 2003. 
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cessation of suicide operations and exchanges of fire with Israeli forces. From it, 
Abbas sought to pave the way for a multilateral truce with Sharon, ending the 
extrajudicial killings of Palestinians and Israeli incursions in the PA ruled areas, and 
lifting the closures. In turn, it was hoped that this would promote the secure 
environment necessary to resume peace talks according to the Road Map.  
 
However, Israel’s determination to maintain its military operations, including its 
incursions and extrajudicial killings, encouraged a Hamas suicide bomber to blow up 
a bus in Jerusalem, killing 22 Israelis on 19 August 2003. Two days later, Sharon's 
government avenged the killing of the 22 Israelis by assassinating the Hamas political 
leader, Ismail Abu Shanab. These two events signified a de-facto collapse of the 
cease-fire even before the Sharon government declared a formal end to the cease-fire 
and vowed to continue the “all-out-war” against Hamas on 1 September.790 With this 
declaration, Abbas had no alternative but to resign his post and to admit his failure on 
6 September 2003, and to abandon all efforts of ministerial committee reform and 
development. 
 
Addressing the PLC, Abbas clarified the main reasons for his resignation, pointing to 
the building of the Separation Wall, which, according to Abbas, “[blocked] the road 
of any progress in the peace process. Israel practises the most horrible oppression 
against our people, land and national rights. Israel failed to meet her commitments in 
the Road Map.” Abbas mentioned internal obstacles as well, emphasizing the 
incitement to which his government was subjected and the little support he and his 
government enjoyed: “I have done my utmost to bring about certain political 
achievements.  Nevertheless, it seems that the issue is not of a political achievement, 
rather, of the political determination of some to block this government’s success.”791  
The “Political Map” of Sharon: Israel’s Separation Wall 
 
As we have seen, the Road Map sought a comprehensive peace settlement based on a 
two states solution under international supervision. It alarmed Sharon who realized 
that Israel would ultimately have to act in accordance with the plan and freeze its 
                                                 
790 Graham Usher. “Dead End”. In Middle East International. No. 708, 12 September 2003. 
791 Al-Ayyam, Al-Quds, & Al-Hayat Al Jadeeda on 7 September 2003 
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settlement activities in the OPT as stipulated by the plan. To combat this possibility, 
new facts on the ground would have to be created to ensure Israel’s control over 
Jewish settlements regardless of the type of future peace settlement with Palestinians, 
the bantustanization of any future Palestinian state, the fragmentation of Palestinian 
society and economy, and if possible, the expulsion of a majority of Palestinians to 
neighbouring Arab countries. These were - and continue to be - the main features of 
Sharon’s political map. Sharon primary instrument for delineation of this map is the 
controversial Israeli “Separation Wall” (called the “Security Fence” by Israelis). 
 
The idea for the “Separation Wall” must be credited to the former Israeli Prime 
Minister Yitzhak Rabin whose 1992 electoral victory was traceable to his pre-election 
comments after the stabbing of an Israeli by a Palestinian in Jerusalem. At that time, 
Rabin declared that Israel must “take Gaza out of Tel Aviv.”792 This approach led him 
to sign the Oslo accords with the PLO. Later, in 1994, Rabin formed a ministerial 
committee to set down a plan for separating Palestinians in the PA-controlled areas 
from Israelis. Rabin’s decision followed the escalation of suicide bombings by Hamas 
and Islamic Jihad against Israelis. A fence, therefore, was erected around Gaza to 
coincide with the handover of control there to the PA under the Oslo accords. 
However, no fence was erected in the West Bank, and the findings of the ministerial 
committee came to naught due to Rabin's assassination.793
 
Shimon Peres, Rabin’s successor, was inspired by his dream of a “New Middle East” 
founded on economic integration rather than separation, and chose not to move in the 
direction Rabin had. Likud’s hawkish Benjamin Netanyahau, who followed Peres, did 
the same but for a very different reason: to appease the settlers who strongly opposed 
the idea of the wall.794 But with the failure of Camp David II and the outbreak of the 
Al-Aqsa intifada, the idea was seriously revived by Ihud Barak, who succeeded 
Netanyahu in the premiership. During Barak’s term, the idea was embodied in a plan 
for the construction of a barrier stretching from Jenin in the northern West Bank to 
                                                 
792 David Makovsky. “How to Build A Fence”. Online 
http://www.washingtoninstitue.org/media/makovsky/makovsky020504.pdf. From March/April 2004 




Latrun in the south, in November 2000. However, some financial and political factors 
froze the plan.795
 
With the rise of Sharon to office in 2001, Barak’s plan was invoked and modified 
before the Israeli cabinet approved it in the form of the "Separation Wall" in July 
2001 and started executing the first phase (phase “A”) in June 2002.796 This phase 
included the building of a segment of the wall that stretches from the village of Salam 
in the north of Jenin to El-Qana south of Qalqilya, in addition to a 22 km segment 
around East Jerusalem. The second phase, or phase “B”, endorsed by the cabinet in 
January 2003, included the building of 45 km of wall along the north of the West 
Bank. The third and forth phases, phases “C” and “D”, announced in March 2003, cut 
halfway into the West Bank to include the main settlement blocs (like Keddumin and 
Ariel settlements) on the Israeli side while simultaneously fragmenting the largest 
portion of Bethlehem and Hebron.797  
 
The completion of these four phases will provide a wall with a length of 360 km. With 
the wall that is planned for the Jordan Valley, which will place all the fertile land on 
the Israeli side, the total length of the wall will increase to 700 km and be three times 
as long as the Berlin Wall.798 According to the World Bank’s estimation, the wall will 
enable Israel to annex around 10% of the West Bank, leaving only 42% of the West 
Bank, in the form of isolated bantustans, under Palestinian control.799 Furthermore, 
around 400,000 Palestinians will be displaced from their land, and nearly a third of 
the West Bank population will lose access to their cultivatable land. This will enable 
Israel to annex de facto 129 out of an estimated 141 settlements in the West Bank 
(including East Jerusalem), and incorporate nearly 90% of the West Bank settlers, 
estimated at 400,000.800   
 
                                                 
795  Peter Lagerquist. “Fencing the Last Sky: Excavating Palestine After Israel’s “Separation Wall”. In 
Journal of Palestine Studies. Vol. XXXIII, No.2 (Winter 2004), Pp.6-7. 
796 Ibid., P.7 
797 Ibid., Pp.7-8. 
798 According Al-Haq institute for Human Rights <http://www.alhaq.org/alhaq_1.htm> 
799 Noam Chomsky. “A Wall as a Weapon”. Online 
http://www.palestinemonitor.org./Special%20Section/Closure/wall_as_weapon.htm from 23 February, 
2004 New York Times. 
800 Lagerquist op.cit., P.13. 
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For example, phase “A”, declared completed in July 2003, had already expropriated 
123,000 dunums (constituting 2% of the West Bank), displaced some 12,000 
Palestinians, and denied the population of 115 Palestinian towns and villages access to 
its cultivated land.801 In the event that Israel continues construction of the wall 
according to its plan, it is expected that the 42% of the West Bank remaining under 
Palestinian control will be divided into three isolated bantustans, together with a 
disconnected forth in Gaza which is already surrounded by a fence,802 thereby 
rendering talk about a future viable Palestinian state devoid of any meaning.  
 
All the indicators show that Sharon is determined to keep constructing the wall 
according to the prescribed phases. In November 2003, he declared that should there 
be no progress with the Road Map, he “would not rule out” proceeding “unilaterally”. 
He would complete the construction of the wall in the West Bank, “redeploy” the 
army to more “defensible borders” and perhaps remove a dozen or so settlements that 
even the wall can not secure.803  
 
Sharon’s statements laid down the main principles of the Gaza disengagement plan, as 
we will see later.  They were delivered in response to an Islamic Jihad suicide 
bombing that left 19 Israelis dead and tens of others injured on 4 October 2003. The 
bombing, committed in Haifa to avenge the killing of nearly 20 Palestinian activists 
and civilians three weeks prior,804 happened just a month after Arafat’s appointment 
of Ahmad Qrieh (better known as Abu Ala’) to the premiership after Abbas resigned. 
Thus, the bombing put Qrieh in a difficult position, particularly after Israel blamed the 
PA for its failure to halt suicide bombings and the Israeli cabinet threatened to expel 
Arafat from the territories. A state of emergency was announced, and Qrieh reduced 
his cabinet to nine ministers805 in order to deal with Israeli threats against Arafat.   
                                                 
801 Figures from <http://www.palestinehistory.com/wall.htm> 
802 Graham Usher. “The End of the Road”. In Middle East Internatonal. No.716, 9 January 2004. 
803 Grahama Usher. “Advantage of Sharon”. In Ibid. No. 715, 19 December 2003.. 
804 Khalid Amayreh. “State of Emergency”. In Ibid., No. 710, 10 October 2003. 
805 Al-Ayyam & Al-Hayat Al Jadeeda on 8, 9, 10 October 2003. 
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Qrieh's Government: In Line with Arafat’s Will 
 
As noted above, following Abbas’ resignation from the premiership, Arafat appointed 
Qrieh, who resigned his post as PLC Speaker. Like Abbas, Qrieh was asked to form 
his cabinet within three weeks of his appointment. Unlike Abbas, Qrieh seemed 
unwilling to commit the same mistakes as Abbas. From the beginning, Qrieh threw 
the ball into the Quartet’s field when he asserted that the cessation of violence and 
suicide bombings would be conditional on a cease-fire agreement “to be observed by 
the concerned parties”,806 including the Quartet members (the US, the UN, Russia, 
and the EU).  In so doing, Qrieh sought to pass the initiative to the Quartet in the hope 
of upgrading its supervisory role to one of enforcement.  
 
In the meanwhile, Qrieh seemed unwilling to challenge Arafat’s grip over security 
forces when he tolerated the foundation of the Palestinian National Security Council 
(PNSC) as the umbrella under which all security forces were to be gathered. 
Empowered to establish an overall security policy, the PNSC was formed of the PA 
president (Arafat) as chair, the prime minister, the minister of finance, the minister of 
interior, a member of the PLO executive committee, a member of the PLC, heads of 
the National Security Force (Qwaat Al Amn Al Watani) in the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, the head of general intelligence (El Mukhabbarat al-Amma), the head of 
military intelligence, in addition to a number of security advisors.807  
 
Qrieh bowed to Arafat’s wishes to control the security forces and to monopolize the 
means of coercion. In fact, Qrieh sought to avoid a possible threat to his political 
career. At the same time, he sought to demonstrate that he was more loyal to Arafat 
than to the US or Israel in order to bolster his legitimacy in the eyes of Palestinians.  
 
Qrieh’s loyalty to Arafat was clear when he dismissed Dahaln, who had already 
declared that he would not serve in any government but Abbas’,808 from his cabinet, 
which he proposed to form with a Fatah majority after Islamic Jihad, Hamas and 
                                                 
806 Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 9 September 2003. 
807 Ibid on 12 September 2003. 
808 Al-Ayyam on 8 September 2003. 
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PFLP once again refused to participate in any government under the Road Map.809 
Though non-Fatah members were initially proposed for Qrieh’s cabinet,810 Qrieh 
quickly excluded them from his cabinet and confined it to nine ministers (originally it 
included 24), in line with Arafat’s preference for a Fatah-dominated emergency 
cabinet primed to address Israel’s threats against him.   
 
Four of the nine ministers had served in Abbas’ cabinet (Nabil Sha’at, Naim Abu El 
Hummus, Sa’eb Erekat and Salam Fayyad). However, with the exception of Fayyad, 
the remaining three were affiliated with Fatah and known Arafat loyalists. The others, 
like Nasser Youssef (Minister of Interior), Abdel El Rahman Hamd (Minister of 
Housing and Public Works), Jamal El Shubki (Minister of Local Government) and 
Jawad El Tibi (Minister of Health), were newly appointed and also affiliated with 
Fatah.811 On 7 October 2003, Qrieh and seven other ministers of the emergency 
cabinet were sworn in before Arafat in accordance with the Basic Law, which 
empowered the PA president to declare a state of emergency without PLC approval 
for one month, after which the approval of two thirds of PLC members was required 
(see chapter IV, P. 183).812
 
However, minister of interior Nasser Youssef took a different position, demanding 
that the cabinet be approved by the PLC before being sworn in before Arafat. As a 
result, Youssef did not take the oath before Arafat,813 who in turn smeared Youssef 
with the same tar as Dahaln. “He wants to work with the Americans and the Israelis 
against the interest of our people,” Arafat told Fatah officials in Ramallah when he 
was asked about his sudden swing in opinion about Youssef after his previous 
acceptance of Youssef as minister of interior.814 Quickly, Qrieh turned against 
Youssef and dismissed him, before accepting Arafat's appointment of Hakam Ba’lawi, 
a member of the PLC and of Fatah's central committee and an Arafat loyalist, as 
                                                 
809 Ibid, & Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 22 September 2003. 
810 Ibid, & Al-Ayyam on 28 September 
811 Al-Ayyam on 10 October 2003. 
812 Ibid & Al-Hayat Al Jadeeda on 7 October 2003. 
813 Ibid., on 8 October 2003. 
814 Quoted in Graham Usher. “Israel, Arafat, and the US occupation”. In Middle East International. No. 
711, 24 October 2003, P.11. 
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acting Minister of Interior (he assumed direct responsibility for the preventive security 
forces, emergency services and rescue and civil police).815  
 
In a sense, Arafat ultimately determined the composition of the emergency cabinet 
and the cabinet’s policy, which sought to reach a cease-fire agreement with the 
opposition factions before concluding a multilateral truce, with Israel ending 
extrajudicial killings, freezing the construction of the Separation Wall and lifting the 
closure. Qrieh clearly expressed this policy, vowing not to drag Palestinians into a 
civil war: "[T]he Palestinian-Palestinian conflict is a taboo. We are not going to play 
the Israeli game and drag ourselves into a civil war. We will keep our dialogue with 
the Palestinian factions including Hamas, Islamic Jihad and others.”816  
 
It seems unlikely that Arafat was not fully aware that such a cease-fire was a far-
fetched one given the failure of Abbas' and the expected escalation of Israeli measures 
on the ground. Still, Arafat supported Qrieh’s policy precisely because of its 
likelihood of failure, which would demonstrate to the US and Israel that Arafat was 
the only one who could halt the violence and suicide bombings.817 As such, Israel 
would have to refrain from adopting any serious measures against him, like expelling 
him from the territories in order to remove him from the political scene. 
 
At the same time, the failure of Qrieh’s dialogue policy would weaken Qrieh’s status 
internally, and make him fully dependent on Arafat and, thereby, less reluctant to 
disobey Arafat’s future instructions. In this connection, Arafat managed to realize his 
goals, as demonstrated by the developments following the day on which the term of 
Qrieh's emergency cabinet expired. 
 
As noted above, Qrieh’s was an emergency cabinet the term of which was only a 
month, after which approval of two thirds of the PLC was required. On 4 November 
2003, the term expired. Arafat was legally obligated to ask the PLC for a further 
                                                 
815 Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 13, 15 October, and Al-Quds on 14 October 2003. 
816 Al-Ayyam & Al-Quds on 7 October 2003. 
817 In December 2003, for example, Arafat would encourage Qrieh to resume dialogue with 12 
Palestinian opposition factions (among which were Hamas and Islamic Jihad) gathered in Cairo. The 
dialogue ended with failure as no agreement was reached after these factions demanded clear 
guarantees ending the Israeli measures on the ground in return for a delcared cease-fire from their side. 
See Grahm Usher. “Advantage Sharon”. In Middle East International, No. 715, 19 December 2003. 
 330
extension of the cabinet’s term, or to declare the dissolution of the government and 
ask Qrieh or another to form a new one. As PLC member Azmi al-Shu’abyi pointed 
out, Arafat “failed to ask the PLC to extend Qrieh’s government’s term.”818  
 
Instead, Arafat said the Qrieh government would be “streamlined” until an expanded 
government was formed.819 When Qrieh began expanding his government, he was in 
no position to resist Arafat’s wishes to keep Hakam Ba’lawi, an Arafat appointee and 
loyalist, for the interior portfolio and to leave the security forces under the PNSC with 
Arafat as chair. Ultimately, Arafat and Qrieh agreed upon this formula before the 
declaration of Qrieh’s regular cabinet. As Qrieh himself pointed out: “We agreed to 
unify the security forces in a manner that ensured the fulfilment of our commitments 
under the leadership of Abu Amar [Arafat].”820  
 
With the exception of a few ministers (like Salam Fayyad), most of Qrieh’s regular 
cabinet ministers were from among Arafat's old guard: Nabil Sha’at, Sa’eb Erekat, 
Intisar El Wazir, Mitri Abu Ita, Mahr El Masri, Jawad El Tibi, Rawhi Fatoh and 
others.821 In this sense, the government was structured in a manner that enhanced 
Arafat’s power and status. Hassan Abu Libdah, the newly appointed director of the 
prime minister’s bureau, admitted this fact when he declared that 
 
“…this government was formed not to diminish the President (Arafat) or share 
his authorities. Rather, it was formed to strengthen the PA, to end chaos, to 
initiate a comprehensive reform, to prepare for the elections, and to push 
forward the peace process. These are the main priorities of the government 
which Mr. Arafat set up for Qrieh and asked him to fulfil.”822
 
On 12 November 2003, the PLC voted in favour of Qrieh's government with 48 in 
favour, 13 opposed and 5 abstentions.823 In so doing, the PLC formally recognized 
Arafat's authority over the government, thereby turning back the clock to a de facto 
presidential system with Arafat standing unchallenged and in control. 
                                                 
818 Al-Ayyam on 4 November 2003. 
819 Ibid & Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 5 November 2003.  
820 Al-Ayyam on 10 November 2003. 
821 The names of the 24 ministers of Qrieh government were published by Ibid & Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda 
on 10 November 2003. 
822 Al-Ayyam on 10 November 2003 
823 Ibid, Al Hayat Al Jadeeda, & Al-Quds on 13 November 2003. 
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Sharon’s Unilateral Steps: Towards the Gaza Disengagement Plan 
 
In a sense, Sharon benefited from Arafat's de facto control over Qrieh's government, 
as Sharon used it as an excuse to proceed unilaterally, starting with the construction of 
the first phase of the Separation Wall, by arguing that there was no fundamental 
change in the Palestinian political system and that Arafat, “the number one enemy of 
peace”, as Sharon prefers to describes him, remained the unchallenged actor in 
Palestinian politics. Palestinians, Sharon continued, failed to meet their obligations 
under the Road Map, including the full empowerment of the Palestinian prime 
minister. In an interview with the Jerusalem Post in October 2003, Sharon stated that 
 
 “…an agreement with the Palestinians won’t happen by itself. It requires a 
Palestinian prime minister who really would be strong. So far the reforms have not 
been implemented. Any prime minister now would have his hands tied by Arafat.”824
 
Consequently, Sharon had the pretext to proceed unilaterally and to impose his own 
vision of a final settlement with Palestinians with the full support of the Bush 
administration.825 In February 2004, Sharon dropped a political bombshell when he 
announced his plan to dismantle most of the 21 Jewish settlements in the Gaza Strip, 
where some 5,000 settlers live, among 1.3 million Palestinians.826 The plan, which 
became commonly known as the "Gaza disengagement plan", embodied the formal 
Israeli position towards the final status settlement with Palestinians and included the 
dismantling of only a few settlements in the West Bank.  
 
The Jewish settlements expected to be dismantled in the West Bank are located 
behind the Separation Wall, and a most generous estimate of their number is five 
(Ghaneem, Kadiem, Homish, Wasah and Nour).827 The Gaza disengagement plan, 
therefore, meant the legitimatization of Israel’s de facto annexation of most of the 
West Bank settlements (the annexation of at least 136 out of 141 settlements) under 
the illusion of compromising so much of Israel's interests by evacuating the Jewish 
settlements in the Gaza Strip.   
                                                 
824 The full text of the interview can be found 
<http://info.jpost.com/Coo3/Supplements/FSB/031017/art.01.htm> 
825 AL-Ayyam on 12 December 2003. 
826 The BBC on 4 February 2004 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3462461.stm> 
827 According to the Sharon Plan published by Al-Quds daily on 17 April 2004. 
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Most importantly, the plan meant an Israeli declaration of the Road Map’s collapse 
and the end of any principled peace settlement with Palestinians based on UN 
Security Council resolutions 242, 338 and 194, confirming the Palestinian rights to 
form a state in WBGS (including East Jerusalem), to return of refugees and to self-
determination. This was, and still is, the PA’s nightmare.  However, the PA was in no 
position to oppose the disengagement plan on principle because so doing would pit 
the PA against an Israeli withdrawal from a Palestinian territory.  
 
The PA, therefore, declared a conditional acceptance of the plan. The withdrawal 
from the Gaza Strip, the PA asserted, would have to take place simultaneously with 
withdrawals from the West Bank in accordance with the Road Map and in a manner 
that would not compromise the formation of a Palestinian state in WBGS (including 
East Jerusalem) at some future time. This, the PA continued, would have to take place 
in full co-ordination with the concerned parties (including the PA, Israel and the 
Quartet members). In March 2004, Arafat put it this way:  
 
“We welcome any simultaneous Israeli withdrawal from any part of our land. I mean 
from Gaza and the West Bank. … To reach a full withdrawal from all our territories… 
the withdrawal should be through talks between the two parties and the framework of 
the Road Map.”828
 
Of course, Sharon was unprepared to listen to Arafat or to respond to his demand to 
revive the peace talks according to the Road Map. What concerned Sharon was how 
to eliminate Hamas' military and civil infrastructure and to weaken its capacity to take 
part in the administration of Gaza after the withdrawal of Israeli soldiers.  Sharon’s 
concern was stimulated by Hamas welcoming his plan as a product of the intifada. 
Hamas was of the opinion that the PA should not coordinate the withdrawal with 
Israel and let Israeli soldiers leave Gaza as if they were “escaping” it. Hamas was 
ready to take part in the administration of the Gaza Strip on an equal footing with 
other factions under the slogan of “partners in blood, partners in decision”.  Hamas 
                                                 
828 Quoted in <http://customwire.ap.org/dynamic/stories/I/ISRAEL_PALESTINIANS?SITE=DCTM…> 
from the Washington Times of 11 March 2004. 
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wanted a nation-wide leadership to adopt a political program seeking the liberation of 
the remaining parts of Palestine through “armed struggle”.829  
 
This position, interpreted by Sharon as a new Hamas threat to escalate its military 
operations against Israeli forces in Gaza, coupled with the absence of any Palestinian 
leader capable of cracking down on Hamas, prompted the Israeli government to 
escalate the “all-out-war” on Hamas. As Israeli Deputy Minister Ihud Olmert pointed 
out: “We decided it was no use waiting for the Palestinians to implement the vision of 
President Bush and the Road Map. Time is of the essence. The status quo needs to be 
changed and we are ready to do this.”830
 
On 22 March 2004, therefore, the Israeli occupying forces assassinated the disabled 
Sheikh Ahmad Yassin, Hamas' founder and spiritual leader. Yassin's assassination 
dealt the hardest blow to Hamas since its foundation in 1989, and the act earned 
strong condemnation from most of the international community, including the UN.831 
After less than a month, on 17 April, Hamas suffered a second loss with the 
assassination of Dr. Abdel Aziz Al Rantisi, Yassin’s successor.832 In carrying out 
these extrajudicial killings, Israel was encouraged by the Bush administration, which 
vetoed a UN Security Council resolution condemning the assassination of Yassin and 
calling a halt to “all attacks against any civilians as well as all acts of violence and 
destruction”, on 25 March 2004.833
 
The extrajudicial killings of Hamas leaders accompanied a serious escalation in Israeli 
incursions into cities, towns and camps in the Gaza Strip, under the pretext of 
combating the "terrorist infrastructure”. In March 2004, Israeli troops backed by tanks 
and helicopters raided al-Bureij and Nusseirat in central Gaza Strip to destroy the 
                                                 
829 The position of Hamas toward the Gaza-disengagment plan was stated in a Hamas internal 
document dated on 23 May 2004. Arabic excerpts of this documents are cited on the official webpage 
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military formations of these refugee camps. Described as a "pinpoint” operation by 
the Israeli army, the raids left 14 Palestinians including an eight-year-old boy dead.834  
 
Most notably was the May raid of Israeli forces into Rafah city under the pretext of 
closing the smuggling tunnels that run from Egypt under the border controlled by 
Israel. Located in the south of the Gaza Strip and described as the most violent area of 
the territories, Rafah is adjacent to the border between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. The 
estimated length of this border is 12.5 km, four of which run alongside the city. Since 
the outbreak of the intifada, Palestinian militants and Israeli forces have regularly 
exchanged fire at various points along the border. Because of that, nearly two thirds of 
the homes demolished by the Israeli occupation forces since the outbreak of the 
intifada (estimated at 2,500) have been in Rafah.835  
 
In addition, almost every house at the southern edge of the city is pockmarked by 
heavy machine gun, tank or rocket fire. Continuously, Israel claims that these houses 
are used by Palestinian militants as hiding places to construct tunnels for smuggling 
small arms and explosives. Under this pretext, the Israeli occupying forces launched 
one of the largest and bloodiest operations in the Gaza Strip since Israel occupied it in 
1967. Operation Rainbow started on 12 May and lasted until 24 May, resulting in 298 
demolished homes and 47 Palestinians killed eleven of whom were children.836  
 
Of the 47 dead, a dozen or so were killed within no more than a few minutes, and 
dozens more injured when an Israeli helicopter dropped a bombshell among hundreds 
of demonstrators who were marching down the main street of Rafah toward Tal El-
Sultan neighbourhood (west of Rafah) where the Israeli raid was concentrated in the 
first days of the operation.837 Israeli shelling of the peaceful Palestinian demonstration 
prompted John Dugard, UN Special Rapporteur to the OPT, to describe the operation 
as “war crimes amounting to collective punishment.”838
 
                                                 
834 The BBC on 7 March 2004. Online <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/3540179.stm> 
835 According to Human Right Watch (HRW) Report of “Razing Rafah: Mass Home Demolitions in the 
Gaza Strip”. May 2004, P.1, Online <http://www.hrw.org/campaigns/gaza> 
836 Ibid, Pp.10-11. 
837 According to BBC on 19 May 2004. Online <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/3728681> 
838 Ibid. 
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Dugard's words reveal Israel’s failure to balance its interests as an occupying power 
against the protection of the civilian population. While Israel, as the occupying power, 
has the rights to defend itself, to close smuggling tunnels and to take measures to 
avoid further attacks, its exercise of these rights must not affect the right of civilians 
to life and property. The shelling of the peaceful demonstration, coupled with the 
wide-scale destruction of homes, suggests that the operation was a measure of 
collective punishment against civilians to avenge the killing of five Israeli soldiers by 
Islamic Jihad militants at the border on 12 May 2004.839  
 
More importantly, they suggest that the operation did not seek to protect soldiers at 
the borders or to close smuggling tunnels, but to widen the buffer zone between the 
Gaza Strip and Egypt in a manner that would tighten Israel’s control over the southern 
border of the Gaza Strip. This would ensure total Israeli control over all the borders of 
Gaza since Israel already controlled the northern borders of Gaza through the Erez 
fence. As Human Rights Watch concluded: 
 
“The pattern of destruction … is consistent with the goal of having a wide and 
empty border area to facilitate long-term control over the Gaza Strip. Such a 
goal would entail the wholesale destruction of the neighbourhood, regardless 
of whether homes in them pose a specific threat to the IDF, and would greatly 
exceed the IDF’s security need”840
 
This is how Sharon understands the Gaza disengagement plan. For him, the plan does 
not mean the dismantling of the Gaza Strip settlements while leaving Palestinians in 
control of the borders. Rather, it means Israeli control over borders and external 
security, notwithstanding the evacuation of the Jewish settlements from the Gaza 
Strip. Israeli forces will keep their fortifications on the borders between Egypt and the 
Gaza strip and, thereby, control the movement of Gazans to the outside world. In 
other words, Sharon seeks to besiege Palestinians within the boundaries of the Gaza 
Strip while simultaneously keeping his forces ready to invade any Gazan area when 
the occasion arises. Sharon admitted as much when he asserted in his plan “the right 
of Israel … to take preventive measures and to act against any Gaza Strip based 
threats.”841
                                                 
839 HRW “Razing Rafah”, op.cit., P.8. 
840 Ibid, P.2. 
841 The full text of Sharon Plan was published by Al-Quds daily on 17 April 2004. 
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Sharon regularly described the plan as “hard concessions”, for which the Bush 
administration traded off Palestinian national aspirations for a state in WBGS with 
East Jerusalem as the capital, as was manifested in Bush's statements on 14 April 
2004.  The statements were delivered after a meeting between Bush and Sharon in the 
White House, during which the US administration endorsed Sharon's plan, accepted 
for the first time Israel's desire not to respect the pre-1967 borders, and backed Israel's 
opposition to the Palestinian right of return.  Referring to the growth of Jewish 
settlements in the West Bank, Bush pointed to “new realities on the ground, including 
already existing major Israeli population centres.” Any final status agreement between 
Palestinians and Israelis, Bush continued, should “reflect these realities”.842 In 
connection to the right of return, Bush declared: 
 
“It seems clear that an agreed, just, fair and realistic framework for a solution 
to the Palestinian refugees issue as part of any final status agreement will need 
to be found through the establishment of a Palestinian state and the settling of 
Palestinian refugees there rather than Israel.”843  
 
The boundaries of the Palestinian state, which was supposed to receive the Palestinian 
refugees according to Bush’s “just and fair” settlement, had already been delineated 
by the Separation Wall and covers at best no more than 42% of the West Bank and the 
Gaza Strip in the form of isolated cantons, with Israel controlling borders and external 
security. This means that the Palestinian cities, towns and villages of pre-1948 are out 
of the picture. Further, all of this implies an American adoption of the Israeli position 
opposing UN resolutions as a basis of any future settlement of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. As Amr Moussa, Secretary General of the Arab League, declared: “This 
development is negative and extremely regrettable because it cancels all previous 
frameworks [for resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict].”844 Among these frameworks 
was, of course, the Road Map which is considered by the EU states as the most 
appropriate formula to settle the conflict based on a two-state resolution. As Javier 
Solana, European Union Foreign Policy Chief, announced: 
 
“The EU remains committed to a negotiated agreement resulting in two viable, 
sovereign and independent states as the only way to achieve permanent peace 
                                                 
842 The Times on 15 April 2004. 
843 Ibid. 
844 Financial Times on 16 April 2004. 
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and an end to the occupation that began in 1967. … Final status issues can 
only be resolved by mutual agreement between the parties”.845
 
For Palestinians, any peace settlement that does not ensure the end of the occupation 
and an independent Palestinian state over WBGS is a nightmare scenario. That is why 
the Palestinian daily of Al-Quds & Al-Ayyam commented on Bush statements as the 
“new Belfour Declaration [referring to November 1917’s British declaration 
supporting the establishment of a Jewish national home in Palestine, see chapter II, 
Pp. 50-51] seeking to liquidate the Palestinian cause.”846 Qrieh considered Bush's 
statements as a clear indication of the biased policy of his administration: “We hope 
the US administration will not say anything that is considered a reward for a party or a 
side at the expense of the other side. Otherwise, there will be no peace.”847 Arafat 
went further and considered the statements as the “fatal bullet” to peace: “It means 
clearly the complete end of the peace process… It would lead to a cycle of violence 
and end all the signed agreements.”848
 
Nevertheless, Arab, European and Palestinian condemnations were not to influence 
the American policy built on the Thomas Hobbes principle of the “justice of power”, 
rather than the “power of justice”.  This principle prompted Sharon to proudly declare 
Bush's statements an “unprecedented achievement in the history of Israel, and the 
most painful strike to Palestinians since Israel's inception in 1948.”849  
The PA: Loosing Authority 
 
Sharon’s success was not confined to the Bush administration’s endorsement of his 
wishes to circumscribe the Palestinian national aspirations within the boundaries of 
his disengagement plan, rather, it extended to include the international community’s 
endorsement of his wishes to consider Arafat’s regime as an illegitimate one. This 
was clearly embodied in the statements of Terje Roed Larsen, UN Special Envoy to 
the Middle East peace process, made in July 2004. In his briefing during a UN 
                                                 
845 Ibid. 
846 Al-Ayyam on 15 April , & Al-Quds on 16 April 2004. 
847 The Times on 15 April 2004. 
848 Ibid. 
849 According to Yediot Ahronot on 22 April 2004. Arabic Internet edition 
<http://www.arabynet.com/article.asp.?did=107462.EN> 
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opening session, Larsen pointed to steadily emerging chaos in WBGS and accused 
Arafat of displaying a lack of will to reform the PA. In Larsen’s words;  
 
“The paralysis of the Palestinian Authority has become abundantly clear, and 
the deterioration of law and order in Palestinian areas is steadily worsening. … 
This collapse of authority cannot be attributed only to the Israeli incursions 
and operations inside Palestinian towns. The Palestinian Authority is in deep 
distress and is in real danger of collapse… Arafat has given only nominal and 
partial support to reform”850
 
 
Larsen’s statements alarmed the PA since they touched on fundamental issues related 
to the PA's future as the appropriate ruler of Palestinians, as well as the ultimate 
source of coercion in WBGS. Accordingly, PA officials quickly dismissed Larsen's 
statements and accused him of serving Sharon’s interests. “It is strange for him to play 
the role of the cheerleader, basically, of Mr. Sharon,” Nasser Al Kidwa, the 
Palestinian permanent observer to the UN, told reporters after attending the UN 
opening session.851  
 
Nevertheless, only a few days after Larsen’s statements, the PA suffered an 
unprecedented state of disorder that threatened its collapse just as Larsen predicted! 
On 16 July 2004, a militant group calling itself the Jenin Martyrs Brigades kidnapped 
Ghazi Al-Jabali, head of the PA civil police, and held him hostage in al-Bureij refugee 
camp for three hours before releasing him upon some PA officials’ mediation. The 
group was protesting what it called “the PA’s failure to combat corruption and to try 
all those accused of misuse of power and office among whom is Ghazi Al-Jabali.”  
 
On the same day, masked Palestinian gunmen kidnapped five French civilians in the 
southern Gaza Strip town of Khan Younis and took them to the local Red Crescent 
headquarters where they ordered workers to leave. The masked gunmen released the 
French civilians after a few hours and demanded to be employed in the PA security 
apparatus. The kidnapping of the French civilians was the third incident of its kind, as 
other unidentified armed men kidnapped Khalid Abu Al Ulah, head of the southern 
office of the Israeli-Palestinian District Coordination and Cooperation Offices 
                                                 




(DCOs), on the main road between Khan Younis and Rafah on the same day.852 In 
protest against this state of disorder, Rashid Abu Shbak, head of the Gaza Strip 
Preventive Security Forces, and Amin el-Hindi, Director General of General 
Intelligence, resigned their posts.853 The result was a stalemate for Arafat, exacerbated 
by Qrieh's resignation from the premiership in protest against the state of disorder.  
 
Arafat dismissed the resignation of Qrieh, Abu Shbak, and El-Hindi. He decreed the 
unification of the Palestinian security forces into three: the civil police, public security 
(or, as it is commonly known, the National Security Force or Qwaat Al Amn Al 
Watani) and General Intelligence. Moreover, he dismissed Al-Jabali from his post and 
appointed Sae’b Al A’jz. In the meanwhile, he replaced Abdel El Raziq El-Majidah 
with Musa Arafat as head of public security. Musa Arafat remained at the head of 
military intelligence as well.854  
 
Though these measures partially contained the crisis, they prompted serious strife 
inside Arafat's party of Fatah. The strife centered around the appointment of Musa 
Arafat to the head of public security. While the young members of Fatah (mainly the 
Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades) considered the appointment of Musa Arafat, described as 
a symbol of corruption and misuse of power by Palestinians, as a clear indication of 
Arafat’s reluctance to promote real reform, Arafat old guards considered it necessary 
to preserve Arafat’s authority. On 17 July 2004, thousands of Fatah supporters backed 
by the Al-Aqsa Martyrs’ Brigades marched toward PLC headquarters in Gaza City 
protesting the appointment of Musa Arafat, and calling on Arafat to bring an end to 
the chaos and to adopt real reformist measures.855  
 
In a similar fashion, dozens of young militants marched through El Nusseirat camp in 
central Gaza chanting “No to Musa Arafat, yes to reform.” In Rafah, the situation was 
worse, as young militants exchanged fire with the guards at preventive security 
headquarters.856 No causalities were reported. However, the events left the future of 
Arafat’s party in real danger and constituted a serious challenge to Arafat’s capacity 
                                                 
852 Al-Hayat Al Jadeeda & Al-Quds on 17 July 2004. 
853 Ibid. 
854 Al-Quds on 18 July 2004. 
855 Ibid. 
856 Lara Sukhtian. “Militants Burn Palestinian Offices”. Online 
<http://www.Israelforum.com/board/archive/index.php/t-5098.html> 
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to preserve it. Paradoxically, the source of the challenge was not the opposition 
factions, most of which demanded immediate reformist measures,857 but, as we have 
seen, militants affiliated with Fatah.  
 
Arafat quickly re-appointed El-Majidah as head of public security, and with Prime 
Minister Qrieh, set up a ministerial committee to investigate the reasons for the 
disorder.858 However, the committee never conducted any investigation. On 21 July, 
Nabile Amr, a PLC member, was shot in the foot with two bullets by unidentified 
armed men.859 The attack on Amr added further ambiguity to the identity of the 
persons behind the disorder.  
 
Palestinians believed Israel stood to benefit most from the internal Palestinian chaos 
and, therefore, blamed it for the recent events. In support of their accusations, 
Palestinians pointed to certain Israeli officials' remarks on Gaza events. Such as 
Sharon’s considering the events as “other evidence of [his] contention that Israel lacks 
a real peace partner.” Some Israeli ministers considered the events as the product of 
Arafat’s continued control over security forces and financial resources. In the words 
of Silvan Shalom, Israeli Foreign Minister, “when Arafat’s security and financial 
authority is confiscated from him, there will be order.”860
 
These events, Palestinians believed, were intended to end Arafat rule in a manner that 
would enable Israel to proceed with its unilateral steps. Assuming this analysis to be 
true, Palestinians failed to see the other side of the coin. The longer Arafat remained 
in power, the more Israel would be justified not to go along with the Road Map. In 
this sense, Israel was unwilling to remove Arafat, but willing to weaken his capacity 
to influence the rules of the game. Only this would enable it to refrain from pursuing 
the Road Map and to proceed unilaterally.   
 
                                                 
857 On 17 July 2004, for example, Islamic Jihad and DFLP published pamphlets declaring their 
apposition to the security chaos, and calling for real and immediate reformist measures. On the 
followed day, PFLP published pamphlet to this effect.  
 
858 Al-Ayyam on 20 July 2004. 
859 Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 21 July 2004. 
860 Al-Ayyam on 19 July 2004. 
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The means to achieve Israel's goal, it could be concluded, was the promotion of 
insecurity, but it would have to take place under the pretext of reform. Only this 
would ensure further international support for Israeli unilateral steps while leaving the 
impression that the events were a Palestinian-Palestinian strife reflecting the PA's 
failure to rule. Against this background, the attack on Amr must be examined. Bearing 
in mind that Amr served as a minister in Abbas’ cabinet and was a member of a 
committee formed to report, on 21 July 2004, to the PLC on the failure of Qrieh's 
government to keep order and combat corruption,861 the attack on Amr was intended 
to give the impression that it and the other events were the violent manifestation of the 
strife between the conservative doctrine (Arafat doctrine) and the reformist doctrine 
(Abbas doctrine).  
 
Ironically, Palestinians themselves believed this story when they accused Dahaln of 
cooperating with Israel in engineering the events. Palestinian accusations against 
Dahaln were prompted by the fact that Dahaln was one of the few Palestinian political 
figures to win Israel's favour and to build a power centre beyond Arafat's reach. In this 
sense, Palestinians asserted, Dahaln was objectively qualified to engineer the events. 
Add to that the fact that Dahaln had served in Abbas' cabinet and was a supporter of 
reform, it is possible to conclude that Dahaln was subjectively qualified to engineer 
the events as well.  
 
However, this conclusion does not mean Dahaln actually participated in the events or 
promoted them. Dahaln ruled out violence from his methodology, asserting that 
Arafat was the representative of Palestinians, notwithstanding Dahaln’s demands to 
implement the PLC document of reform of 2002, to reorganize the security forces, to 
ratify PLC laws, and to initiate elections for the Fatah central committee in order for 
the young generation to assume a leading role in the party.862  
 
Whoever engineered them, the events proved that the PA was in a serious crisis and 
that reform was urgently needed. Under this pressure, Arafat agreed to cooperate with 
the parliamentary committee (formed on 22 July 2004) to implement the PLC plan of 
                                                 
861 Al-Hayat AL-Jadeeda on 22 July 2004. 
862 Al-Quds on 1 August 2004. 
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reform of 2002.863 Meanwhile, Arafat endorsed Qrieh’s demand to enjoy real 
authority over the three security forces, which legally were under the minister of 
interior’s control (the Preventive Security Forces, Emergency Services and Rescue, 
and Civil Police). The Qrieh government adopted a series of re-appointments within 
these forces as a first step to implementing the security plan envisaged by Al A’jz to 
improve the performance of the PA security forces.864 This step was followed by the 
deployment of the Palestinian police to the various towns and cities of WBGS.865 
However, the regular Israeli incursions into Palestinian towns and cities restricted the 
forces' efforts to keep order.  
 
On 18 August 2004, Arafat delivered an unprecedented speech before the PLC, 
including a comprehensive assessment of the PA's achievements and failures since its 
foundation in 1994. In his speech, Arafat pointed to the “Israeli aggressive war” 
against the Palestinians and their institutions, beginning with Israel's failure to 
implement the political accords signed with the Palestinians and culminating in the 
Israeli re-occupation of Palestinian cities and towns during the intifada. The war 
reached its peak, Arafat asserted, with the construction of the Separation Wall to 
consume around 58% of the West Bank, the regular incursions into Palestinian towns 
and cities, and the shelling of Palestinian security forces and institutions. All of this, 
Arafat explained, weakened the capacity of PA institutions to work in an effective 
manner, and “produced a security vacuum in several areas … and, hence, promoted 
chaos and security anarchy, thereby stifling the emergence of the rule of law.”866  
 
Nevertheless, Arafat admitted the PA's role in stifling the rule of law and the PA 
institutions' weak performance when he asserted “the unacceptable and incorrect 
practices of some institutions.  Some misused their office … and only a little support 
was given to the rule of law, independence of judiciary, and principles of 
accountability.”867 To deal with the crisis, Arafat called for immediate presidential 
and parliamentary elections, a number of laws to organize the work of the security 
forces and to promote financial transparency, and the full empowerment of the 
                                                 
863 Al-Ayyam on 23 July 2004. 
864 Ibid, & Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 3 August 2004. 
865 Al-Ayyam on 8 August 2004. 
866 The full text of Arafat speech was published by Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 19 August 2004. 
867 Ibid. 
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Attorney General to follow up all issues related to the misuse of public office and of 
funds. Most notable was Arafat’s announcement of his readiness for accountability by 
the PLC, by a parliamentary committee, or by any other Palestinian body. 868  
 
Arafat initiated a comprehensive reform plan, affecting the political system, judiciary, 
security institutions and bureaucracy. Arafat’s reform plan was inspired mainly by the 
2002 PLC reform plan,869 and, in this sense, Arafat’s plan was a PLC plan. This was 
the first time Arafat adopted a PLC plan or resolution, which may denote Arafat's 
readiness to accept real reforms and thereby to yield significant power.  
 
The following developments on the ground may support this analysis. In the same 
month as Arafat's speech, Ali Al Jarbawi, Executive Director of the Central Elections 
Commission, announced the start of the registration period for the second presidential 
and parliamentary elections on 4 September 2004. Around 1.8 million Palestinians, Al 
Jarbawi noted, were expected to register as eligible voters during the registration 
period which lasted up until 7 October of the same year.   
 
To this end, Al Jarbawi added, at least 1009 registration stations were founded to 
enable Palestinians of WBGS (including East Jerusalem) to register for the elections 
that were to be held according to the 1995 Electoral Law (see chapter IV). 80% of the 
eligible voters, Al Jarbawi expected, would participate in the elections which needed 
some six months of preparation.870 In the period between 4 September and 7 October 
2004, registration of eligible voters started, and thousands of Palestinians registered in 
the several registration stations in the various cities and towns of WBGS (including 
East Jerusalem).  
 
However, the process was interrupted in some governorates like Jabalia in the 
northern Gaza Strip where Israel launched a bloody military operation that lasted for 
around three weeks, leaving 125 Palestinians dead. Furthermore, some Palestinians of 
other governorates like Jerusalem, for example, were unable to reach the registration 
                                                 
868 Ibid. 
869 The committee, headed by Abbas Zaki, a PLC member, and included other nine PLC members, 
submited it report to the PLC speical session held in Ramallah and Gaza in the period of 18-25 August 
2004.  
870 The London-Based daily of Al-Hayat on 18 August 2004. 
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stations due to the Israeli imposition of roadblocks. This forced the Central Elections 
Commission to extend the registration period for another week upon a request by the 
PLC.871 In mid-October, the Central Electoral Commission announced the completion 
of the eligible voters’ registration. Nevertheless, no elections were held, mainly due to 
the sudden deterioration of Arafat’s health in late October 2004. Palestinians became 
deeply engrossed in the health developments of their long-time symbol and the man 
who transformed theirs from “a refugee cause” to “a national cause”.  
 
On 29 October, Arafat, said to require medical treatment for an intestinal flu, boarded 
a Jordanian helicopter and left his headquarters (Al-Muqatah) in Ramallah for the first 
time in more than two years (since March 2002). As he boarded the helicopter on his 
way to the Percy Hospital’s state-of-the-art hematology clinic in France, thousands of 
tearful Palestinians, bodyguards and officials chanted, using his nom de guerre: “We 
will sacrifice our blood and souls for you, Abu Ammar” and “the mountain cannot be 
shaken by the wind”872 (one of Arafat's favourite sayings). These tearful Palestinians 
were disappointed on this occasion, as the mountain was shaken. Arafat departed on 
11 November 2004.  
After Arafat’s Departure  
 
Arafat's death ended one of the most controversial eras in Palestinian history. It 
started with Arafat appearance in the late 1950s and his subsequent success of, 
together with Khalil El Wazir (assassinated by Israeli intelligence in April 1988), 
Salah Khalaf (assassinated in January 1991) and others, laying the foundation for the 
first modern Palestinian national movement, Fatah, the revised Arab acronym for the 
Palestinian national liberation movement and itself meaning “openness”. Fatah's 
founding occurred in the early 1960s, and preceded Arafat's and his colleagues’ 
success in dominating the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), a national 
organization founded by the Arab states in 1964 to enable Palestinians to play their 
part in the liberation of their land.873  
 
                                                 
871 Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 6 October 2004. 
872 See Haaretz on 30 October 2004. English Internet edition 
<http://www.harretzdaily.com/hasen/spages/494992.html> 
873 For discussion over the developments concerning the building of PLO, and Fatah movement, see 
Cobban op.cit., chapter 2 (Pp.21-35). 
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After that, Arafat assumed the chairmanship of the PLO executive committee, and 
managed to flee with the PLO away from Arab tutelage and to gather all Palestinians 
with their various ideological affiliations under the PLO banner, armed struggle being 
its only instrument to liberate Palestine. However, with the outbreak of the third Arab-
Israeli war in 1973, and the subsequent American and Soviet pressure to convene an 
international peace conference to settle the conflict, Arafat introduced his peace 
initiative known as the “ten points plan”, which sought to establish a Palestinian 
Authority on any part of Palestine.874  
 
Arafat’s peace initiative enabled him to get, in 1974, the Arab states and the UN 
General Assembly to endorse the PLO’s claim to be the sole representative of 
Palestinians, and the right of Palestinians to self-determination.875 This was an 
unprecedented political achievement for Arafat and his organization, as it transformed 
the Palestinian cause from a cause of refugees to a cause of nationhood. However, this 
achievement prompted Israel to invade Lebanon in 1982 with the aim of destroying 
the PLO military and civil infrastructures, which were rebuilt there after the PLO’s 
expulsion from Jordan following the Palestinian-Jordanian civil war of the early 
1970s.  
 
With the semi-destruction of his organization’s military and civil infrastructures in 
Lebanon, Arafat set up his headquarters in Tunisia before the breakout of the first 
intifada, which enabled him and his organization to participate (within the context of 
a joint Palestinian-Jordanian delegation) in the Madrid Peace Conference initiated by 
the Americans on 30 October 1991.  However, the right-wing Israeli government in 
power at that time rendered this conference largely unproductive. With the rise of 
Yitzak Rabin to the Israeli premiership in 1992, new windows of peace opened, and 
Arafat initiated with Rabin the Oslo backchannel to sign the Declaration of Principles 
in 1993.  
 
                                                 
874 For this Plan see Y. Harkabi, The Palestinian Covenant and its Meaning, Valentine Mitchell & CO. 
LTD (1979) Pp. 147-148 and also for the most recent discussion over this programme see chapter 
Muhammad Muslih. “A Study of PLO Peace Initiatives, 1974-1988.” In Avraham Sela & Moshe 
Ma’oz (eds.) The PLO and Israel: From Armed Conflict to Political Solution: 1964-1994. New York: 
St. Martin’s Press, 1997. 
875 Cobban op.cit.,  Pp.58-63. 
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The Declaration of Principles and the subsequent Cairo agreement (or Gaza-Jericho 
Agreement) gave rise to the first Palestinian authority on a Palestinian territory in 
May 1994. The PA was empowered with authority over civil matters, and all issues 
relating to sovereignty and external security remained under Israeli control. In July 
1994, Arafat returned to the territories for the first time in five decades. He assumed 
the PA chairmanship before being formally elected to the post in 1996 after the 
extension of PA civil control to 27% of West Bank and 60% of the Gaza Strip.  
 
Nevertheless, Arafat was asked to go through bitter rounds of negotiations with the 
Israeli government to realize the Palestinian aspirations of self-determination and 
return, culminating in the unproductive Camp David II. Its failure turned the clock 
back to the days of antagonism that distinguished Israeli-Palestinian relations before 
1993. This fact was manifested by the outbreak of the Al-Aqsa intifada in 2000 and by 
the subsequent obstruction - or collapse - of peace. Arafat, thus, was besieged in his 
compound in Ramallah, and the resistance of his people was labelled with terror, 
before his authority being subjected to unprecedented pressure to reform itself. 
 
As we have seen, Arafat was labelled as a terrorist and was pressured to yield his 
authority to a strong prime minister as a precondition to the revival of peace. Between 
the pressure of his enemies to yield his authority and the pressure of his people to 
realize their national aspirations, Arafat managed; it should be admitted, to play the 
game and to remain the unchallenged leader and symbol of the Palestinian nation until 
he was formally pronounced dead on 11 November 2004. 
 
Like any other leader, Arafat had successes, as well as failures. Among his most 
notable successes was the momentum the Palestinian cause gained during his time, as 
manifested in the UN General Assembly resolutions providing for the rights of 
Palestinians to self-determination and to an independent state. His other major 
achievement was his conversion of the first intifada into the creation of the PA, the 
first Palestinian authority in history. Through the first intifada, Arafat managed to 
gain Israel’s formal recognition of the Palestinian national existence and, thus, to 
transform the issue of the Palestinian entity from the realms of theoretical possibility 
into an empirical reality. 
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The PA formed the first building blocks of a future Palestinian state, creating Para-
state institutions like the cabinet, legislative body and security institutions. Though 
Arafat sought to evolve this authority into a state with its derivative attributes, 
including a monopoly on coercion and the ability to issue binding rules, certain 
political reasons (as we have seen in chapter III) hampered Arafat's attempts to do so.  
 
In his endeavors to evolve his authority into a state (in terms of monopolizing 
coercion and issuing binding rules), Arafat was restrained by the conditions of interim 
accords signed with Israel, conditions that prompted several mistakes on Arafat's part. 
Prompted by the possible threat of his opponents (mainly Hamas and Islamic Jihad), 
Arafat concentrated power into his hand and into the few around him whom he 
trusted. The majority of the population was denied access to effective political 
participation in a manner that hindered the emergence of a democratic political system 
based on the principles of separation of powers, accountability, transparency, and the 
rule of law.  
 
In addition, Arafat hindered the emergence of a professional bureaucratic system and 
tended instead to enlarge and overstaff the PA civil and security apparatus with the 
aim of gaining people’s loyalty. In other words, Arafat politicized the bureaucracy 
and, hence, diverted it from its intended purpose (the welfare of Palestinians).   
 
Nevertheless, Palestinians tolerated Arafat's internal mistakes, particularly in light of 
his position in Camp David II when he refused to yield their national aspirations. 
Though this position might be perceived by some as irrational in that it deprived 
Palestinians of a historical opportunity to achieve their state,876 Palestinians 
considered it a most patriotic stance and, thus, considered Arafat the most conceivable 
leader, with more than 26% of Palestinians trusting him the most in comparison to 
1.7-11.2% trusting other public figures (like Ahmad Yassin, Hamas founder; Ahmad 
Sa’adat, Secretary General of the PFLP; and others) in October 2003.877  
 
                                                 
876 See for example Barry Rubin. “The Terror and the Pity: Yasir Arafat and the Second Loss of 
Palestine”. In Journal of Middle East Review of Internal Affairs (MERIA). Vol. 6, no.1 (March 2002). 
Internet edition <http://meria.idc.ac.il> 
877 See GMCC Poll No.49, October , 2003. Online <http://www.jmcc.org> 
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Anyone who witnessed the hundreds of thousands of tearful Palestinians who 
gathered in Arafat's compound awaiting the arrival of his body on 12 November 2004 
would understand what Arafat meant to them. Simply put, Arafat embodied the 
Palestinians' national aspirations for an independent state, self-determination and 
return, which aspirations he never yielded to Israel. Eventually, these tearful 
Palestinians moved their sadness aside to show outstanding skill in dealing with the 
legal implications of their historical leader’s departure.     
  
As was mentioned in chapter IV (P. 190), the PLC Speaker is supposed to replace an 
incapacitated PA president for a period not exceeding 60 days, during which free 
presidential elections are to be held. Accordingly, Rohi Fatoh, PLC Speaker since 10 
March 2004,878 took over the PA chairmanship before scheduling presidential 
elections for 9 January 2005. On 25 December 2004, the Central Elections 
Commission initiated an electoral campaign scheduled for 25 December 2004 to 8 
January 2005 (two weeks). Seven candidates competed for the PA chairmanship: 
Mohammoud Abbas (Abu Mazen), Fatah candidate; Taysser Khalid, DFLP candidate; 
Bassam El Salihi, People Party candidate; and Mustafa El Barghuti, Al-Sayyad 
Barakah, Abdel Halim Al Ashqar and Abdel Karim Shbeer, all independent 
candidates.879  
 
The favorite to win was Abbas, the candidate for the largest Palestinian party (Fatah) 
and the one who strongly reappeared onto the political scene as Arafat’s successor to 
the head of the PLO executive committee. However, Abbas did not win without a real 
challenge from El Barghuti. Over the course of the Al-Aqsa intifada, El Barghuti had 
been deeply involved in defending Palestinian human rights and had succeeded in 
recruiting considerable international opposition to the Separation Wall.  
 
Both Abbas and El Barghuti appeared to adopt the same political program in their 
campaigns’ main slogans. While Abbas promised “to end the occupation”, to achieve 
security for citizens and to reform and develop PA institutions, El-Barghuti demanded 
                                                 
878 Rohi Fatoh is a Fatah affiliated PLC member. As we have seen in chapter IV, he was the holder of 
the PLC secretary general post since the PLC inauguration in March 1996. Currently, he is the heir of 
Rafiq Al-Nitshah, the Fatah affiliated PLC member, and the holder of PLC speaker post after Qrieh 
resignation from this post to take over the premiership. See Al-Quds on 4 November 2003, & Al-Ayyam 
on 11 March 2004. 
879 Al-Quds on 26 December 2004. 
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that electors “leave the Palestinian cause in clean and honest hands.”880 In this sense, 
El Barghuti called on Palestinians to elect a leader who would realize their national 
aspirations and build viable government institutions. Both men thus sought to realize 
the same goal. However, El Barghuti considered Abbas an old guard of the PLO and 
called for the young generation to have access to top political posts. 
 
Aside from El Barghuti, Abbas faced little challenge from other candidates, most of 
whom were unknowns. Most importantly, Abbas did not face any real challenge from 
the Oslo opponents (Hamas, Islamic Jihad and PFLP), all of which boycotted the 
elections for the same reasons they boycotted the 1996 elections (see chapter IV). On 
the eve of the elections, 1,282,524 Palestinians were registered by the Central 
Elections Commission, constituting 71% of eligible voters (estimated at 1.8 million). 
Registered voters were able to vote at any one of 1074 polling stations distributed 
between the sixteen governorates of the West Bank (including East Jerusalem) and the 
Gaza Strip. They were asked to elect the PA president from among the above-
mentioned candidates. Some 22,632 observers monitored the elections process. Of 
these were 7,142 local observers representing 201 local institutions and commissions, 
12,448 observers representing 13 partisan commissions, 2,242 observers representing 
the independent candidates, and 800 international observers representing 58 
international organizations.881  
 
Only 775,146 of registered voters actually voted (60% of the registered voters and 
only 43% of eligible voters). The low turnout was due mainly to Israeli roadblocks 
that prevented many voters from reaching polling stations. In Jerusalem, for example, 
only 26,365 Palestinians could vote out of the 120,000 registered.882 Abu Mazen 
earned 62.23% of the votes. Following Abu Mazen was El-Barghuti with 19.08%, Al-
Sayyad Barakah with 3.97%, Taysser Khalid with 3.05%, Bassam El Salihi with 
2.96%, Abdel Halim Al Ashqar with 2.86%, and Abdel Karim Shbeer with 0.67%.883
 
Abbas' win was welcomed.  Bush, who had severed contact with Arafat, declared that 
he was prepared to meet Abbas: “I look forward to welcoming him here if he chooses 
                                                 
880 Ibid. 
881 Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 9 January 2005. 
882 Al-Ayyam on 11 January 2005. 
883 Ibid. 
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to come.”  Shimon Peres, Israeli Labor Party leader, considered Abbas “a moderate 
man, an intelligent man, an experienced man. … There is legitimate Palestinian 
leadership whose leader is definitely against terror and war.” Even Sharon welcomed 
Abbas' win: “His declaration of the framework of the election campaign was 
encouraging.”884 Sharon also commented on Abbas' pre-election comments in which 
he called for the halt of the use of weapons and the disarming of the intifada: “The use 
of weapons is harmful, and it should stop.  It is important to keep the uprising away 
from arms because the uprising is a legitimate right of people to express their 
rejection of the occupation by popular and social means.”885 Hence, Abbas, in the 
concerned parties’ eyes, embodied a different strategy from that of Arafat. The 
essence of this strategy was the dismissal of violence in favour of peace negotiations 
and peaceful protests to realize Palestinian national aspirations. 
 
In the eyes of Palestinians, Abbas embodies a new era with a functioning democracy. 
As Ziad Abu Amr, a PLC member and a close ally of Abbas, pointed out: “It could be 
the beginning of a new era. We may be laying the foundation for the second working 
democracy in the Middle East.”886 Of course, Abu Amr was referring to Israel, which 
always calls itself the region’s only democracy. In fact, the Palestinians' success in 
smoothly and legally transferring power to Abbas enables them to proudly claim that 
they are the first Arab people to elect two leaders (Arafat and Abbas) within no more 
than nine years.  
 
Palestinian moves towards democratic transformation did not stop there. In December 
2004, Palestinians began the first local elections in nearly three decades (as we 
mentioned in chapter II, the last local elections were organized in the West Bank in 
1976). These elections, the preparation of which had began in July 2003,887 are 
organized into four rounds covering the estimated 600 local commissions of WBGS, 
and are to be completed by the end of 2005. The first round of elections was 
organized in the West Bank on 23 December 2004 and in the Gaza Strip on 27 
January 2005. The round covered 26 villages and towns in the West Bank, and 10 in 
                                                 
884 Herald Tribune on 11 January 2005. 
885 Abbas statements were published by Ibid, and the German Newspaper of “Der Tagesspiegel” on 15 
December 2004. 
886 Herald Tribune on 11 January 2005. 
887 Al-Hayyat Al-Jadeeda on 16 July 2003. 
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the Gaza Strip.888 The decision to organize the round in the Gaza Strip one month 
after the West Bank round was due to the Israeli incursions into the Gaza Strip which 
made it difficult for Palestinians to organize simultaneous rounds in both areas. 
 
In the West Bank, more than 81% of eligible voters (eligible voters were estimated at 
144,000) voted for 886 candidates who sought the 306 seats of 26 local councils.889 
The highest turnout was recorded in Kafr Al Lobed, with more than 95% of the 
village’s eligible voters actually voting. The lowest turnout was recorded in Dier 
Daboon, with a participation rate of no more than 44%. Women showed 
unprecedented participation, with a rate estimated at more than 79% as against 22% 
for men. Furthermore, at least 17% of the seats went to women.890  
 
In Gaza, nearly 60,500 Palestinians turned out at 167 electoral boxes distributed 
between ten polling stations; with a turnout rate of 72% (registered voters were 
estimated at 83,700). These Palestinians elected 118 councillors out of 414 candidates 
(68 candidates were women) for ten local councils. The highest rate of participation 
was recorded in El Musadir, with a turnout rate of 96%, while the lowest participation 
was recorded in Dier El Balah with a turnout rate of 77%. Female participation was 
notable, with a turnout rate of 50%, and no less than 20 seats (approximately 17%) 
went to women.891
 
Perhaps the most notable aspect of these elections was Hamas' participation in clear 
contradiction to its boycott of the presidential elections. Its participation reveals the 
growing divide in Hamas insofar as the party's attitude towards the peace process is 
concerned. This divide may explain why Hamas did not participate in the presidential 
elections but did take part in the local elections. Arguably, Hamas may have used the 
local elections to test its popularity and to decide whether it ought to proceed with its 
“moderate policy” seeking a share of power. 
 
Running in the elections as the “Islamic Reform Bloc” in the West Bank and as the 
“Reform and Change Bloc” in the Gaza Strip, Hamas did well against Fatah, which 
                                                 
888 Al-Ayyam on 21 December 2004. 
889 Ibid on 22 and Al-Quds on 23 & 24 December 2004. 
890 Al-Ayyam & Al Quds on 27 December 2004. 
891 Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 28 & 29 January 2005. 
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ran as the “Bloc of Arafat, the Martyr”. In the West Bank, nearly 91 seats or 30% of 
seats went to Hamas members and supporters, as against 153 seats or 50% that went 
to Fatah members and supporters. The remaining seats went to independents. In some 
areas, Hamas enjoyed sweeping victories. For example, Hamas won ten out of 11 
seats in El-Shiyoukh near Hebron. Furthermore, Hamas was expected to have 
representation on twelve of the 26 local councils.892  
 
By comparison, Hamas enjoyed an even bigger victory in the Gaza Strip, with no less 
than 77 seats or 65% of the 118. 37 seats went to Fatah, three to independents and one 
to PFLP. As a result, Hamas dominates seven local councils, leaving only three for 
Fatah.893 Hamas' sweeping victory in the Gaza Strip is explained by the fact that the 
Gaza Strip is considered the “Home of Hamas”. Hamas was born and raised in the 
Gaza Strip, and many of its top leaders (Ahmad Yassin, Abdel Aziz Al-Rantisi and 
others) settled there. Thus, it should not be surprising that Hamas won 13 out of 14 
seats on the Dier El Balah local council as against one for Fatah; 11 out of 13 seats on 
the Zawaida local council as against two for Fatah; 12 out of 13 seats on the Bani 
Suhlia local council as against one seat for an independent; 11 out of 13 seats on the 
Beit Hanoun local council as against one seat each for PFLP and for an independent; 
nine out of 11 seats on the Al-Nasser local council (in Rafah) as against two for Fatah; 
nine seats out of 11 on the Al-Shoka local council (in Rafah) as against two for Fatah; 
and seven out of 11 seats on the Kheza’a local council as against three for Fatah and 
one for an independent. However, Fatah dominated the following local councils: El 
Zahrah, with seven seats as against two for Hamas; Al-Maghazi, with 10 seats as 
against three seats for Hamas; and El Musadir, with all nine seats.894  
 
Hamas' electoral success is a clear indication of its growing constituencies of support. 
This may encourage its leaders to seek to share power and to cease boycotting the 
formal state institutions. Hamas' positive attitude towards the legislative elections 
scheduled for 17 July 2005 suggests that Hamas is so inclined.895  
 
                                                 
892 Al-Ayyam on 25 & 27 December 2004. 
893 Al-Quds on 29 January 2005. 
894 Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda & Al-Quds on 29 January  
895 Al-Quds & Al-Hayat Al-Jadeeda on 9 Janaury 2005. 
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Nevertheless, Hamas' newly emerged moderate attitude remains conditioned on the 
ability of the newly-elected PA President Abbas to halt Israeli measures against 
Palestinians: the extrajudicial killings, the closure, the road blocks, the incursions into 
Palestinian cities and towns, and so forth. Only this will enable Abbas to conclude a 
cease-fire agreement with Hamas and other Palestinian factions like Islamic Jihad and 
Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigades, and to halt these factions’ attacks against Israeli targets, 
like the January 2005 attack at Karni crossing (the main crossing for goods and 
supplies into the Gaza Strip) which left six Israelis dead.896  
 
It must be emphasized that Abbas’ success in halting Israeli measures against 
Palestinians will not ensure him a lasting cessation of these factions’ attacks against 
Israeli targets. Abbas must hurry to conclude a final status peace settlement, ensuring 
the realisation of the Palestinian aspiration for an independent state with East 
Jerusalem as its capital. This would enable Abbas not only to halt violence but to 
evolve his authority into a state with all its derivative attributes, including the capacity 
to issue binding rules and to monopolise coercion.897   
 
Of course, Abbas is not going to succeed if he is abandoned. The international 
community must take its moral and legal responsibility and pressure Israel to comply 
with the UN General Assembly resolutions providing for a Palestinian state over 
WBGS with East Jerusalem as its capital. It is said that the international community 
learned from the bitter experience of the Oslo process and became aware of the 
negative ramifications of any settlement not based on international law. Among these 
negative ramifications is the four-year bloodshed of the Al-Aqsa intifada- a bloodshed 
that seems most likely to renew itself if a real peace based on justice and fairness does 
not prevail in the future.   
 
 
                                                 
896 See the BBC on 14 January 2005. Online 
<http://newswww.bbc.net.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4174687.stm> 




Historically speaking, Palestinians have always had some level of access to local level 
institutions (municipal and rural councils) but only intermittently had access to 
national level institutions of state functions (Parliament & Cabinet). However, at all 
times and regardless of the level of access Palestinians have always been constrained 
in their access by their ruler and this access was confined to particular social stratum. 
It was the Oslo process which made it possible (in theory) for everyone to have full 
access at all levels.  
 
Nevertheless, as Chapters III & IV (the Oslo Autonomy, the Process: the peace, the 
people, and the authority, & the Palestinian Legislative Council: the Incomplete 
Democracy) show the reality of the Oslo process has meant that in fact what has 
occurred is a concentration of power into the hand of the ruling elite (Arafat and the 
small elite around him) at the expense of the majority of population who were denied 
access to national & local level institutions of state functions. This state of the 
political marginalization (or denationalization) of the majority of population hindered 
the emergence of a democratic political system based on the principles of the 
separation of powers, accountability, and transparency, and stifled the emergence of 
the rule of law. 
 
Arafat and the small elite around him had not only hindered the emergence of a 
democratic political system, and stifled the emergence of the rule of law, but also (as 
chapter V of the Oslo Autonomy: Functional Perspective discusses) the emergence of 
a bureaucratic system with a recruitment system based on achievement rather than 
informal/irrational criteria (competence), highly specialized and differentiated 
administrative role of civil servants (differentiation), and well established and 
thoroughly understandable system of super-ordination and sub-ordination (hierarchy) 
as Max Weber suggests. Instead of building a bureaucratic system with these 
structural characteristics, Arafat and the small elite around him tended to enlarge and 
overstaff it, with the aim of gaining people’s loyalty, and supporting their legitimacy. 
Thereby, politicizing the bureaucracy, and hence, diverted it from its intended purpose 
(the welfare of Palestinians).   
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In sum, the peace process with its reference of Oslo accords hampered the building of 
durable and responsive political institutions as well as professional bureaucratic 
system. This happened when this process demobilized people (mainly due to its 
failure to realize Palestinian national aspirations in sovereign state and self-
determination), and therefore, enabled Arafat and the small elite around him to 
concentrate power and to introduce a semi-autocratic rule stamped by a neo-
patrimonial principles that enable the ruler to exploit public fund and institutions in 
order to gain people allegiance and to enhance his regime legitimacy.  
 
In response, the opponents of Oslo process & Arafat- Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and 
PFLP-had strengthened their institutions, and started to practice Para-state functions 
parallel to PA formal institutions (as chapter V shows). Some of the opponents’ 
institutions had been laid dawn long time ago, and others had been founded after PA’s 
arrival to WBGS in 1994. These institutions, most of which are of charitable nature, 
became one of the main sources of services for Palestinians. Thousands of Palestinian 
families inside the territories became very much dependent on the services of these 
institutions. Some of these institutions went further and started running schools, 
kindergarten, and so forth. Al Salah Islamic Society, for instance, is affiliated with 
Hamas, and run several elementary schools in the territories. 
 
 The contribution of these institutions to Palestinians’ welfare became very evident 
during the recent intifada. The Israeli measures adopted against Palestinians during 
the current intifada had left thousands of them dead, other tens thousands injured, and 
tens of thousands have been arrested. Hundreds of homes demolished, and large 
stretches of agricultural land razed. In addition to the huge death toll, and the losses in 
the properties, the economic situation of most Palestinians has rapidly deteriorated 
with an unemployment rate of more than 63% by 2004.898 This fact, coupled with the 
financial crisis which the PA had started to encounter since the outbreak of the 
intifada, presented these institutions as a major supplier of the services for 
Palestinians.  
 
                                                 
898 London-based daily of Al-Hayat on 31 July 2004. 
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Most importantly is the fact that these institutions are protected by the militia of the 
political party with which it is affiliated. El Salah Islamic Association, for instance, is 
protected by Izz al-Din Qassam Brigades, the military wing of Hamas. The Friends of 
Martyr, affiliated with the Islamic Jihad, and protected by the Al-Quds Brigades, the 
military wing of Islamic Jihad. All of these institutions (together with the militia 
which protect them) enjoy autonomous status far from PA control. One can claim, 
therefore, that the Palestinian scene is witnessing a form of multi-states (in functional 
sense) or Islands of states, each of which enjoys autonomous status far from others’ 
control, and seek to gain citizens’ loyalty through the services it provides to them. The 
Palestinian scene might be illustrated by the following graph: 










Accordingly, State- in the term of central, autonomous, and differentiated 
organization with the power of issuing authoritative binding legal rules and 
monopolizing coercion (as Joel Migdal suggests) was absent from the Palestinian 
scene.  
 
That is why the reform emerged at the top of Palestinians agenda during the Al-Aqsa 
intifada (2000-2004). As chapter VI (Al-Aqsa Intifada: the Struggle for Reform) 
discusses, Palestinians initiated some reform measures during Al-Aqsa intifada. 
Nevertheless, the question of the Palestinian state in term of central organization with 
a power of issuing authoritative binding legal rules and monopolizing coercion 
remained open, and its answer remains conditioned on the ability of the newly elected 
PA president Mohammoud Abbas (Abu Mazen) to conclude a final status peace 
settlement for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict ensuring the realization of the Palestinian 
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rights in state and self-determination. Only this would enable PA to evolve itself into 
state with all the derivative attributes including the capacity of issuing binding rules 
and monopolizing coercion as Joel Migdal suggests. 
 
Accordingly, we can claim-drawing on our case (WBGS in the period of 1994-2004)-
 
that the ability of any people to build their state in term of autonomous, differentiated, 
and centralized organization that monopolizes coercion and has the capacity to issue 
territorially binding rules is not separate from the process of building a state in terms 
of external sovereignty. The completion of the later process is a pre-condition for the 
success of the former process. Alternatively, building a state in term of external 
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